JUDGMENT : 1. In these applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are involved identical questions of law regarding the imposition and recovery of cane cess under Section 29 of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Bihar Act 7 of 1937), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, and the subsequent validating Acts and Ordinances. The petitioner is a company carrying on the business of manufacture of sugar in the name and style of The Belsand Sugar Company Limited, Righa, in the district of Sitamarhi For the crushing season 1966-67 (December, 1966 to February, 1967) cane, cess was imposed on the petitioner as required under Section 29 of the Act, amounting to Rs. 3,32,363.94 and a requisition for recovery of the said amount was filed by the Cane Officer, Muzaffarpur respondent no. 3, to the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2, on 5-4-1967 under Section 5 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (Bihar and Orissa Act IV of 1914), hereinafter to be referred to as the Recovery Act. On the basis of the said requisition, respondent no.2 signed the certificate of demand on 23.5.67 under Section 6 of the Recovery Act for recovery of the arrears of cane cess, initiating the recovery proceeding numbered as certificate case 2 of 1967-68 This forms the subject matter of C.W.J.C. 1270 of 1972 whereas the subject-matter of C.W.J.C. 1271 of 1972 is recovery of arrear of cane cess amounting to Rs. 2,46,655.15 for the crushing season 1967-68 (November, 1967 to January, 1968), the requisition for the recovery of which was filed on 4-4-1968 and the certificate of demand was signed on 16-12-1968 in Certificate case 97 of 1968-1969. The petitioner filed objections in the two cases under Section 9 of the Recovery Act challenging the validity of the impositions on the basis of a Bench decision of this court in the case of (1) A.K. Jain V. Union of India (1968 P.L.J.R. 179) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of (2) A.K. Jain Vs. The petitioner filed objections in the two cases under Section 9 of the Recovery Act challenging the validity of the impositions on the basis of a Bench decision of this court in the case of (1) A.K. Jain V. Union of India (1968 P.L.J.R. 179) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of (2) A.K. Jain Vs. Union of India (1970 P.L.J.R. 86-A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 267) holding that, if Bihar Act 7 of 1937 provided anything contrary to Rule 3(3) of the Sugar Control ORDER :, 1955 issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of 1955), it must be held to have been altered in view of Article 372 of the Constitution. It may be mentioned here that Bihar Act 7 of 1937 was a temporary enactment originally intended to remain in force till 30-6-1941 but its life was extended from time to time by different amending Acts. The last extension was made by Bihar Act 6 of 1950 up to 30-1-1955, which was followed by Bihar Act 7 of 1955 extending the life of the Act indefinitely. After a part of the Act was struck down by this court, no legislative measures were taken until 12-1-68 when Ordinance In of 1968 was promulgated by the Governor of Bihar with instruction of the President of India. This ordinance was followed by numerous successive Ordinances, to wit Bihar Ordinance VI of 1968, Ordinance XIII of 1968, Ordinance IV of 1969 and Ordinance VI of 1969. Then during the President's rule came President's Act 8 of 1969 which was followed by Bihar Ordinance XX of 1971, Ordinance XLIX of 1971, Ordinance LXIX of 1971, Ordinance LXI of 1972, Ordinance CX of 1972, Ordinance CLXV of 1972, Ordinance CLVII of 1973, Ordinance XVIII of 1973, Ordinance XV of 1974 and the Ordinance LXXXIV of 1974 last up to date is Ordinance CXV of 1974. Each Ordinance in its turn, while repealing all the previous Acts or Ordinances, validated retrospectively all acts done or purporting to be done impositions of taxes, liabilities having accrued and rights vested thereunder. Each Ordinance in its turn, while repealing all the previous Acts or Ordinances, validated retrospectively all acts done or purporting to be done impositions of taxes, liabilities having accrued and rights vested thereunder. The certificate of demand in C.W.J.C. 1270 of 1972 will have to be judged in the light of Ordinance III of 1968 whereas that in C.W.J.C. 1271 of 1972 on the basis of Ordinance VI of 1968 not that there is any material difference in so far as the statutory provisions are concerned. 2. It may be mentioned here that Bihar Ordinance III of 1968 laid down for the first time in Section 35 (3) that "the amount of tax due shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum and shall be recoverable as a "Public demand". Bihar Ordinance CX of 1972, which was in force at the time when these writ applications were filed, laid down in Section 49 (3) read with Section 51 of the Ordinance that the arrears of such tax shall bear interest at the rate of 11 per cent per annum. The petitioner having filed objections in the two cases under Section 9 of the Recovery Act subsequently paid off all the arrears of cane cess and petitions were thereafter filed before the Certificate Officer, Sitamarhi, respondent no. 1, for withdrawal of the demand notices. Respondent no. 1 by his ORDER :s in both the cases, directed that interest and cost be calculated on the basis of Section 17 of the Recovery Act at the rate of 61 per cent per annum. According to the petitioner, however, the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2, on receipt of the records from respondent no. 1 calculated the dues not on the basis of Section 17 of the Recovery Act but at the rate of 11 per cent per annum under Section 49 (3) read with Section 51 of Bihar Ordinance CX of 1972. The total outstanding dues on the basis of calculation of interest at the rate of 61 per cent per annum in the case of C.W.J.C. 1270 of 1972 amounts. according to the petitioner, to Rs. 39,834.87 whereas at the rate of 11 percent per annum to Rs. 81,436.57. In C.W.J.C. 1271 of 1972 the corresponding figures are Rs, 14,881.79 and Rs. 29,616.99 respectively. according to the petitioner, to Rs. 39,834.87 whereas at the rate of 11 percent per annum to Rs. 81,436.57. In C.W.J.C. 1271 of 1972 the corresponding figures are Rs, 14,881.79 and Rs. 29,616.99 respectively. The calculation chart showing how these figures have been arrived at has been appended to the writ petition as Annexure 9 in each of the cases. 3. In the writ petitions and the supplementary affidavits thereto numerous points have been taken. Mr. Jagdish Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner, has, however, confined his attack to the demands made on the following grounds :- (i) There is no provision in Act 7 of 1937 for recovery of cane cess as a public demand. (ii) The recovery of interest is not permissible because Act 7 of 1937 is a self-contained Act which provides for the imposition of penalty of Rs. 2,000/- in default in the payment of cane cess. There is neither any statutory provision nor any contractual obligation. The legislature having exhausted the liability for default in the payment of cane cess by fixing a penalty of Rs 2,000/-, any other penalty in the shape of liability to pay interest was barred. (iii) The rate of interest charged at 11 per cent per annum as per calculation chart (Annexure 9 in each of the cases) was unwarranted in law. (iv) The ordinances in question were ultra vires. Bihar Act 7 of 1937 having been declared uitra vires by this court on the ground that the centra1 legislature was held competent to enact those provisions, the Bihar Legislature will not be competent even to validate it. It was, therefore, submitted that both the imposition of the cane cess as well as the charging of interest and the mode of recovery thereof as a public demand were ultra vires. 4. To take up the last point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner first, suffice it to say that, on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. S.K.G. Sugar (P) Ltd. V. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1533), it is no longer open to the petitioner to challenge the vires of the ordinances. In the case of S.K.G. Sugar Ltd., the supreme court has laid at rest any controversy that may be said to have arisen on account of this Court's JUDGMENT : in the case of (1) A.K. Jain (1968 P.L.J.R. 179) supra which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in (2) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 267 supra. The law has been settled as laying down that the taxing provisions of Bihar Act 7 of 1937 as re-enacted permanently by Bihar Act 7 of 1955 continued to be operative and validly in force at all material times; the successive ordinances promulgated by the Governor of Bihar validated by way of abundant caution those taxing provisions Of anything or anything done thereunder. By virtue of the legal fiction introduced by the validating provisions of each successive Ordinance, the imposition of the cane cess deriving its legal force and validity must be held to have so derived them directly from the corresponding ordinances in force at the material times. It must also be taken to be well settled that the taxing provisions of the Act were neither rendered inoperative by Article 254(1) nor repealed or altered by the competent legislature within the contemplation of Article 372 of the Constitution. It is no longer open, therefore, to contend that the Acts or any of the ordinances in question suffers from the vice of encroaching upon any prohibited field of taxing legislation. The vires of Bihar Ordinance III of 1968 was also the subject-matter of challenge before this court on a previous occasion and a Bench of this court in the case of (3) Harinagar Sugar Mills Limited V. The State of Bihar and others (Title suit I of 1969 decided on 18th September, 1969) held the same to be intra vires. 5. This then brings us to the first question as to whether resorting to the provisions of the Recovery Act can be held to be in any way unwarranted in law. So far as Bihar Ordinances III and VI of 1968 are concerned, Section 35(1) (a) of each of them lays down that the State Government may, by notification, impose a tax not exceeding 67 paise per quintal on entry of sugarcane into the local area specified in such notification for consumption or use or, for sale to, a factory situated therein. Clause (b) of Section 35(1) authorises imposition of tax at the same rate on the purchase of sugarcane by or on behalf of the occupier of a factory subject to certain proviso with which we are not concerned in these cases. And, then Section 35(3) of each of these Ordinances reads thus: "The tax payable under Sub-section (1) shall be paid by the occupier of the factory to the collector of the district concerned such manner as may be prescribed and the amount of tax due shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum and shall be recoverable as a public demand." 6. As a matter of fact, each of the Ordinances at all material times prescribed the mode of recovery of the arrears of cane cess due as if it were recoverable as a public demand. Mr. Sahai, however, laid stress on, and invited our attention to the Act which in so many words did not incorporate any provision in it for recovery of arrears of cane cess due as public demand. Section 30 of the Act, however, empowered the State Government to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and Section 30 (2) (t) reads as follows: "30. Power to make rules. (2) In Particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for - (t) the authority by which, the person from whom and the manner in which a tax or cess imposed under Section 29 shall be collected." In pursuance of the rule-making power the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules) were framed, which came into force on the 15th of June, 1938. Rule 46-A of the Rules prescribed the manner of collection of cess. And, the relevant provisions of Rule 46-A may be reproduced below: "46A. Collection of cess(2) Within a fortnight of the close of each month the occupier shall pay into the treasury the amount due as cess on the quantity of sugarcane which has entered the local area during the month in question. And, the relevant provisions of Rule 46-A may be reproduced below: "46A. Collection of cess(2) Within a fortnight of the close of each month the occupier shall pay into the treasury the amount due as cess on the quantity of sugarcane which has entered the local area during the month in question. (3) Within a fortnight of the close of each month or within a fortnight of the notification of any increase in cess, the occupier shall submit to the Collector a return in Form XXIV or XXIV-A, as the case may be, showing the quantity of sugarcane that has entered the local area during the month or during the crushing season in question, and the amount of cess credited by him into the treasury on account of that quantity of sugarcane, together with the treasury chalan or receipt to show that the amount of the cess due has been duly credited into the treasury. "(5) All sums payable in accordance with Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 shall be recoverable by the Collector as a public demand." It will thus be seen that apart from the fact that the Ordinances in question specifically provided for the mode of recovery of the arrears of cane cess as a public demand, the Rules in pursuance of Section 30 of the Act also prescribed the manner of recovery of Cane cess as a public demand. 7. Mr. Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that although the ordinances in question may be said to have provided specifically for such mode of recovery, the Act was silent in this respect and it was beyond the competence of rule making authority to lay down any such mode. Elaborating this point, learned counsel urged that Section 30(2) (t) of the Act merely empowered the rule-making authority to prescribe the manner in which a tax or cess duly imposed could be collected. The term ‘manner’ merely clothed the rule-making authority to lay down the procedure of recovery. In other words, only the procedural aspect could be the subject-matter of the subordinate legislative authority. To say as has been said in Sub-rule (5) of Rule 46A of the Rules, that all sums payable shall be recoverable by the collector as public demand is not to lay down any procedure for recovery of the tax or cess due, for, it trenches upon a substantive field of law. To say as has been said in Sub-rule (5) of Rule 46A of the Rules, that all sums payable shall be recoverable by the collector as public demand is not to lay down any procedure for recovery of the tax or cess due, for, it trenches upon a substantive field of law. It was contended that the onerous method of realisation or recovery has been prescribed in the Recovery Act. Such an onerous method, it was suggested, is not only procedural but substantive too. Learned counsel laid great stress upon Section 15 of the Recovery Act in trying to impress upon us that the provisions relating to the recovery of a public demand were not only procedural in nature. Ingenuous as this argument may seem to be to some, I, for one, fail to understand any intelligible differentia between a 'manner' in some circumstances being a part of procedural or adjective law while in others a part of substantive law. The Recovery Act lays down the law relating to the recovery of public demands. In other words, the various provisions of the Recovery Act merely lay down the manner in which a public demand may be realised or recovered. I do not see any infirmity in the Act, instead of incorporating in it the whole of the Recovery Act, empowering the rule making authority to lay down the manner of realisation and the rule-making authority, in its turn, without incorporating all the provisions of the Recovery Act in the Rules, merely laying down that the taxes or cesses due on cane shall be recoverable in the manner which has been laid down in the Recovery Act. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the term 'manner' is "the way in which anything is done: method" (see Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary). The Recovery Act lays down the method of recovery of public demands whereas Rule 46-A (5) of the Rules instead of incorporating in it the whole of the provisions of the Recovery Act lays down the method or mode of collection of taxes or cesses on cane as the same as that of a public demand payable to the Collector. The Recovery Act lays down the method of recovery of public demands whereas Rule 46-A (5) of the Rules instead of incorporating in it the whole of the provisions of the Recovery Act lays down the method or mode of collection of taxes or cesses on cane as the same as that of a public demand payable to the Collector. My view that the Recovery Act deals with the manner or mod e of recovery of a public demand also finds support from a Bench decision of this court, to which I was a party, in the case of (4) M/s. Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. V. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1974 Patna 75) in which it was observed that the only distinction between the mode of recovery of a public demand simpliciter not payable to the Collector and arrears of land revenue payable to the Collector is between the different modes of filing the certificates. There is, thus, absolutely no substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the distinction sought to be made out by him is too nice to be intelligible. This disposes of the first point raised by learned counsel. 8. The next point that falls for consideration is whether recovery of interest under Section 17 of the Recovery Act can be said to be in any way illegal. It was contended that the Act is a special Act. Section 26 of the Act empowers the State Government to impose certain penalties in case of breach of conditions of the licence. Section 27 of the Act provides for other penalties which may be imposed for various other infractions of the law by the occupier of a factory and under certain circumstances by its manager. Sub rule (6) of Rule 46A of the Rules also prescribes imposition of a fine which may extend to Rs. 2000/- in certain circumstances. On the basis of these provisions, Mr. Sahai contended that the Act and the Rules being a self contained statute prescribing special provisions regarding imposition of penalty for various other infractions of the law, the provisions of the Recovery Act could not be invoked, as the latter Act was a general Act. Learned counsel relied upon the maxin generali specialibus non derogant. He also invoked the doctrine of "double jeopardy". Learned counsel relied upon the maxin generali specialibus non derogant. He also invoked the doctrine of "double jeopardy". I am afraid the petitioner cannot successfully press into service these principles, and this part of the argument is also without any substance. Section 26 of the Act, as already stated above, merely authorises the imposition of penalty for breach of conditions of the licence in contravention of the provisions of Section 11 A of the Act. Section 27 authorises the imposition of varying amounts of penal fine for infraction and contravention of the various provisions of law as contained in Sections 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 24 of the Act. Section 27 (6) is a residuary penal clause authorising the imposition of penalty extending up to Rs.2,000/- on any person contravening any of the provisions of the Act for which no penalty is otherwise provided. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 46A of the Rules prescribes that if the occupier of a factory without good and sufficient cause fails to credit into the treasury on the due date the full amount payable on account of cess or fails to keep the correct daily account or fails to submit on the due date the monthly return in the prescribed forms, he shall be punishable with fine extending up to Rs. 2000/-. It will thus be noticed from the aforesaid penal provisions that penalties have been prescribed for infractions of the law so that no occupier or manager of a sugar factory can disregard the mandatory statutory provisions with impunity. This, however, by no stretch of imagination can be held to preclude the enactment of a statutory provision for realisation of the taxes and cesses that have fallen due. Indeed, while the penal provisions are intended to keep the occupier and the manager of a sugar factory within the limits of correct behaviour, such provisions can in no way be said to absolve the factory of the tax or cess liability merely because in case of non-discharge of such a liability certain penal consequences may follow. Indeed, while the penal provisions are intended to keep the occupier and the manager of a sugar factory within the limits of correct behaviour, such provisions can in no way be said to absolve the factory of the tax or cess liability merely because in case of non-discharge of such a liability certain penal consequences may follow. The former falls within the four corners of penal law in so far as Section 28 of the Act prescribes the mode of prosecution resulting in any such penalty to be imposed by a magistrate of second class or of compouding of offence by the Cane Commissioner at any stage before the conviction, whereas the latter deals with merely the recovery or discharge of a civil liability. It is true that Rule 46 A (6) of the Rules puts the defaulter into jeopardy of being penalised for an offence by his prosecution but it is equally true that the liability which a factory has incurred for payment of taxes or cesses can well be recovered in the manner prescribed by law. In the present cases, such a manner of recovery has been validly, as I have already held above, prescribed as the mode in which a public demand may be recovered under the Recovery Act. The charging of interest under Section 17 of the Recovery Act on the tax or cess, which is the subject matter of a certificate proceeding, is not in the nature of a punitive provision for any infraction of the law. It is merely incidental to the principal amount having been not paid over a certain period after the due date on account of a statutory civil liability having been imposed. In short, whereas the different punitive provisions in the Act or the Rules fall within the ream of penal law, the provision regarding the charging of interest in Section 17 of the Recovery Act fastens a civil liability upon the factory. Neither of the two aspects encroaches upon the field of the other. There can thus be said to be neither any repugnancy between them nor can one be said to exclude the other. I, accordingly, over rule the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that the recovery of statutory interest under Section 17 of the Recovery Act was in any way illegal. 9. There can thus be said to be neither any repugnancy between them nor can one be said to exclude the other. I, accordingly, over rule the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that the recovery of statutory interest under Section 17 of the Recovery Act was in any way illegal. 9. The only point which remains to be disposed of is the matter with regard to the quantum of interest, that has been actually charged from the petitioner by the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2 by his ORDER :dated 18-8-72 as incorporated in Annexure 7 to each of the two writ petitions As already stated above, the interest charged in respect of the crushing season 1966-67 relating to C.W.J.C. 1270 of 1972 is Rs. 81,454/- whereas for the crushing season 1967-68 relating to the other writ petition a sum of Rs 30,775.34. The case of the petitioner is that these amounts have been arrived at by calculating the interest at the rate of 11 per centum per annum under Section 49(3) read with Section 51 of Bihar Ordinance CX of 1972 which was wholly illegal, since that ordinance could have no application to the periods in question. The stand fairly taken by the learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondents is that no interest could be charged at the rate of 11 per centum per annum, but, according to his submission, as also is the case made out in the counter-affidavit, interest has been charged actually at the rate of 6½ per centum per annum under Section 17 of the Recovery Act The amounts of arrears of cane cess due on various dates 'as also the various amounts paid on particular dates during the pendency of the certificate proceeding as mentioned in Annexure 9 to each of the writ petitions have not been disputed. It is also not disputed that interest under the Recovery Act in respect of the crushing season 1966-67 could accrue and has been so held to have accrued with effect from the date of the demand notice dated 23-5-1967 whereas in the other case relating to 1967-68 from 16-12-1968 which was the date of the demand notice These facts also are borne out by Annexure 9. I have carefully checked the arithmetical calculation of the amount of interest liable to be paid by the petitioner in each of the two cases at the rate of 61 per centum per annum and I feel prima facie convinced that the total dues outstanding principal and interest-as on 18.8.72 in C.W.J.C. 1270 of 1972 has been correctly shown as Rs. 39,834.87 in Annexure 9 whereas the total dues after calculating the interest at the rate of 11 per centum per annum come to Rs. 81,000/- and odd; so also in C.W.J.C. 1271 of 1972 on calculating the interest at the rate of 6½ per centum per annum the total amount of outstanding dues of principal and interest as on 18.8.72 seems prima facie to be correctly shown as Rs. 14,881.79 whereas' on calculating the interest at the rate of 11 per centum per annum the total dues come to Rs. 29,000/- and odd. On behalf of the respondents, the learned standing counsel could not give any satisfactory explanation as to how under Annexure 7 of the two writ petitions the District Certificate officer could calculate the outstanding dues to be Rs. 81,454/- and Rs. 30,775.34 respectively. There thus seems to be sufficient force in the objections of the petitioner that although the respondents are pretending to charge interest at the statutory rate of 61 per centum per annum under Section 17 of the Recovery Act, in effect they have calculated the interest at the rate of 11 per centum per annum. That being the position, the distress warrant issued against the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 81,454/- for crushing season 1966-67 and that for a sum of Rs. 30,775.34 for the crushing season 1967-68 as incorporated in Annexure 8 of the two writ petitions are not valid in law. The distress warrants as contained in Annexure 8 to each of the writ petitions must, therefore, be quashed for the amounts mentioned therein, For the same reason the unspeaking ORDER :of the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2, fixing the amount in Annexure 7 of each of the writ petitions must also be held to be bad and have to be quashed. It shall, however, be open to the Certificate Officer, respondent no. 1 and the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2, fixing the amount in Annexure 7 of each of the writ petitions must also be held to be bad and have to be quashed. It shall, however, be open to the Certificate Officer, respondent no. 1 and the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2, to recalculate the interest at the rate of 61 per centum per annum under Section 17 of the Recovery Act and thereafter proceed in accordance with law. 10. These writ applications, therefore, succeed to this limited extent that the calculations of interest as contained in the ORDER :s of the District Certificate Officer, respondent no. 2, incorporated in Annexure 7 to each of the two writ petitions and the distress warrants issued for such amounts (Annexure 8 to each of the writ petitions) must be held to be bad in law and are accordingly quashed. But in view of the observations made and directions given in the penultimate paragraph of this JUDGMENT :, respondents 1 and 2 may proceed in accordance with law. These applications are accordingly allowed in part. In the circumstances of the case, however, I shall make no ORDER :as to cost. I agree Application dismissed