Judgment D.P. Sinha, J. The petitioners have come up in revision in the followings circumstances: The Opposite Party, Padmanand Choudhary, filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that on the night between the 19th and 20th of May, 1969, at about 2 A.M., the petitioners armed with a gun and lathis came to his Bhuskar and set fire to it, as a result of which the Bhuskar together with Bhusa worth Rs.2500/- kept in it was burnt and destroyed. An inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, was held by a First Class Magistrate, Khagaria. On a consideration of the evidence, the learned Magistrate framed charges under sections 143, 144, 435/109 and 435/149 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners, and relying on the decision of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Babulal and another Vs. State, he declined to frame a charge under section 436 of the Indian Penal Code because the Bhuskar, in his opinion, was not the kind of building which was contemplated within the meaning of section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. As against that order declining to frame a charge under section 436 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners, the opposite party filed a revision before the Sessions Judge which was heard by the Additional Sessions Judge, who came to the conclusion that the evidence indicated that the Bhuskar was building meant for the custody of property and, therefore, by his order dated the 4th April, 1973, he directed the Magistrate to frame a charge under section 436 of the Indian Penal Code and commit the petitioners to the Court of Sessions on the said charge. It is against that order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the petitioners 'have moved this Court in revision. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Babulal's case applies to this case also, in as much as, a Bhuskar of the kind which was alleged to have been burnt was not a building within the meaning of section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. The contention does not appear to be sound. In Babulal's case, the structure, which was made of straw, had only pillars with a straw thatch, and not doors, etc. The contention does not appear to be sound. In Babulal's case, the structure, which was made of straw, had only pillars with a straw thatch, and not doors, etc. It was in respect of that kind of structure that it had been observed that it did not amount to a building within the meaning of section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. In the case in hand, the evidence led before the Magistrate showed that it was a Bhuskar enclosed on all sides and it had Jaffri shutters. There can be no doubt that such a structure is a building, and since the Bhuskar is meant for the custody of Bhusa, which is property, it is certainly a building within the meaning of section 436 of the Indian Penal Code, which applies to a building which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property. A Bhuskar is ordinarily a place for the custody of Bhusa. From the above facts it would appear that the Bhuskar in question was quite different from the structure which was the subject of consideration in Babulal's case. In that case, it was observed that an ordinary double thatched shed, as it was, resting on bamboos or wooden or brick pillars having no doors, etc. could not be treated as a building within the meaning of that term used in section 436. It was pointed out that the word 'custody' was undoubtedly different from the word 'keeping' and it implied a sense of security which would be wanting in the case of a shed, which is only meant to provide shelter from sun and rain and which has no doors, etc. and, consequently, where a thatched shed for tethering horses as in that case was destroyed by fire due to mischief, the offence fell under section 435 and not under section 436. It is, therefore, manifest that the structure on the basis of which the observation in Babulal's case had "been made was quite of a different kind, and as such; the decision in that does not apply to this case. 4. Learned Counsel argued that even though there was a Jaffari shutter in the hut-like structure, such a structure could not be described as a building. I do not think there is any warrant for this proposition. 4. Learned Counsel argued that even though there was a Jaffari shutter in the hut-like structure, such a structure could not be described as a building. I do not think there is any warrant for this proposition. A poor man or even a well to do cultivator may have a hut as dwelling house and he may have also a hut for the custody of property which he may possess. There is hardly anything in the meaning of the word 'building' which may suggest that it should be either brick-built or mud-built or a building of some such durable and shale material. 5. In the circumstance', there would appear no merit in this application and the order made by the Additional Sessions Judge is not fit to be interfered with. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.