Order.- This revision petition arises out of the proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The short facts of the case are that one Kunchi alias Geveran, the respondent herein, made an application against the petitioners herein before the Executive I class Magistrate, Hosur, in M.C. 2 of 1973 on his file, praying for a declaration that he respondent) is entitled to possession of the property described in the schedule, viz.., (1) S. No. 260/1, wet 2-47-0 hectares and (2) S. No. 260/2, dry, 3-63-5 hectares, of Jagadab village, within Kaveripatnam sub-registration district, in Krishnagiri taluk, and for necessary orders directing the petitioners not to interfere with his possession. A preliminary order under section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was passed and served on the petitioners, stating that a dispute between the parties, which was likely to cause breach of the peace, existed in respect of S.No.260/1 and the petitioners were required to put in their statements of their claim in respect of their possession and enjoyment of the land specified in the notice. 2. The said case was transferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri, and was numberedas M.C.No. 623 of 1973, which was then forwarded to the District Munsif, Krishnagiri for deciding the question of possession of the “subject to dispute”. The District Munsif took the matter on his file in O.P.No.13 of 1974 and after elaborately discussing the evidence adduced on both sides and the documents marked, and finding that the petitioner had been in possession of the properties, directed the parties to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri, who thereafter passed the final order declaring that the petitioner was in possession of the properties described in the schedule to the petition (covering both S.Nos.260/1 and 260/2) and entitled to retain such possession until ousted by due course: of law and strictly forbidding any disturbance of his possession in the meantime. 3. At the outset, I may point out that no argument was advanced on behalf of the petitioner in respect of the order passed relating to the property in S.No. 260/1. But Mr. T.K. Rajagopalan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, mainly contends that the final order “declaring that the petitioner was in possession of the properties described in the schedule to the petition”, which obviously covers the lands in both S.Nos. But Mr. T.K. Rajagopalan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, mainly contends that the final order “declaring that the petitioner was in possession of the properties described in the schedule to the petition”, which obviously covers the lands in both S.Nos. 260/1 and 260/2, is one without jurisdiction as the preliminary order passed under section 145 (1) by the Executive First Class Magistrate relates to the property in S.No. 260/1 alone and the reference by the Chief Judicial Magistrate to the learned District Munsif was made for deciding the question as to who was in possession of the “disputed land” on the date of the preliminary order, wherein the land in S.No.260/1 alone is mentioned, and therefore the present final order covering the lands in both the survey fields is irregular and bad in law. Further, he vehemently submits that this irregularity is an error of jurisdiction vitiating the operation of the order so far as S.No. 260/2 is concerned. 4. Mr. Nainar Sundaram, appearing for the respondent, submits that the omission of S.No. 260/2 in the preliminary order is, however, only an irregularity in the proceeding and does not affect the Magistrate’s jurisdiction and therefore, when it is complained of only at the stage of appeal or revision, the validity of the order must be judged by the test of prejudice. According to him, it would be quite unjustifiable and unreasonable to set aside the lengthy proceedings under section 145 when the facts indicate that the parties could not conceivably have been prejudiced by the absence of mentioning of one of the items of properties in dispute the preliminary order, as in the instant case. Where it is manifest that both the parties have known well all the facts in dispute and contested the matter, with advantage of the knowledge of the whole of the facts, and put up a defence against them on an elaborate scale, it cannot be said that the petitioners have been prejudiced by this final order and that the said order is one without jurisdiction. 5. Before going into the merits of this case, I shall now discuss the effect of the omission of the land in dispute in the preliminary order and the importance of the preliminary order as a condition precedent in the subsequent proceedings. 6. 5. Before going into the merits of this case, I shall now discuss the effect of the omission of the land in dispute in the preliminary order and the importance of the preliminary order as a condition precedent in the subsequent proceedings. 6. Proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, are summary in nature and its object is merely to prevent a breach of the peace by maintaining one or other of the parties in possession. Therefore, as it is well-settled, a Magistrate exercising powers under section 145 gets jurisdiction only when there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof within its local jurisdiction. When the Magistrate is satisfied that there is no likelihood of the breach of the peace the only proper course for him to do is to decline to proceed under section 145. As has been observed by Subba Rao, J. as he then was, in Padmaraju Subbaraju v. Padmaraju Konetiraju1, though it often happens that a Magistrate is moved by an application by the affected party, a preliminary enquiry need not be at the instance of a particular party. The Magistrate may initiate it sua motu. In other words, the proceedings start not on the complaint or the police report but on a subjective satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. Therefore, the starting point of the proceedings under this section is not the information received by the Magistrate or the application made to him or the receipt of the police report but his subjective satisfaction recorded in writing. 7. The main object of drawing up proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, can only be to inform the parties of the proceedings of the grounds or of the information which satisfy the Magistrate that a dispute exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof. 7. The main object of drawing up proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, can only be to inform the parties of the proceedings of the grounds or of the information which satisfy the Magistrate that a dispute exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof. A Magistrate, while instituting proceedings under section 145, “shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court.” Sub-section (3) of section 145 is supplementary to sub-section (1) and it is framed with the object of giving all persons interested in the dispute notice of the proceedings before the said Magistrate, so that they might have an opportunity of appearing and putting their claims, if they have any, and further it provides for the publication of a copy of the order in a conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. Where a preliminary order under section 145 (1) is not at all passed, the subsequent proceedings culminating in the final order are vitiated. But, if there is a defective prelimnary order resulting in prejudice to either of the parties, it would undoubtedly be fatal. Even the subsequent act by another Magistrate to whom the case was transferred through the District Magistrate would be one based completely on the defective order. There are some conflicting decisions as to the effect of the omission on the part of the Magistrate; (1) topass the preliminary order as required under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code; (2) to state the grounds of his being satisfied as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace; and (3) to comply with the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 145 after passing the preliminary order. So far as the omissions in respect of the latter two grounds are concerned, the preponderance of judicial opinion is that those omissions are curable under section 537 of the old Criminal Procedure Code, corresponding to sections 464 and 465 of the new Code. However, as the present revision is not directed to decide the question or legality of either of these two grounds, I do not propose to go into that question. However, as the present revision is not directed to decide the question or legality of either of these two grounds, I do not propose to go into that question. Regarding the first ground among the three mentioned supra, viz., the effect of the omission to issue the order under section 145 (1), it has been observed by Burn, J., in Mariasusai Udayan v. Mahamud Azeemudeen Sahib1, as follows: “The decisions of this Court so far tend to show that unless there is a preliminary order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass any order under section 145 (6), Criminal Procedure Code. These decisions, I would say, with all respect, are correct for the reason which I have already indicated”. The said reason runs in these terms: “There was nothing to prevent the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate from drawing up a preliminary order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, on the date on which he decided that the case was one properly falling under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The importance of this is that the question of possession has to be decided with reference to the date of the preliminary order (see section 145(4), Criminal Procedure Code) and if there is no preliminary order, the one question which the Magistrate has to decide cannot be decided.” Balakrishna Ayyar, J., while deciding the effect of the absence of the preliminary order as required by section 45 (1), after discussing a number of decisions on the subject, has held in Pakamaraja Naicker v. Chandambara Nadar2, as follows: — “If I may say so with respect, I prefer the reasoning of Burn, J., because, as already explained, under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate has to determine who was in possession on a particular date and that date is the date of the order under section 145(1) and if there is no order under section 145(1), Criminal Procedure Code, there will be no c ate with reference to which the question of possession can be determined.” In Sib Narain v. Satish Chandra3, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed that in drawing up a preliminary order in a proceeding under section 145, the subject-matter of the dispute should be clearly specified and an omission to do so amounts to a serious defect. Mr. Mr. Nainar Sundaram has relied on a catena of decisions in support of his contention., of which I may mention some leading decisions. In Ratan Singh v. Raghubir Singh1, it has been held that where the party who is alleged to have dispossessed the other party to a proceeding under section 145, knows very well the subject-matter of the dispute, an omission to clearly specify it in the preliminary order is only a minor defect of procedure and can be ignored. The facts of this case are quite different from the facts of the present case. In the above case, the only dispute related to a piece of land behind the complainant’s house and as such both the parties knew very well the subject-matter of disptue. The omission was in respect of clear specification of the land. However, in the above case, the learned Judge has approved of the principle laid down in Sib Narain v. Satish Chandra2. He has also referred to the decision In re Petition of T.A. Martin3, wherein it has been observed that the preliminary order passed in that case by the Magistrate gave no mention as to the subject of dispute and it left the persons to whom the notice was ordered to be issued quite in the dark as to the property in regard to which they had to set forth their respective claims. The Allahabad High Court (per Banerjee, J.) in that case held that inadequacy of such order gave the High Court jurisdiction to interfere and the order of the Magistrate was set aside. In my view, the facts in the said Allahabad decision and the Calcutta decision in Sib Narain v. Satish Chandra2, are more applicable to the present case. On the other hand, as I have already mentioned, the facts in Ratan Singh v. Raghubir Singh1, are distinguishable from the facts of the present case and therefore it is not helpful to the respondent herein. 8. In Khudiram Mandal v. Jitendranath4, the Calcutta High Court has held that the misdescription of the property will amount to only an irregularity not vitiating the final order and it cannot be a ground for interference in revision as it has not caused any prejudice. 8. In Khudiram Mandal v. Jitendranath4, the Calcutta High Court has held that the misdescription of the property will amount to only an irregularity not vitiating the final order and it cannot be a ground for interference in revision as it has not caused any prejudice. In the above said case, the Calcutta High Court has gone into the question of misdescription of the property but not the entire omission of property and as such this decision is not applicable to the present case. 9. Then, the learned Counsel relies on Padmanava v. Bindku Bhusan5, wherein it has been held: “In any case the parties were fully aware as to what lands were the subject-matter of the dispute and the proceedings under section 145 and did not,, it appears, raise any objection before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In these circumstances, any misdescription of the property cannot be treated as anything, except as a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the final order.” In this case also, only a misdescription of the property was involved. 10. The next case on which reliance was placed was State of Madhya Pradesh v.Prem Lal6, wherein it has been held that where once a valid preliminary order under section 145 (1) has been passed, subsequent errors or omissions relating to procedure or to specification of property in the preliminary order do not vitiate the subsequent proceedings. In this case, a valid preliminary order was passed. Their Lordships held that only subsequent errors or omissions relating to procedure or to specification of property in the preliminary order do not vitiate the subsequent proceedings. On the facts of the case, some additional lands were specified later on after application filed but before the commencement of the hearing. Under these circumstances, it was held as stated supra. Therefore, this ruling will not be of any assistance to the respondents’ 11. Reference was then made to the decision in Sanjhi v. Tirath Ram7. There no miscarriage of justice was caused to the party by the fact that the preliminary order was not drawn up strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 145, that the parties were present before the Magistrate and had led evidence, but no objection was taken by any party that the preliminary order was defective. There no miscarriage of justice was caused to the party by the fact that the preliminary order was not drawn up strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 145, that the parties were present before the Magistrate and had led evidence, but no objection was taken by any party that the preliminary order was defective. Under those circumstances, it was held that it would not be proper to quash the proceedings and allow the parties to agitate the matter once again. From the judgment in that decision, the full facts of the case are not clear. 11.a. Nevertheless, it seems that the Magistrate passing the preliminary order had not followed certain directions contained in the Code. Under such circumstances, the Division Bench held that if no miscarriage of justice was caused, it would not be proper to quash the proceedings and allow the parties to agitate the matter once again in the trial Court, which would involve them in unnecessary expenses and inconvenience. Therefore, in my view, the above decision will not render any help to the respondent. 12. Finally, the learned Counsel drew my attention to the decision in Kondappa v. Ram Row1, where in Pakamraja Naicker v. Chidambaram Nadar2, has been relied on. In this Andhra Pradesh case, Kondappa v. Ram Row1it has been observed that where a preliminary order under section 145 (1) is not at all passed, the subsequent proceedings culminating in the final order are vitiated. But, if there is a preliminary order, however defective it may be, the defect would not be fatal, unless it has resulted in prejudice. In this case, the endorsement was signed by the Head Clerk and the Magistrate bad endorsed “yes” with his initial thereunder. Even the notices under section 145 (1), which were issued to the parties, were only under the signature of the Head Clerk for the Magistrate. Under these circumstances, the learned Judge observed, at p. 170: “The law does not attach and value to an order made by a person other than the Magistrate himself. Even the notices under section 145 (1), which were issued to the parties, were only under the signature of the Head Clerk for the Magistrate. Under these circumstances, the learned Judge observed, at p. 170: “The law does not attach and value to an order made by a person other than the Magistrate himself. Is follows therefore, that the notice referred to cannot be deemed to be an order under section 145 (1)....Mere communication of the order, though there Was no such order as contemplated by section 145 (1) at all, would not make it an order under section 145 (1) made by the Judicial Magistrate.” In the light of the above observation, it seems that the learned Judge has gone to the extreme proposition of law and held that “if there is a preliminary order, however defective it may be, the defect would not be fatal unless it has resulted in prejudice.” In my view, this proposition will not be applicable to the facts of the present case since, as is rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the final order in this case is void as one passed without jurisdiction. Though in the above case the proposition of law was made as mentioned supra, on account of the peculiar facts of the case, his Lordship held that whether any prejudice was caused or not, the irregularity committed in that case was grave enough going to the root of the jurisdiction amounting to an illegality and therefore the order of the Magistrate was liable to be set aside. Thus, it is clear from this decision that even if no prejudice is caused to the parties, if any grave irregularity amounting to an illegality is committed, then the order could be quashed. Now, in the present case, we have to see whether there is a total absence of a preliminary order in respect of the property S. No. 260/2 and whether that omission,irrespective of the fact whether there was any prejudice caused or not, is an irregularity grave enough going to the very root of the jurisdiction amounting to an illegality which ultimately will vitiate the entire proceedings and whether the order of the Magistrate is, therefore, liable to be set aside. It is manifest (1) that the subject of dispute in a proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, must be fully ascertained: and (2) that the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists is a condition precedent to initiate the said proceedings. If one of the subject-matters of dispute mentioned in the application made by the party or in the police report is completely left out as in this case, while passing the preliminary order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, it means that the Magistrate is either not satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace does exist in relation to the particular property or he is not of the view that an order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is necessary with regard to that item of property. It is abundantly clear, therefore, that those lands in dispute in respect of which the breach of the peace exists must be ascertained and expressly mentioned in the preliminary order before the reference under section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, is made so that both the parties to the dispute may be put on notice. 13. But, it is not for the civil Court sitting on a reference to go beyond the scope and give a finding of possession with regard to a property not mentioned in the preliminary order. 14. The scope of reference under section 146 is of a limited character. The civil Court gets jurisdiction only on a reference being made to it by the Magistrate and its jurisdiction is confined to disposing of the matter 50 referred. In other words, the civil Court is strictly restricted to an examination of the question and the consideration of the dispute which has been expessly referred by the Magistrate for decision Neither the scope of the enquiry can be enlarged, nor its powers extended even at the instance of the parties who have not obtained any order of reference, because making reference is an act within the jurisdiction or authority of the Magistrate. Sub-section (1) of section 146 lays down that a Magistrate can make a reference to a civil Court: (1) if he is of opinion that none of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the proceeding or; (2) if he is unable to decide as to which of them was then in such possession. Therefore, section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, is a sort of corollary to section 145 and the legality of an order under it depends on its having been preceded by legal proceedings under section 145. Applying the above principle to the instant case, I am of opinion that the final order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate regarding S. No. 260/2 on the basis of the finding of the civil Court is one without jurisdiction, since the reference by the Magistrate was strictly confined to the decision of the dispute regarding S. No. 260/1 which was the only property mentioned in the preliminary order under section 145 (1). 15. The main submission of Mr Nainar Sundaram that the petitioners have not raised any objection about the omission of S.No. 260/2 during the entire proceedings cannot hold good, because unless there is a preliminary order under section 145 (1), the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass any order under section 145 (6). The non-objection of the parties during the proceedings about the omission or vagueness or unascertainability of the land in dispute has no bearing on the final order. At this juncture, it may also be noted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, while passing the order forwarding the papers to the District Munsif, has stated as follows: "In the result, under section 146 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, the records are forwarded to the District Munsif, Krishnagiri, to decide the question as to which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute." It may be noted that the subject of dispute in this case, as found in the preliminary order, is only in respect of S. No. 260/1 and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate under these circumstances, should be deemed to have referred the matter for decision to the District Munsif only in respect of S. No. 260/1. The above opinion of mine is also fortified by a decision of this Court in Mariasusai Udayan’s case1 In the said case, Burn, J., has held: "The decisions of this Court so far tend to show that unless there is a preliminary order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate has no juridiction to pass any order under section 145 (6), Criminal Procedure Code. These decisions I would say with all respect are correct for the reason which I have already indicated. The conduct of the petitioners in allowing the learned Magistrate to go on without objection is no doubt reprehensible, but it cannot validate an order, which is without jurisdiction. The order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is therefore set aside." A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Shreedhar Thakur and others v. Kesho Sao and others1, has held: "The mere fact that the parties knew the disputed land is hardly of any use, because they may not agree as to its identity in case of future dispute". 16. For the reasons mentioned above, I hold that the final order in respect of S.No. 260/2 is one without jurisdiction which undoubtedly is a grave irregularity amounting to an illegality and has caused prejudice to the petitioners as they were not put on notice in respect of that property. 17. Therefore, I allow this revision petition in part and set aside the operative portion of the final order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, so far as it relates to S. No. 260/2 and dismiss the rest of the petition viz., in respect of S. No. 260/1. 18.Cr.M.P. No. 2347 of 1974.- This is a petition filed by the petitioners in Criminal Revision of Case No. 536 of 1974 to quash the proceedings of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, in so far as it relates to S. No. 260/2. 19. In view of my order in Criminal Revision Case No. 536 of 1974, this petition is allowed. 20.Crl.M.P. No. 2656 of 1974.- It is left to both the parties to take appropriate proceedings in proper form to safeguard their rights if they so desire in respect of survey No. 260/2.