JUDGMENT K. N. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against the order of the State Government dated 20-2-1975 retiring the petitioner compulsorily from Government service on his attaining the age of 55 years by giving him three months' salary in lieu of period of notice. 2. The petitioner was appointed Sales Tax Officer in Sales Tax Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh. On 9-2-1971 be was promoted to the post of Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner. While working on that post he attained the age of 55 years on 3-5-1974. A Screening committee was appointed by the State Government to scrutinise service records of all officers in the Sales Tax Department who had attained the age of 55 years for the purpose of considering the question of their retention in service beyond the age of 55 years. The committee consisted of high experienced officers like Commissioner, Sales Tax Chief Secretary to Government, U.P. Chairman and Member Administrative Tribunal Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Administrative Reforms Department, Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department and Commissioner, Secretary to Government, Appointment Department and Director, Animal Husbandry and ex-officio Special Secretary to Government, Animal Husbandry Department. The screening committee considered the petitioner's records for the period of last 10 years of his service and forwarded its recommendations to the State Government. The Governor after considering the service record of the petitioner accepted the recommendations of the screening committee and formed an opinion that the petitioner's retirement from service was in public interest. It was thereafter that the impugned order was issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers under Fundamental Rule 56 (a) retiring the petitioner compulsorily by giving him three month's salary in lieu of period of notice. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order is arbitrary and capricious as it is based on no material. There was no relevant material on the basis of which the State Government could bonafide form opinion that the petitioner's retention in service beyond the age of 55 years was not in public interest. The relevant extract from petitioner's character roll relating to the petitioner's work and conduct since 1968 to 1974 have been annexed to the counter affidavit as Annexure CA-1 On a perusal of the same I find that the petitioner's work and conduct was of average nature.
The relevant extract from petitioner's character roll relating to the petitioner's work and conduct since 1968 to 1974 have been annexed to the counter affidavit as Annexure CA-1 On a perusal of the same I find that the petitioner's work and conduct was of average nature. Entries for the year 1972-73 show that he was an officer of average quality. In 1973-74 again he was described as an officer of average ability. The entries for the years 1968-69 and 1969-70 contain adverse remarks against the petitioner. Further Annexure CA-2 shows that in year 1974, the State Government issued two orders, one on 20-7-1974 and the other on 20-11-1974 censuring petitioner's conduct as it found that the petitioner had committed misconduct in favouring certain traders is the matter of assessment of sales tax. These facts were taken into account by the screening committee as well as by the State Government in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner's retention in service beyond the age of 55 years was not in public interest. On the face of these materials it is difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the impugned order was passed arbitrarily or capriciously or that there was no material before the State Government. Annexure CA-1 and C. A. 2 contain adequate material on the basis of which any reasonable person could come to the conclusion that the petitioner's work and performance was not above average so as to retain him in service beyond the age of 55 years. Applying the principles laid down by this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. S. M. Banerji, 1974, A. L. J. page 238 the impugned order cannot be characterised arbitrary or capricious and it is not open to this Court to set in appeal over the decision of the State Government. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the petitioner was promoted on 9-2-1971 and as such any entries prior to that date could not be taken into account to retire the petitioner pre-maturely. I am not inclined to accept this contention. But even assuming that any adverse entry prior to 9-2-1971 could not be taken into account, there was sufficient material on record against the petitioner which related to the period subsequent to his promotion on the basis of which the State Government could reasonably form the opinion to retire the petitioner.
I am not inclined to accept this contention. But even assuming that any adverse entry prior to 9-2-1971 could not be taken into account, there was sufficient material on record against the petitioner which related to the period subsequent to his promotion on the basis of which the State Government could reasonably form the opinion to retire the petitioner. As already noted in the years 1972-73 as well as in 1973-74 while the petitioner was working as Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner, he was found to be an Officer of average quality. His work and conduct was not found above aver age. Further two censure entries were awarded to him in 1974 which were also taken into account. In this view of the matter the petitioner's content that the order was passed capriciously or arbitrarily must fail. 5. It is then urged that the petitioner had made representation against the entries awarded to him in 1974, but before it could be decided he was compulsorily retired, therefore, the entry for the year 1974 could not be taken into account. I find no justification to accept this contention. After the entry was made petitioner was given opportunity to represent against those entries pending representation State Government was not divested of its powers to retire the petitioner under fundamental rule 56, pendency of representation does not place any restriction on that power, it was open to the State Government to retire the petitioner compulsorily provided conditions -precedent laid down by the rules were satisfied. The petitioner has failed to show that the order was not issued in accordance with fundamental rule 56. 6. In view of the above discussion I find no illegality in the impugned order. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The interim order dated 3-3-1975. is discharged.