Paul, J.-These two writ petitions are for the issue of writs of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ or order, directing the respondents to produce the body in person of the detenu K.Narayanaswamy, on whose behalf W.P.S.R. No. 54681 of 1975 has been filed, and of the detenu M.H. Khaleel Rehnam on whose behalf W.P.S.R.No. 64622 of 1975 has been filed and against whom detention orders have been passed under section 3 (2) (a) read with section 3 (1) (a) (ii) in the case of the former and under section 3 (2) (c) read with section 3 (1) (a) (ii) in the case of the latter under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act as amended by the first Amendment Ordinance No. 4 of 1975 and the Second Amendment Ordinance dated 19th June, 1975 and who are now being detained in the Central Prison at Vellore and Madras respectively. 2. In view of the aforesaid amending Ordinances, the question whether these writ petitions are maintainable has been argued at some great length by both sides. It is contended by Mr. 2. In view of the aforesaid amending Ordinances, the question whether these writ petitions are maintainable has been argued at some great length by both sides. It is contended by Mr. Alagnmalai on behalf of the petitioners that he could challenge the validity of the detention orders, since the challenge is outside the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and he is challenging the validity of the Act firstly on the ground that section 16-A (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act introduced by the first Amendment Ordinance of 1975 is unconstitutional inasmuch as by that section the rules of natural justice had been dispensed with and to that extent there is a curtailment of the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; and such limitation of judicial review strikes at the very basic structure of the Constitution and secondly 16 (5) of the Act introduced by the first Amendment Ordinance dispenses with the opportunity of making a representation to the Government, and also with the disclosure of the material facts which formed the basis of the detention order and that amounts to curtailment of the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and thereby strikes at the basic structure of the Constitution and thereby section 16-A (3) of the Act introduced by the first Amendment suffers from the vice of excessive delegation inasmuch it confers blanket powers on the executive He also challenges the detention orders on the ground that ex facie they show that the detention orders have been passed in a callous and cavalier like manner and as such are not valid detention orders. 3. Enlarging his contentions that a challenge of the Act outside the provisions of Part III of the Constitution can be made despite the amending Ordinances and despite the two Proclamations of Emergency made by the President, Mr. 3. Enlarging his contentions that a challenge of the Act outside the provisions of Part III of the Constitution can be made despite the amending Ordinances and despite the two Proclamations of Emergency made by the President, Mr. Alagumalai has argued that the fact that Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 have been suspended during the continuance of the emergency by reason of the President’s two proclamations, and by the Presidential Orders will not bat an aggrieved person from moving the Court if the pleas on which relief is claimed are not related to the aforesaid fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order; and further it is open to the aggrieved person to show mala fides on the part of the authority passing the detention order. 4. Article 31-B of the Constitution says that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or Provision is consistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall,subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. 5. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971, has been included in the Ninth Schedule. By reason of such inclusion neither that Act nor any of the provisions of it shall be deemed to be void or ever to. have become void on the ground that the Act or any provision thereof is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution which deals with Fundamental rights. Therefore, no challenge of the Act or any of its provisions on the ground that the Act or any of its provisions is inconsistent with or abridges the fundamental rights specified in Part III of the Constitution, is permitted. Therefore, no challenge of the Act or any of its provisions on the ground that the Act or any of its provisions is inconsistent with or abridges the fundamental rights specified in Part III of the Constitution, is permitted. But, if the challenge is based on other grounds, such a challenge, in our view, would be permissible, for in Article 31-B there arc the words “any provisions of this part” and they do limit the bar under Article 31-B to challenges on the ground that the Act or any of its provisions is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III of the Constitution. 6. The decision in R. Anandan Nambiar and another v. Chief Secretary, Government of Madras and others1, lends support to that view. The decision in Mokhan Sing v. State of Punjab,2 also would endorse that view. In that case, the petitioners were detained by orders passed by the State Government under rule 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and the detention orders were challenged by the petitioners. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection was raised that the petitions for the issue of writs of habeas corpus were not maintainable and were incompetent in view of the Order issued by the President of India under Article 359(1) suspending the rights of any person to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 for the period during which the proclamation of emergency issued under Article 352 was in force, if such person had been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder. The Supreme Court, however, held that the last clause of the Presidential Order postulated that the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder was valid and during the pendency of the Presidential Order the validity of the Act, rule or order made thereunder cannot be questioned on the ground that they contravened Articles 14, 21 and 22. But that limitation would not preclude a citizen from challenging the validity of the Act, rule or order made thereunder on any other ground. 7. Mr. But that limitation would not preclude a citizen from challenging the validity of the Act, rule or order made thereunder on any other ground. 7. Mr. Alagumalai next contended that the Amendment to the Maintenance of Internal Security made by the two Ordinances of 1975 are unconstitutional, inasmuch as section 16-A (1) of the Act introduced by first Amendment Ordinance dispenses with the rules of natural justice. But then, the Supreme Court has held in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India3, that whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rulwe was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case. As has been held in Sushil Chandra v. State1, "principles of natural justice cannot override the effect of statutory provisions and rules and the statute, either by express provision or by any implication, may exclude the operation of one or the other principles of natural justice". Likewise in D. Purduvah v. Chancellor, U.A.S. Bangalore2. It has been held that a plea of violation of natural justice is not available where a statutory provision has authorised the procedure complained of. In The Union of India v. P.K. Roy3, the Supreme Court has observed " but the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of a rigid formula". The application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case. 8. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha4, has observed as follows: "Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. As observed by this Court in A.R. Kraipak v. Union of India5, the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law but supplement it. As observed by this Court in A.R. Kraipak v. Union of India5, the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law but supplement it. It is true that, if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the Legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication exoludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice, then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision, the principles of natural justice." 9. Therefore, the attempt of the learned counsel for the petitioners to invoke the principles of natural justice for challenging the validity of section 16-A (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act has to fail. 10. Section 16-A (1) is a statutory provision which expressly excludes the application of the principles of natural justice for it begins with the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any rules of natural justice the provisions of this section shall have effect during the priod of the operation of the Proclamation of Emergency." Further, there is section 18 introduced by the Second Amendment Ordinance — which says that no person (including a foreigner) detained under this Act shall have any right to personal liberty by virtue of natural law or common law, if any. The argument that that provision is also unconstitutional cannot be accepted. 11. Yet another contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned provisions of the Act are opposed to the spirit which pervades the Constitution. However in Gopalan v. State of Madras6, Kania, C.J. and Maharajan, J., have observed: " There is considerable authority for the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the constitution but not expressed in words. However in Gopalan v. State of Madras6, Kania, C.J. and Maharajan, J., have observed: " There is considerable authority for the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the constitution but not expressed in words. Where the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the Legislature we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the spirit of the Constitution which is not even mentioned in the instrument. It is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interpretation except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority... It is only in express constitutional provisions limiting legislative power and controlling the temporary will of a majority by a permanent and paramount law settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation that one can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of Courts of justice to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the judiciary powers too great and too indefinite either for its own security or the protection of private rights." 12. The next contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that section 16-A curtails the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and strikes, therefore, at the basic structure of the Constitution. But then, in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar1, it was contended that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which has inserted, inter alia Articles 31-A and 31-B in the Constitution of India was ultra vires or unconstitutional in as much as by reason of those articles the powers of the High Court under Article 226 to issue writs have been affected. Repelling that argument it was held that it was not correct to say that the powers of the High Court under Article 226 to issue writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III are in anyway affected and they remained just the same as they were before; only a certain class of case has been excluded from the purview of Part III and the Courts no longer interfere, not because their powers were curtailed in any manner or to any extent, but because there would be no occasion hereafter for the exercise of their power in such cases. The same principle would apply to the contention now raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. There lis no curtailment of the powers conferred on the High Court by Article 226 by reason of section 16-A of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. But the right of certain persons detained under the Act to enforce certain rights by coming before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has been suspended during the emergency. In Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura,2 the Supreme Court has observed that unquestionably, the Court’s power to issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus has not been touched by the President’s Order, but the petitioners right to move the Supreme Court for a writ of that kind has been suspended by the order of the President......As a result of the President’s Order the petitioners right to move the Supreme Court but not the Courts power under Article 32 has been suspended during the operation of the emergency. 13. Another contention raised by Mr. Alagumalai on behalf of the petitioners is that section 16-A (3) of the Act introduced by the First Amendment Ordinance confers blanket powers on the executive and therefore it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. This contention has also to be negatived. As has been observed in H. Saha v. State of West Bengal3, "the nature of the right infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, all provide the basis for considering the reasonableness of a particular provision. As has been observed in H. Saha v. State of West Bengal3, "the nature of the right infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, all provide the basis for considering the reasonableness of a particular provision. The procedure embodied in the Act has to be judged in the context of the urgency and the magnitude of the problem, the underlying purpose of the restrictions and the prevailing conditions. Elaborate rules of natural justice are excluded either expressly or by necessary implication where procedural provisions are made in the statute." 14. In every democratic country at present relatively only a small part of the total legislative output is enacted by the Legislature and the large bulk of it is issued as delegated legislation in the forms of rules, regulations and by-laws which are made by various administrative authorities under powers conferred on them by the Legislature. In India as elsewhere the mechanism of delegated legislation is used extensively. The prevailing principle is that essential powers of Legislation cannot be delegated. The Legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a rule of conduct. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal basis which are to control in given cases and must provide the standard to guide the functions of the body in power to execute the law. Courts have recognised that in modern times when the Legislatures enact laws to meet the challenges of complex socio-economic problems it is often convenient and necessary for them to delegate powers to the delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy of their Acts. Of course, the power delegated should not be unguided and uncontrolled. When a statutory provision is challenged before the Courts on the ground of excessive delegation the attempt of the Courts is to see whether the power is unguided or there is some policy subject to which it has to be exercised. In doing so Courts have usually leaned in favour of the validity of the legislation instead of looking at the legislation with a critical eye to find out the policy. In doing so Courts have usually leaned in favour of the validity of the legislation instead of looking at the legislation with a critical eye to find out the policy. The Courts have adopted a liberal attitude and have at times themselves supplied or articulated the policy if one is not discernible or clear on the face of the statute in question. Delegated legislation may however be declared ultra vires if the rule-making authority exercised its powers mala fide or acts with an ulterior motive but a rule cannot be declared invalid if it is within the scope of the delegating statute. 15. In Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab1, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Right up from the time when this Court dealt with special References in 1951, In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc.,2 the question about the limit within which the Legislature can legitimately confer powers on its delegate has been examined on several occasions and it has been consistently held that what the Legislature is prohibited from doing is to delegate its essentially legislative function and power. If it appears from the relevant provisions of the impugned statute that powers which have been delegated include powers which can legitimately be regarded as essentially legislative powers, then the legislation is bad and it introduces a serious infirmity in the Act itself. On the other hand, if the Legislature lays down its legislative policy by means of making appropriate rules, then such delegation is not impermissible. In Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh3, where the validity of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was challenged, this Court in upholding the validity of the impugned statute held that the preamble and the body of the relevant sections of the said Act sufficiently formulate the legislative policy and observed that the ambit and character of the Act is such that the details of that policy can only be worked out by delegating the power to a subordinate authority within the framework of that policy.” 16. Examining the impugned statute now before us, we are satisfied that the attack against the validity of the Act on the ground of excessive delegation is unsustainable. Examining the impugned statute now before us, we are satisfied that the attack against the validity of the Act on the ground of excessive delegation is unsustainable. The legislative policy is broadly indicated in the preamble of the Act and specific guidance has been given to the authorities in the matter of exercising the powers delegated to them No essentially legislative function has been delegated under the Act to the Executive. 17. Now in the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the Act declares the purpose which is to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of maintenance of internal security and matters connected with it and it states that the Central Government or the State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person including a foreigner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers etc., the security of the State or the maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and service essential to the community etc., may make an order directing such person to be detained. Then certain officers have been empowered to exercise the powers conferred on the Central Government or the State Government. Sufficient safeguards have been made in the latter case by providing that when any such officer exercises the powers he should report the fact to the State Government with the grounds on which the order has been made and such order shall not remain in force for more than 12, days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government and again there is provision that when any such order is made or approved by the State Government, the State Government shall within 7 days report the fact to the Central Government with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity for the order. Then there are safeguards like the provision for reference to advisory boards. Such being the case, it cannot be said that section 16-A (3) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. 18. We are not able to accept the contention raised in this petition but in regard to which no arguments were advanced by Mr. Then there are safeguards like the provision for reference to advisory boards. Such being the case, it cannot be said that section 16-A (3) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. 18. We are not able to accept the contention raised in this petition but in regard to which no arguments were advanced by Mr. Alagumalai that section 18 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, inasmuch as it dispenses with the right of personal liberty by virtue of natural law or common law, is outside the scope of the Presidential Ordinance making power under Article 123 of the Constitution and likewise the contention that sect ion 16-A (6) of the Act which dispenses with the application of sections 8 to 12 of the Act in cases of detention, made under the First Amendment Ordinance is unconstitutional as it is outside the scope of the President’s power under Article 123 of the Constitution. Under Article 123 if at any time, except when both houses of Parliament are in session the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinance as circumstances appear to him to require; the power is co-extensive with the law making power of Parliament. We are also unable to accept the contention that the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Ordinances do not bear a rational connection with the Presidential Order made under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution. 19. The learned Counsel for the petitioners finally contended that the orders of detention in these cases are invalid as having been passed in a careless cavalier-like manner with chill indifference and in a mechanical fashion. He has pointed out that in the case of the detention order in respect of Thiru Narayanaswamy, the order merely says that he shall be detained and kept in custody in the Central Prison without specifying in which Central Prison he shall be detained and further that the detention order has been made by Sri Dewan Mohammed, both as Collector and District Magistrate of the Chingleput District, even though under section 3 (2) (a) only the District Magistrate could exercise the powers. But then, the Government has invested all Collectors with the powers of a District Magistrate by virtue of their office. But then, the Government has invested all Collectors with the powers of a District Magistrate by virtue of their office. Hence it is that in the detention order it stated that “the District Magistrate and Collector was satisfied.” Such a description cannot be construed as a defect which would invalidate the order. Likewise the omission to specify the Central Prison in which the detenu is to be detained is also not a fatal defect, for the Act does not state that the detention order should specify the exact prison in which the detenu should be detained. 20. In the case of Sri, Khaleel Rahman, the learned counsel for the petitioners points out that the declaration mentions both sections 3 (2) (a) and 3 (2) (c). The declaration is in a cyclostyled form and both sections 3 (2) (a) and 3 (2) (c) have, been mentioned and the former has not been struck out. This is a mere clerical omission. It cannot be said by reason of it that the detention order is invalid. Actually the detention order mentions section 3 (2)(c). It cannot be contended that the aforesaid defects would indicate that the order was passed in a careless or mechanical manner or with chill indifference. Again, in the case of the detenu Khaleel Rahman, the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on a press statement issued by the Commissioner of Police on 25th July, 1975 to show that there is no nexus between the activities of the petitioners as stated in the press statement and the purpose for which the detention was ordered. In the press statement of the Commissioner of Police issued or 25th July, 1975 all that is stated is that 13 persons were arrested and detained for having been receivers of stolen articles. It might be noted that there is no mention of the name of the petitioner as one of the persons so arrested. Therefore the argument of the learned counsel that the petitioner was arrested for having been a receiver of stolen articles which activities do not have any nexus to the object of detaining him which was to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to to the maintenance of public order, cannot be accepted. 21. Mr. Therefore the argument of the learned counsel that the petitioner was arrested for having been a receiver of stolen articles which activities do not have any nexus to the object of detaining him which was to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to to the maintenance of public order, cannot be accepted. 21. Mr. Alagumalai next contended that the detention orders are invalid inasmuch as the declaration and the detention orders have both been passed on the same day and it is not possible to know whether the declaration was passed earlier on the detention order; and if the detention order had been passed earlier and the declaration made later, that would be a contravention of the provisions of the Act. But then, the Act merely enjoins the making of a declaration and that has to be followed by the detention order. Of course, before making a declaration a detention cannot be ordered. Therefore it is that in this case a declaration has first been made and the detention order has been separately passed. Mr. Alagumalai contends that both the declaration and the detention order should be comprised in one and the same proceeding as otherwise it would not be possible to say that the first declaration was made and then the detention order was passed. We are not able to agree with him in this. There is also no material at all from which it could be inferred that the detention order in this case was passed before the declaration was made; and we find that there has been a proper compliance with the provisions of the Act in these two cases. We therefore find that these two petitions for the issue of writs of habeas corpus are not maintainable at all and have to be and are rejected. Leave refused.