JUDGMENT K.B. Srivastava, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution relates to two service matters, regarding seniority and promotion. 2. Originally, there were two petitioners and 19 respondents; however, on account of the deaths of Shri Ram Bhargava, petitioner No. 2, and Abdul Khair, respondent No. 10; and the superannuation of Mritunjai Lal, Pooran Chand Pande, Ram Sunder Singh and Ghulam Haider, respondents Nos. 6, 11, 12 and 15, during the pendency of the petition and the controversies being purely personal relating to service matters the maxim or the principles of the maxim actio personalis moritnr cum personal, has become applicable-and further since the service interests of the deceased Sri Ram Bhargava only and not of Madan Mohan Saran, petitioner, No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) clashed with those of A.B. Sinha and S.K. Bose, respondents Nos. 18 and 19, the dispute has now narrowed down between the petitioner and Chandra Bhushan Lal Srivastava, Jivan Chand Mitra, Kripa Narain Srivastava, Prag Raj Dube, Mahesh Chandra Srivastava, Shushil Kumar Srivastava, Vishwa Nath Prasad, Brij Narain Mehra, shyam Krishan Lal and Nabi Ahmad, respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16 and 17 respectively, and, in the circumstances, therefore, it would be necessary to narrate only such facts as are relevant to the remaining controversy. 3. The prayer in the petition is for the issue of three separate writs namely - (a) A writ of certiorari quashing (i) three orders dated September 6, 1967, October 19, 1968 and March 1, 1969, passed by the Chief Justice, respondent No. 1 containing general principles for fixation of seniority of the staff holding posts in various grades in the Establishment of the High Court, and (ii) Gradation List of 1951, Draft Gradation List of 1967 and Final Gradation List of 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 1951, 1967 and 1969 Lists), in so far as they show respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16 and 17 as senior to the petitioner, (b) A writ of quo warranto requiring the respondents Nos 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 to show by what authority they are holding the posts of Assistant Superintendent or Superintendent in the said Establishment and (c) A writ of mandamus commanding respondent no. 1 and the Registrar, respondent No. 2, to re-fix the seniority of the petitioner and respondents, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16 and 17 on the basis of their respective lengths of service in a substantive capacity in the grade of Upper Division Assistants (hereinafter referred to as U. D. As.). 4. For a proper appreciation of the controversy, it seems necessary to mention that formerly there used to be two High Courts in our state, namely, the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh, referred to as "existing High Courts" in Article 2 (1) of the U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. By the Force of Article 3 of the said Order, as from the appointed day (July 26, 1948), the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh (the existing High Courts) were amalgamated and thereafter constituted one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which has been referred to in the subsequent Articles as "the New High Court". By virtue of Article 6, every person who, immediately before the appointed day, was a servant of either of the existing High Courts was as from that day a servant of the New High Court, and was deemed to have been appointed to a corresponding pest in the New High Court, on the same terms and conditions of service (or on terms and conditions as similar thereto as the changes effected by the Amalgamation Order permitted) as were applicable to him immediately before the appointed day, provided that nothing in Article 6 was to be deemed to prevent the Chief Justice of the New High Court from altering the designation or the duties of any posts. Now, before the appointed day, there were two separate Establishments of staff, one under the existing High Court in Allahabad and the other under the Chief Court in Oudh. With the amalgamation of the existing High Courts, the staff in the two separate Establishments stood automatically appointed in the Establishment of the New High Court. The twin questions of fixation of seniority of the staff of the previous two Establishments vis-a-vis each other and promotion to superior posts or grades, became a live issue and took years to resolve, and seems still to be in a state of uncertainty in certain respects. 5. The twin questions of fixation of seniority of the staff of the previous two Establishments vis-a-vis each other and promotion to superior posts or grades, became a live issue and took years to resolve, and seems still to be in a state of uncertainty in certain respects. 5. One matter which may be dealt with at the outset is as to the nature and pattern of the office establishment of our High Court. The petitioner's contention in paragraphs 10 to 16 of the petition is that the establishment has a multiplicity of cadres, each with a different method of recruitment; different sanctioned strengths of posts, whether permanent or temporary; different scales of pay; different nature of work; and even different avenues of promotion, thus, according to him, there are separate cadres of Superintendents, U. D. As. Reference Clerks (hereinafter referred to as R. C.), Lower Division Assistants (hereinafter referred to as L. D. As), Translators and Revisers. He has further contended that the fact that the establishment consists of separate cadres is one which was recognised by Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, the then Chief Justice, on October, 18, 1933 and by a Judges Committee on September, 2, 1937, on Administrative File No. VC-35 and by respondent No. 2 on December 5, 1962 and by the Judges Committee on December 16 1965, on Administrative File No. VC-119. This contention of the petitioner has been controverted in paragraphs 8 to 13 of the joint counter affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. According to them, their is a single establishment with a single cadre, though for administrative convenience, the work of the establishment is divided into four separate department called (1) General office (comprising Administrative, Judicial, Accounts, Criminal, Copying Stamp Reporters and Library Sections). (2) Translation Department, (3) Bench Readers Department and (4) Personal Assistants and Stenographers Department. each department leaving different nomenclature of posts, in different scales of pay, with different nature of work, but still constituting only one establishment. The word "cadre" has at times been used in official correspondence and notings but their contention is that the mere wrong or loose use can have no effect upon the true factual and legal position that the establishment is one comprising it single service and a single cadre. There appears to be substance in this contention. The word "cadre" has at times been used in official correspondence and notings but their contention is that the mere wrong or loose use can have no effect upon the true factual and legal position that the establishment is one comprising it single service and a single cadre. There appears to be substance in this contention. It appears that the then Provincial Government framed Draft Rules under Section 241 (2) (b) read with Section 242 (4) of the Government of India Act, 1935, to regulate the conditions of service of the staff attached to the existing High Court in Allahabad and sent the same for comments to that High Court on March 15, 1940, (see page 315 of the paper book). Draft Rule 2 had two provisos. The first proviso was as follows :- "Provided that the Chief Justice may from time to time leave unfilled or hold in abeyance any vacant post without entitling a person to any compensation, or may, after obtaining the sanction of the Governor, increase the strength of the staff attached to the High Court (or transfer a post from one cadre to another)." (Emphasis added). The High Court changed the proviso by deleting the words "or transfer a post from one cadre to another" and the reason given was that "the different sections in the office are not to be regarded as separate cadres". Likewise, Draft Rule 5 relating to rates of pay, Draft Rules 7, 8 and 9 (corresponding to existing Rules 8, 9 and 10) relating to promotion also contained the word "cadre" but the word was deleted from these rules also. The Governor accepted the Rules, as modified by the High Court by G. O. No. 680,'VII-140-936, dated April 13, 1946, and as a result of that the Allahabad High Court (Conditions of Service of Stiff) Rules, 1946 (hereinafter re offered to as the Rules) came into force with effect from April 29, 1946. The opening clause, and Rules 4, 5, 7 (1), 7 (2., 11, 12, 13, 14 (a) and 16, and the provisos to Rules 2, 10 and 12 (7) of the Rules refer to all the posts as one entity by comprehensive term "staff attached to the High Court" Rules 8, 9 and 10 refer to the staff as officials of one or other department. Rule 2 says that the "staff attached to the High Court shall consist of the posts specified in the first column of the schedule hereto." The scheme behind the Rules thus also points to the fact that a the establishment is one, comprising a single cadre. 11te question whether there is only one of there are separate and distinct cadres, came up for decision in Abdul Khair v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice (Special Appeal No. 312 of 1970, decided on August 26, 1970) (All) and S.N. Dwivedi, J., (as he then was), speaking for the court, observed thus : "It is true that in correspondence the word 'cadre' has often been used. The word 'grade' has also been used. The word class has perhaps never been used. It seems to us that the word 'cadre' has been used loosely in correspondence. There are no cadres in the High Court staff. The Rules do not use the word 'cadre'. Indeed, the word 'cadre' was used in the draft rules but it was deleted at the instance of the court from the finalised rules. The staff of the High Court constitute one establishment. Services are classified according to posts, and grades or classes. There is also classification of posts and grades or classes into departments." The Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1414 of 1972 against this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court on August 14, 1972. We are is agreement with the above observations, and see no reason to take a different view. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the definition of the word "cadre" in F. R. 9 (4). The U. P. Fundamental Rules were made by the over nor in exercise of his powers under Section 241 (2) (h) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under F.R. 9 (4), the word "cadre" means the strength of a service or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit. The argument is that there can be a separate cadre for a part of a service also and since various posts under various nomenclatures have been sanctioned by the Governor, therefore, posts under a particular nomenclature must be regarded as posts borne on a separate cadre. We are riot inclined to agree with this contention. The argument is that there can be a separate cadre for a part of a service also and since various posts under various nomenclatures have been sanctioned by the Governor, therefore, posts under a particular nomenclature must be regarded as posts borne on a separate cadre. We are riot inclined to agree with this contention. In the first instance, the proposition statement of the establishment of the Chief Court in Oudh, as sanctioned by C. O. No. 508/VII-800 (59)/1947- Judicial (Civil) Department, dated February 18, 1948, and the Rules both speak of one establishment and though the grades of pay are different, they are all shown as the strength of a single service in the establishments of the then two existing High Courts. Secondly, even though they may be regarded as a pact of a service, there is nothing to show that they have been sanctioned as separate units. Thirdly, the Fundamental Rules came into force with effect from April 1, 1942, whereas the Rules came into force four years later. The rule-making authority, namely, the Governor must have been aware of the definition of the word "cadre" in the Fundamental Rules when he approved the Rules and accepted the proposal of the High Court that the service constituted one service and the word "cadre" should be deleted from all rules wherein it occurred. In the circumstances, therefore, we are of the view that the office establishment, of our court is one establishment having a single cadre and it is wrong to say that there are several cadres in that service. 6. The petitioner has challenged the seniority fixed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on a variety of grounds, namely (1) the competency on the part of respondent No. 1 to pass orders of seniority, in the absence of a rule. (2) failure to circulate the 1951 List to the staff posted at Lucknow with a view to inviting objections against that list, (3) failure to decide objections made by the petitioner to the 1967 and the 1969 Lists, (4) breach of the rules of natural justice in not affording an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard in connection with his representations, and (5) wrong decision regarding the seniority of the petitioner as against respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16 and 17. 7. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16 and 17. 7. The Rules deal with the strength of 'staff conditions of service of Registrar probation, rates of pay, pay during the period of probation, other conditions of service promotion, promotion to posts of responsibility, promotion to posts of Deputy Registrar etc., appointment, enquiry into conduct of members of staff, appeals, period of appeal, conditions of service of inferior servants and protection of rights of staff in employment on March 31, 1937, There is no specific rule at all for regulating seniority amongst the members of staff. Rule 7, which deals with "other conditions of service" in so far as it is material, reads : 7(1) "Subject to these rules, the rules and orders for the time being in force and applicable to servants of the Crown of corresponding classes in the service of the United Provinces Government shall regulate the conditions of service of persons serving on the staff attached to the High Court : Provided that the powers exercisable under the said rules and orders by the Governor shall be exercisable ......... by the Chief Justice or by such person as he may, by general or special order, direct. (2) If any question arises as to which rules and orders are applicable to the case of any person serving on the staff attached to the High Court, it shall .................. be decided by the Chief Justice." 8. The applicability of rule 7 to the question of fixation of seniority, was not accepted in Abdul Khair's case (supra) in the following terms: "We think that rule 7 cannot help............ which class of service in the Government service corresponds to any class of service in this court is to be determined by the Chief Justice under rule 7 (2). We do not think that it is open to us to determine that question." Rule 7 has not been pleaded as the seniority rule in the petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not pin his faith also on that rule as the rule regulating seniority. We do not think that it is open to us to determine that question." Rule 7 has not been pleaded as the seniority rule in the petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not pin his faith also on that rule as the rule regulating seniority. The questions as to which classes of servants of the Crown correspond to which classes of the staff of the High Court and as to which rules and orders applicable to the servants of the Crown are also applicable to the staff of the High Court, are at the bottom questions of fact and not of law. Respondent No. 1 alone is competent under sub-rule (2) Of rule 7 to decide such matters. It is not open to us to divest him of this power and allocate it to ourselves. Nor is it possible slap in the absence of the relevant facts From the record. It appears to us, therefore, that rule 7 has no applicability to matters concerning regulation of seniority and since there is no other rule specifically governing such matters, we will have to find out whether respondent No. 1 has any such power under -Article 229 of the Constitution. Article 229, in so far as it is relevant reads : 229 (1) "Appointments of officers and servants of the High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the court as he may direct : Provided that............ (2) subject to the provisions of any law made by the legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose : Provided that the rules made in this clause shall, so for as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions require the approval of the Governor of the State." Under clause (2) of Article 229, the Chief Justice of a High Court has the power to provide for the conditions of service of the servants of his High Court by making rules for the purpose. Such rules, if any, are however, subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of that State. Such rules, if any, are however, subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of that State. Neither the Legislature of our State, nor the Chief Justice of our High Court, as has been seen above, has made any law or rule to govern seniority. Under clause (1) of Article 229, however, the Chief Justice of a High Court has tie power to make appointments of servants of his High Court. The question now is, whether in the absence of a law or rule, the administrative, power of appointment, with the constitutional backing (behind it, does or dies not include the power to pass orders from time to time to regulate the seniority of the servants already appointed or to be appointed from time to time. The fixation of seniority does not relate to salaries. allowances, leave or pension, and there- fore the approval of the Governor shall not be necessary in the matter of regulation of seniority as the Chief Justice has the power to regulate if under clause (l). In T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem, AIR 1961 SC 276 , the question mooted was as to the extent and amplitude of the administrative power of a statutory authority in the matter of appointment, dismissal or removal, in the absence of laws or rules and regulations governing such matters. The Supreme Court held : "It is true that where executive power impinges upon the rights of citizens it will have to be backed by an appropriate law; but where executive power is concerned only with the personnel of the administration it is not necessary even though it may be desirable that there must be laws, rules or regulations governing the appointment of those who would carry on the administration under the control of the District Counsel. The sixth Schedule vested the administration of the autonomous districts in the Governor during the transitional period and thereafter in the District Council. The administration could only be carried on by officers like the Siem or Chief and others below him, and it seems to us quite clear, if the administration was to be carried on, as it must that the Governor in the first instance and the District Council after they came into existence, would have power by virtue of the administration being vested in them to appoint officers and others to carry on the administration. Further once the power of appointment falls within the power of administration of the district the power of removal of officers and others so appointed would necessarily follow as a corrollary. The Constitution could not have intended that all administration in the autonomous districts should come to a stop till the Governor made regulations under paragraph 19 (1) (b) or till the District Council passed laws under Para 3 (1) (g). The Governor in the first instance and the District Councils thereafter were vested with the power to carry on the administration and that in our opinion included the power to appoint and remove the personnel for carrying on the administration. Doubtless when regulations are made under Para 19 (1) (b) or laws are passed under para 3 (1) with respect to the appointment or removal of the personnel of the Administration, the administrative authorities would be bound to follow the regulations so made or the laws so passed. But from this it does not follow that till the regulations were made or the laws were passed, there could be no appointment or dismissal of the personnel of the administration. In our opinion, the authorities concerned would at all relevant times have the power to appoint or remove administrative personnel and the general power of administration vested in them by the sixth Schedule. The view therefore taken by the High Court that there could be no appointment or removal by the District Council without a law having been first passed in that behalf under Para 3 (1) (g) cannot be sustained." In B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1942 , the contention was that no recruitment could be made to any service so long as rules were not made under Article 209 of the Constitution. The contention was repelled by the Supreme Court in the following words : "We are unable to accept this contention. First it is not obligatory under proviso to Article 309 to make rules of recruitment, etc., before a service can be constituted or a post created or filled. This is not to say that it is not desirable that ordinarily rubes should be made on all matters which are susceptible of being embodied in rules. Secondly, the State Government has executive power, in relation to all matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power, to make laws......... This is not to say that it is not desirable that ordinarily rubes should be made on all matters which are susceptible of being embodied in rules. Secondly, the State Government has executive power, in relation to all matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power, to make laws......... We see nothing in the terms of Article 309 of the Constitution which abridges the power of the executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution without a law. It is hardly necessary to mention that if there is a statutory rule or an Act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it cannot in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act." In Sant Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 the point canvassed was that in the absence of statutory rules governing promotions to Selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the rules already framed. The contention was overruled by the Supreme Court in the following terms : "We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory Rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed." 9. The ratio of these three decisions of the Supreme Court has full application and thus there can be no doubt that it is open to the Chief (Justice to regulate seniority under clause (1) of Article 229 in the absence f law and rules on the subject. Clause (1) confers on him the power to make appointments. This power is unfettered, without any limitations or inhibitions. The power is very wide and would necessarily include the ancillary power to regulate seniority amongst the appointees. Clause (1) confers on him the power to make appointments. This power is unfettered, without any limitations or inhibitions. The power is very wide and would necessarily include the ancillary power to regulate seniority amongst the appointees. There can be no doubt that such an implied power is inherent in the superior power of appointment. It would thus be clear that where there are no rules whatsoever to govern service matters, or where there are rules but they are silent as to a particular service matter, the authority competent to regulate that matter, can issue instructions from time to time with regard to that matter. In making the appointments and in regulating the seniority of the staff, the Chief Justice exercises an administrative power with Constitutional validity behind it, and the discretion exercised by him cannot be open to challenge, except on well know grounds, that is to say hen the exercise of discretion is discriminatory or mala fide, or the like the test of competency, therefore, respondent No. 1 had on the power to pass the various impugned orders. 10. The posts which have some bearing on the determination of the question of seniority, are those of L.D. As., R. Cs. and U.D.As. in the General Office, and of Translators and Revisers in the Translation Department. There were no posts of L.D. As., and U.D.As., before April 1, 1947, as prior to that date, there were corresponding posts collectively known as posts of Assistants in various grades of pay. The scales of pay were revised on July 4, 1931, April 1, 1947, April 1, 1965, August 1, 1967, and August 1, 1972. They are known as post 1931, post-1947, post-1965, post-1967 and post-1972 scales of pay. The scales of pay were as follows : L.D. As. Post-1947: Rs. 60-4-100-EB-5-140. Post-1965: Rs. 100-4-120-EB-5-145-EB-5-170-EB-5-180. Post-1967: Rs. 120-6- 150-EB-6-180-EB-10-230-EB-10-250, Post-1972: Rs. 280-8-320-EB-9-410-EE-10-450, RCs. Post-1947: Rs. 75-5-100-EB-5-160. Post-1965: Rs. 120-6-150-EB-6-180-EB-8-220) . Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-260-EB-15-335-EB-15-380-EB-400. Post-1972: Rs. 350-15-500-EB-20-600-EB-25-700. U. D. As. Post-1947: Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300. Post-1965: Rs. 150-8-190-EB-10-240-E B-10-260--I2-296-EB-12 320-15-350- Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-275-EB-15-350-E 3-20-450. Post-1972: Rs. 350-15-500-EB-20-600-EB-25-700. Translators. Post-1947: Rs. 120-8-200- EB-10-300. Post-1965: Rs. 150-8-190-EB-10-240-EB-10-260-12-296-EB-12-320-15-350. Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-260-EB-15-335-EB-I5-380-EB-20-400. Post-1972: Rs. 350- 15-500-EB-20-600-EB-25-700. Revisers: Post-1947: Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300-Plus Special pay of Rs. 20/-. Post-1965: Rs. 180-10-220-10-260-EB-12-320-EB-15-380. Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-260-EB-15-335-EB-15-380--EB-20--400-plus a special pay of Rs. 20/-. Post-1972: Rs. 350-15-500-EB-20-600--EB-25--700 plus a Spacial pay of Rs. 20/-. 11. 120-8-200-EB-10-300. Post-1965: Rs. 150-8-190-EB-10-240-E B-10-260--I2-296-EB-12 320-15-350- Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-275-EB-15-350-E 3-20-450. Post-1972: Rs. 350-15-500-EB-20-600-EB-25-700. Translators. Post-1947: Rs. 120-8-200- EB-10-300. Post-1965: Rs. 150-8-190-EB-10-240-EB-10-260-12-296-EB-12-320-15-350. Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-260-EB-15-335-EB-I5-380-EB-20-400. Post-1972: Rs. 350- 15-500-EB-20-600-EB-25-700. Revisers: Post-1947: Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300-Plus Special pay of Rs. 20/-. Post-1965: Rs. 180-10-220-10-260-EB-12-320-EB-15-380. Post-1967: Rs. 200-15-260-EB-15-335-EB-15-380--EB-20--400-plus a special pay of Rs. 20/-. Post-1972: Rs. 350-15-500-EB-20-600--EB-25--700 plus a Spacial pay of Rs. 20/-. 11. Judged from any angle, the post of a L. D. A. has always been inferior to the post of an U.D. A A. The nomenclature 'Lower' and 'Upper', the scales of pay in the post-1947, 1965, 1967 and 1972 of the two kinds of posts ; the avenue of promotion from the post of a L.D.A., first to the post of a R.C., in a higher scale, and then to the post of an U.D.A. in a still higher scale all point to the same conclusion. It is true that no comparison is possible between The post of a L.D.A. in the General Office and the post of a translator in the Translation Department ; still, on the basis of scales of pay of these two posts, in the post-1947, 1965, 1967 and 1972 scales of pay, the post of a L.D.A. has throughout been an inferior one, carrying a lower scale of salary. Now as regards Translators and U.D.As., the scales of pay of a Translator and an U.D.A., were identical for a long number of years from April 1, 1947, to July 31, 1967. The post 1967 scales of pay did however, make a distinction between these two posts on same respects. The minimum of the two scales still remained the same at Rs. 200/-, but a departure was made in three respects, namely, (1) the number of efficiency bars to be crossed by a Translator was three as against two by an U.D.A.. (2) the rate of annual increment admissible to a Translator was Rs. 15/ up to the stage of Rs. 380/-whereas the rate of annual increment admissible to an U.D.A., was Rs. 20/-from lower stage of Rupees 350/- and (3) the maximum of the Scale of a Translator was Rs. 400/- as against the maximum of Rs. (2) the rate of annual increment admissible to a Translator was Rs. 15/ up to the stage of Rs. 380/-whereas the rate of annual increment admissible to an U.D.A., was Rs. 20/-from lower stage of Rupees 350/- and (3) the maximum of the Scale of a Translator was Rs. 400/- as against the maximum of Rs. 450/- of an U.D.A. This distinction was done away with on March 20, 1968 when Government took two decisions, one of parity between the two posts and the second giving this parity retrospective effect, (para 15 of counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 1, and 2). The distinction thus had a temporary phase, and after its abolition with restropective effect, it has no effect upon the fact that posts of Translators and U. D. As. have always carried an identical scale of salary and can be treated as equivalent posts. 12. After the amalgamation of the two High Courts, the question of laying down principles for determination of seniority of the staff of the two separate establishments, was referred to a committee of three Hon'ble Judges. Mr. Justice K.N. Wanchoo (as he then was) suggested that "seniority should be determined grade-wise (1947), that is, separately for Upper Division Assistants, Reference Clerks and Lower Division Assistants on the basis of pre-1931 scales of pay that the Assistants would have been drawing on the date of the amalgamation, had the post-1931 and the revised 1947 scales of pay not come into force; but if at any stage all the. Assistants of Allahabad and Lucknow were drawing salaries in the post-1931 scale of pay, seniority should be determined on the basis of the date of confirmation in post-1931 scale of pay, Assistants confirmed in the higher scales of pay would he senior to those confirmed in the lower scales. For Assistants in the same pre-1931 grade, seniority would be according to the date of confirmation in the grade." Mr. Justice Raghubar Dayal (as he then was) agreed with this and their recommendations were approved by B.B. Malik, the then Chief Justice on June 9, 1949 (page 92 of the paper book). For Assistants in the same pre-1931 grade, seniority would be according to the date of confirmation in the grade." Mr. Justice Raghubar Dayal (as he then was) agreed with this and their recommendations were approved by B.B. Malik, the then Chief Justice on June 9, 1949 (page 92 of the paper book). This position is in accord also with the principles formulated by the State Government in Judicial (Civil) Department G. O. No. 2673/VII-517-1947, dated September 29, 1948 (page 93 of the paper book), namely, that "those belonging to higher class or grade are senior to those belonging to lower grade or class irrespective of length of service." The 1951 Lists prepared separately for L. D. As. , R. Cs. U. D. As., Translators Revisers and other categories of posts, showing the inter se seniority of each member of the staff in a particular grade, as on February 1, 1951, was founded on these principles based on fair play, common sense and anxiety to do justice. The petitioner's contention (Paragraph 4 of the petition) that this list has no binding force due its non-circulation and thereby depriving him of an opportunity to make a representation, in breach of the principles of natural justice, is devoid of force in view of the positive assertion of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, based on official records (paragraph 6 of their counter-affidavit) that the list was duly circulated and the petitioner made no representation whatsoever. It will be too late in the day now to permit him to assail it after a lapse of practically two decades. 13. Perhaps on account of reluctance or the part of the staff to move on promotion from Allahabad to Lucknow or from Lucknow to Allahabad, entailing inconvenience to them or, may be, impelled by a desire to effect economy, respondent No. 2 devised a system of local promotions from a lower grade to a higher grade of Allahabad Assistants in the vacancies occurring at Allahabad and of the Lucknow Assistants in the vacancies occurring at Lucknow, without affecting their respective seniority in the combined gradation list, Respondent No. 2 accordingly pissed an order on August 16, 1952, which reads thus : "May restrict future promotions from one grade to another of the Allahabad Assistants in the vacancies occurring at Allahabad and of the Lucknow Assistants in the vacancies occurring at Lucknow to the following conditions. (a) That in consequence of this system of promotion, the seniority of Assistants in both the branches of office shall remain intact according to the positions in the combined gradation list. (b) That the above system of local promotions will in no way operate as a bar in the case of any Assistant who may be prepared for physical transfer when his turn for promotion comes." This system of local promotions thus made it possible for a person at Lucknow junior to a person at Allahabad, in the same scale of pay, to be promoted locally at Lucknow to a higher grade and vice versa, unless such a person was prepared for his physical transfer from one place to another, but it was made clear that such promotion will not make him senior to the person who has not ben promoted, though be is senior to him in the combined gradation list. His seniority was to remain intact. The petitioner's contention that this order has no statutory force because respondent No. 2 was not competent to pass it, has no merit inasmuch as this order was upheld later by respondent No. 1. It would follow from this that the petitioner's claim of being senior because of his earlier promotion and confirmation, as against the respondents, cannot be allowed to prevail. In order to enable us to judge the petitioner's seniority vis-a-vis respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5,7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16 and 17 on merits it was incumbent upon the petitioner to have given his and their service history but he has, either by design or laches, omitted to do so and has thus left the matter in a state of uncertainty. It should have been obvious to him that comparative seniority can only be judged on the availability of the entire relevant data. We had no option but to collect the history as as we could from the scanty material on the record. 14. The petitioner must have been an Assistant before April 1, 1947 in one of the scale of pay admissible to various categories of Assistants, but there can be no doubt that he came to hold the post of a L. D. A. on April 1, 1947 in the scale of Rs. 60-4-100-EB-5-140. 14. The petitioner must have been an Assistant before April 1, 1947 in one of the scale of pay admissible to various categories of Assistants, but there can be no doubt that he came to hold the post of a L. D. A. on April 1, 1947 in the scale of Rs. 60-4-100-EB-5-140. That this would be the true position can admit of no doubt, notwithstanding the petitioner's contention in paragraph 2 of his petition that he had originally entered service in Oudh as a L.D. A., which fact has correctly been denied by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in paragraph 4 of their counter-affidavit as there were posts of Assistants only in various grades and no posts of L. D. As. before April 1, 1947. The petitioner has suppressed the date of his confirmation as a L. D. A. the date of his promotion to or confirmation in the next higher post of a R.C., or even the date of his promotion to the next higher post of an U. D. A. He has only cared to give August 1, 1960 as date of his confirmation as an U. D. A. His seniority in the 1951 list of L. D. As. was at 78 and in the 1967 List of U. D. As. at 25 and in the 1969 List of U.D. As. at 13. Thus, on the date of the petition, he was confirmed U. D. A. in the scale of Rs. 200-15-275-EB-15-350-EB-20-450 (paragraphs 5 and 7 of the petition and pages 29 and 291 of the paper book). 15. Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were, appointed directly as Translators in the scab of Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300 and confirmed as such on October 3, 1951, July 13, 1952 and November 1, 1952 respectively when the petitioner was still holding the post of a L. D. A. in the lower scale of Rs. 60-4-100- EB-5-140. Thus their confirmation as Translators in the higher scale was made about nine years, 8 years and nine years respectively earlier dun the confirmation of the petitioner as an U. D. A. in the equivalent grade of Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300. Their seniority vis-a-vis the petitioner cannot be judged on the basis of the 1951 List because they were shown in the 1951 List of Translators, while the petitioner held his seniority at 78 in the 1951 List of L.D. As. 120-8-200-EB-10-300. Their seniority vis-a-vis the petitioner cannot be judged on the basis of the 1951 List because they were shown in the 1951 List of Translators, while the petitioner held his seniority at 78 in the 1951 List of L.D. As. In the 1967 List of U. D. As, these three respondents had their respective seniority at 10, 11 and 12 as against 25 of the petitioner. In the 1969 List, they are not shown in the List of U. D. As. because by then, they were holding higher posts of either of a Superintendent or an Assistant Superintendent, but the petitioner was still in the U. D. As. List at No. 13. 16. Respondent No. 7 was, like the petitioner, a L. D. A. in the lower scale of Rs. 60-4-100-EB-5-140 and was junior to him in the 1951 List of L. D. As. (his seniority being at 162 as against 78 of the petitioner) but he was selected and appointed as a Translator in the higher scale of' Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300 in the year 1954 and was confirmed on such a post on November 9, 1955 about five years earlier than the confirmation of the petitioner as an U. D. A. in the equivalent grade. His seniority in the 1967 List of U. D. As. was at 14 as against 25 of the petitioner. His name also does not figure in the 1969 List of U. D. As. as, like respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5, he had also been promoted by then to a still higher post of an Assistant Superintendent. (paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 7 and page 36 of the paper book). 17. After coming into force of the Constitution, writ work increased and translation work decreased thereby necessitating an increase in the sanctioned strength of U. D. As. (dealing with writ work etc.) and a corresponding decrease in the sanctioned strength of Translators (responsible for translation work). Accordingly, from time to time, respondent No. I moved the State Government for the abolition of some posts of Translators and a corresponding increase in the posts of U. D. As. in lieu thereof. The Government accepted the proposal and abolished four posts of Translators and created four corresponding posts of U. D. As. Accordingly, from time to time, respondent No. I moved the State Government for the abolition of some posts of Translators and a corresponding increase in the posts of U. D. As. in lieu thereof. The Government accepted the proposal and abolished four posts of Translators and created four corresponding posts of U. D. As. on January 1, 1955 and abolished five posts of Translators and created five corresponding posts of U. D. As. on August 1, 1961. As a consequence thereof batch of four (Translators and Bench Readers) was transferred to the General office in 1955 and the second batch of five was transferred in 1961, Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 were included in the batch of five (page 36 of the paper book). The transfer of these two batches of four and five was, however, not made in the interest of administration but at their own request and after they had given an undertaking that they should be placed at the bottom of the U. D. As. Gradation List. The ordinary rule of seniority was, therefore, not applied in their case and they were made juniors to such of the U. D. As. who were already working in the General office from dates earlier than their dates of transfer (paragraphs 17 to 21 of the petition, paragraphs 4, 15 and 16 of the counter-affidavit of respondents No. 1 and 2 and paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 7). 18. Respondent No. 8 was appointed directly as a Translator on September 8, 1952 and confirmed as such on March 1, 1954 in the higher grade of Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300; and while holding a lien on the permanent posy of a Translator in the said grade, he was assigned to the General office to look after the important work of amendment of rules. 120-8-200-EB-10-300; and while holding a lien on the permanent posy of a Translator in the said grade, he was assigned to the General office to look after the important work of amendment of rules. Respondent No. 1 moved the Government on January 31, 1964 by letter No. 1470 stating that in order to cope with the pressure of work in the General office, it had become necessary to retain the services of this respondent in the General office to look after the important work of amendment of rules and since his further retention in that office while still holding the post of a Translator may be open to objection, he (respondent No. 1) had decided to have his post permanently transferred to the General office and re-designated as the post of an U. D. A. by effecting a corresponding reduction in the sanctioned strength of the Translation Department. Government accepted the proposal on April 14, 1964 by G. O. No. 512/VII-A-1/988/60 and conveyed its sanction to the permanent transfer to the General office of one permanent post of Translator and its re-designation as the post of an U.D.A. in the equivalent scale. Re-designation, obviously, means change of nomenclature without, affecting in any manner either the post itself or its incumbent. It cannot, therefore, be called a case of a new appointment against a newly created post because in fact it was the permanent transfer of this respondent along with his post of Translator (re-designated as an U.D.A.) from the Translation Department to the General Office. On his transfer to the General Office he was placed at the bottom and in the 1967 List of U. D. As., his seniority was shown at 43 against 25 of the petitioner. The petitioner's contention is that this respondent's seniority at 43 was rightly shown in the List and three successive representations made by this respondent for re-fixing his seniority in accordance with date of his confirmation (March 1, 1954) in the equivalent grade of Translators was rejected by respondent No. I one after the other on file. Nos. VC. 36 and VC 150 during the years 1964 and 1966. His further contention is that this has virtually sealed his fate as he did not make any fresh representation after the rejection of his earlier three representations (paragraphs 31 to 34 of the petition). Nos. VC. 36 and VC 150 during the years 1964 and 1966. His further contention is that this has virtually sealed his fate as he did not make any fresh representation after the rejection of his earlier three representations (paragraphs 31 to 34 of the petition). We have considered this but are of the view that the contention is devoid of merit. Respondent No. 8 was transferred to the General Office as an U.D.A. in an equivalent grade in public interest and not at his own request (as was the case with respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 7). It was his old post of Translator which he continued to hold after its re-designation as the post of an U.D.A. The office had made a mistake in fixing his seniority at 43 at the bottom of the 1967 List of U. D. As. but this was corrected by respondent No. I as the correction came within the policy decisions dated September 6, 1967, September 21, 1968, October 19, 1968 and March 1, 1969. We will have occasion to deal with these orders a little later. After the correction this respondent's seniority was at No. 1, in the 1969 List of U. D. As. This was occasioned by giving him his due seniority according to his date of confirmation in the equivalent grade of a Translator. There were precedents also in favour of this respondent inasmuch as on earlier occasions also, whenever permanent transfers were made from one department to another in public interest, and not at request or after giving en undertaking, seniority was fixed in accordance with the date of confirmation in the post from which the official had been transferred. (Paragraphs 4, 15, 161 27, 28 and 29 of the counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2). 19. Respondent No. 9 was also appointed directly as a Translator on Apri1 25, 1954 and was confirmed on that pest on May 1, 1955 and was detailed to the General Office on January 4, 1966 on an important assignment. Respondent No. 1 thereafter moved the Government on May 5, 1967 by D. O. No. C-2528 to transfer his post of Translator from the translation Department to the General office in the U. D. As. Grade. Respondent No. 1 thereafter moved the Government on May 5, 1967 by D. O. No. C-2528 to transfer his post of Translator from the translation Department to the General office in the U. D. As. Grade. The Government however, abolished one temporary post of a Translator and created one temporary post of an U. D. A. by G. O. No. 1295/VHH-1/92/67 dated August 5, 1967. This being not in accordance with the recommendation made, respondent No. I again moved the Government on August 8, 1967 and this time, Government transferred one permanent post of a Translator, along with its incumbent (this respondent) from the Translation Department to the General office in the equivalent grade of an U. D. A. and further agreed that this respondent shall be deemed to have been appointed as an U. D. A. with effect from the date he had started working as such, that is to say with effect from January 4, 1966. This G. O. is No. 2269-7-Ka-1/92/67 dated September 19, 1967 (paragraphs 35 and 36 of the petition, paragraphs 4, 15 and 31 of the counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Annexure 11, page 49 of the paper book). He had his seniority in the 1967 list of Translators but on the basis of the facts referred to in connection with respondent No. 8, he was shown at No. 2 in the 1969 List of U.D. As. 20. Respondent No. 13 was a L.D.A, in the post 1947 scale of Rs. 60-4-100-EB-5-140. He was promoted as a R.C.A. on January 16, 1950 in the scale of Rs. 75-5-100-E13-S-160 and was confirmed on January 6, 1951. He was then promoted as an U.D.A. and confirmed on January 1, 1962 (paragraph 5 of counter affidavit of respondent No. 11 and pages 35 and 291 of the paper book). His confirmation as an U.D.A. was against a vacancy occurring at Allahabad subsequent to the date of the confirmation of the petitioner on August 1, 1960 in a vacancy occurring at Lucknow. However, his confirmation subsequent to the confirmation of the petitioner in the same grade will not affect his earlier higher seniority in view of the policy decision dated August 16, 1952 whereby that seniority was to be retained as the policy decision had given a guarantee that the seniority of an official in the combined List will remain intact. However, his confirmation subsequent to the confirmation of the petitioner in the same grade will not affect his earlier higher seniority in view of the policy decision dated August 16, 1952 whereby that seniority was to be retained as the policy decision had given a guarantee that the seniority of an official in the combined List will remain intact. This respondent was at 56 as against 78 of the petitioneitioner in the 1967 List; and at No. 7 against 13 of the petitioner the 1951 List of L.D. As. at No. 19 as against 25 of the petitioner in the 1969 List (Paragraph 33 of the counter affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2). 21. Respondent No. 14 was a L.D.A. and was subsequently promoted as an U.D.A. and confirmed on that post on January 1, 1962. His seniority in the 1951 List of L.D. As. was at 57 against 78 of the petitioner: 20 against 25 in the 1967 List of U.D.As., and 8 against 13 in the 1969 List. He was also promoted and confirmed in a vacancy at Allahabad and will not lose his seniority in the combined list according to 1952 policy decision. 22. Respondent No. 16 was a L.D.A. and was promoted as R.C. on February 7, 1950 and confirmed on that post on January 6, 1953. He started officiating as an U.D.A. on October 18, 1957 and was confirmed on March 28, 1962 (paragraph 6 of the Counter-affidavit of respondent No. 11). His seniority in the 1951 List of L.D. As. was at 61 against 78 of the petitioner at 22 as against 25 in the 1967 List of U.D.As. and at 10 against 13 in the 1969 List. He was also promoted locally at Allahabad and, therefore, in accordance with the 1952 decision, he will retain his seniority in the Combined List over that of the petitioner. 23. Respondent No. 17 was a L.D.A. and promoted as a R.C. On February 14, 1950 and confirmed on that post on January 6, 1953. Later, he was promoted as an U. D. A. and confirmed on March 8, 1962 (paragraph 7 of the Counter-affidavit of respondent No. 11). His seniority in the 1951 List of L.D.As. was 62 against 78; at 23 against 25 in the 1967 List of U.D.As. and at 11 against 13 in the 1969 List of U.D.As. Later, he was promoted as an U. D. A. and confirmed on March 8, 1962 (paragraph 7 of the Counter-affidavit of respondent No. 11). His seniority in the 1951 List of L.D.As. was 62 against 78; at 23 against 25 in the 1967 List of U.D.As. and at 11 against 13 in the 1969 List of U.D.As. He was also promoted locally at Allahabad and will, therefore, retain his seniority in the Combined List. 24. On the permanent transfer of respondent No. 8 from the Translation Department to the General Office as an U. D. A., some officials made representations to respondent No. 1 with regard to the question of seniority of Translators transferred permanently as U. D. As, and then respondent No. 1 took the following policy decision on September 6, 1967 : "In determining the seniority as U. D. A. vis-a-vis promotee from the general office a Translator whose post is transferred to the General office, seniority shall be determined by length of service in officiating capacity as Upper Division Assistant,.service as Translator being counted as that of an U. D. A.". By this decision, respondent No. 1 regulated seniority of promotees from the General office to the posts of U. D. As., vis-a-vis Translators permanently transferred from the Translation Department to the general office as U. D. As. The decision is quite clear that the period of service as a Translator will count towards fixing of seniority as an U. D. A. when respondent No. 9 as similarly transferred permanently from the post of a Translator to the post of an U. D. A., respondent No. 1 reconsidered the matter and passed the following order on September 21, 1968 : "It is expedient to have a uniform policy for fixing seniority of officials. For fixing seniority in any grade, the criterion should be the date of confirmation of the official in that grade. Subject to any direction from me or the Registrar, seniority of officials in all grades should be fixed accordingly." On October 3, 1968, the petitioner and some others mail a joint representation and five representatives had a personal interview also with respondent No. 1 and after hearing them, respondent No. 1 took the following policy decision on October 19, 1968 : "Five representatives from the officials belonging to the U. D. A. grade saw me today and explained their objection. I do not think that there should be any difficulty in carrying out my order dated 21-9-1968. The order was not intended to upset promotions which have already taken place. That order was meant for fixing seniority between two officials in the same grade. It Appears that formerly, Translators and officials of U.D.A. grade had the same scale of pay. So, for purposes of operation of the order dated 21-9-1968, the two grades can be regarded as equivalent for fixing seniority of translators upon their merger into the cadre of U.D. As. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that officials of Lucknow Bench and Allahabad Bench form a single cadre. So, for purposes of fixing seniority of Lucknow Officials and Allahabad Officials in the same grade, the principle contained in my order dated 21-9-1968 should be followed. A draft seniority List should now be prepared accordingly. The draft should be circulated amongst officials at Allahabad and Lucknow. The officials will be at liberty to file objections against the draft seniority list within one month of the date of circulation. Final seniority list will be prepared after disposal of such objections." 25. On November 15, 1969 a gradation List was prepared accordingly. Certain objections were filed to that List. On March 1, 1969, respondent No. 1 rejected those objections and directed the office to finalise the gradation list. The order passed by respondent No. 1 reads thus: "....................... A number of objections have been filed against the draft gradation list. Two broad points have been raised in these objections. The first point relates to the seniority between Allahabad officials and Lucknow officials. The second point relates to fixation of the seniority of officials, who were at one time Translators, but have now been absorbed as Upper Division Assistants in the General office....... The broad basis for fixing seniority of any official in a particular grade is the date of confirmation of the official in that grade. My order on the subject dated 21-9-1968. ran thus ............... (Already quoted by us). The Additional Registrar has prepared the draft seniority list in the light of my order dated 21-9-1968. But there is another factor. In the year 1952 the then Registrar : ..................Passed the following order : (Already quoted by us). My order on the subject dated 21-9-1968. ran thus ............... (Already quoted by us). The Additional Registrar has prepared the draft seniority list in the light of my order dated 21-9-1968. But there is another factor. In the year 1952 the then Registrar : ..................Passed the following order : (Already quoted by us). It appears that between 1952-1968 promotions were made at Allahabad and Lucknow in accordance with the policy laid down by the Registrar in 1952. and seniority lists were prepared accordingly. Since promotions appear to have been made locally with a guarantee to retain the initial seniority, that seniority has to be maintained in accordance with the policy statement of 1952. I gather that the seniority list prepared by the office upto the year 1968 was in accordance with the Registrar's directions of the year 1952. It is not therefore, necessary to disturb the seniority list prepared in accordance with the policy statement of 1952. My general order dated 21-9-1968 has to be read with the Registrar's direction of the year 1952. The Registrar's order referred to above issued in the year 1952 will cease to have effect form today. Seniority already fixed in accordance with that principle will be maintained. But in future, seniority should be determined in accordance with the date of confirmation. Promotions may be made locally at Allahabad or at Lucknow according to the exigencies of the case. But in future seniority will be, governed by the date of confirmation in a particular grade. As regards Translators, I directed on 19-10-1968 that for purpose of operation of the order dated 21-9-1968, the two grades of Translators and Upper Division Assistants (in the old scales) should be regarded as equivalent for fixing seniority of Translators upon their merger into the cadre of Upper Division Assistants. Bearing that principle in mind, I find that Shri Mahesh Prasad Srivastava and Shri Sushil Kumar (formerly Translators) are senior to ..................and others in the regular line ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . It appears that Shri Mahesh Prasad Srivastava and Shri Sushil Kumar were brought in regular office in public interest, and not upon their request. Since they were brought into the regular line in public interest, they should not lose their initial seniority as Translators.......... The Additional Registrar should now prepare a fresh gradation list on the lines indicated above. . It appears that Shri Mahesh Prasad Srivastava and Shri Sushil Kumar were brought in regular office in public interest, and not upon their request. Since they were brought into the regular line in public interest, they should not lose their initial seniority as Translators.......... The Additional Registrar should now prepare a fresh gradation list on the lines indicated above. This new draft gradation list should be published at Allahabad and Lucknow. Objections against the new draft gradation list may be filed in one month from the date of publication." 26. In compliance with the directions of respondent No. 1 a fresh draft gradation list was prepared and circulated. Objections on matters of covered by the order dated March 1, 1959 were invited. The 1969 List was then confirmed. The petitioner's contention that this list has wrongly shown his seniority is without any force, in view of the discussion above. His contention that the orders are not valid because they were passed behind his back without giving a personal hearing to him, has also no merit. It was not incumbent upon respondent No. 1 to consult his officials in taking policy decisions. He invited objections, he disposed them of, he also heard some representatives and that is all that was required. He had the statutory right to decide such questions and us decisions are based on established principles consistently followed and the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge these decisions. 27. The upshot of the discussion above clearly establishes that he petitioner is not entitled to obtain any writ of certiorari or nandamus. 28. We shall now consider the petitioner's challenge to the promotion of respondent No. 3 as Superintendent, Confidential Department; of respondent No. 4 as Superintendent, Budget; of respondent No. 5 as Superintendent, General Administration; of respondent No. 7 as Superintendent, Vigilance Department; of respondent No. 3 as Assistant Superintendent; Records (Administration Department); and of respondent No. 9 as Assistant Superintendent, Administration, in the General office, either at Allahabad or at Lucknow. The attack is based on three grounds and we propose to deal with them in seriatim. 29. The attack is based on three grounds and we propose to deal with them in seriatim. 29. The first ground taken is that there are separate cadres; thus there is a separate cadre of Translators and a separate cadre of L. D. As., that the channel of promotion of a Translator is confined first to the post of a Reviser and then to the post of a Superintendent in the Translation Department and he cannot be promoted, consequently as an U.D.A. and then to the post of a Superintendent in the General office; while the avenue of promotion open to a L.D.A. is to the post of a R. C and then to the post of an U.D.A. and then to the still higher post of an Assistant Superintendent or a Superintendent in the General office and, therefore, the promotion of these respondents (who were all Translators) to the posts of Assistant Superintendent/Superintendent in the Genera office is neither in consonance with the standing practice nor with the statutory rules (paragraphs 9 to 16 of the petition). This ground has been traversed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of their counter-affidavit. According to them, the entire establishment comprises a single cadre though for administrative convenience, it is spread over four separate departments, and as the nature of work assigned to each department differs basically from that of the other, promotions have, with a view to maintain a reasonable standard of efficiency, been ordinarily confined to members of each department and for that purpose a separate Departmental seniority List is maintained for each department and promotions are made to posts in a particular department from members belonging to that department on the basis of their inter se seniority. However, this normal rule of promotion has sometimes been departed from when promotions are made by transfer of an official from one department to another. It has been further averred that the promotion of a Translator is not always first to the post of a Reviser, because there are no such posts at Allahabad and the three such posts at Lucknow have practically been kept in abeyance. It has been further alleged that at times Translators are promoted as Superintendents in the G: neral office and it member of the staff in the General office is promoted as a Superintendent in the Translation Department. It has been further alleged that at times Translators are promoted as Superintendents in the G: neral office and it member of the staff in the General office is promoted as a Superintendent in the Translation Department. Finally, it has been said that posts of responsibility (and posts of Assistant Superintendents/Superintendents are posts of responsibility) are selection posts and promotion to such posts is not confined to the Department where the vacancy occurs but members of all the departments are considered before making a particular promotion to these posts. Instances have been quoted in various paragraphs of the counter-affidavit in support of the above. We have held earlier that the establishment of our High Court has a single cadre. Rule 8 of the Rules reads : "Promotion shall ordinarily, be confined to members of the respective departments of the office and shall ordinarily be made according to seniority. An official may receive special promotion for recognised merit irrespective of the grade to which he may belong or of his seniority within the grade." Thus, in terms of Rule 8, normally, promotion in a particular department has to go to a member of that department on the basis of his seniority. This explains why separate Inter-Departmental Seniority Lists have to be maintained. The rule uses the word 'Ordinarily' at two places in the first sentence once in the portion promotion shall ordinarily be confined to members of the respective departments, and for a second time in the portion 'and shall ordinarily be made according to seniority.' This shows that it is permissible to depart from the normal rule in two respects, that is to say, a member of one department can be promoted in another department and even in the same department a junior can be promoted over it senior. This aspect has been further emphasised in the rule by saying that an official may receive 'special promotion' 'for recognised merit irrespective of the grade' or of his seniority within the grades. Rule 10, inter alia, says that promotions to all other posts (other than posts of Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars and pasts mentioned in Rule 9). This aspect has been further emphasised in the rule by saying that an official may receive 'special promotion' 'for recognised merit irrespective of the grade' or of his seniority within the grades. Rule 10, inter alia, says that promotions to all other posts (other than posts of Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars and pasts mentioned in Rule 9). "shall be made by Registrar by transfer from one department of the office to another in accordance with the Rules, subject to any general or special order passed by the Chief Justice." When we read Rule 8 and Rule 10 together, it becomes quite clear tart a departure is permissible from the normal rule of promotion if it is of practicable to continue promotion to members of a particular department in which the promotion vacancy has occurred. The rule is based on the sound principle that special merit calls for recognition irrespective of grade or seniority. It is not open to the petitioner, therefore, to contend that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had no power to promote officials of one department to promotion posts in another. 30. The second contention of the petitioner is that before making a promotion to the post of an Assistant Superintendent or a Superintendent, the entire field of eligibility has to be considered, and, any omission on the part of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to do so, will render the promotion invalid; and this is what actually happened when respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 were promoted (paragraph 25 of the petition). This has not been specifically denied in paragraph 22 of the counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. They have not alleged that a scrutiny of the entire field of eligibility was made before these respondents were promoted. Rule 9 has the heading "Promotion to posts of responsibility etc." Posts of Assistant Superintendents and Superintendents are covered by Rule 9 which regulates promotion to such posts. It says that promotion to such posts of responsibility or trust or which require special qualifications "shall be made by selection, irrespective of seniority. Rule 10 mentions that promotion to posts mentioned in Rule 9 shall be made by the Registrar "by selection." This Rule came up for interpretation in Mahesh Prasad Srivastava v. Abdul Khair (1971) 1 Serv. LR 157. Rule 10 mentions that promotion to posts mentioned in Rule 9 shall be made by the Registrar "by selection." This Rule came up for interpretation in Mahesh Prasad Srivastava v. Abdul Khair (1971) 1 Serv. LR 157. The Division Bench had this to say : "Selection, irrespective of seniority; under rule 9 necessarily implies that a persion promoted should be chosen out of a number of eligible candidates for the post to which he has been promoted. Selection should be made obviously on a comparison of merit of the eligible candidates......... From the above facts it will appear conclusively that firstly greater emphasis was laid on seniority rather than on merit and consequently, when the merit of Mahesh Prasad Srivastava has not been compared with the merit of any other Upper Division Assistant who is eligible for promotion to the post of the Assistant Superintendent...... accordingly.........the appellant has not been promoted by selection irrespective of seniority as contemplated by Rule 9." The use of the words "selection, irrespective of seniority" shows that the field of eligibility takes within its embrace even the junior-most member of each department. Being a selection post, 'promotion has not to be confined to the members of the particular department in which the vacancy has occurred; and the Rule requires respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to take into consideration members of the entire Establishment, irrespective of seniority, in making their choice for promotion. It is well known that promotion to as election post is not a matter of right which can be claimed merely by seniority. The circumstance that these posts are classed as posts of responsibility, or trust or of special qualifications and promotions have to be made by selection, irrespective of seniority, suggests that promotions to these posts are not automatic, being made only on the basis of ranking in the Gradation List. The question of merit enters primarily in the reckoning. In our view, the petitioner is right in his contention that the ranking or position in the Gradation List does not confer any right on these respondents to be promoted and that it is a well established rule that promotion to such posts is to be based primarily on merit and not seniority alone. In our view, the petitioner is right in his contention that the ranking or position in the Gradation List does not confer any right on these respondents to be promoted and that it is a well established rule that promotion to such posts is to be based primarily on merit and not seniority alone. The principle is that when the claims of officials to such posts is under consideration, seniority should not be regarded except where the merit of the officials is judged to be equal and no other criterion, therefore, is available. It is unfortunate that the field of eligibility was kept so wide and respondent No. 1 may, perhaps, like to amend the rule to narrow down the field to certain number, that is to say five to seven times of the actual promotion posts lying vacant or likely to become vacant. But the rule as it stands, obviously, vitiates the promotions made as there was failure to consider the entire field of eligibility to the great disadvantage of the petitioner. 31. The third ground of attack is that the petitioner made a representation (Annexure 7) on September 26, 1968 against promotion of respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 but that representation has not been decided (paragraphs 25 and 26 of the petition). The reply of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is that Annexure 7 was really a reminder of the petitioner's representation dated June 16, 1967, which had already been decided by respondent No. 1 and the decision communicated to the petitioner on September 26, 1967 and, therefore, no action was necessary on Annexure 7. A perusal of Annexure 7, however, shows that the question of promotion was also raised though it was interlinked with the earlier representation dated June 16, 1967 and, therefore, we need not take this into consideration. 32. In fine, the only relief that we can grant to the petitioner is that we quash the promotions of respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 because their promotions were made in breach of Rules 9 and 10. It will be open to respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to reconsider the matter and pass suitable orders.