JUDGMENT - P.B. SAWANT, J.:---This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 18-8-1968 passed by the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Poona, in Civil Appeal No. 736 of 1968 in the proceedings under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, (hereafter referred to as the said Act). 2. The petitioner in this petition is the landlord of the suit premises which consists of the entire ground floor except one room in a two storeyed bungalow which is situate at City Survey No. 573/1, Jangli Maharaj Road, Shivaji Nagar, Poona. Respondents Nos. 1(A to E) are the heirs of the original tenant who died pending this petition. Originally the entire ground floor in the said bungalow was let out in the year 1946 to the tenant. Admittedly in the year 1949 the tenant voluntarily handed over the possession of one room to the landlord in order to satisfy the landlords requirement which as was made out then was for the purpose of opening an office for his son who had started practising as a lawyer. Admittedly further there were two suits filed by the landlord against the tenant for possession of the suit premises on the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord. The said suits were Suit No. 1522 of 1953 and Suit No. 1125 of 1959. The said suits were dismissed since it was held that the landlord has not proved his bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises. Thereafter by a notice dated 25-6-1965 the landlord again terminated the tenancy of the tenant and demanded possession of the suit premises on the ground that he required them for his bona fide and personal occupation. The requisition in the said notice having been not complied with, the landlord filed the present suit on 1-10-1965. The said suit being Suit No. 2948 was dismissed by the trial Court which held that the landlord had failed to prove his bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises. In appeal against the said decision of the trial Court, the Appellate Court by its impugned order confirmed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the landlords appeal. This petition is directed against the said order of the lower Appellate Court. 3. Mr. In appeal against the said decision of the trial Court, the Appellate Court by its impugned order confirmed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the landlords appeal. This petition is directed against the said order of the lower Appellate Court. 3. Mr. Dalvi who appears for the petitioner landlord contended that the finding given by the lower Appellate Court on the issue of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord was vitiated because the lower Appellate Court had not taken into consideration the comparative strength of the family of the landlord and of the tenant and the premises in their respective possession. He urged that this Court has in a decision in (Mangharam Chubarmal v. B.C. Patel)1, 73 Bom.L.R. 140 held that while considering the question of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord, the situation of the tenant should be taken into consideration. In other words, what Mr. Dalvi wanted to urge was that while considering the requirement of the landlord, the comparative accommodation in the possession if the tenant should be taken into consideration. Mr. Dalvi urged that this was one of principles laid down in the said decision. Inasmuch as the lower Appellate Court had not taken into consideration the strength of the tenants family and the size of accommodation in the possession of the tenant, the decision of both the courts below is liable to be quashed. In the first instance I do not find that there is any such proposition of law laid down in the decision relied on by Mr. Dalvi. The said decision has to be read in the context of the facts which were before the Court and the arguments which were advanced before the learned judge. In main contention which was advanced before the Court in that case was that the bona fide and reasonable requirements of the landlord have to be considered without reference to the hardship or plight in which the tenant will be placed if a decree of eviction is passed against the tenant. Referring to this contention the learned Judge had made certain observations on which Mr. Dalvi based his entire argument. The said observations in their context have been reproduced below. The observations on which Mr. Dalvi has relied on heavily in support of his argument are under lined. "Mr. Referring to this contention the learned Judge had made certain observations on which Mr. Dalvi based his entire argument. The said observations in their context have been reproduced below. The observations on which Mr. Dalvi has relied on heavily in support of his argument are under lined. "Mr. Sorabjee wants me not to follow the English Law on the ground that the words reasonably and bona fide refer to the landlord without reference to the tenant. I am not prepared to agree with this submission. As I have shown above, even when one of the three words were used, i.e. bona fide or reasonably or required in the various Indian statutes dealing with rent legislation, the courts have considered all the relevant factors, objectively without reference to the landlord while deciding either the bona fides or the reasonableness or the bare requirement of the landlord. It is emphasised in so many words that the mere wish or the intention of the landlord is not sufficient to give him a right to evict the tenant. The Rent Act is enacted with the avowed object of protecting tenants against unreasonable eviction. While considering the relevant factors for deciding the bona fide and reasonableness of the landlords requirement, the tenant cannot be forgotten for all the time. Various objective facts are mentioned like the public good, the hardship of the landlord, the plight of the tenant and it is said that the courts should take a broad common sense view of the whole matter. But at the same time while considering the reasonableness of the landlords requirement, the mere fact that the tenant will be evicted and will suffer hardship is per se not relevant. It is the inevitable consequence of every order in ejectment which would be passed in favour of the landlord. If that is considered as decisive then the landlord, who, bona fide and reasonably requires the premises, will fail in all cases. But the tenants hardship may be linked up with the conduct of the landlord and may give rise to some consideration of justice and equity in favour of the tenant. Such factors will have to be objectively considered while deciding the question of bona fides and reasonableness of the landlords requirement. But the tenants hardship may be linked up with the conduct of the landlord and may give rise to some consideration of justice and equity in favour of the tenant. Such factors will have to be objectively considered while deciding the question of bona fides and reasonableness of the landlords requirement. For instance, if the landlord lets out an open plot of land to the tenant and later on connives at or consents to the construction of some structure thereon at considerable cost by the tenant and shortly thereafter starts eviction proceedings, the tenants hardship attributable to the landlords conduct is a relevant factor which will reflect not only on his bona fides but also on the reasonableness of his requirement. I have given only one illustration to indicate as to how certain factors will have to be objectively considered while deciding the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord. In my view that will be the true meaning of the expression reasonably and bona fide required used in section 13(1) of the Rent Act. Each case will have to be decided on the facts as appearing in that case. These are the only general observations which any Court can make while interpreting these two words". 4. It will therefore be obvious in the first instance that the learned Judge has made the said observations to repel the contention advanced on behalf of the landlord that while considering the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord the plight in which the tenant will be placed should not be considered at all. After stating that the plight of the tenant will be one of the relevant factors and objective facts which will have to be taken into consideration while considering the requirement of the landlord the learned Judge has also hastened to add that the mere fact that the tenant will be evicted and will suffer hardship is per see not relevant. Secondly, it is obvious that the said observations have been made from the angle of the plight of the tenant vis-a-vis the requirement of the landlord and not from the angle of the comfort in which the tenant is situate viz-a-viz the requirement of the landlord. Secondly, it is obvious that the said observations have been made from the angle of the plight of the tenant vis-a-vis the requirement of the landlord and not from the angle of the comfort in which the tenant is situate viz-a-viz the requirement of the landlord. This is obvious because the learned Judge is at pains to emphasise the object with which the Rent Act was placed on the statute book and therefore the impelling necessity to consider the plight of the tenant even while considering the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord. This is farthest from the argument advanced by Mr. Dalvi who by relying on the said observations tried to build up the argument that while considering the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord the condition of the tenant and by that he meant not only the plight of the tenant, but also the comfort in which the tenant is situate should likewise be considered and that according to Mr. Dalvi is the principle or the proposition which is impliedly laid down by the said decision. I have quoted the entire context in which the learned Judge has made the said observations and have also pointed out the purpose for which the said observations were made. It would thus appear that the argument advanced by Mr. Dalvi is without any foundation. No such proposition flows from the said observations and therefore the said argument is to be stated only to be rejected. I also do not find any merit in the said contention even otherwise, for although Mr. Dalvi did not want to advance the proposition in so many words and in fact fought shy of it, the logical conclusion to which the said argument by Mr. Dalvi would lead is that in considering the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord the comfort in which the tenant resides or is situate has also to be taken into consideration as one of the relevant factors. Dalvi would lead is that in considering the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord the comfort in which the tenant resides or is situate has also to be taken into consideration as one of the relevant factors. Needless to say, when the Legislature desires that the ban on the right of the landlord to evict his tenant should be lifted only if, among other things the landlord proves his bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises it could only mean one thing and that is that the landlord has to establish the said bona fide and reasonable requirement on the merits of his own case and not with reference to the comfort in which the tenant is situate. As far as therefore the said ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the said premises are held as laid down in Clause (g) of sub-section (I) of section 13 of the said Act is concerned, the said ground has to be made out by the landlord on the basis of his own needs and while considering the needs of the landlord, what is required to be considered by the courts is the merits of his case and the situation in which the tenant is placed will not enter into consideration while deciding the said issue. The said situation will undoubtedly be considered only after the landlord establishes his bona fide and reasonable requirement for the purpose of considering the comparative hardship as laid down in sub-section (2) of the said section 13 of the said Act. I am therefore, not impressed by this argument even otherwise. 5. The second contention advanced by Mr. Dalvi was that the landlord has 11 members in his family and that the tenant had five members. The same has pending this petition been reduced to three and the Court should consider the increase or reduction in the number of the members either of the landlord or the tenant pending this petition. For one thing this statement with regard to the members in the respective families is not admitted, and secondly what is under attack is the judgment of the Appellate Court which was given on the basis of the number of members in the respective families on the date of its decision. For one thing this statement with regard to the members in the respective families is not admitted, and secondly what is under attack is the judgment of the Appellate Court which was given on the basis of the number of members in the respective families on the date of its decision. The Appellate Court paragraphs 7 to 9 has considered the merits of the landlords case as well as of the tenants case and has come to the conclusion that there has been no material change after the decision of the earlier suit between the parties which was Suit No. 1125 of 1959. It may be stated here that as per Ex. 65 which is the judgment in Suit No. 1522 of 1953, the landlords case was that there were 12 members in his family. As per Ex. 66-A which is the judgment in the last Suit No. 1125 of 1959, the landlords case was that there were 14 members in the family. In the present suit, it is the case of the landlord that there are 11 members in the family. In spite of the same the Appellate Court has considered the landlords case member wise in paragraph 9 of its judgment and has come to the conclusion that the landlord has failed to prove his bona fide requirement. There is no error to law shown by Mr. Dalvi in the said finding. Mr. Dalvi attacked the said finding only on the ground that the comparative position of the tenant viz. the strength of the tenants family was not considered and compared in contrast to the strength of the landlords family. The same argument which has been negatived by me earlier is advanced in different words. Therefore the finding of the learned Judge on the needs of the landlord which is based on the examination of the landlords requirement cannot be said to be either illegal or vitiated. 6. Mr. Dalvi then stated that the plaintiff and his wife were old, that the plaintiffs wife was suffering from heart trouble and blood pressure and therefore they were in need of the ground floor premises. The Appellate Court has held that there was no evidence whatsoever on record about the ailment of either the plaintiff or his wife. Even apart from that finding, an offer was made very fairly by Mr. The Appellate Court has held that there was no evidence whatsoever on record about the ailment of either the plaintiff or his wife. Even apart from that finding, an offer was made very fairly by Mr. Baadkar on behalf of the tenants that if the only difficulty with the landlord is that they cannot stay on the first floor and they need the ground floor accommodation, the respondents Nos. 1(A to E) are prepared to go on the first floor in exchange for the suit premises. Mr. Dalvi was not prepared even to consider this offer. He only-pleaded that in addition to the first floor he wants the suit premises. I therefore find that there is no merit in this contention advanced by Mr. Dalvi on the basis of the illness of the plaintiff and his wife. 7. There is no other contention advanced in this petition. In the result the petition fails and the rule granted in the petition is discharged with costs. -----