JUDGMENT Gulati, J. - The petitioner is a tenant of a shop in Qasba Nakur, district Saharanpur, where he is carrying on business in cloth. The 4th respondent, Mamraj Pal (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) purchased this shop from its previous owner Krishan Chand for a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. He made an application under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, seeking permission to file a suit for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that he required the shop for his father who wanted to start some business. The petitioner contested the application saying that the landlord himself was a typist in the Collectorate compound and the family lived in Mansa Kailashpur, a place close to Saharanpur and that his father was a very old man and was engaged in the sale and purchase of sheep and goats and, therefore, the need of the landlord was not bona fide. He also alleged that the previous land. lord Krishan Chand had made attempts to evict him and as he did not succeed he fraudulently transferred the shop to the landlord for inadequate price with a view to making a second attempt to evict him. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that the need of the petitioner was not genuine inasmuch as he sold his cloth by hawking in adjoining villages and did not do any business from the shop. He accepted the need of the landlord as genuine and granted him permission to institute a suit for the ejectment of the petitioner. This order was set aside by the Commissioner and the permission was revoked. The landlord then approached the State Government under section 7-F. The State Government has reversed the order of the Commissioner and has again granted permission to the landlord. The petitioner now approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Commissioner no doubt recorded a finding that the need of the petitioner was not very pressing as he was selling cloth not from the shop but by hawking in the adjoining villages. He, however, found that even though the petitioner's need was not very pressing yet the land-lord had not succeeded in establishing his own bona fide need. 2. The Commissioner no doubt recorded a finding that the need of the petitioner was not very pressing as he was selling cloth not from the shop but by hawking in the adjoining villages. He, however, found that even though the petitioner's need was not very pressing yet the land-lord had not succeeded in establishing his own bona fide need. He also appears to have accepted the plea of the petitioner that the sale of the shop in dispute by its previous owner in favour of the landlord was a collusive transaction and had been entered into with a view to get the shop vacated somehow. The State Government has accepted the plea of the landlord that he wanted his father to start business in the disputed shop. This is finding of fact and this court ordinarily would not interfere. But it appears that the State Government in arriving at that ending has not token into consideration one material aspect, namely, that the transaction of purchase by the landlord of the shop in dispute was a collusive transaction and had been into entered into with a view to getting the shop vacated. This circumstance had a material bearing on the bona fide need of the landlord. It was necessary for the State Government to have considered this fact and to have recorded its own finding before setting aside the order of the Commissioner. In Suresh Chandra Gupta v. Mohammad, 1974 A.L.J. 213 a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar situation has held that it is incumbent upon the State Government to record its own findings on all the findings recorded by the Commissioner before it can set aside the latter's order. 3. The State Government has committed another error. It has sought to give preference to the landlord on the ground that he has invested money in the purchase of the shop. Clearly the landlord has no such preferential right on that ground so far as the Rent Control and Eviction Act is concerned. Every landlord has a vested right in a property purchased or inherited by him but when the question comes as to whether he may be permitted to evict a sitting tenant, the consideration that the landlord had invested money in the purchase of the property is not a relevant consideration. Every landlord has a vested right in a property purchased or inherited by him but when the question comes as to whether he may be permitted to evict a sitting tenant, the consideration that the landlord had invested money in the purchase of the property is not a relevant consideration. The landlord can succeed only if he establishes his own bona fide need and his need is found to be greater than that of the tenant. It is only when the accommodation is vacant that a landlord may be allowed to assert his right to use the property for his personal need. But when there is a sitting tenant the landlord has no preferential right. 4. There is yet another infirmity in the case. The petitioner has alleged mala fide and bias. He has stated in paragraph 19 of the writ petition that one Sri Mahmood All Khan, who was a minister in the State Government has influenced the State Government to give decision in favour of the landlord because the Minister and the landlord were both friends and belonged to the same village. Sri Mahmood Ali Khan has been impleaded as a respondent by name. He has not cared to controvert this averment of the petitioner. The State Government also has not filed a counter-affidavit to controvert this allegation, with the result that this allegation of the petitioner goes unrebutted. The landlord has no doubt denied this allegation but, in my opinion, the proper person who could deny this allegation was the State Government or Sri Mahmood Ali Khan himself. In the absence of a denial from these two sources, no reliance can be placed on the averments of the landlord. The order of the State Government, therefore, stands vitiated because of the uncontroverted bias pleaded by the petitioner. 5. For all these reasons the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the State Government dated 4-2-1972 and of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 14-5-1970 are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs.