Anandjee v. K. L. Shrimali — 1975 DIGILAW 443 (ALL)

ORDER K.N. Singh, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Vice-Chancellor of the Banaras Hindu University dated 22-12-1972 appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap, Respondent No. 3, as Head of the Department of Law for a period of two years and for the issue of a writ of quo warranto requiring respondent No. 3 to show cause under what authority he holds the office of the Head of Department and for the issue of a mandamus directing the Vice-Chancellor to restore the petitioner as Head of the Department of Law. 2. Dr. Anandjee, the petitioner, was appointed Professor and Head of Department of Law in the Law College of the Banaras Hindu University by a resolution of the Executive Council dated 21-8-1959 on probation for a period of two years on the recommendation of a Selection Committee constituted under the Banaras Hindu University Act 1915, and the Statutes framed thereunder. He joined his duties at the Banaras Hindu University (hereinafter referred to as the University) on 27-10-1959. On that very day, he was informed by the Registrar that he was appointed Dean of Faculty of Law of the University with effect from the date he joined his duty under Statute 25: 1 of the University. The Executive Council resolved to waive the probationary period of the petitioner and confirmed him on the post of Professor and principal of Law College with effect from 11-7-1961. The petitioner thereupon executed agreement with the University as required by Section 19-A of the Banaras Hindu University Act, a copy of the agreement has been filed as Annexure II to the petition. Earlier the petitioner was the only Professor in the Department of Law, but later on two more professors were appointed. There were thus three professors in the Department of Law including the petitioner. 3. On 30-3-1972. the Executive Council of the University proposed a new set of Statutes including Statute 25 : 4 conferring power on the Vice-Chancellor to appoint Head of the Department and to fix tenure of the appointee. The President of India, who is the Visitor of the University, approved the Statutes on 24-7-1972. Dr. K. L. Shrimali Vice-Chancellor of the University passed orders on 22-12-1973 appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department of Law for a period of two years. The President of India, who is the Visitor of the University, approved the Statutes on 24-7-1972. Dr. K. L. Shrimali Vice-Chancellor of the University passed orders on 22-12-1973 appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department of Law for a period of two years. In pursuance of that order the petitioner had to hand over charge of the office of the Head of the Department to Dr. Dharam Pratap and, ever since then he was deprived of the benefits and privileges of the Head of the Department. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition challenging validity of the order of the Vice-Chancellor appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap as the Head of Department. 4. Sri S. C. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the impugned order appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap, respondent No. 3, as Head of Department of Law was issued by the Vice-Chancellor in pursuance of his powers conferred on him by Statute 25 : 4. The validity of the Statute as well as the order of the Vice-Chancellor was assailed on the following grounds : (1) Statute 25:4 is ultra vires of the Act as Section 17 does not confer any power to frame a Statute for changing Head of Department. If it is held that Section 17 confers power to frame Statute 25 : 4 then Section 17 is void for delegating excessive legislative functions to the Executive Council. (2) Statute 25 : 4 is in conflict with the substantive provisions of the Act as contained in Sections 7-C (i) and 16-B (i). (3) Statute 25 : 4 is illegal as it seeks to take away petitioners vested right to act as Head of Department with retrospective effect. (4) Statute 25 : 4 is ultra vires of Article 16 of the Constitution as it is discriminatory in matters relating to employment in the University. (5) The impugned order is vitiated as it was issued mala fide by Dr. K. L. Shrimali the Vice-Chancellor. 5. Sri B. P. Singh, Advocate General of Bihar, appearing on behalf of the respondents, urged that Statute 25 : 4 was valid and no discrimination was practised against the petitioner, none of his vested rights were taken away with retrospective effect. The Vice-Chancellor passed the impugned order bona fide in exercise of his powers under the Statute to effectuate the policy of appointment of Heads of Department by rotation. 6. The Vice-Chancellor passed the impugned order bona fide in exercise of his powers under the Statute to effectuate the policy of appointment of Heads of Department by rotation. 6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Banaras Hindu University Act of 1915 and the amendments made in the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder from time to time. The Banaras Hindu University Act of 1915 was amended in 1958 and 1966 and finally in 1969. After the Amending Act No. 34 of 1958 and before its amendment in 1966 and 1969. Section 17 was as under: - "17 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: - (a) the constitution, powers and duties of the Court, the executive Council, the Academic Council, the Standing Committee of the Academic Council, the Finance Committee and such other bodies, as may be deemed necessary to constitute from time to time; (b) the election and continuance in office of the members of the said bodies, including the continuance in office of the first members, and the filling of vacancies of members, and all other matters relative to those bodies for which it may be necessary or desirable to provide; ............. ............. (g) the establishment and abolition of Faculties, Department, Halls, Colleges and Institutions. ............. ............. (j) all other matters which by this Act are to be or may be provided by the Statutes. (3) The Executive Council may, from time to time, make new or additional Statutes or may amend or repeal the Statutes: but every new Statute or addition to the Statutes or any amendment or repeal of a Statute shall require the previous approval of the Visitor who may sanction, disallow or remit it for further consideration." Section 17 of the Act conferred powers on the Executive Council to frame Statutes to amend the same or to repeal the existing statutes in respect of the matters enumerated in Section 17 of the Act. The Executive Council in exercise of its powers framed Statutes 25 and 26-A. Statute 25 laid down that every Head of the Department, who is a Professor shall, by rotation according to seniority, act for a period of two years as the Dean of the Faculty; provided that if in any Faculty there is no Professor, the senior most Reader shall act as the Dean and if there is no Reader, the Vice-Chancellor or the Pro Vice-Chancellor, if so designated by the Vice-Chancellor, shall act as the Dean. Statute 26-A laid down that each Faculty shall consist of such Departments as may be assigned to it by Ordinance. It further provided that no Department shall be established or abolished except by the Statutes. The proviso to clause (2) laid down that all the Departments which had been established in accordance with the Act, the Statutes or the Regulations as in force immediately before the commencement of the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1951, shall be, deemed to be Departments established by these Statutes. It is conceded that the Department of Law was established prior to November 3, 1951, i.e. the date from which the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1951, came into force. Thus the Department of Law was established under the Statutes. Statute 26-A (4) was in the followings terms : - "(4) Each Department shall have a Head who may be a University Professor or, if there is no professor, a Reader and whose duties and functions, and terms and conditions of appointment shall be laid down by the Ordinance:" Provided that if there are more professors or, as the case may be, Readers than one in any Department, no person shall be appointed to be the Head of any Department except in accordance with the provisions made in respect thereof by the Ordinances, provided further that if there is no professor/ Reader in a Department the Dean of the Faculty concerned shall act as the Head of that Department." The above Statute contemplated appointment of Heads of Department whose terms and conditions were laid down by the Ordinance. Section 18 of the Act confers power for framing Ordinance in respect of matters enumerated therein or for matters which may be required by the Statutes. Statute 26-A (4) contemplated framing of Ordinance, regulating duties and functions and terms and conditions of appointment of Head of Department. Section 18 of the Act confers power for framing Ordinance in respect of matters enumerated therein or for matters which may be required by the Statutes. Statute 26-A (4) contemplated framing of Ordinance, regulating duties and functions and terms and conditions of appointment of Head of Department. Ordinance 5-A as printed on page 65 of the University Calendar 1962 Edition laid down that the Head of Department shall be appointed in accordance with Statute 26-A (4). In a Department where there were more than one professor or Reader, the appointment was required to be made by the Executive Council on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor. These provisions were in force at the time the petitioner was appointed professor in the Department of Law. Since the petitioner was the only professor in the Department of Law he was appointed Head of the Department by the Executive Council on the recommendation of the then Vice-Chancellor in accordance with Statute 26-A (4) and Ordinance 5-A. 7. The Act was amended by the Banaras Hindu University Amendment Act of 1966. Section 17 was substantially amended and sub-section (2) was substituted. The amended Section 17 (2) laid down that the Statutes in force at the commencement of the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1966, shall be those as set out in the Schedule to the Act. Statutes 25 and 26-A (4) were included in the Schedule to the Act. Thus Statute 25 and Statute 26-A (4) were adopted by the Parliament and engrafted in the Act, thereupon the Statutes became part of the Act itself. In 1972 Statutes 25 and 26-A (4) were amended by the Executive Council of the University. The amendment was approved by the Visitor on 24th July, 1972, thereafter the Statutes came into force. The amended Statute 25:4 which is relevant runs as under :- "25 (4) (1) Each Department shall have a Head whose duties, functions and terms and conditions of appointment shall be laid down by the Ordinances. (2) In the case of Departments which have more than one professor, the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint one of the Professors as the Head of the Department for a specified period as laid down in the Ordinance. (2) In the case of Departments which have more than one professor, the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint one of the Professors as the Head of the Department for a specified period as laid down in the Ordinance. (3) In the case of the Departments where there is only one professor, the Vice-Chancellor shall have the option to appoint either the professor or a Reader in the Department for a specified period as laid down in the Ordinance. (4) Any professor or Reader shall have the option to resign the Headship at any time during his tenure or also to decline the offer of appointment as Head of the Department. (5) If no professor or Reader is appointed Head of the Department or when the place of the Head of the Department is vacant for any reason the Dean of the Faculty concerned shall act as the Head of the Department. (6) The- existing Heads of Department shall cease to function as such from the date another person is appointed as Head of the Department in accordance with sub-cl. (2) or (3)." The Executive Council framed Ordinance on 6th May, 1972, laying down period, terms and conditions of appointment of Heads of Department. It provides that the Head of a Department shall be appointed for a period of two years and shall be eligible for reappointment. The Statute so amended provides that each Department shall have a Head who may be a University Professor and where there are more than one Professor, the Vice-Chancellor may appoint one of them as Head of Department for a specified period. The Ordinances specify that period which is two years. The Department of Law admittedly consists of three professors, the Vice-Chancellor therefore in exercise of his powers under Statute 25:4 appointed Dr. Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department for a period of two years. The petitioner who has been functioning as Head of the Department ever since his appointment ceased to hold that office. 8. Section 17 after the Amending Act of 1969 is in the following terms: "17 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: (g) the establishment, reconstitution, amalgamation, division or abolition of faculties, departments, hostels, colleges and institutions: ............. (1) the classification and the manner of appointment of teachers in the University and the, Colleges ............. (1) the classification and the manner of appointment of teachers in the University and the, Colleges ............. (2) The Statutes in force at the commencement of the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act, 1966, shall be those set out in the Schedule to this Act. (3) The Executive Council may, from time to time, make new or additional statutes or may amend or repeal the Statutes. (4) Every new Statute or addition to a Statute or any amendment or repeal of a Statute shall require the previous approval of the Visitor who may sanction or disallow it or remit it for further consideration." The above provisions confer power on the Executive Council to make new or additional Statutes or to amend and repeal statutes, making provision for all or any of the matters enumerated in sub-section (1). Under Cl. (g) of Section 17 (1) of the Act, the Executive Council is empowered to frame Statutes for the establishment, reconstitution abolition of faculties and Departments. The power of the Executive Council to frame Statutes relating to establishment, reconstitution of faculties and departments includes the power to frame statutes making provision for the appointment of Head of Department. No doubt clause (g) does not expressly confer such a power on the Executive Council but the power to establish a department or a faculty necessarily carries with it ancillary power to make provision for other matters which would be necessary for the exercise of power to make provision for the establishment of a Faculty or a Department. It is noteworthy that Statute 26-A (4) (as it existed prior to its amendment in 1972) had been framed by the Executive Council in exercise of its powers under Section 17 (1) (g) of the Act as it existed prior to its amendment in 1966 and 1969. Those Statutes contemplated appointment of a Head of Department and framing of Ordinances regulating terms and conditions and powers of the Head of Department. Parliament adopted those Statutes and engrafted the same in the Act itself. The legislative intent is thus clear that the Executive Council is invested with power to frame Statutes in respect of appointment of Head of Department. Parliament adopted those Statutes and engrafted the same in the Act itself. The legislative intent is thus clear that the Executive Council is invested with power to frame Statutes in respect of appointment of Head of Department. Section 17 (1) (p) and sub-sections (2) and (3) read with Statute 25 and 26-A (4) contemplated that the Executive Council may from time to time make new or additional Statutes in respect of matters enumerated in Section 17 (1) of the Act and in respect of such other matters which may be required by the Statutes. As already noted Statutes 25 and 26-A (4) themselves contained provision for the constitution of Faculties, creation of Departments and appointment of Heads of Departments. In my opinion the impugned Statute 25: 4 clearly falls within clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, and as such the Executive Council had full jurisdiction to frame Statute 25 : 4. 9. Sri S. C. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that there was a basic- difference in the phraseology of Section 17 (1) (g) as it existed, prior to its amendment in 1966 and Section 17 (1) (g) as it exists today after its amendment in 1966 and 1969. According to him. Section 17 (1) (b) and (g) expressly conferred power on the Executive Council to frame Statutes for the election and continuance in office of the members or bodies of the University including the members of the Faculties and since a Head of Department is Head of the Faculty Section 17 (1) as it then existed conferred that power, but after its amendment in 1969 Section 17 (1) (g) docs not confer any such power on the Executive Council. I find no substance in this contention. Section 17 (1) (b) as it existed prior to 1966 amendment conferred power for framing of statutes relating to the election and continuance of members of the bodies but Cl. (g) conferred power on the Executive Council to frame Statutes for the creation and establishment of Departments. It was in exercise of that power that Statute 26-A (4) was framed. Similar provision exists in Section 17 (1) (g) even after the amendment of the Act in 1966 and 1969. There is no basic difference in Section 17 (1) (b) and (g) and Section 17 (1) (b) after its amendment. It was in exercise of that power that Statute 26-A (4) was framed. Similar provision exists in Section 17 (1) (g) even after the amendment of the Act in 1966 and 1969. There is no basic difference in Section 17 (1) (b) and (g) and Section 17 (1) (b) after its amendment. Section 17 (1) (b) after its amendment in 1969, contains almost the same language as it existed in Section 17 (1) (b) prior to its amendment in 1966. Section 17 as it now stands confers power for framing of Statutes with respect to the appointment, election, nomination and all other matters relating to the authorities. But clause (g) of Section 17 (1) is the same as it stood prior to its amendment which required framing of Statutes for creating or abolishing of Departments. The power to create Department necessarily includes power to frame Statutes making provision for appointment of Heads of Departments. I find no basic difference in Section 17 of the Act after its amendment in 1916 and 1966. The Amending Acts have not taken away the power conferred on the Executive Council to frame Statutes in respect of Departments. I, therefore, hold that the Executive Council had jurisdiction to frame Statute 25 : 4 which contains provisions for appointment of Head of Departments. 10. Sri Khare then urged that Section 17 itself was void inasmuch as it delegated essential legislative functions to a subordinate authority for framing statutes. In considering the question it is necessary to bear in mind that it is well settled that in the increasing complexity of modern administration and the need for flexibility, capable of rapid adjustment to meet the changing circumstances which cannot always be foreseen, it is open to the legislature to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to its delegates. Legislature cannot provide for all possible contingencies because one cannot visualise various permutations and combinations of human conduct and behaviour and for that reason the Legislature delegates legislative functions to subordinate authority and now the power of delegation as per necessity has become a constituent element of legislative power as a whole. The delegation of legislative power is permissible only when the legislative policy and principle are adequately laid down and the delegate is only empowered to carry out the policy within the guidelines laid down by the legislature. The delegation of legislative power is permissible only when the legislative policy and principle are adequately laid down and the delegate is only empowered to carry out the policy within the guidelines laid down by the legislature. The legislature can- not abdicate its authority in conferring power on the subordinate authority to perform essential legislative functions, instead delegation is made for the purpose of working out the details within the essential principles laid down by it. (See M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Workmen of M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co., AIR 1972 SC 1917 : (1972 Lab IC 1128). As already noted Section 17 makes provision for the framing of statutes for all or any of the matters enumerated therein. Sub-section (2) confers statutory force to the Statutes which were already in existence at the time of the enforcement of Amending Act of 1969. The Parliament indicated the matters in respect of which Statutes could be framed and it laid down its policy under the Act. There is enough guidance in the provisions contained in the Act. Moreover Section 17 itself enumerates matters in respect of which Statutes are required to be framed by the subordinate authority. The power of the Executive Council is not absolute, instead is hedged with restrictions. There is no excessive delegation of legislative functions. Further Section 17 of the Act does not confer any essential legislative functions. The Act contains provision relating to the constitution and functioning of officers and authorities of the Universities. It defines their area of jurisdiction and lays down basic structure of administrative machinery of the University. The legislature conferred power on the Executive Council which is the chief executive Authority of the University to frame Statutes in respect of matters indicated in Section 17 of the Act, this was necessary to meet the contingencies which may arise in the administration of the University. The nature of power conferred on the Executive Council is primarily of subordinate nature, the Parliament has not abdicated its function, instead it has laid down guiding principles and restrictions on the power of the Executive Council as would be clear from the provisions contained in the four sub-sections of Section 17 of the Act. 11. The nature of power conferred on the Executive Council is primarily of subordinate nature, the Parliament has not abdicated its function, instead it has laid down guiding principles and restrictions on the power of the Executive Council as would be clear from the provisions contained in the four sub-sections of Section 17 of the Act. 11. Sri Khare referred to a number of authorities in support of his contention that Section 17 delegated essential legislative functions to the Executive Council and placed reliance on Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman Patna Administration Committee, ( AIR 1954 SC 569 ); Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, ( AIR 1960 SC 554 ); B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, ( AIR 1967 SC 1480 ); M/s. Devi Das Gopal Kishnan v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1967 SC 1895 ) and Harakchand Ratan Chand v. Union of India, ( AIR 1970 SC 1453 ). None of these cases lend any support to the petitioner's case. As already discussed the Parliament did not abdicate its essential legislative function in enacting Section 17 of the Act. On the other hand, it indicated matters in respect of which provision could be made by the Statutes for carrying out the purpose and implementing the policy of the Act. The Act and the Statutes as set out in the Schedule to the Act under sub-sec (2) of Section 17 of the Act provide sufficient guidelines to the Executive Council. 12. Sri Khare then urged that the provisions of Statute 25 : 4 are in conflict with the substantive provisions of the Act as contained in Sections 7-C (1) and 16-B (1). Section 7-C (1) lays down that the Vice-Chancellor shall be a member of the Executive and Academic Officer of the University and he shall exercise general supervision and control over the affairs of the University and give effect to the decisions of its authorities. The Executive Council is an authority of the University under Section 8-A of the Act. Section 7-C (1) does not place any restriction on the power of the Executive Council to frame Statutes. The Vice-Chancellor is no doubt required to give effect to the decisions of the authorities including the Executive Council. The Executive Council is an authority of the University under Section 8-A of the Act. Section 7-C (1) does not place any restriction on the power of the Executive Council to frame Statutes. The Vice-Chancellor is no doubt required to give effect to the decisions of the authorities including the Executive Council. The petitioners contention that since he was appointed Head of Department by the Executive Council, the impugned Statutes which empower the Vice-Chancellor to appoint another person as Head of the Department is in conflict with the authority of the Executive Council and therefore Statute 25 : 4 is in conflict with Section 7-C of the Act is misconceived. Statute 25 (4) has been framed by the Executive Council itself. The Vice-Chancellor gave effect to its decision, in exercising his powers. Statute 25:4 by no stretch of imagination is in conflict with Section 7-C of the Act. 13. Section 16-B (1) lays down that salaried officers and teachers of the University shall be appointed under a written contract, which shall be lodged with University and a copy of which shall be furnished to the officer or teacher concerned. It was urged that in pursuance of this provision the petitioner entered into a written contract with the University which contained a clause that the petitioner was appointed Head of the Department, as such he was entitled to continue as Head of the Law Department till he attained the age of superannuation. Statute 25 : 4 takes away that right, therefore, it is in conflict with Section 16-B (1) of the Act. I find no substance in this contention. The petitioner was appointed Head of Department at a time when there was only one post of professor in the Department of Law, his appointment was made in accordance with the then existing Statutes which made provision for the appointment of Head of a Department. After the amendment of the Statutes the power to appoint Head of the Department was conferred on the Vice-Chancellor, which, is in no way inconsistent with Section 7-B (1) of the Act. The petitioners right to act as Head of Department flowed from the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder. If the Statutes had made no provision for appointment of a Head of Department, the petitioner could not have been appointed to that office. The petitioners right to act as Head of Department flowed from the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder. If the Statutes had made no provision for appointment of a Head of Department, the petitioner could not have been appointed to that office. The petitioners right to hold the office of Head of Department was created by the Statute and that right had been taken away by the Statutes. Section 16-B merely requires employees of the University to enter into an agreement with the University. The agreement lodged by the petitioner (Annexure II to the petition) itself contains provision that the terms and conditions of the petitioners appointment in the University shall be subject to the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations framed under the provisions of the Act. The agreement is not sacrosanct: it is subject to the Statutes which may be amended from time to time. The petitioner,' therefore, cannot derive any right to hold the post of Head of Department permanently in pursuance of the said agreement. I am therefore of the opinion that the petitioners contention that Statute 25:4 is in conflict with Section 7-B (1) of the Act is untenable. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner had a vested right to hold the office of Head of Department till he attained the age of super annulation. In support of this contention he placed reliance on paragraph 1 of the agreement, Annexure II to the petition, which provided that the petitioner was appointed professor and Head of Department on permanent basis. The agreement however does not confer any legal right much less any vested right on the petitioner to hold the office of the Head of Department permanently. By clause 1 of the agreement the petitioner himself agreed to perform such duties and functions as may be required in accordance with the Act, Statutes, Ordinance and Regulations framed from time to time. Further clause 9 of the agreement laid down that the petitioner shall abide by the Ordinances, rules and regulations which may be framed regulating the conditions of service and the petitioner further agreed to abide by the decision of the Executive Council which may be taken from time to time. These conditions clearly contemplated that the petitioners appointment as professor or Head of Department was subject to the provisions contained in the Act and the Statutes and Ordinances framed thereunder. These conditions clearly contemplated that the petitioners appointment as professor or Head of Department was subject to the provisions contained in the Act and the Statutes and Ordinances framed thereunder. As already noted, the office of the Head of Department was created by Statute and the petitioner was appointed to that office in pursuance of the provisions contained in the Statute itself. The petitioners right to hold the office of Head of Department does not flow from any contract but from statutory provisions contained in the Statute framed by the Executive Council. Once the office of Head of Department was created and appointment thereto was made under the Statutes, that right could legally be taken away after the amendment of the Statute. It is well established principle that the terms and conditions of service of an employee can unilaterally be altered by the competent authority without the consent of the employee. See Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 . 15. The contention that the petitioners right to hold the office of the Head of Department has been taken away with retrospective effect is again misconceived. Statute 25: 4 does not operate with retrospective effect, instead it is prospective in operation. The petitioner had acted as Head of Department till the issue of the impugned order. Statute 25 : 4 does not affect the petitioners right for any period prior to the issue of the impugned order. There is a distinction between the existing right and a vested right. Where a statutory provision operates prospectively it cannot be held to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights arc included. (See T. D. Rajpurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patel, AIR 1966 SC 1758 ). Since Statute 25:4 does not take away the petitioners right with retrospective effect it is not necessary to consider cases which were cited at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that is not permissible to a subordinate legislative authority to take away vested right with retrospective effect. 16. Sri Khare then urged that Statute 25 : 4 practises hostile discrimination against the petitioner. It creates two classes of Heads of Departments, one appointed by the Executive Council and the other appointed by the Vice-Chancellor without there being any reasonable basis for the classification. 16. Sri Khare then urged that Statute 25 : 4 practises hostile discrimination against the petitioner. It creates two classes of Heads of Departments, one appointed by the Executive Council and the other appointed by the Vice-Chancellor without there being any reasonable basis for the classification. Article 16 lays down that no discrimination shall be practised by the State in matters relating to public service. The Article ensures equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment in public service. The petitioner is no doubt entitled to the protection of Article 16 of the Constitution. If Statute 25 (4) practised discrimination, it is liable to be declared void. In my opinion, however, Statute 25 (4) does not create inequality in matters relating to employment, instead it makes provision for providing equality of opportunity to the various Professors to hold the office of Head of Department by rotation. The purpose and the policy underlying statute 25 : 4 are eminently directed to provide equal opportunity to the Professors for appointment as Head of Department. There is therefore no force in he contention that Statute 25 :4 creates inequality. All the Heads of Departments whether they are appointed by the Executive Council or by the Vice-Chancellor form the same class and Statute 25 (4) applies equally to all those persons. It docs not discriminate the petitioner in any manner. Previously the Executive Council had power to appoint a Head of Department. After the amendment of the Statute, that power is conferred on the Vice-Chancellor. It is permissible under the Act to confer that power on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances there is no question of two classes of Heads of Departments as contended by the petitioner. All those who hold the office of Head of Department are equally affected. The amended Statute 25:4 applies to all the Heads of Departments whether they are appointed by the Executive Council or by the Vice-Chancellor. Statute 25:4 does not practise any discrimination. I am therefore of the opinion that Statute 25:4 is not violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. 17. The petitioner has no legal right to hold the office of Head of Department much less any enforceable right in Court of law. There is no dispute that the office of Head of Department is not a separate post, nor it forms any separate cadre, no emoluments are attached to that office. 17. The petitioner has no legal right to hold the office of Head of Department much less any enforceable right in Court of law. There is no dispute that the office of Head of Department is not a separate post, nor it forms any separate cadre, no emoluments are attached to that office. The office of Head of Department has been created only for the purpose of administrative convenience. A Head of Department is required to look after the administration of the Department concerned, to grant leave to the officials employed in that department and to assign the work of teaching to teachers. The petitioner was Head of Department merely because he was appointed Professor. His right as a Professor including emoluments, salary and other allowances is not affected on his removal from the office of the Head of Department. As already observed the office of Head of Department is an offspring of the Statute, even if there be any right in the petitioner to hold that office, that right has legally been taken away by the amendment of the Statute. The petitioner has no legal right to the office of the Head of Department, and as such he is not entitled to enforce any such right in a Court of law. If the petitioner relies upon the agreement entered into between him and the University m pursuance of Section 16-B (2), the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition, instead his remedy would be to raise dispute before a Tribunal as contemplated by Section 16-B (2) of the Act. 18. Sri Khare then urged that the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 22nd December. 1973, appointing professor Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department in place of the petitioner was issued mala fide as the Vice-Chancellor was annoyed with the petitioner. In considering the question of mala fides it is necessary to bear in mind that a very heavy burden lies on the person who challenges the bona fides of a public authority. In Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das Advani, ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ), Das, J. observed : "The point is that it lies heavily on the person who challenges the bona fides of a public authority or who contends that the authority had acted outside its powers to establish his case on cogent legal evidence. In Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das Advani, ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ), Das, J. observed : "The point is that it lies heavily on the person who challenges the bona fides of a public authority or who contends that the authority had acted outside its powers to establish his case on cogent legal evidence. He cannot succeed by leaving the matter in the air and to the ingenuity of his counsel in creating the atmosphere of mere suspicion, which falls far short of legal proof." The above observations make it amply clear that a heavy burden of proof lies on the petitioner to prove mala fides of the Vice-Chancellor. Suspicion howsoever strong cannot take the place of proof and the mala fides must be proved by reliable legal evidence. The concept of mala fides contemplates that an order may be issued because of the authority having exceeded his power or abused his power in violation of law. While in other case it may be exercise of power in bad faith for ulterior motive or purpose. In other words a dishonest exercise of power is commonly and generally characterised as exercise of power mala fide. If power is granted for me purpose and if it is exercised for a different purpose in the eye of law that power is not validly exercised. In exercising the power the authority concerned may have several purposes, but the order cannot be struck down on the ground of mala fides unless it is found that the dominant purpose or motive was bad or dishonest and that the power was exercised for some ulterior reasons. In Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1964 SC 72 ) the Supreme Court while considering the question of mala fides observed: "Some times the courts are confronted with cases where the purposes sought to be achieved are mixed, some relevant and some alien to the purpose. The courts have on occasions resolved the difficulty by finding out the dominant purpose which impelled the action and where the power itself is conditioned by a purpose, have proceeded to invalidate the exercise of the power when any irrelevant purpose is proved to have entered the mind of the authority. The courts have on occasions resolved the difficulty by finding out the dominant purpose which impelled the action and where the power itself is conditioned by a purpose, have proceeded to invalidate the exercise of the power when any irrelevant purpose is proved to have entered the mind of the authority. This is on the principle that if in a situation the dominant purpose is unlawful then the act itself is unlawful and it is not cured by saying that they had another purpose which is lawful." In Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, ( AIR 1969 SC 215 ) the Supreme Court again observed : - "But the question arises as to what is the legal proposition if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In such a case where there is mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose the proper test to be applied is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose." In the light of the above observations it is necessary to consider the allegations of mala fides to determine the question as to whether the Vice-Chancellor exercised his power under Statute 25 : 4 for the purpose for which the power was conferred on him or that he opted to exercise that power for some other purpose namely to wreak vengeance against the petitioner. 19. The allegations of mala fide are contained in paragraphs 20 to 44 of the petition. These allegations are of different kinds which can conveniently be placed in the following groups: (1) Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Vice-Chancellor, interfered with the administration of the Department of Law. He admitted student leaders who were in disciplined and were not entitled to admission, namely, Gopal Tripathi Shaturdra Prakash and Harikesh Bahadur. The Vice-Chancellor postponed the examinations. He permitted the students to appear at the 5th Semester examination even though the students had failed and were not eligible to appear at the examination. The Vice- Chancellor acceded to the request of students for open admission to the Law classes irrespective of the fact that no adequate provision existed for imparting education to the additional students. He permitted the students to appear at the 5th Semester examination even though the students had failed and were not eligible to appear at the examination. The Vice- Chancellor acceded to the request of students for open admission to the Law classes irrespective of the fact that no adequate provision existed for imparting education to the additional students. The petitioner protested against the aforesaid steps and tried to persuade the Vice-Chancellor to act in accordance with the rules but instead of following the Rules Dr. K.L. Shrimali was annoyed and reprimanded the petitioner and ignored his protests. (2) The petitioner applied for grant of leave for going abroad. Dr. K. L. Shrimali instead of granting leave placed the petitioners leave application before the Executive Council. Leave was no doubt granted to the petitioner, but it was with certain conditions and the Executive Council expressed its disfavour to the manner in which the petitioner had carried on negotiations for getting his emoluments fixed with the authorities in the foreign country. The petitioner got an impression that the Vice-Chancellor had no faith in him. (3) The petitioner made complaint against the Office Superintendent of the Law Department and requested the Vice-Chancellor to transfer him on the ground of. his insubordination but the administration of the University permitted him to remain in Law Department for a year and when the petitioner raised this issue before the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. K. L. Shrimali observed that the petitioner should not raise petty matters before him. (4) In the meeting of Academic Council held on 19th November, 1973 the Vice-Chancellor publicly scolded the petitioner and accused him of having improperly recorded the minutes of the Faculty of Law. (5) The Vice-Chancellor was interested in getting the Department of law split up in two departments. This proposal was, however, rejected by the Faculty of Law but later on the Vice-Chancellor made another effort to get the proposal approved by the Faculty of Law. (6) Certain Ordinances were incorrectly published by the administration of the University which were included in the University Calendar. These Ordinances had not been framed in accordance with Section 18 of the Act. Certain students filed suits and took proceedings to take benefit of those Ordinances. (6) Certain Ordinances were incorrectly published by the administration of the University which were included in the University Calendar. These Ordinances had not been framed in accordance with Section 18 of the Act. Certain students filed suits and took proceedings to take benefit of those Ordinances. The Vice-Chancellor became angry with the petitioner as he wrongly believed that the petitioner was responsible for the faulty drafts and for wrongly including the Ordinances in the University Calendar. (7) An Enquiry Committee was appointed by the Vice-Chancellor to hold enquiry into certain matters relating to the University. The Committee was presided over by Sri Gyanendra Kumar, a retired Judge of this Court. Dr. K.L. Shrimali criticised Sri Gyanendra Kumar for taking independent view without appreciating the University's interest, he directed the petitioner to meet Sri Gyanendra Kumar and explain to him the interest of the University. The petitioner refused to do that. Dr. K. L. Shrimali then impressed upon the petitioner to appear as a witness before the Committee. The petitioner appeared before Shri Gyanendra Kumar but he could state only those facts which he had seen, he did not state facts which the Vice-Chancellor wanted him to state. For this reason the Vice-Chancellor became infuriated against the petitioner. (8) On 15th October, 1973, Dr. K.L. Shrimali called the petitioner at his residence and made a suggestion to him that he should resign and further he asked the petitioner to take action against Sri Charan Das Seth, a leading lawyer of Varanasi who was a part-time teacher in the Law School, as Sri Seth assisted students who had filed suits in civil courts against the University. The petitioner told the Vice-Chancellor that he had no desire to continue as Dean until retirement but he refused to resign under pressure. (9) The Vice-Chancellor appointed an Enquiry Committee to hold enquiry into the incidents which had taken place on 15th October, 1973, when the law examinations were disturbed and certain students had pressurised the examinees to walk out of the examination hall. The Committee was presided by Sri Ratan Singh, a retired Judge of the Patna High Court. The Committee recorded a finding against the students and suggested action against them, but Dr. K. L. Shrimali did not take any action against the erring students, on the other hand he removed the petitioner and appointed Dr. The Committee was presided by Sri Ratan Singh, a retired Judge of the Patna High Court. The Committee recorded a finding against the students and suggested action against them, but Dr. K. L. Shrimali did not take any action against the erring students, on the other hand he removed the petitioner and appointed Dr. Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department of Law. 20. In the counter-affidavit filed by Dr. A. S. Raturi, Registrar of the University, the above noted allegations are denied. It is asserted that in matters relating to the students trouble, admission of students, postponement of examinations, the Vice-Chancellor being the Principal Chief Executive Officer of the University, exercised his powers and took steps to serve the interest of the University having due regard to the circumstances which prevailed at that time. The Vice-Chancellor was not bound to act on the advice or in accordance with the will or desire of the petitioner. It is asserted that the Vice-Chancellor constituted a Committee consisting of a number of Professors including the petitioner to consider the question of appointment of students. The petitioner was appointed Convener of the Committee. The report of the Committee was placed before the University Grants Commission. The Vice-Chancellor was not antagonised with the petitioner, on the other hand whenever there was any occasion petitioner was assigned work of responsibility. He was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Organisation Committee for making necessary arrangements for the meeting of the Association of the Commonwealth Universities. The petitioner was however taking rigid attitude which was likely to enhance students trouble while the Vice-Chancellor took different view and tackled the various problems on a practical plane with a view to maintain peace in the University. As regards the allegation about delay in granting leave to the petitioner, it is asserted that the Executive Council was the competent authority to grant leave and the Vice-Chancellor had nothing to do with the delay which occurred in the grant of leave to the petitioner. The petitioner's allegation with regard to the transfer of the office Superintendent of the Law Department is denied. It is asserted that when the petitioner made complaint of insubordination against Sri Ramamurthi, Office Superintendent of the Law Department, he was requested to frame charge-sheet against him, but he refused to do the same. The petitioner's allegation with regard to the transfer of the office Superintendent of the Law Department is denied. It is asserted that when the petitioner made complaint of insubordination against Sri Ramamurthi, Office Superintendent of the Law Department, he was requested to frame charge-sheet against him, but he refused to do the same. Thereafter the petitioner was requested to send details of the incident on the basis of which Sri Ramamurthi was being accused of insubordination. After getting the details he was charge-sheeted for misconduct and misbehaviour and later on he was transferred to the Finance Section of the University Central Office. The Vice-Chancellor did not ask the petitioner to do anything unfair or improper although he was always anxious to see that the interest of the University did not suffer. The allegations relating to the incident which is alleged to have happened in the meeting of the Academic Council are replied in paragraph 43 of the counter-affidavit. The Academic Council by its resolution dated 12th October. 1973, did not approve the proceedings of the meeting of the Faculty of Law dated 14th September, 1973, instead it returned the same to the Faculty of Law, later on, it was confirmed with certain corrections. This indicated that originally minutes had not been recorded correctly. The petitioner as Dean of the Faculty of Law used to record the minutes of the meeting of the Faculty of Law, it was in these circumstances that the Vice-Chancellor told the petitioner to record the minutes of the meeting correctly. It is further asserted that there was a feeling among the teachers of the Law Department that the Faculty of Law should be divided in two Departments. That proposal was not accepted by the Faculty, thereafter the matter was dropped. It is denied that the proposal was directed against the petitioner. The allegation regarding the incorrect publication of the Ordinance is replied in paragraph 31 of the counter-affidavit, it states that the mistake had been committed by the office. The Dean of Faculty of Law namely the petitioner was requested to draft transitory Ordinances to regularise the matter. There was no question of Dr. K. L. Shrimali showing his annoyance towards the petitioner. The Dean of Faculty of Law namely the petitioner was requested to draft transitory Ordinances to regularise the matter. There was no question of Dr. K. L. Shrimali showing his annoyance towards the petitioner. The allegations contained in paragraphs 35 and 40 of the petition relating to the Enquiry Committee headed by Sri Gyanendra Kumar and the petitioners discussion with the Vice-Chancellor on matters relating to Sri Charan Das Seth, a part-time teacher in the Faculty of Law, are denied in paragraph 41 of the counter-affidavit. 21. Dr. K.L. Shrimali was impleaded by name and notice was issued to him by this Court but he has not filed his own affidavit placing his version before the court. Normally, if allegations of mala fides are made against a party it is the duty of that party, if notice is issued to him, to place his version before the court. Many a time allegations of mala fide cannot be determined unless the affidavit of the person concerned against whom mala fides are alleged is placed before the Court. The allegations relating to motive or malice or ill-will entertained by an authority or person can adequately be denied or controverted only by the authority or person concerned against whom allegations are made and not by any other person. Dr. K. L. Shrimali has strangely enough chosen not to file his own affidavit. Learned counsel for the University could not give any satisfactory explanation as to why Dr. K. L. Shrimali did not file his own affidavit giving his statement with regard to the allegations made against him. It is difficult to appreciate the conduct of Dr. K. L. Shrimali, as a responsible person he owed a duty to the Court to file return to place his own version before the Court. If Dr. K. L. Shrimali had filed his own affidavit, the task of the court would have been easier, his silence on the matters in issue makes the task of the court difficult. In the absence of any affidavit of Dr. K. L. Shrimali the court has no choice except to proceed on the assumption that the facts stated in the petition which relate exclusively to Dr. K. L. Shrimali are correct. No doubt some of the allegations made by the petitioner have adequately been replied by Dr. In the absence of any affidavit of Dr. K. L. Shrimali the court has no choice except to proceed on the assumption that the facts stated in the petition which relate exclusively to Dr. K. L. Shrimali are correct. No doubt some of the allegations made by the petitioner have adequately been replied by Dr. A.S. Raturi, but he could not and did not give any reply to the allegations which were within the exclusive knowledge of the Vice-Chancellor. Nonetheless, the petitioners onus still remains heavy to prove that Dr. K. L. Shrimali had animus against him and that in issuing the impugned order he did not exercise his powers bona fide, instead he was. (actuated by malice and ill-will towards the petitioner. In this background the petitioners legations are necessary to be considered. 22. In considering the aforesaid allegations of mala fide the proper approach is to consider the entire allegations together and to find out whether those allegations are sufficient to prove malice on the part of Dr. K.L. Shrimali and whether the impugned order was the result of the malice or ill-will. It may be that a single allegation if established may justify inference of mala fide, but if each allegation is dealt with separately if may not lead to inference of mala fide, but when all the allegations are taken together and found to be established then the inference may be drawn from those established allegations that the order was passed mala fide out of personal ill-will or malice. The allegations made by the petitioner against Dr. K. L. Shrimali are to the effect that the petitioners suggestions and protests in vinous matters relating to admission of students, holding of examinations, taking of disciplinary action against the students, grant of leave, taking action against the subordinate employees were not given any heed, instead the Vice-Chancellor acted in violation of rules and against the petitioner's suggestions. This indicates that there existed a serious difference of opinion between the petitioner and the Vice-Chancellor. Mere existence of difference of opinion, howsoever serious it may be, cannot be sufficient to draw inference that Dr. K.L. Shrimali entertained malice or ill-will against the petitioner on that account. This indicates that there existed a serious difference of opinion between the petitioner and the Vice-Chancellor. Mere existence of difference of opinion, howsoever serious it may be, cannot be sufficient to draw inference that Dr. K.L. Shrimali entertained malice or ill-will against the petitioner on that account. Many a time difference of opinion may exist between honest and right thinking persons but that by itself would not be sufficient to draw the inference of any motive or malice unless adequate facts and circumstances are placed to support the inescapable inference of malice or ill-will. 23. It is significant to note that the petition does not contain any averment that due to the aforesaid difference of opinion between the petitioner and Dr. K.L. Shrimali in matters relating to the administration of the Law Department or due to the incidents which took place in the meeting of the Academic Council or on other matters, Dr. K.L. Shrimali entertained malice against the petitioner or that he passed the impugned order appointing Professor Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department with a view to wreak vengeance against the petitioner. There is no such allegation at all in the petition except that the word "mala fide" has been used. There is no allegation of bad faith, motive or ill-will against Dr. K.L. Shrimali. In the absence of any such clear cut allegation, it is difficult to accept the contention that since there was difference of opinion between the petitioner and Dr. K.L. Shrimali, an inference should be drawn that the impugned order was passed by the Vice-Chancellor not with a purpose to effectuate the policy laid down by the Executive Council under Statute 25:4 but with a different purpose to remove the petitioner from the office of Head of Department merely because Dr. K. L. Shrimali was annoyed with him. In State of Haryana v. Rajendra Sareen ( AIR 1972 SC 1004 ) : (1972 Lab IC 546) the Supreme Court rejected the plea of mala Tides which was based on a number of incidents which indicated misunderstanding between the Chief Minister on the one hand and the Chief Secretary on the other. The principles laid down in that case are fully applicable to the instant case. The principles laid down in that case are fully applicable to the instant case. The allegations made by the petitioner merely show that there was difference of opinion between the petitioner and the Vice-Chancellor and those allegations fail to prove that in issuing the impugned order the dominant purpose was the ill-will or bad faith of the Vice-Chancellor which he entertained against the petitioner. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner laid stress on the allegations contained in paragraphs 35 and 40 of the petition and urged that the allegations contained therein could be replied only by the Vice-Chancellor and none else, since Dr. K. L. Shrimali has not filed his affidavit, the allegations contained therein are sufficient to draw inference of mala fides. On an analysis of the allegations made in paras. 35 and 40 of the petition, I find that the petitioner has failed to make out any case of personal ill-will or malice against Dr. K.L. Shrimali. The allegations contained in paragraph 35 of the petition merely suggest that the Vice-Chancellor committed impropriety in asking the petitioner to influence Sri Gyanendra Kumar to keep the interest of the University in his mind. The petitioner has further suggested that the Vice-Chancellor asked him to appear as a witness before the Committee and to depose about facts which he had not see. The vice-chancellor was keen to safeguard the interest of the University, he may have talked to the petitioner and expressed his opinion that Sri Gyanendra Kumar was taking an independent view and he was ignoring the interest of the University. He may have further asked the petitioner to appear as a witness. In doing that the Vice-Chancellor may have committed impropriety, but then if those facts are accepted to be correct, do not show any animus or existence of motive or ill-will against the petitioner. It is noteworthy that the Vice-Chancellor's request that the petitioner should appear as witness was carried out by the petitioner and he did appear as a witness. The allegations in paragraph 35 do not contain any clear assertion that the petitioner was asked by Dr. K.L. Shrimali to put pressure on Sri Gyanendera Kumar. It is noteworthy that the Vice-Chancellor's request that the petitioner should appear as witness was carried out by the petitioner and he did appear as a witness. The allegations in paragraph 35 do not contain any clear assertion that the petitioner was asked by Dr. K.L. Shrimali to put pressure on Sri Gyanendera Kumar. The petitioner has asserted that the Deputy Registrar (Academic) told him that the Vice-Chancellor was annoyed with Sri Gyandendra Kumar The petitioner ha no personal knowledge of this fact and that the said Deputy Registrar has not filed his own affidavit. The allegation contained in paragraph 35 of the petitioner do not support the allegations that Dr. K.L. Shrimali entertained personal malice against the petitioner and it was for that reason that the he appointed Prof. Dharam Pratap and removed the petitioner from the office of Head of Department. 25. Paragraph 40 of the petition contains allegations to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor asked the petitioner to resign from the office of Dean of the Faculty of Law and he asked the petitioner to take action against Sri Charan Dass Seth, a part-time teacher in the Department of Law. The averments contained in that paragraph show that the petitioner had told the Vice-Chancellor that he should put a moratorium to the question of continuance of a persons as Dean for Faculty of Law. The dispute in the present case is not for the office of Dean, Faculty of Law, but even if the Vice-Chancellor had asked the petitioner to resign from the office of the Dean, Faculty of Law, it does not necessarily follow that the Vice-Chancellor was interested in removing the petitioner from the office of Head of Department due to any personal malice or ill will. As regards the Vice-Chancellor request to the petitioner to take action against Sri Charan Das Seth, the petitioner has himself stated in paragraph 40 that the he had informed the Vice-Chancellor that since Sri Charan Das Seth had ceased to be employee of the University, no question of taking any action arose against him. In paragraph 40 of the affidavit of Dr. A.S. Raturi it has been asserted that there were complaints against Sri Charan Das Seth that he was advising the students who had filed cases against the University and that he was briefing tha lawyers against the University. In paragraph 40 of the affidavit of Dr. A.S. Raturi it has been asserted that there were complaints against Sri Charan Das Seth that he was advising the students who had filed cases against the University and that he was briefing tha lawyers against the University. The Vice-Chancellor took a serious note of this fact and for that Sri Charan Das Seth. On coming to know that Sri Charan Das Seth was no longer a part-time lecturer, the Vice-Chancellor did not take any further action in the matter. These facts again do not show that Dr. K.L. Shrimali acted with any malice or ill-will. 26. In order to ascertain the dominant purpose which was sought to be achieved by the impugned order it is necessary to consider the purpose which was sought to be achieved by enacting Statue 25:4. In this connection it would be pertinent to recall that the Estimate Committee of the Bansras Hindu University (1965-66) reported that there was an urgent need for relieving the Heads of Departments of routine administrative work so that they could devote more time for the planning and direction of the research and teaching. The report of the Estimate Committee was considered by the Gajendragadkar Committee which was appointed by the state of unrest and agitation in the University. In Chapter VI of its report of the Committee specifically dealt with this question and observed as under: "We feel that in view of the fact that the University would have mote that one professor, particularly in all the major departments it would be desirable that the headship in the department should go by rotation amongst the Professor. The term of head of the department may be two to three years. Each department should have a small advisory committee consisting of the junior and senior teacher. This Committee should look into the development needs and facilities for staff and research needs." The Executive Council considered the report of the Estimate Committee and the observation made by the Gaendragadkar Committee. The University Grants Commission also made a recommendation to the University to make provision for appointment of Head of Department by rotation so that Professor and Readers could get equal opportunity for acting as Head of Department. The University Grants Commission also made a recommendation to the University to make provision for appointment of Head of Department by rotation so that Professor and Readers could get equal opportunity for acting as Head of Department. In this back ground the Executive Council realised that if one Professor of the Department was allowed to continue as Head of a Department throughout his career, in that event interest of Eduction suffered because the Head of Department was generally busy with his administrative and other duties and he was not able to devote much of his time to academic matters and there was heart burning among other professors who never got any chance of becoming Head of Department. The Executive Council considered these aspects and thereupon it took a policy decision and made provision for the appointment of Head of Department by rotation as it was being done in the case of Deans of various Faculties. In pursuance of that policy the Executive Council framed Statue 25:4 conferring power on the Vice-Chancellor to appoint Head of Department for a period of two years. 27. The aforesaid historical back ground indicates the purpose for which power was conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to appoint Head of Department by rotation. The petitioner was appointed Head of Department in 1959 at a time when he was the only Professor in the Department of Law. Later on, two other posts of Professors were created. Thus there were three Professors working in the Department of Law. The petitioner acted as Head of Department of for a pretty long period. After the enforcement of Statute 25:4 the Vice-Chancellor was duty bound to appoint Professors by rotation for a period of two years. The Vice-Chancellor considered it necessary to appoint another Professor as Head of Department of Law and for that reason he issued the impugned order appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap. The Vice-Chancellor did not pick out the petitioner only He issued similar orders in respect of other Departments and those who had been holding the office of Head of Department for a incumbents were appointed in terms of Statute 24:4. These facts clearly show that the Vice-Chancellor was implementing the policy laid down by the Executive Council in changing Head of Department. In this background it is difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that in appointing Dr. These facts clearly show that the Vice-Chancellor was implementing the policy laid down by the Executive Council in changing Head of Department. In this background it is difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that in appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department of Law, the dominant purpose of the Vice-Chancellor was personal ill-will and not the purpose for which power was conferred on him. The petitioner has failed to raise even a whisper in the petitioner that the impugned order was issued by Dr. K.L. Shrimali on account of any malice or ill-will against the petitioner. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned order is vitiated on the ground of mala fides. 28. In view of the above discussion I do not find illegality in the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor appointing Dr. Dharam Pratap as Head of the Department of Law. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.