JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS case has been placed before this Bench for a decision on the question whether an order of the Judicial authority under section 6c (1)of the Essential Commodity Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 439 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ( 2. ) THE answer to the question must depend on whether the Judicial authority appointed by the State Government to hear appeals under section 6c (1) of the Act, against orders of confiscation of an essential commodity made by the Collector acting under section 6a, seized in pursuance of an order under section 3 of the Act, is an "inferior Criminal Court. " ( 3. ) IT is well settled that sections 435 and 439 of the Code must be read together. [see, Emperor v. Har Prasad Das (ILR 40 Cal. 477)]. Section 439 must, therefore, be read along with and subject to the provisions of section 435. Sub-section (1) of section 435 authorises the High Court to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before "any inferior criminal Court" situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction. The word proceeding under section 439 must, therefore, mean a proceeding before an inferior criminal Court within in meaning of section 435 of the Code. ( 4. ) SECTION 6c (1) of the Act reads as follows : "6c. Appeal- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under section 6a may within one month from the date of the communication to him of such order, appeal to any judicial authority appointed by the State Government concerned and the judicial authority shall, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be beard, pass such order as it may think fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the order appealed against. " ( 5. ) PURSUANT thereto, the State Government issued a notification to the following effect : "notification No. 14393-1792-XX1b dated 27-4-1967-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 6c of the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1966, the State Government are pleased to appoint all District and Sessions Judges as Judicial authority within their respective jurisdiction. " ( 6. ) PURSUANT thereto, the State Government issued a notification to the following effect : "notification No. 14393-1792-XX1b dated 27-4-1967-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 6c of the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1966, the State Government are pleased to appoint all District and Sessions Judges as Judicial authority within their respective jurisdiction. " ( 6. ) IT is worthy of note that the appeal against an order of confiscation made by the Collector under section 6a is not provided to the Court of Sessions. The appeal lies to "the District and Sessions Judge" who is the holder of an office, and exercises both civil and Criminal jurisdictions. The District and sessions Judge entertains and disposes of an appeal under section 6c (1) not as a Sessions Judge of the Court of Sessions, but as a Judicial authority appointed by the State Government under the notification referred to above. ( 7. ) THE line of authorities starting from national Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General (ILR 1913 AC 546) and ending with N. S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and brothers (LR 1913 AC 546), enunciating the well known rule that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie in a Court already established, then such appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court has, therefore, no application. The decisions in Kailashchandra and others v. District Judge, Bhopal and others (1963 MPLJ 270) and Municipal Council Khandwa v. Santoshkumar and others ( 1975 MPLJ 33 (FB)) on which reliance is placed, and which proceed upon that well recognized principle are, therefore, not attracted. ( 8. ) THE Act itself makes a distinction between the Judicial authority and the Court. The group of sections 6a to 6d were inserted by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1966. These provisions were designed to authorise the confiscation of essential commodities like foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils etc. , which are seized in pursuance of orders under section 3 in relation thereto, and for the speedy and effective control and disposal of the seized commodities, which are parishable in nature, i. e. , for equitable distribution thereof to the community. Section 6a authorises the Collector to direct the confiscation of an essential commodity seized in pursuance of an order under section 3 of the Act. This is purely a Governmental function. Section 6a authorises the Collector to direct the confiscation of an essential commodity seized in pursuance of an order under section 3 of the Act. This is purely a Governmental function. This section has not been enacted with a view to provide an alternative to section 7 which deals with penalties. The Parliament in its wisdom thought it necessary that an order of confiscation or forfeiture may be passed initially, and may not wait till the final disposal of the prosecution. ( 9. ) UNDER section7 of the Act, a person, who contravenes an order made under section 3, is punishable with the penalties mentioned in its various clauses. Under clause (b), the Court has been empowered to forfeit the seized commodity like foodgrains etc. , in respect of which an order under section 3 has been contravened. The proviso confers a discretion on the Court, for the reasons to be recorded, to refrain from passing an order for forfeiture. It is thus clear that a person, who has contravened any order under section 3, is liable to punishment under section 7. He is also liable under section 6a to the confiscation of the involved goods, where the Collector is satisfied that there has been a contravention of an order under section 3. ( 10. ) THE power of confiscation of an essential commodity seized in pursuance of an order under section 3 of the Act vested on the Collector under section 6a is, therefore, distinct from the power of forfeiture given to the criminal court under section 7 (1) (b) of the Act. In regard to prosecutions for violation of different Foodgrians Control Orders passed by virtue of the powers conferred on the State Government by section 3 of the Act, a different procedure is provided in the Act. Some of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable so far as they relate to trial of cases, and appeals and revisions against convictions in the said trials. In regard to provisions for confiscation, a different procedure is provided and a distinct right of appeal is conferred. That part of the scheme of the Act has been kept separate and it is not provided that it has anything to do with ordinary criminal Courts. Prosecutions of the breach of the provisions of the various Foodgrains Control Orders are made to lie in ordinary criminal Courts. That part of the scheme of the Act has been kept separate and it is not provided that it has anything to do with ordinary criminal Courts. Prosecutions of the breach of the provisions of the various Foodgrains Control Orders are made to lie in ordinary criminal Courts. Section 7 of the Act, dealing with penalties has laid down that such penalties have to be awarded by Courts. It is, therefore, apparent that a distinction has been made in the Act itself between a Judicial authority and a Court. ( 11. ) THE power of confiscation conferred on the Collector under section 6a of the Act being of a drastic nature, the Parliament has provided an adequate safeguard that he shall not exercise such powers without compliance with the requirements of section 6b. This section lays down that before the orders for confiscation of the seized commodity is passed, the Collector shall conform to the rules of natural justice. He is required to give a notice to the owner of the seized commmodity to show cause why the commodity is proposed to be confiscated, and he must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, before the commodity is confiscated. The Parliament has provided a further safeguard, by enacting section 6c. This section expressly provides for a right of appeal against the order of confiscation to a Judicial authority to be appointed by the State Government. ( 12. The Parliament has provided a further safeguard, by enacting section 6c. This section expressly provides for a right of appeal against the order of confiscation to a Judicial authority to be appointed by the State Government. ( 12. ) THAT the confiscation order passed by the Collector under section 6a is provisional, and is made subject to the result of the appeal to the Judicial authority appointed under section 6c (1) as also to the result of the prosecution eventually launched is made clear by enacting section 6c (2) which reads : "6c (2) Where an order under section 6a is modified or annulled by such judicial authority, or where in prosecution instituted for the contravention of the order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under section 6a, the person concerned is acquitted and in either case it is not possible for any reason to return the essential commodity seized such person shall be paid the price therefor as if the essential commodity has been sold to the Government, with reasonable interest calculated from the day of the seizure of the essential commodity and such price shall be determined- (i) in the case of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils, in accordance with the pro-visions of sub-section (3 B) of section; (ii) in case of sugar, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3c) of section; and (iii) in the case of any other essential commodity in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 3. " ( 13. ) THE Collector while passing an order of confiscation under section 6 A does not function as a Magistrate nor does he thereby become "a Court" within the classification of criminal Courts under section 6 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The Collector is the administrative head of his district, and he as such is not subordinate to the Court of Sessions. Their Lordships of the Privy council in Mumar Singh Chhajor v. Emperor (AIR 1946 PC 169) held that a Special Magistrate acting under clause 26 of the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance, 1942, is not a court inferior to the High Court and, indeed, not a Court at all and, therefore, the high Court has no power of revision under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of criminal Procedure. So also, in Dargah Committee v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1962sc 574) their lordships of the Supreme Court while interpreting section 234 of Ajmer Merwara municipalities Regulation, 1925, held that the enquiry contemplated by the magistrate under that section, partakes of the character of a ministerial enquiry rather than judicial enquiry. They held that an order made by him under section 234 was not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as such he could not be regarded as an inferior Criminal Court within the meaning of section 435 of the Code. ( 14. ) IN The Cantonment Board, Ambala v. Pyare Lal ( AIR 1966 SC 108 ), their Lordships while dealing with the powers of the Magistrate acting under section 259 of the cantonments Act, 1924, held that he acts as a persona designata and, therefore, his order is not revisable under section 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal procedure. Their Lordships held that though the High Court may not have jurisdiction to interfere under section 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can certainly interfere with the order of Magistrate under Article 227 of the Constitution. That precisely is the case here. The decision of their lordships in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushailiya ( AIR 1964 SC 416 ) is distinguishable on facts. There the Magistrate acting under section 20 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (1956), is a Court and, therefore, subject to the revisional jurisdiction conferred under section 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 15. ) THE controversy in question had arisen before one of us (Sen J.) in m/s. Satya Narayan Dal Mill, Multai v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Cri. Revn. No. 832 of 1970, decided on the 30th April 1971 ). In repelling the contention that revision lay under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was observed : "on a plain construction of the section, it must follow that the Sessions Judge, who entertains an appeal under section 6c, acts as a persona designata and not as a Court functioning and exercising his authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of section 439 of the code of Criminal Procedure. He cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of section 439 of the code of Criminal Procedure. " "that precisely is the position obtaining under section 6c of the Essential Commodities act, under which the District Judge acts as a persona designata of the State Government. Likewise, in State of M. P. v. Gulabkhan (1964 MPLJ 355 ). a learned single Judge of this Court, while dealing with an order of the Rent Controlling Authority under section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, held that he does not function as a Criminal Court and, therefore, the provisions of section 435 of the Code were not attracted. Following these decisions, it must be held that the revision is incompetent. " We think, that lays down the correct law. ( 16. ) THE majority of the High Courts have taken the view that the Judicial authority appointed by the State Government under section 6c (1) of the Act, is not "an inferior criminal Court", and was, therefore, not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. [see, The State of Mysore v. Pandurang Purusappa Naik and others ( (1971) 2 Crl J 1355); State v. Sriramulu Chettiar ( (1973) 1 Crlj 732) and The State of Gujarat v. Chimanlal Maganlal Shah ( (1974) 1 Crlj 716 ). The view to the contrary in Legisetty Ramaiah and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( (1972) 2 Crlj 1071), does not seem to be correct. ( 17. ) WE, accordingly, hold that no revision lies under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The application shall, therefore, be treated as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Revision held not competent.