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1975 DIGILAW 497 (SC)

Mahammadunnks Son Kappatta Kathokandath Bava v. Kunhoosas Son Ampalath Veettil Kunnathodath Mahammadunni

1975-12-02

A.N.RAY, M.H.BEG, P.N.SHINGHAL, R.S.SARKARIA

body1975
JUDGMENT A. N. RAY, C. J. :— This is an appeal by certificate from the judgement dated 17th July, 1969 of the High Court of Kerala. 2. The question in this appeal is whether defendants Nos.1 and 4 are entitled to share in the property allotted to defendant No. 3 in a partition decree. Defendant No.4 is the appellant. 3. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted on 19th November, 1957 for partition of properties. Properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint belonged to the mother of defendant No. 3. Properties mentioned in Schedule C to the plaint were joint properties of the father and the mother of defendant No.3 4. The plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are the sons of one of the brothers of the mother of defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 1 is the son of another brother of the mother of defendant No. 3 Defendant No. 4 is the son of defendant No. 3 s father s brother. 5. Defendant No. 3 died during the pendency of the suit. Thereafter defendant No. 1 filed his additional written statement and claimed half share in the property of defendant No. 1 had married defendant No. 3 on 30th august, 1959. 6. The trial Court allotted to defendant No. 3 3/6th share in properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and defendant No.2 were each given 1/6th share in properties in schedules A and B to the plaint. With regard to Schedule C properties the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were each given 9/96th share and defendant No.3 was given 51/96th share and defendant No. 4 was given 18/96th share. 7. The question in this appeal is whether defendants Nos. 1 and 4 are entitled to share in the property allotted to defendant No. 3 in a partition decree. Defendant No. 4 is the appellant. 225 8. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted on 19th November, 1957 for partition of properties. Properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint belonged to the mother of defendant No. 3. Properties mentioned in Schedule C to the plaint were joint properties of the father and the mother of defendant No. 3. 9. 225 8. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted on 19th November, 1957 for partition of properties. Properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint belonged to the mother of defendant No. 3. Properties mentioned in Schedule C to the plaint were joint properties of the father and the mother of defendant No. 3. 9. The plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are the sons of one of the brothers of the mother of defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 1 is the son of another brother of the mother of defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 4 is the son of defendant No. 3 s father s brother. 10. Defendant No. 3 died during the pendency of the suit. Thereafter defendant No. 1 filed his additional written statement and claimed half share in the property of defendant No. 3 on the ground that defendant No. 1 had married defendant No. 3 on 30th August, 1959. 11. The trial Court allotted to defendant No. 3,3/6th share in properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint, The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were each given 1/6th share in properties in Schedules A and B to the plaint. With regard to Schedule C properties the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were each given 9/96th share and defendant No. 3 was given 51/96th share and defendant No. 4 was given 18/96th share. 12. The trial Court found that defendant No. 4 was alone entitled to the share of defendant No. 3 on the ground that marriage of defendant No. 3 with defendant No. 1 was not proved. The trial Court also found that defendant No. 3 was mentally unsound to enter into any marriage, 13. Defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal. The High Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and held that defendant No. 1 was married to defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 3 was in a lucid interval at the time of marriage. 14. Counsel for the appellant defendant No. 4 impeached the finding of the High Court both with regard to the fact of marriage and the finding that defendant No. 3 was married in a lucid interval. 15. 14. Counsel for the appellant defendant No. 4 impeached the finding of the High Court both with regard to the fact of marriage and the finding that defendant No. 3 was married in a lucid interval. 15. Defendant No. 4 relied on three document in support of the submission that defendant No. 3 was not a sane person to enter into marriage with defendant No. 1. The first document is Exhibit B-34 which is an order dated 8th November.1956 declaring defendant No. 3 to be a person of unsound mind. In that order defendant 4 was appointed guardian of the property of defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 1 was appointed guardian of the person of defendant No. 3, The second document is Exhibit B-8 dated 7th September, 1959. The appellant submitted that on 7th September. 1959, defendant No. 3 wanted to get herself declared as a person of sound mind. By an order dated 5th February, 1960 being Exhibit B-31 the District Judge dismissed the application of defendant No. 3. The third document on which the appellant relied is the suit in this appeal where defendant No. 3 on 19th November, 1957 was impleaded, as a person of unsound mind. 16. The apeel1ant contended that though Exhibit B-34 namely, order dated 8th November, 1958 declaring defendant No. 3 as a person of unsound mind was not a judgment in rem but it was a judgment inter- partes and it would, therefore be admissible under Sections 11 and 13 of the Evidence Act. The appel1ant also contended relying on the decision in Amanchi Seshamma v. Amanchi Padamanabha Rao. ILR 40 Mad 660 that once a person is adjudged insane it is presumed that state of unsoundness will continue until proved to the contrary. 17. Counsel for the appe1lant therefore contended that the conclusion of the High Court that defendant No. 3 was in a lucid interval at the time of marriage was against the overwhelming documentary evidence. 18. The documents relied on by the appellant do not rule out lucid interval at the time of marriage on 30th August, 1959. The High Court relied on the evidence of D.W. 4 who attended the marriage, D.W. 4 was a teacher. His evidence was that defendant No. 3 at the time of marriage talked with Musaliar. 18. The documents relied on by the appellant do not rule out lucid interval at the time of marriage on 30th August, 1959. The High Court relied on the evidence of D.W. 4 who attended the marriage, D.W. 4 was a teacher. His evidence was that defendant No. 3 at the time of marriage talked with Musaliar. His further evidence was that Musaliar called defendant No. 3 and she went near him and told him that he was being authorised by her to give her in marriage to defendant No. 1. The High Court rightly found that defendant No. 3 gave her consent to the marriage and was in her lucid interval. 19. The High Court reversed the finding of the trial Court and held that the marriage took place. The High Court relied on the oral evidence and found that marriage in fact was held. The conclusion of the High Court on both the questions is correct. The appeal is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. For Citation : AIR 1976 SC 224