Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1975 DIGILAW 423 (MAD)

J. Viswanatha Chettiar v. The Official Assignee, Madras

1975-09-01

NATARAJAN, VEERASWAMI

body1975
Judgment :- VEERASWAMI 1. The third respondent, who was brought on record in the appeal at his instance, was a tenant of Premises Nos. 557 and 558 in Profits Road, Madras. The lease was granted to him by the appellants mother with effect from 1st January 1961 for a period of 12 years, the 3rd respondent by an order dated 3rd July 1973 with reference to an act of insolvency on 16th September 1972 was adjudicated as an insolvent. Earlier on 14th November 1972, the Official Assignee was appointed as an interim receiver and was directed to seal the premises white the insolvency petition was pending. On an application by the appellant for the purpose, Sethuraman, J. directed the keys of the premises to be handed over to the third respondent. This order is the subject matter of the appeal. Originally, the 3rd respondent had not been imp leaded in the appeal. While it was pending, at the instance of the appellant, the Official Assignee was asked to hand over the keys to him, the court not being aware at that time that the 3rd respondent had an order in his favour and he was not a party to the appeal. 2. The 3rd respondent contends that since, on he expiry of the term of the lease, he became a statutory tenant within the meaning of S. 2(8) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and as this right was merely personal to him and, therefore, did not vest in the Official Assignee, it is he who is entitled to have the keys of the premises. On the other hand, according to the appellant, since the adjudication was with effect from 16th September 1972, the date of the act of insolvency, and since the lease period came to an end only on 1st June 1973, the outstanding portion of the lease vested in the Official Assignee on the adjudication of the third respondent and that, therefore, the third respondent would not be entailed to possession of the premises. But, the Official Assignee at no time took possession of the premises. All that he did was to obey the directions of the court that the premises should be sealed in order that later on he may take possession of the movables inside the premises. But, the Official Assignee at no time took possession of the premises. All that he did was to obey the directions of the court that the premises should be sealed in order that later on he may take possession of the movables inside the premises. For the purpose of removing the movables the premises were opened and that was how the Official Assignee came into possession of the keys. As a matter of fact, it appears that the third respondent had continued to be in possession all the time though along with and on his lock on the premises was super-imposed another lock of the Official Assignee to Obey the orders for sealing the premises. But, this could not detract from the fact that the third respondent as a matter of fact was not deprived of his possession at any time, until on the orders of this court, the keys were directed to be handed over by the Official Assignee to the appellant. 3. It has been held in Mohanaranglah Chtill v. Official Assignee, 1965-1 M.L.J. 221: 77 L.W. 528 by a single Judge of this court, and this we think is the correct decision, that statutory protection of a tenant, who continues to be in possession of the leased premises after the expiry of the term of the lease, is not such property as would vest in the Official Assignee on adjudication of the person. In Hajee Abdulla Salt v. Moorjanl and others (S.A. No. 83 of 1965) Since reported in 88 L.W. 559 (D.B.) a Division Bench of this Court held that, on death, the statutory protection of a tenant holding over would come to an end at the protection was only personal to him, which could not be regarded as property. It follows, therefore, in our opinion, that since the 3rd respondent had not been deprived of his physical possession of the premises at any time and such possession he continued to have been after the termination of the period of the lease, be should be regarded as a tenant within the extended meaning of the definition of the term under the Act and that being a personal protection to him as a statutory tenant, it did not vest in the Official Assignee. He is therefore, entitled to the keys. The appeal is dismissed. No costs. 4. He is therefore, entitled to the keys. The appeal is dismissed. No costs. 4. We direct the handing over of the keys to the 3rd respondent by the appellant by 5 pm tomorrow (2nd of September 1975).