JUDGMENT Gopi Nath, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. The plaintiffs were the landlords of the premises in dispute. The defendant fell into arrears for the period 1-3-1968 to 31-2-1968. The rate of rent was Rs. 25/- per month. The plaintiffs accordingly served upon the defendant a notice terminating his tenancy and requiring him to pay the arrears. The notice was dated 3-1-1969 and was served on the defendant on 4-1-196). According to the plaintiffs the arrears were not paid and the default continued. The suit giving rise to this appeal was accordingly filed on the basis of default for a period of more than three months. 2. The defence delivered was that after receiving the notice the defendant tendered the rent to the plaintiffs on 30th January, 1969. They refused to accept the same. Consequently a money order was sent for the amount on 31-l-1969. The money order was addressed to Sri Badri Prasad Mahavir Prasad. Badri Prasad was the father; Mahavir Prasad was the son, Both had given the notice to the defendant. The defendant accordingly sent the money order in the name of the father and the son both. This money order was returned to the defendant on 7-2-1969 with an endorsement by the postman which was as follows. "Returned for one address only." The meaning of this endorsement is not clear. However, the defendant sent another money order on 7th February 1969 , which was refused by the plaintiffs on the ground that It was tendered to them after the period of notice. In the circumstances the defendant contended that he had tendered the rent within a period of one month from the date of the notice and could not be treated as a defaulter for the purposes of the suit. 3. Both the courts below decreed the suit for ejectment as also for the arrears of rent and damages for the period of occupation after the service of notice on the ground that the defendant had failed to establish that he had tendered the rent within the period prescribed in the notice. 3. Both the courts below decreed the suit for ejectment as also for the arrears of rent and damages for the period of occupation after the service of notice on the ground that the defendant had failed to establish that he had tendered the rent within the period prescribed in the notice. The defendant appealed to this court and by an order dated 13th May, 1975 the learned Munsif was required to submit his finding afresh on the question whether the money order sent by the defendant on 31-1-1969 was taken and tendered by the post man to the plaintiffs before it was returned with the endorsement "Returned for one name only." Tate learned Munsif has returned a finding that on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties it was not proved by the defendant that the money order was taken to the plaintiffs within time. The appeal has been posted for hearing after the receipt of this finding. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that both the courts below having held that a money order was sent by the defendant on 31-1-1963 the presumption in law is that it was taken by the postman to the addressees and was returned after the addresses had refused to accept the same. He has further urged that the postman examined in the case has clearly stated that the money order was tendered to the addressees but the father refused to accept the tender on the ground that it was addressed in two names. In the circumstances a valid tender would be deemed to have been made by the defendant to the plaintiffs-landlord within the time allowed by the notice and he could not be treated as a defaulter. 5. I find force in the submission. The postman is an agent of the payee. (See Bhika Lal v. Munna Lal, 1974 R.C.J. 77. It was held in that case that if the tenant remitted rent to the landlord by money order well within time he would be deemed to have discharge his part of the duty; the post office being the agent of the payee. In the instant case, the money order was remitted on 31-1-1969 from Lucknow to the payee who was also residing in Lucknow. The notice sent by the landlord on 3rd of January, 1969 was served on the defendant on 4-1-1969. In the instant case, the money order was remitted on 31-1-1969 from Lucknow to the payee who was also residing in Lucknow. The notice sent by the landlord on 3rd of January, 1969 was served on the defendant on 4-1-1969. In the normal Course, thee money order sent on 31-1-1969 would have reached the addressee within a couple of days, i.e. latest by 2nd of February, 1969. The postman definitely stated that he took the in money order and tendered it to the addressees, although he did not remember the date of the tender. No suggestion was made in cross examination that the tender was made after the 3rd of February 1969. In the circumstances, it will have to be assumed that in the normal course of business the money order must have been tendered on or before the 2nd of February 1969. In view of the law laid down in the case of Bhikha Lal (supra), the post office being the agent of the payee, the remittance would be deemed to have been made within time to the payee. The return of the money order on the ground that it was addressed to the persons is also not valid. The notice was issue on behalf of two persons, namely, Sri Badri Prasad and his son Sri Mahavir Prasad. The tenant would naturally send the money order to the two persons who had given the notice. I thus find was no defect in the remittance. The remittance having been made within the time prescribed, the money order would be deemed to have been tendered to the addressees within the period Prescribed. In this view of the matter, the defendant was not in default of the payment of arrears, making him liable to ejectment on the basis of the notice terminating his Tenancy. The suit thus could not be decreed for ejectment. 6. In the result, the appeal succeeds in part and is allowed to this extent that the decree for ejectment passed against the defendant-appellant is set aside. The decree for the recovery of the amount found due against him is, however, maintained. In view of the divided success of the parties, I direct them to bear their own costs.