JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also dispose of Misc. Petitions Nos. 838 of 1972 and 162 of 1973. ( 2. ) THE petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 802 of 1972 carry on the business of manufacturing oil oil oil-cakes at Raipur. The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Raipur, which is respondent No. 1 in all the three petitions, has been constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960. The Committee by its notice dated 14th February 1970 informed the petitioners that they had brought within the market area agricultural produce (oil seeds) as mentioned in the accompanying statement for purposes of sale for the period from 23rd November 1965 to 15th December 1968, and that the petitioners were liable to pay market-fees amounting to Rs. 6,384. 94. The petitioners were asked to produce accounts for scrutiny of the Committee, in case they disputed the correctness of the enclosed statement. The petitioners did not give any reply to this notice. The Committee then assessed Rs. 6,384. 94 as the market-fees recoverable from the petitioners and requested the Tahsildar raipur, to recover the same as arrears of land revenue. The petitioners then filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the recovery. ( 3. ) IN Misc. Petition No. 838 of 1972 the facts are that the petitioners are manufacturers of oil and oil-cakes and also carry on the business of rice-milling. The petitioners were served with a notice by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Raipur, on 9th October 1970 to the effect that they were liable to pay Rs. 22,366. 98 as market-fees on paddy and oil seeds brought by them for sale within the market area for the period from 25th November 1965 to 27th April 1970. A statement of account was enclosed along with the notice and the petitioners were required to produce their books of account for scrutiny, in case they disputed the accounts sent by the Committee. The petitioners did not reply to this notice. The Committee then started the recovery of the said amount of market-fees through the Tahsildar, Raipur. The petitioners then filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the recovery. ( 4. ) IN Misc. Petition No. 162 of 1973 the petitioners are wholesale dealers in Kirana. The petitioners did not reply to this notice. The Committee then started the recovery of the said amount of market-fees through the Tahsildar, Raipur. The petitioners then filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the recovery. ( 4. ) IN Misc. Petition No. 162 of 1973 the petitioners are wholesale dealers in Kirana. They were served with a notice by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, raipur, on 30th May 1970 demanding Rs. 12,334. 06 as market-fees on the agricultural produce brought by them for sale within the market area for the period from 2nd December 1965 to 22nd September 1969. An account on the basis of which the market fees were assessed was enclosed along with the notice and the petitioners were asked to produce their accounts, in case they disputed the accounts sent by the Committee. No reply to this notice was given. The Committee started recovery of the said amount through the tahsildar, Raipur, on which this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed to challenge the recovery. ( 5. ) THE petitioners in Misc. Petitions Nos. 802 and 838 of 1972 hold licences from the Committee for their processing or pressing factories under rule 72 of the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1962. In accordance with the terms of their licences, they are bound to produce their registers and books of account before the committee for purposes of scrutiny. The petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 162 of 1973 are licensed as traders under rule 69. They are also bound to produce their books of account for examination, if so required by the Committee, under the terms of their licence. ( 6. ) THE petitioners in Misc. Petitions 802 and 838 of 1972 first contended that the goods brought by them within the market area were all for consumption in the processing or pressing factories owned by them and that the goods were not sold. The respondent Samiti controverted this allegation of the petitioners. According to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Committee, the goods in respect of which market-fees were being required were actually sold by the petitioners within the market area. The petitioners did not reply to the notices which were issued by the Committee contending that the goods were not sold by them. According to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Committee, the goods in respect of which market-fees were being required were actually sold by the petitioners within the market area. The petitioners did not reply to the notices which were issued by the Committee contending that the goods were not sold by them. If goods are brought for bona fide consumption within the market area and not for sale, a certificate has to be furnished to the market committee in Form VI in accordance with rule 56 (4 ). No such certificate was furnished in either of these cases. In view of these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the petitioners contention that the goods were actually used in their factories is not correct and it is more reasonable to hold that the goods were sold as contended by the Committee. ( 7. ) IN Misc. Petition No. 162 of 1973 it is first contended that the goods were brought within the market area for purposes of export. As already stated, the petitioners in this petition are licensed traders. A licensed trader who brings within the market area goods for export has to furnish a declaration in Form VI to the Committee. No such declaration was submitted by the petitioners. The petitioners also did not reply to the notice issued by the committee. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to hold that the goods were actually sold within the market area as contended by the Committee. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners in all these petitions realising the difficulty that it was not possible to establish that the goods were either used in the manufacture of other commodities in the factories or were exported, gave up the factual dispute. It was, however, contended that the recovery of market fees was illegal as no machinery for assessment of the fees was prescribed either by the Act or the Rules. ( 9. ) POWER to levy market-fees is conferred by section 20 of the Act on the market Committee. This section provides that the market committee may, in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf and subject to such limits as may be prescribed, levy fee on agricultural produce brought in the market area for sale or brought or sold therein. This section provides that the market committee may, in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf and subject to such limits as may be prescribed, levy fee on agricultural produce brought in the market area for sale or brought or sold therein. Section 38 (2) (xxiii) authorises the making of rules by the State Government for the recovery and disposal of fees leviable by or under the Act. Under section 42 every sum due to a market committee under the Act is recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. ( 10. ) RULE 56 of the rules authorises the Market Committee to levy and collect fees on notified agricultural produce brought in the market area for sale or brought or sold therein at such rates as may be specified in the bye-laws subject to the maximum limit of twenty-five naya paise and minimum limit of ten naya paise per Rupees 100 worth of such agricultural produce. The fees are payable by the seller and buyer in equal proportion. But if the buyer cannot be identified the whole fee is payable by the seller who brings the produce in the market area for sale. We have already referred to sub-rule (4) of rule 56. This rule provides that no fee shall be levied on notified agricultural produce brought from outside the market area by the industrial concerns situate in the market area for their bona fide consumption or by the licensed traders for export in respect of which a declaration has been made and certificate has been obtained by the market committee in Form VI. The words "certificate has been obtained by the market committee" are somewhat ambiguous. But read in the context they mean that the declaration and the certificate as required by Form VI have to be furnished by the person bringing the goods within the market area to the market committee if the goods are brought for bona fide consumption or for export. Rule 57 provides that the fees are payable as soon as the agricultural produce is brought into the market area or market proper for sale or bought or sold in the market yard. This rule further provides that the fees shall be recoverable in such manner as may be specified in the bye-laws. Rule 57 provides that the fees are payable as soon as the agricultural produce is brought into the market area or market proper for sale or bought or sold in the market yard. This rule further provides that the fees shall be recoverable in such manner as may be specified in the bye-laws. The evasion of payment of fees is made punishable under rule 62 with a fine which may extend to Rs. 50/ -. ( 11. ) BYE-LAWS have been framed by the Committee in accordance with the Act and Rules. Bye-law 46 fixes the rate of market-fees. Clause (1) of this bye-law provides that the market-fees will be payable when the agricultural produce is brought within the market area, market proper or market yard for purposes of sale. Clause (2) provides that if the buyer cannot be traced the whole of the fee will be recoverable from the person who brings the agricultural produce within the market area for sale. Clause (4) is similar to rule 56 (4)and requires that a person bringing any agricultural produce for purposes of consumption in his factory or for purposes of export must give a declaration in form VI to the market committee. This clause further provides that until such a declaration is given, the person bringing the agricultural produce will not store it in any godown or shop. Bye-law 47 (5) provides that the fees shall be paid in the office of the market committee immediately after the sale. Bye-law 84 makes it obligatory for all licensees to produce their registers and books of account for purposes of scrutiny if so required by the President, Vice-President or Secretary of the Committee. This bye-law further provides that the moment a written direction is received by the licensee he will have to appear with all the relevant record and books of account in the office of the Committee. It is also provided that the scrutiny of the record and books of account produced by the licensee would be limited for carrying out the legitimate purpose of the Committee. ( 12. ) ARTICLE 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The word "tax" in this article includes any impost such as duties ceases or fees; Muhammadbhai v. Stale of Gujarat ( AIR 1962 SC 1517 . ). [article 367 (18)]. ( 12. ) ARTICLE 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The word "tax" in this article includes any impost such as duties ceases or fees; Muhammadbhai v. Stale of Gujarat ( AIR 1962 SC 1517 . ). [article 367 (18)]. The words "levy" and "collection" in the article are also used in a comprehensive sense to cover all steps beginning from imposition and ending with recovery. The word "levy" thus covers not merely imposition but also assessment. A taxing statute has, therefore, to provide not only for the imposition of the tax or fees with which it deals, but also for its assessment and collection. Article 265, however, does not lay down that any detailed machinery should be provided for assessment. The procedural provisions for assessment must, of necessity, depend upon the nature of the tax or fees which is sought to be imposed by the statute. We have already referred to the material provisions of the Act and Rules. Section 20 of the act, read with rule 56 authorises a Market Committee to levy and collect market-fees. The word "levy" in these provisions must, in our opinion, include assessment. It is true that neither the Act nor the Rules expressly lay down any procedure for assessment. The Bye-laws also do not contain any express provision for assessment. We are, however, of opinion that the authority to make an assessment in accordance with the principles of natural justice must be implied from the terms of rule 56 read with bye-law 84. This we say on the principle that an authority to do something essential for the exercise of the power conferred can be legitimately inferred as a matter of construction. In - Asstt. Collector, C. E. v. N. T. Co. of India Ltd. ( AIR 1972 SC 2563 .) the Supreme Court was concerned with the construction of rule 10-A of the Central Excise Rules, which authorised the Government to collect any deficiency in duty but did not provide any procedure for ascertainment of the deficiency in duty. In - Asstt. Collector, C. E. v. N. T. Co. of India Ltd. ( AIR 1972 SC 2563 .) the Supreme Court was concerned with the construction of rule 10-A of the Central Excise Rules, which authorised the Government to collect any deficiency in duty but did not provide any procedure for ascertainment of the deficiency in duty. In holding that a power of assessment in accordance with a quasi-judicial procedure to ascertain the deficiency, in case the assessee disputed the demand of the government, was implicit, the Supreme Court made the following observations: "it is true that rule 10-A seems to deal only with collection and not with the ascertainment of pay deficiency in duty or its cause by a quasi-judicial procedure. If, however, it is read in conjunction with section 4 of the Act, we think that a quasi-judicial proceeding, in the circumstance of such a case, could take place under an implied power. It is well established rule of construction that a power to do something essential for the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation may be implied. See Caries on Statute Law (Fifth Edition) p. 105. " This case further holds that the word, "levy" is wider in scope and includes both imposition and assessment. The principle applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Asstt. Collector, C. E. v. N. T. Co. of India Ltd. (supra) wholly applies in the instant case. The authority to levy and collect fees is conferred by rule 56 and section 20 of the Act necessarily implies that the Committee can make assessment of the fees in a quasi judicial manner if the demand made by it is disputed by the assessee. Bye-law 84, which makes it obligatory on every licensee to produce his books of account before the Committee and which authorises the Committee to scrutinize the books so produced, also goes to show that the Committee can hold an inquiry to find out the amount of market-fees recoverable by it. The facts stated by us earlier will show that in all these petitions a quasi judicial procedure was followed by the Committee. The Committee issued notices to the petitioners tentatively assessing the fees payable by them and requiring them to produce their books of account for examination, in case the amount assessed was disputed by the petitioners. The facts stated by us earlier will show that in all these petitions a quasi judicial procedure was followed by the Committee. The Committee issued notices to the petitioners tentatively assessing the fees payable by them and requiring them to produce their books of account for examination, in case the amount assessed was disputed by the petitioners. None of the petitioners raised any objection to the notices issued by the Committee. They did not produce their accounts for examination by the Committee. In the circumstances, the Committee was justified in holding that the amount demanded by it in the notices as market-fees was properly recoverable from the petitioners. ( 13. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners referred to us the case of K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1961 SC 552 .) for the proposition that a statute imposing a tax must provide a procedural machinery for assessment. The case of Moopil Nair deals with the question whether a taxing law can be held to be an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f)and (g) of the Constitution. In that connection it was held in that case that when a taxing Act provides no machinery and procedure to be followed in making the assessment and the whole thing is treated from beginning to end as of a purely administrative character completely ignoring the legal position that the assessment of a tax on a person or property is at least of a quasi-judicial character, the Act may be held to be imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g ). The same principle is stated in Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1963 SC 1667 . ). In our opinion, these cases are not applicable. We have already stated that from the terms of rule 56 and the bye-laws a quasi-judicial procedure is envisaged for assessment of the fees, in case of dispute. Further, the petitioners nowhere challenge any provision of the Act or Rules or Bye-laws as ultra vires and void on the ground that it infringes upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19. The market-fee collected under the Act and the Rules is a simple impost. Further, the petitioners nowhere challenge any provision of the Act or Rules or Bye-laws as ultra vires and void on the ground that it infringes upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19. The market-fee collected under the Act and the Rules is a simple impost. It is primarily for the traders who bring the goods for sale to pay the fees when the goods are brought for sale or sold. They are required under the Rules and the Bye-laws to maintain accounts. No elaborate procedure for assessment is needed in fixing the amount of the fees. In case of dispute, a scrutiny of the accounts maintained by the licensees, in most cases, would be enough. We are, therefore, of opinion that the procedure of assessment, which is implicit under the Rules, is a reasonable one. ( 14. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners also referred to us to the Madhya pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (Act No. 24 of 1973), which has repealed and replaced the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960. It was argued that the new Act contains express provisions for assessment of fees and that there was no such provision in the repealed Act with which we are concerned. It is true that the new Act makes express provisions, but from that alone it cannot be inferred that there was absolutely no machinery for assessment under the old Act and the Rules made under it. As already stated, the power to assess in a quasi-judicial manner was implicit in rule 56. ( 15. ) THE petitions fail and are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs of these petitions. The amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petitions dismissed.