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1975 DIGILAW 45 (ALL)

Hamid Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh

1975-01-20

R.L.GULATI

body1975
JUDGMENT Gulati, J. - The petitioners are tenants of two adjoining shops. The petitioner No. 1, Hamid Hussain in a watch repairer and petitioner No. 2 Raj Kishore Baijal is a tailor. The shops were purchased by Azmat Ali in 1965. Azmat Ali himself lives in Malasiya while his family lives at Jaunpur with his brother Ahmad Ali, who holds a general power of attorney from his brother. Ahmed Ali is running a workshop for repairs and service of motor cycles and scooters and sale of parts and accessories thereof, in a shop belonging to one Hari Shanker. He is a licensee and not a regular tenant. He moved an application under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act on behalf of his brother Azmat Ali for permission to file a suit against the petitioners on the ground that the accommodation in dispute was required for Ahmad All where he wanted to shift his workshop. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application on the ground that the application under Section 3 should have been moved by the landlord himself and not by his brother and that the accommodation in possession of Ahmad Ali is adequate for his needs. He also held that the petitioners had no alternative accommodation and it would be unfair to shift them to some other locality because they had earned some goodwill. The Commissioner did not agree with these findings. He held that the fact that the landlord himself did not sign the application under Section 3 was not fatal and in any case his brother was competent to file such an application as he held a power of attorney in his favour. He also held that while the landlord was living in Malasiya his family consisting of 7 members was residing at Jaunpur and the two brothers were joint. The accommodation in which Ahmad Ali was carrying on the shop was too small and the accommodation in dispute was more adequate. He also found that the petitioners were engaged in petty work of tailoring and watch repairing which they could easily carry on at any other place and according to him the need of the landlord was genuine and greater than that of the tenant. He, therefore, granted the permission to the landlord to file the suit. He also found that the petitioners were engaged in petty work of tailoring and watch repairing which they could easily carry on at any other place and according to him the need of the landlord was genuine and greater than that of the tenant. He, therefore, granted the permission to the landlord to file the suit. Against this order the petitioners went up in revision before the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act. The State Government has endorsed the finding of the Commissioner and has held that on a comparison of the needs of the landlord and the tenant the need of the former appears to be genuine and greater. In the opinion of the State Government the petitioners would have no difficulty in finding alternative accommodation for petty work that they were doing. The petitioners are aggrieved and have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. In proceedings under Section 3 of the Act two things are essential. First of all it has to be found that the need of the landlord is genuine and bona fide and secondly if the need is found to be genuine and bona fide the authorities will have to compare the relative hardships in case the application is allowed. The Commissioner as also the State Government have recorded a finding on the material on record that the need of the landlord is genuine and on comparison they have also found his need to be greater than that of the tenant. It has also been found that the tenants would have no difficulty in finding alternative accommodation. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government suffer from any legal infirmity. 3. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the application under Section 3 of the Act was not maintainable inasmuch as it had not been signed by the landlord himself but had been signed by his brother and the power of attorney in the latter's favour did not authorise him to make such an application. It is not possible to accept this contention. A reading of the power of attorney as a whole leaves no room for doubt that the landlord had authorised his brother to institute or defend all proceedings to respect of his property. It is not possible to accept this contention. A reading of the power of attorney as a whole leaves no room for doubt that the landlord had authorised his brother to institute or defend all proceedings to respect of his property. The other could apply under Section 3 for permission to file a suit against the petitioners an the ground that the accommodation was required for the personal use of the landlord. In any case the objection is much too technical to be fatal and I agree with the Commissioner that the application could not be thrown out on this ground alone. 4. The next contention is that the application under Section 3 was based upon the need of the landlord's brother Ahmad All and it could not be said to be the need of the landlord. It was also urged that the Commissioner was wrong in holding that the two brothers were joint. He says that there is no such thing as a joint family under the Mohammadan law. Now it is true that under the Mohammadan law the concept of a joint Hindu family as under the Hindu law is not there but it cannot be said that a Muslim family cannot be joint. The Commissioner had in the instant case found that the landlord's family was living with his brother at Jaunpur and the two might have joint interest in the business which the brother was carrying on at Jaunpur. But even if the brothers were not joint in the business the fact that the landlord's family and his brother were living jointly at Jaunpur is enough to provide a legitimate basis for the landlord's request to have the shop vacated for the use of his brother. Section 3 of the Act does not enumerate the circumstances under which permission may be granted to a landlord to file a suit for the ejectment of his tenant. It leaves a discretion with the Rent Control and Eviction officer. In my opinion, it would be relevant consideration if permission is granted to a landlord to file a suit against his tenant on the ground that the accommodation is needed by his brother. Such a need would be considered to be the personal need of the landlord. The need of the landlord need not necessarily be his personal need. In my opinion, it would be relevant consideration if permission is granted to a landlord to file a suit against his tenant on the ground that the accommodation is needed by his brother. Such a need would be considered to be the personal need of the landlord. The need of the landlord need not necessarily be his personal need. It may be the need of any member of his family who is dependent upon him or in whose welfare he is interested. In Balbhadra Beharilal v. Premchand Lalchand, AIR 1953 Nagpur 144 , it was held that the need of the widowed daughter and her children must be deemed to be the need of the landlord, because even though a married daughter leaves the family of her father but the blood ties are not severed and certain obligations still remain on the parents for the welfare of the daughter and her children if she becomes a widow. The learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court have held that the expression "personal need" must be given a liberal interpretation. They have relied upon two decisions of the English Courts. The first is Smith v. Panny, (1946) 2 All. Er. 672, where the words "for himself" were interpreted to include the members of the landlord's family. The second is Jones v. Whitehill, (1950) 1 All Er. 71 , where it has been held that a niece of the tenant's wife was regarded as falling within the meaning of "members of the tenant's family." 5. In Institute of Radio Technology v. Pandurang, AIR 1946 Bombay 212 , the words "his own occupation" in Section 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939 were interpreted to mean the occupation of the landlord and all persons who are dependant on him. The learned Judges have also relied upon the observations of Chagla, C. J. in Parikh v. Ochhalal Parikh, Cited at page 257 of the principal of Rent Control by R.B. Andhyarujina Changla, C. J. held that looking to the customs of the society and the nature of socialties which subsist between the different members of family in India a members of the family of the landlord for whom the premises are required need not necessarily be dependant upon the landlord. I am in respectful agreement with this view. I am in respectful agreement with this view. The brother of the landlord would safely be said to be a member of his family and his need could be equated with the need of the landlord. I, therefore, find no force in the contention of the learned counsel that the need of the landlord was not personal and, as such, no permission should have been granted to him to evict the tenants. 6. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.