Judgement B.N. SARMA, J.:- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Shri Kumar Rasik Chandra Deb Barma a resident and rate payer of Agartala Municipality praying for an appropriate writ quashing the order of the Chief Commissioner, Tripura, dated 25th day of April, 1955 superseding the Commissioners of the Agartala Municipality under Section 292 of the Tripura Municipal Act (since repealed and hereinafter called the Tripura Act) read with para 5 of the Tripura (Administration) Order 1949 for a period of one year and the subsequent orders extending the said supersession order under Section 293 of the Tripura Act till 1961 and thereafter under S.554 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (hereinafter called the Bengal Act), which was extended to Tripura, and also the notice of demand, dated 22-6-1972 issued to the petitioner by the Administrator under Section 155 of the Bengal Act requiring him to pay a sum of Rs. 5476.96 p. (Annexure S) within a period of one month. The petitioner has further prayed for a writ of the nature of quo warranto for removal of the Administrator of the Agartala Municipality from his Office. 2. The facts leading to the writ petition in brief, are as below: 3. The Tripura State Municipal Act was in force in Tripura till 15th August, 1961. In April, 1955 all the elected Municipal Commissioners having tendered their resignation the charge of Agartala Municipality was handed over to the then State Government, on 24-4-55. On the following day i.e. on the 25th day of April, 1955 the then Chief Commissioner issued an order (Annexure A) superseding the Commissioners of the Agartala Municipality under Section 292 of the Tripura Act read with para 5 of the Tripura (Administration) Order 1959 for a period of one year pending fresh election on the ground that a grave emergency arose due to the resignation of the Commissioners en bloc and appointed the District Magistrate, Tripura as Administrator of the said Municipality. Since then, year after year, the Chief Commissioner extended this order of supersession by issuing orders under Section 293 of the Tripura Municipal Act till 1961. Since then, year after year, the Chief Commissioner extended this order of supersession by issuing orders under Section 293 of the Tripura Municipal Act till 1961. After the Tripura Act was repealed and the Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act XV of 1932) was extended to Tripura on the 15th August, 1961, the said supersession order was similarly extended from year to year by orders issued under Section 554 of the Bengal Act. The order dated 22-4-65 extending the order of supersession for a period of one year expired on 24-4-66 but no order of extension was passed before its expiry. On 29-4-66 the Commissioner, however, issued an order purported to be under Section 554 of the Bengal Act, extending the previous order of supersession with retrospective effect from 24-4-66. Since then the order of supersession has again been extended from year to year under the aforesaid section, till now. 4. The present Administrator Shri Manik Lal Ganguly was appointed as Administrator by the orders dated 20-4-71 (Annexure Q) and dated 24-4-72 (Annexure R) issued by the Lt. Governor, and the Governor, respectively, of Tripura. He issued a demand notice to the petitioner on 22-6-72 (Annexure S), under Section 155 (4) of the Bengal Act requiring him to pay Rs. 5476.96 p. being his dues to the Municipality for several years from 1955-56 to 1972. This notice was issued under certificate of posting. On receipt of this notice the petitioner came and obtained the present rule. 5. According to the petitioner the original order of supersession of the Commissioners of the Agartala Municipality by the Chief Commissioner under S.292 of the Tripura Act read with para 5 of the Tripura (Administration) Order 1949 on the alleged ground of grave emergency due to the resignation of the Commissioners en bloc was not warranted by the said section and as such the said supersession order is void and inoperative. Even if the said order is found to be good, the failure on the part of the Chief Commissioner to extend the period of supersession on expiry of the order dated 22-4-65 within time, brought the order of supersession to an end and it could not be revived by the order issued on 29-4-66 with retrospective effect. Even if the said order is found to be good, the failure on the part of the Chief Commissioner to extend the period of supersession on expiry of the order dated 22-4-65 within time, brought the order of supersession to an end and it could not be revived by the order issued on 29-4-66 with retrospective effect. That being the position the appointment of the present Administrator Shri Manik Lal Ganguly is without jurisdiction and he has no legal authority to issue any demand notice. The petitioner has accordingly prayed for an appropriate writ quashing the initial order of supersession passed under Section 292 of the Tripura Act as well as the subsequent orders extending such supersession and also the demand notice issued by respondent No. 2 i.e the Administrator on 22-6-72. As already pointed out he has further prayed for a writ of the nature quo warranto for removal of the present Administrator, respondent No. 2 from his Office. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently urged before us that the petition is barred by the principles of res judicata and stare decisis in view of the earlier decisions of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1971,* Kiriti Mohan Deb Barma v. Lalit Mohan Nag, and two earlier decisions of the Judicial Commissioner of Tripura viz. (1) Jagneshwar v. Bimal Kanti, AIR 1961 Tripura 52 and (2) Saroj v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Tripura 37 and also had for inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. * Reported in Assam LR (1972) Gauhati 194. 7. Admittedly in none of the aforesaid cases the petitioner was a party. The question of applying the principle of res judicata, therefore, does not arise. The decisions of the Judicial Commissioner in the aforesaid two cases also cannot operate as stare decisis, so far this Court is concerned, in our opinion. In Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1971* of this Court (Kiriti Mohan Deb Barma v. Lalit Mohan Nag) none of the questions agitated in the present writ petition was decided. The question that arose in that case was whether the sanction for prosecution accorded by the Administrator under Section 554 of the Bengal Municipal Act was valid. The learned Magistrate found that the complainant had no legal right to prosecute the accused as the sanction for the said prosecution was illegal. The question that arose in that case was whether the sanction for prosecution accorded by the Administrator under Section 554 of the Bengal Municipal Act was valid. The learned Magistrate found that the complainant had no legal right to prosecute the accused as the sanction for the said prosecution was illegal. He came to the finding of the illegality of the sanction on the ground that the supersession order of the Agartala Municipality was itself illegal and that the Administrator could not, therefore, be legally vested with the powers and duties of the Commissioners of the said Municipality under S.554 of the Bengal Act and accordingly was not competent authority to grant necessary sanction. In this view of the case, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused. In appeal this Court held that the learned Magistrate had erred in adjudicating the validity or otherwise of the supersession order of the Municipal Commissioners and in basing his verdict of acquittal on the invalidity of such supersession. It was further held that the decision of the Judicial Commissioner in Jagneshwar v Bimal Kanti, AIR 1961 Tripura 52 where the order of supersession was found to be valid was binding on all subordinate Courts in Tripura on the principle of `stare decisis and the Magistrate was not justified, in the absence of any special circumstances that had subsequently supervened, in taking a contrary view. In this view of the case this Court set aside the order of acquittal and remanded the case for fresh disposal. This decision does not, therefore, operate as `stare decisis in this case. 8. So far as delay is concerned, it is true that ordinarily this Court will not countenance any inordinate delay in filing such writ petition. But as has been held in the decisions reported in AIR 1965 All 151 , Baij Nath v. State of U.P. and in S.B. Roy v. P.N. Banerjee, (1968) 72 Cal WN 50, delay in presenting a petition for a writ of quo waranto, in which the right of a person to function in a certain capacity is challenged, cannot be a ground for rejecting it. In such a case it was held, everyday the person so acts in that capacity, a fresh cause of action arises. We are in respectful agreement with this view. In such a case it was held, everyday the person so acts in that capacity, a fresh cause of action arises. We are in respectful agreement with this view. In the instant case if the petitioner succeeds in establishing before us that the respondent No. 2 has no jurisdiction to hold the post of Administrator, the delay in presenting the petition will not defeat his cause. We accordingly proceed to examine the points which were urged before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. M. Majumder. 9. The first contention of Mr. Majumder is that the original order of supersession passed by the Chief Commissioner under Section 292 of the Municipal Act read with para 5 of Tripura (Administration) Order, 1949 is without jurisdiction and not warranted by the said section. According to him the Chief Commissioner was competent to supersede the Commissioners of the Municipality on any one or other of the grounds specified in that section. As the resignation of the Commissioners does not come within any of those grounds the order of supersession passed by him was bad in law. 10. Section 292 of the Tripura Municipal Act is in the following terms: "292. If, in the opinion of the Minister, the Commissioners have shown their incompetency to perform, or have persistently made default in the performance of the duties imposed on them by or under this Act or by any other law, or have exceeded or abused their powers, the Minister may, by an order, published with reasons for making it, in the State Gazette, declare such Commissioners to be incompetent, or in default, or to have exceeded or abused their powers, as the case may be, and supersede them for a period to be specified in the order: Provided that except in case of misappropriation of municipal funds or persistent default in the performance of duties by the Commissioners the power under this section shall not ordinarily be exercised until action has been taken under section 291." 11. In our opinion when the Commissioners of the Municipality resigned en masse it amounted to a persistent default in performance of their duties imposed on them by or under the Act and as such the Chief Commissioner was competent to pass the order of supersession under the said section. 12. It was argued by Mr. In our opinion when the Commissioners of the Municipality resigned en masse it amounted to a persistent default in performance of their duties imposed on them by or under the Act and as such the Chief Commissioner was competent to pass the order of supersession under the said section. 12. It was argued by Mr. Majumder that when the Commissioners had resigned they were no longer in office and therefore, the question of their persistent default to perform their duties under the Act could not arise. We are unable to accept this contention. The resignation to be effective must be accepted. In the instant case the order of supersession of the Commissioners by the Chief Commissioner amounted to acceptance of their resignation and it can, therefore, be said that the Commissioners were in office at the tame when the order of supersession was issued. 13. The next contention of Mr. Majumder was that the period of supersession, as extended by the order dated 22-4-65 having already expired on the 24th day of April, 1966 by efflux of time and the Chief Commissioner not having extended the same before expiry of the period of supersession, the term could not be extended afterwards by the order, dated 29-4-66, with retrospective effect and that being so the subsequent orders extending the period of supersession from year to year are of no avail. 14. Sub-section (2) of Section 554 provides as below : "On the expiration of the period of supersession specified in the order, the State Government may- (i) extend the period of supersession for such further term as it may consider necessary, or (ii) reconstitute the Commissioners of the municipality by a fresh general election and the persons who vacated their offices under clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall not be disqualified for election or appointment under Section 26, or (iii) reconstitute the Commissioners of the municipality by appointment only for such period as it may consider necessary and the persons who vacated their offices under clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall not be deemed disqualified for appointment: Provided that the State Government may, if circumstances permit, at any time before the expiration of the period of supersession take action either under clause (ii) or clause (iii) of this sub-section." 15. According to Mr. Majumder the words "on expiration" mean "prior to expiration" or "simultaneously with the expiration". According to Mr. Majumder the words "on expiration" mean "prior to expiration" or "simultaneously with the expiration". We are unable to accept this contention. The meaning of the word "On" has been given in Blacks Law Dictionary - as "upon", "as soon as", "near to", "along" "along side of" and "adjacent to" etc. In our opinion the word "On" occurring in this sub-section means "as soon as". This will be quite evident if we read the entire sub-section. It is clear from the provisions of the said sub-section that reconstitution of the Commissioners of the Municipality by a fresh general election under clause (ii) or reconstitution of the Commissioners of the Municipality by appointment under clause (iii) are to be made after the expiration of the period of supersession. It is only in special circumstances the State Government may, at any time before the expiration of the period of supersession, take action either under Clause (ii) or Clause (iii) of this sub-section. If the word "on" means "after" in regard to Clause (ii) and Clause (iii) we are unable to hold that it will have a different connotation in regard to Clause (i). 16. The next contention of Mr. Majumder was that as provided in Clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 554 the period of supersession can be extended for only one term and not more. We are unable to accept this contention as well. Under Section 13 of the General Clauses Act the word in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa. The question as to whether the word "term" occurring in this sub-section means singular or plural has got to be ascertained in the context of the other provisions of the Act. It is seen from some of the provisions of the Act that whether the legislature intended to prescribe a fixed term or period it did so in clear language. For example in proviso to Section 16 (c) of the Bengal Act it has been provided that if in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary so to do in the circumstances of the case, it may, from time to time, by notification specifying the circumstances, extend the period of two years referred to in the previous proviso by such further period or periods not exceeding 4 years. If the legislature actually intended that the order of supersession should not be extended for more than one term it would have specifically provided to that effect as in the proviso to Section 16 (c). 17. As a result of the foregoing discussions we have no hesitation to hold that the order of supersession issued by the Chief Commissioner and his subsequent orders extending the said order of supersession issued from year to year, are valid in law. That being the position the appointment of respondent No. 2 as Administrator of the Agartala Municipality cannot be without jurisdiction. 18. The last contention of Mr. Majumder before us was that the action of the respondent No, 2 in including quarterly instalments of several years in one demand notice (Annexure S) dated 22-6-72, is contrary to the provisions of Section 155 of the Bengal Act. His further contention in this regard is that service of such notice under certificate of posting, as was done in the instant case, is violative of the said provisions and is, therefore, invalid. This contention is equally unacceptable. Rule 39 of the Rules relating to collection of taxes etc. framed under Section 215 (g) of the Bengal Municipal Act, by the Government of Tripura in 1963 provides for issue of a consolidated notice for several quarters or years. 19. Mr. Majumder wanted to impugn the validity of this Rule before us. He was, however, not allowed to do so as the vires of these Rules were not challenged in his writ petition. 20. It was then submitted by Mr. Majumder that, as provided in Sec. 155 of the Bengal Act, it is mandatory that the defaulting rate payer should be served with bills for each quarter before a demand notice is issued; but in the instant case such bills were not served on him. The State in its counter-affidavit has stated that the bills were served on the petitioner and it has annexed the copies of the reports submitted by the person who served such bills. The question as to whether these bills were served or not is a disputed question of fact and this Court while deciding a writ petition will not go to decide such a question. 21. The question as to whether these bills were served or not is a disputed question of fact and this Court while deciding a writ petition will not go to decide such a question. 21. So far as service of the notice is concerned it is seen from the counter affidavit filed by the State that the notice was personally offered to the petitioner but he refused to accept the same. Under such circumstances the person authorised to serve the notice served the same by hanging on the wall of the dwelling house of the petitioner and a further notice was sent to him under certificate of posting. In our opinion there was substantial compliance with the provisions of S.155 of the Bengal Act. 22. Be that as it may, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute before us the liability of the petitioner to pay the tax demanded from him and he submitted that he is ready and willing to pay all his dues. In view of this admitted liability we are unable to quash the demand notice even if there was any irregularity in the service of the same. 23. In the result, it is seen that there is no force in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. D. PATHAK, J.:- I agree. Petition dismissed.