JUDGMENT R. L. Gulati, J. - The petitioner was appointed as apprentice in the office of the opposite party, the District Judge, Lucknow on 3rd November, 1939. In due course he gained promotion to different posts and finally in January, 1973 he was working as Munsarim, Judge small Cause Court, Lucknow. It appears that some complaints were made about the loss of nine plaints filed in the Court of the Judge, Small Cause Court. Lucknow. A preliminary enquiry was held by Shri Om Prakash, the then Judge, Small Cause Court, Lucknow. He submitted a report holding that the 9 plaints were actually handed over, to the petitioner in the month of January. 1973 and they had been lost due to his negligence. On receipt of this report Shri H. G. Shukla, the then District Judge, Lucknow ordered a more thorough enquiry against the petitioner according to the rules after framing charges against him. Shri I. S Mathur, Additional Judge, Small Cause Court was appointed as Enquiry Officer. 2. Before the enquiry could commence the petitioner filed an application on 9th June, 1973 in which he admitted the loss of the plaints due to his negligence. He also prayed that in view of his admission it was not necessary to hold an enquiry. He, however, expressed his sincere regrets and threw himself at the mercy of the District Judge for awarding him such punishment as he may deem fit and proper. Mr. Shukla accepted his suggestion and abandoned the enquiry. He recorded a finding that the plaints in question were presented to the petitioner on different dates in January, 1973 and they had been lost due to his negligence. He then set out to examine the facts and circumstances of the case with a view to awarding suitable punishment to the petitioner. He noticed that Sri Om Prakash, who held the preliminary enquiry had spoken very highly of the integrity of the petitioner and had come to the conclusion that no mala fide could be attributed to the petitioner inasmuch as the Court fees stamps had already been punched and bore the names of the plaintiffs so that the stamps could not be used a second time. Mr. Shukla agreed with these observations and stated : - "I had also occasion to watch Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava, when he worked as II Clerk in my office. Mr. Shukla agreed with these observations and stated : - "I had also occasion to watch Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava, when he worked as II Clerk in my office. He impressed me as an honest and straightforward worker, though he was not as competent as I would like my II Clerk to be. But this does not reflect on the honesty, integrity and straight forwardness of Shri Devi Dayal Srivastava. in the circumstances of the case I have no hesitation in agreeing with Sri Om Prakash that Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava could not have any intention to remove the plaints himself." He went on to say that as observed by Sri Om Prakash, Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava was more or less on the verge of retirement. He joined this Department on 3-11-1939 and throughout his service of more than 33 years, he had not been guilty of any misconduct. His character roll was quite clean except for an adverse entry dated 17-9-1967 by the District Judge who had reprimanded him for his failure to cope with the work as suits clerk. He further observed that as the petitioner could not derive any monetary gain from the removal of the plaints, he was merely guilty of negligence and nothing more. 3. Sri Om Prakash had pointed out in his preliminary report that the petitioner was a victim of a conspiracy in as much a senior official of his own grade was interested in ousting him and occupying that post himself. In his explanation the petitioner had not named the official who wanted to oust him but on enquiry Shri Om Prakash came to the conclusion that one Shri Madho Prasad, the Record Keeper of the District Judge's court was the person who aspiring to occupy the post of the petitioner and was responsible for the removal of the plaints. Mr. Shukla agreed with the finding also and made the following observation :- "From the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava has been a victim of a nefarious plan to get him removed from his present post. Mr. Shukla agreed with the finding also and made the following observation :- "From the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava has been a victim of a nefarious plan to get him removed from his present post. I am, therefore, quite definite in my mind that if I were to award a deterrent punishment which may seem to be called for in view of the serious nature of the negligence resulting in the loss of as many as nine plaints (or even a hand punishment of removal from service) or compulsory retirement to Shri Devi Dayal Srivastava I would be only playing into the hands of those who wanted his removal from the post of the Munsarim, Judge, Small Cause Court by hook or by crook. Not only this (every honest official occupying covered) post would also, in that case, remain constantly exposed to such plans by the machine,tors. This would result in all round demoralisation and consequent inefficiency in the working of the offices." He accordingly passed the following order :- "Upon careful consideration of the matter I am satisfied that a punishment of reduction of Sri Devi Dayal Srivastava by two stages in his present scale of pay would meet the ends of justice, would be a sufficient punishment to him and would, at the same time, be an effective discouragement to persons who might be thinking of ousting their colleagues from coveted places in the manner this incident was enacted." He also awarded him the following adverse entry : - "He is reduced by two stages in his present time scale of pay for being negligence in performance of his duties as Munsarim of the Court of Judge, Small Cause, resulting in loss of as many as nine plaints. 4. This order was passed on 29th June, 1973 and the unfortunate episode had thus come to an end. B it unfortunately for the petitioner, Mr Shukla retired soon afterwards and Shri Kam Surat Singh succeeded him on 17th July, 1973 as the District Judge, Lucknow. Four months later on 24th November, 1973, Shri Ram Surat Singh served a notice on the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56 (a) giving him three months notice on the expiry of which he was to retire from the service. Four months later on 24th November, 1973, Shri Ram Surat Singh served a notice on the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56 (a) giving him three months notice on the expiry of which he was to retire from the service. In other words, Sri Ram Surat Singh formed the opinion that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired after completing the age of 55 years. The petitioner made a representation against this but the same was filed with the remarks that compulsory retirement was not a punishment. He has now approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Now it is true that compulsory retirement is not a punishment in the sense that it does not attract article 3 11 of the Constitution. The petitioner is not entitled to any notice or hearing before an order of compulsory retirement is passed. But the fact remains that the petitioner has been deprived of his right of continuing in service for 3 years more An order of compulsory retirement can only be passed in public interest and there must be some material to support the opinion that it is necessary in public interest to retire a Government Official. In other words, when the order of compulsory retirement is challenged the authorities concerned must disclose some material which is relevant to the question of public interest. An order of compulsory retirement passed without such material is liable to be struck down. 6. Now it is not disputed that the petitioner's integrity was never doubted nor was he given any misconduct entry. He had been reprimanded in 1957 on the ground that he was not able to cope with his work. That is the only material upon which the impugned order has been passed beside of course, punishment in connection with the loss of 9 plaints. Sri Shukla, the District Judge, who dealt with this matter did consider the adverse entry of 1957. He also considered the possibility of the petitioner being compulsorily retired but having regard to all the circumstances of the case he came to the conclusion that no severe punishment was called for nor its case where the petitioner should be prematurely retired. In other words, the question of premature retirement of the petitioner was very much in the mind of the District Judge when he decided to award him the punishment of reduction in salary. In other words, the question of premature retirement of the petitioner was very much in the mind of the District Judge when he decided to award him the punishment of reduction in salary. He did not think it proper to retire him compulsorily either on the ground of loss of the plaint or because of the adverse entry given to him in the year 1957. After the order passed by Mr. Shukla, on 29th June, 1973 the petitioner has not earned any other adverse entry nor has any other circumstances arisen which could justify the order of compulsory retirement. The order passed by the District Judge, in my opinion, amounts to the review of the order passed by his predecessor. This was not justified for the simple reason that public policy demands that a decision taken honestly by a competent Government officer should not be reviewed or revised by his successor subsequently. In R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 P.C. 27 it has been laid down that in a case in which after Government officials, duly competent and duly authorised in that behalf have arrived honestly at one decision their successors in office after the decision has been acted upon and is an effective operation, cannot purport to enter upon a reconsideration of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision. There a Sub Inspector of public was granted invalid pension by a competent authority and thus duly ceased to be in service and the office succeeding the authority which had granted the pension reconsidered the matter and ordered his removal from the service. The Privy Council held that the servant had suffered a wrong and therefore had every right to complain of the stoppage of pension as a breach of rules relating to pension. The same view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this court in Bhagwandas v. Chief Mechanical Engineer' Northern Railway, 1969 ALJ 29 while dealing with Rule 99 of the Northern Railway Discipline and Appeal Rules the Bench observed:- "Rule 99 did not confer on tho authorities, mentioned in that rule the power to revise the order at any time they wish. It is settled rule of public policy not to allow decisions taken honestly by Government officers duly competent and duly authorised in that behalf to be re-opened." This principle clearly applies to the facts of the present case. The learned District Judge, Mr. Shukla had considered the question of compulsory retirement of the petitioner and had taken into consideration the adverse entry given to him in 1957. He had come to the conclusion that it was not proper to take any action against the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56 and to retire him compulsorily. This decision had been arrived at honestly by him and had been acted upon inasmuch as the petitioner's salary was reduced. In these circumstances it was against the public policy for his successor to have come to a different conclusion on the same facts and to order the petitioner's compulsory retirement. 7. I may state here that this court after admitting the writ petition had stayed the operation of the impugned order so that the petitioner continued in service until he attained the age of superannuation on 21st July, 1975. He has thus already retired and by quashing the impugned order there is no question of his being reinstated nor he is entitled to any further remuneration. But it is necessary to quash the order so that the question of the petitioner's pension etc. may not be adversely affected. 8. In the result, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 24th November 1973 purporting to have been passed under Fundamental Rule 56 (a) is quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs.