JUDGMENT : P.D. Desai, J. For reasons which would be given in our judgment to be delivered later, we pass the following order in this writ petition. 2. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of dismissal and the subsequent orders passed in appeal and review are declared to be null and void. The petitioners will be deemed to have continued in service as if the said orders were not passed Rule made absolute in these terms with costs. 3. On April 16, 1975 we disposed of this writ petition by an order pronounced in the Court. We had indicated that the reasons on which the said order was founded would be given in our judgment to be delivered later. We now proceed to state the reasons in support of our decision pronounced earlier. 4. The first and the second petitioners joined railway service on September 10, 1944 and January 30, 1945 respectively. Both of them are holding the post of Head Ticket Collector and they are permanent Government employees. At the material time, they were posted at Baroda. It is the case of the petitioners that because of the sudden arrest of leaders of railway employees and tension generated on that account and for want of protection, they could not attend duty on and with effect from May 4, 1974. However, in pursuance of the appeal dated May 13, 1974 issued by the Divisional Superintendent, Western Railway, Baroda calling upon the railway employees to come back to duty and assuring full protection to the loyal staff who might resume duty, the petitioners presented themselves for duty on May 15, 1974 The Station Master, Baroda, however, did not allow them to resume duty and gave a written intimation to the effect that they were dismissed from service by the competent authority. On May 16, 1974, they received orders dated May 12, 1974 passed by the Senior Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Baroda (first respondent) dismissing them from service with effect from the date of the said orders The text of the order served on each petitioner is in identical terms and we shall, therefore, set out the material of the order served upon the first petitioner (Annexure 'A'). It reads as under:- "You are hereby informed that you have been absenting from duty from 4-5-74. It reads as under:- "You are hereby informed that you have been absenting from duty from 4-5-74. You have not given any intimation regarding your unauthorised absence and I am convinced that you are on strike which is declared illegal. You have, therefore, committed an offence of serious misconduct and I hold you responsible for the same. 2. I, therefore, order that in accordance with the powers conferred on me under Rule 14 (ii) or the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, you are dismissed from service from 12-5-74". It might be stated at this stage that it is not in dispute that the orders of dismissal were passed without holding an inquiry or issuing a show-cause notice in view of the fact that powers conferred by Rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) were invoked in the case of the petitioners. 5. On June 10, 1974 each of the petitioners preferred an appeal against the order of dismissal under Rule 8 and as required by sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 he set out in the appeal memo the material statements and arguments on which he relied. It was inter alia urged by each petitioner that Rule 14 (ii) which was invoked against him did not prohibit affording of reasonable opportunity to show cause and that it only enabled the disciplinary authority to dispense with the holding of an elaborate inquiry. The order of dismissal was, therefore, passed in violation of the guarantee afforded by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and in breach of rules of natural justice. Each petitioner also gave explanation for his absence from duty during the relevant period. The petitioners were given a personal hearing on August 31, 1974 by the appellate authority and the result of the appeals was communicated to them by separate letters dated September 25, 1974. The appellate orders are in terms identical save and except certain minor particulars such as the name of the delinquent, particulars as to salary etc. We shall, therefore, set out the full text of the order served upon the first petitioner (Annexure 'C'). It reads as under:- "In reference to his appeal, I gave personal interview to Shri Jayantilal Patel at 12.02 hrs on 31-8-74. He was not accompanied by any representative. We shall, therefore, set out the full text of the order served upon the first petitioner (Annexure 'C'). It reads as under:- "In reference to his appeal, I gave personal interview to Shri Jayantilal Patel at 12.02 hrs on 31-8-74. He was not accompanied by any representative. During the interview he repeated what is stated in the appeal. He added that he had no intention of going on strike, but due to intimidation by the mob and anti-social elements he could not come on duty from 4-5-74 onwards. At the end, he begged for mercy and stated that he will never repeat the irregularity in future. 2. On going into the case, I am inclined to believe that Shri Jayantilal Patel, took part in the illegal strike. He has, therefore, been correctly charged with the offence of serious misconduct and has, therefore, been correctly dismissed from service. I am, therefore, inclined to confirm the punishment imposed on him by Sr. DCS. However, as he was very sorry for the action taken by him, as a gesture of mercy, and in view of his assurance that he will never repeat this offence in future, I take a lenient view this time. He should be reverted to the grade of Rs 330-560 on pay Rs. 440/-p.m., for a period of one year affecting seniority and increment. He may be taken back to duty." It would thus appear that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon each petitioner was reduced to that of reduction to a lower grade for a period of one year affecting seniority and increment. 6. The first and the second petitioners then preferred review applications on October 21, and October 20, 1974 respectively under Rule 25. The result of the said applications was communicated to them by letters dated January 31, 1975 and February 5, 1975 respectively. The orders passed by the reviewing authority in each case are substantially indentical and we shall, therefore, set out the order served upon the first petitioner (Annexure SE'). It reads as under:- "The representation dated 21-10-74 submitted by Shri Jayantilal Patel against the penalty of reduction to the grade of Rs 330-560 (R) on pay Rs. 440-/p.m. for one year affecting seniority and increment imposed on him by DS/BRC was reviewed by CCS who has observed that he does not find any justification to review the punishment imposed by DS". 7. 440-/p.m. for one year affecting seniority and increment imposed on him by DS/BRC was reviewed by CCS who has observed that he does not find any justification to review the punishment imposed by DS". 7. Upon rejection of their review applications, the petitioners preferred the present writ petition on February 24, 1975 challenging the disciplinary action taken against them. Rule was issued on the petition on February 27, 1975 and it was made returnable on March 24, 1975. The petition was duly notified for hearing and it was called on for hearing before us in due course along with certain other matters. The actual hearing of the petition, together with four other petitions which have been disposed of by separate judgments, commenced on April 10, 1975 and concluded on April 15, 1975. On April 11, 1975 Mr. O. N. Desai sought permission to appear on behalf of the railway authorities in the midst of the hearing and in the interest of justice we acceded to his request. It was made clear to him, however, that since the actual hearing had commenced on the previous day, no application for adjournment, would be entertained. The respondents have not filed a return and the hearing of the petition has, therefore, proceeded on the material placed on record of the case by the petitioners. However, at the request of Mr. Desai and with the consent of the petitioners, we have permitted the respondents to produce and place on record a copy of the original order purported to have been passed under Rule 14(ii) against each of the petitioners. Since the contents of those orders are to some extent different from the contents of the orders served "on the petitioners, it would be necessary to set them out. The original orders against both the petitioners are in indentical terms and we shall, therefore, set out only one of such orders, namely, the order made against the first petitioner. It reads as under:- "From the facts mentioned on page 1 C. it is found that Shri Jayantilal, Hd TC/BRCP is absenting from duty with effect from 4-5-74. So, he is on strike which is declared illegal. From these facts, I have come to the conclusion that Shri Jayantilal has committed an offence of serious misconduct. 2. It reads as under:- "From the facts mentioned on page 1 C. it is found that Shri Jayantilal, Hd TC/BRCP is absenting from duty with effect from 4-5-74. So, he is on strike which is declared illegal. From these facts, I have come to the conclusion that Shri Jayantilal has committed an offence of serious misconduct. 2. The circumstances of the case are such that if the ordinary procedure of dismissal, which is fully merited, is followed, there are likely to be numerous complications detrimental to the interests of the Railway. At the present juncture, we cannot afford to disturb the peaceful working of the important work of Hd. TC 'and, therefore, it is not reasonably practicable to give Shri Jayantilal an opportunity of showing cause. 3. I, therefore, consider that the powers vested in me under Rule 14 (iii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. should be exercised in dismissing Shri Jayantilal from service and notice should be issued accordingly. As Shri Jayantilal is already absent from duty from 4-5-74, he should be deemed to have been dismissed from service with immediate effect." 8. The impugned orders of dismissal were challenged in the petition and at the hearing on diverse grounds. It is unnecessary for us, however, to consider the validity of all the grounds since, in our opinion, the petition is capable of being disposed of on the ground dealt with hereafter. 9. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that in the faces and circumstances of the case, no major penalty such as dismissal or reduction in rank could have been imposed without affording to them a reasonable opportunity of showing cause. The submission was developed on the following lines : a railway servant could not be ordinarily visited with such major penalty except after holding an elaborate inquiry in the manner prescribed in the Rules. However, such an inquiry may be dispensed with in a given ease in the circumstances mentioned and the manner prescribed in Rule 14(ii). Even in such a case, however, the concerned railway servant must still be afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause as contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India unless the disciplinary authority is independently satisfied as required by clause (b) of the proviso to the said sub-article that it is not reasonably practicable to give such an opportunity. Even in such a case, however, the concerned railway servant must still be afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause as contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India unless the disciplinary authority is independently satisfied as required by clause (b) of the proviso to the said sub-article that it is not reasonably practicable to give such an opportunity. This must be so because the inquiry prescribed in the Rules is substantially different from and more elaborate than the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2)and, therefore, the satisfaction reached by the disciplinary authority under Rule 14(H) could not be treated as' satisfaction under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311 (2). In the 'instant case, on a true and proper construction of the impugned orders of dismissal read as a whole, it appears that all that the disciplinary authority was satisfied was that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the elaborate manner prescribed in the Rules. There was, however, no indication in the impugned orders that the disciplinary authority was also satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) and the said authority did not appear to have applied its mind to the question of practicability of holding such an inquiry and it had in fact not acted under clause (b) 5 of the proviso to Article 311(2). As such, the impugned orders passed without holding an inquiry in the manner contemplated by Article 311(2) are ultra vires. 10. It was contended on behalf of the respondents on the other hand that it was fallacious to urge that Article 311(2) and the Rules in question contemplated different kinds of inquiries affording reasonable opportunity varying in content and that the satisfaction reached by the disciplinary authority under Rule 14(ii) that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner prescribed in the Rules was tantamount in the eye of law to the satisfaction of such authority that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry even in the manner contemplated by Article 311(2). It was therefore, not necessary for the disciplinary authority to independently exercise powers for dispensing with the inquiry both under Rule 14(ii) as well as under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2). It was therefore, not necessary for the disciplinary authority to independently exercise powers for dispensing with the inquiry both under Rule 14(ii) as well as under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2). It was contended in the alternative that, even assuming that the inquiry prescribed by the Rules was substantially different from and more elaborate than the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) and even further assuming that such distinction was not present to the mind of the disciplinary authority when it was satisfied about dispensing with the inquiry in the present case, it was manifest on a plain reading of the impugned orders that the disciplinary authority was clearly of the view that it was not reasonably practicable to serve upon the petitioners a statement of charges and allegations and to hold an oral inquiry and to call upon the petitioners to show cause why the penalty of dismissal should not be imposed upon them. On a true and proper construction of the relevant recitals contained in the impugned orders, urged the respondents, it was manifest that the disciplinary authority was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry whatsoever or to give to the petitioners an opportunity to show cause and that the impugned orders could not, therefore, be challenged on the ground urged on behalf of the petitioners. 11. We have broadly set out the rival contentions of the parties and it would appear therefrom that the first question which arises or determination is whether the inquiry prescribed by the Rules is different from and more elaborate than the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) and whether the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that It is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner prescribed in the Rules would necessarily imply its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold even such inquiry as is contemplated by Article 311(2). The second question which arises for determination is whether on a true interpretation of the orders impugned in this case it could be said the disciplinary authority was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry whatsoever, that is, it was not possible to hold an inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) as well as an inquiry as prescribed in (he Rules, 12. The decision of the first question posed above involves, in the first place, appreciation of the true content and meaning of Article 311(2) read in the light of Article 309 and Article 310 and, in the next place, the ascertainment of the scope and ambit of the Inquiry prescribed under the Rules In order to appreciate the effect of the above mentioned constitutional provisions, it would be necessary to refer to their genesis and the legislative background. By section 74 of the Government of India Act, 1833. the tenure of all services under the East India Company was subject to His Majesty's pleasure However, servants in the employment of the East India Company were also made subject to the pleasure of the Court of Directors with a proviso which excepted from the said rule those who had been appointed directly by His Majesty. The Government of India Act, 1858, under which the Crown took over the Government of this country, delegated the powers in relation to the servants of the Company which had till then vested in the Directors to the Secretary of State by section 37 The Government of India Act, 1915 repealed all the earlier parliamentary legislation but it contained a saving clause in section 130 which preserved the earlier tenure of servants and continued the rules and regulations applicable to 'them. Section 96B (1), which was inserted in the said Act by an amendment made in 1919, in substance provided that subject to the provisions of the said Act and rules made thereunder, every person in the Civil Service of the Crown in India held office during His Majesty's pleasure and that no person in that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Section 96B(2) conferred power on the Secretary of State in Council to make Rules for regulating inter alia the conditions of service and discipline and conduct of the civil servants. It appears that in pursuance of the power conferred by section 96B(2). The Civil Services Classification Rules, 1920-24, were framed and Rule XIV of the said Rules prescribed the procedure for holding a departmental inquiry in all cases where dismissal, removal or reduction of any officer was to be considered. It appears that in pursuance of the power conferred by section 96B(2). The Civil Services Classification Rules, 1920-24, were framed and Rule XIV of the said Rules prescribed the procedure for holding a departmental inquiry in all cases where dismissal, removal or reduction of any officer was to be considered. In R. Venkatarao v. Secretary of State for India A.I.R. 1937 P C 31, the Judicial Committee held that section 96B (1) did not confer upon a Government servant a right enforceable by action in a Civil court to hold his office in accordance with the Rules and it rejected the contention that an action would lie for breach of any of the Rules. However, in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India A.I.R 1937 P.C. 27 the Judicial Committee held that the stipulation in section 96B(1) to the effect that no person in the civil service of the Crown in India should be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed had statutory force and stood on a footing quite other than any matters governed by the Rules and that, therefore, a dismissal purporting to be made by an official who was prohibited by the statute from making it rested upon an illegal and improper foundation. The effect of these two decisions was that a breach of the Rules gave no cause of action to a Government servant enforceable in a Court of Jaw, but redress could be sought in such a forum in the case of infringement of the statutory provision itself which rendered the resultant action null an void. Then came the Government of India Act, 1935. Subsections 1 and 2 of section 240 of the said Act in substance reproduced the provisions of section 96B (1). Sub-section (3) of section 240 provided that no member of a civil service of the Crown in India or holding any civil post under the Crown in India shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. This sub-section thus introduced an important qualification on the exercise of the Crown's pleasure and gave statutory protection to Civil 'servants which was not till then available to them. This sub-section thus introduced an important qualification on the exercise of the Crown's pleasure and gave statutory protection to Civil 'servants which was not till then available to them. In High Commissioner of India v. I.M. Lal A I.R. 1946 P.C. 121, the Judicial Committee held that section 240(3) stood on the same footing as section 240(2) and that the ratio of the decision in Rangachari's cast (supra) applied to section 240(3) as well and that, therefore, the purported dismissal of a Government servant in contravention of section 240(3) was void. 13. This was the position at the commencement of our Constitution and reference has been made to it only with a view to bringing into bold relief the fact that even prior to the enactment of the Constitution and even under the Government of India Act, 1935, the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause to a Government servant against whom an action of dismissal or reduction in rank was proposed to be taken had acquired statutory force and it was well-settled that any action in breach of such requirement was null and void. 14. The Constitution has dealt with this subject in Part XIV which is entitled "Service under the Union and States." Section 240 (1) of the 1935 Act has been substantially reproduced in Article 310(1) and sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 240 have become Article 311(1) and (2). Article 310 deals with the tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State and provides that except as expressly provided by the Constitution, such office is held during the pleasure of the President if the post is under the Union or during the pleasure of the Governor if the post is under a State. The doctrine of pleasure is thus firmly entrenched in Article 310(1). It is significant to note, however, that the exercise of pleasure is made subject to any other express provisions in the Constitution The exception contemplated by Article 310 (1) might be illustrated by reference to Articles 124, 148, 218 and 324. Another exception is also provided by Article 311 which must be read as a proviso to Article 310. It is significant to note, however, that the exercise of pleasure is made subject to any other express provisions in the Constitution The exception contemplated by Article 310 (1) might be illustrated by reference to Articles 124, 148, 218 and 324. Another exception is also provided by Article 311 which must be read as a proviso to Article 310. Article 311 imposes a two-fold restriction on the exercise of pleasure and correspondingly confers a two-fold protection on persons who come within the said Article, namely (i) against dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed and (ii) against dismissal or removal or reduction in rank without holding an inquiry in which they have been informed of the charges against them and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and, where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon them any such penalty, until they have been given a reasonable opportunity, of making representation on the penalty proposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry. Subject, therefore, to those exceptions and limitations, the doctrine of pleasure handed down from the provisions of imperial legislation still holds field under our constitution. 15. Article 309 which also occurs in the same part provides that Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the appropriates legislature may regulate the requirement and conditions of service of person appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. The proviso to the said Article in substance provides that it would be competent for the President or the Governor, or such person as they might direct, to make rules regulating the recruitment and prescribing the conditions of service of persons respectively appointed to services and posts under the Union or the State, until provision in that behalf is made by legislation enacted by the appropriate legislature. Since Article 309 is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Article 310 (1) is inevitably attracted and the Acts of the appropriate legislature or the Rules framed by the President or Governor, as the case be, may cannot impair or affect the exercise of pleasure of the President or the Governor specified in Article 310(1). Since Article 309 is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Article 310 (1) is inevitably attracted and the Acts of the appropriate legislature or the Rules framed by the President or Governor, as the case be, may cannot impair or affect the exercise of pleasure of the President or the Governor specified in Article 310(1). Besides, the pleasure of the President or the Governor mentioned in Article 310(1) can be exercised by such person as the President or the Governor may respectively direct and the pleasure thus exercised by the delegate has to be in accordance with the Rules made in that behalf and subject to Article 310 (1). Thus, there is no doubt that Article 309 has to be read subject to Articles 310 and 311 and Article 310 has to be read subject to Article 311 and other express provisions However, Article 311, being not subject to any other provision of the Constitution, is within the field covered by it absolute and paramount and its provisions are mandatory (See Moti Ram v. N.E. Frontier Railway A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 600, N. Ram Nath v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2641 and Shamsher singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1974 S. C. 2192). However, there are three classes of cases referred to in the proviso to sub-article (2) of Article 311 in which one of the restrictions on the exercise of pleasure and the statutory protection afforded to civil servants, namely, the holding of an inquiry and giving of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, is removed. The said proviso in substance enacts that Article 311(2) shall not apply (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reasons, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry, and (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Ia these three classes of cases it would not be necessary to hold an inquiry envisaged by Article 311 (2) and the final order in such cases would be ex-parte without the authority having the other side of the picture (See Gopal Krishana v. State of M. P., A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 240). 16. It would thus appear that the requirement of holding an inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) which operates as a restriction on the exercise of pleasure by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, can be done away with only under the aforementioned three circumstances and in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso. Since Article 309 is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, no Act of an appropriate legislature nor any rule made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, can impinge upon the constitutional guarantee afforded by Article 311(2) which itself, as stated earlier, is an exception to the doctrine of pleasure. Indeed, it is well-settled that the rule making authority contemplated by Article 309 cannot be validly exercised so as to curtail or affect the rights guaranteed to public servants under Article 311(2) and that no rules framed under Article 309 can trespass on the rights conferred by Article 311 (See Moti Ram's Case (supra) 27). 17. Now, against the aforesaid Constitutional background, we might consider the scheme of the Rules with which we are concerned in the present case. Part I of the Rules contains definitions. Part 11 deals with suspension. Part III deals with penalties and disciplinary authorities. Rule 6 which occurs in the said Part prescribe five minor and five major penalties. Among major penalties are included reduction to a lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service and removal as well as dismissal from service The Rule provides that the penalties may. "for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided", be imposed on a railway servant. Rule 7 prescribes the disciplinary authorities and Rule 8 indicates the authority which can institute disciplinary proceedings. Part IV prescribes the procedure for imposing penalties. Rule 9 contained in the said part deals with the procedure for imposing major penalties. "for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided", be imposed on a railway servant. Rule 7 prescribes the disciplinary authorities and Rule 8 indicates the authority which can institute disciplinary proceedings. Part IV prescribes the procedure for imposing penalties. Rule 9 contained in the said part deals with the procedure for imposing major penalties. Sub-rule (1) thereof enjoins that no order imposing major penalties shall be made "except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Rule and Rule 10, or in the mariner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1950." Sub-rule (3) requires the disciplinary authority to draw or cause to be drawn up the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour of a railway servant into definite and distinct articles of charge as also a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article Such statement must contain all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by a railway servant and a list of documents by which, and a fist of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. Sub-rule (4) requires the disciplinary authority to deliver to the railway servant a copy of the documents mentioned in sub-rule (3) and directs it to call upon such servant to submit a written statement of his defence within ten days if no inspection of documents is necessary for the preparation of defence and, if such inspection is necessary, within ten days after the completion of the inspection Under Sub-rule (5) the railway servant it is enabled to inspect and take extracts from the documents specified in the list referred to in sub-rule (3) within five days of the receipt thereof or within such further time not exceeding five days as the disciplinary authority may allow A further time limit of ten days is provided for taking inspection of documents other than those which are referred to in the list drawn up under the sub-rule (3). The railway servant is also required under this sub-rule to submit a list of defence witnesses. A note appended below the said sub-rule requires the disciplinary authority to furnish the railway servant, if he applies in writing, with the copies of statements of witnesses not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of such witnesses. The railway servant is also required under this sub-rule to submit a list of defence witnesses. A note appended below the said sub-rule requires the disciplinary authority to furnish the railway servant, if he applies in writing, with the copies of statements of witnesses not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of such witnesses. Sub-rule (7) requires the disciplinary authority to consider and decide after the receipt of the written statement of defence whether to proceed further with the enquiry and, if so, whether to hold the inquiry himself or to appoint and inquiring authority There are certain further provisions, in this sub-rule dealing with the situation arising in cases where all the articles of charge might be admitted by the railway servant or where instead of imposition, of major penalty a minor penalty is thought fit to be imposed. Provision is also made for the appointment of a presenting officer. Sub rule (8) requires the disciplinary authority, where it is not the inquiring authority, to forward to the inquiring authority documents therein mentioned Sub-rule (V) entitles the railway servant to present his case with the assistance of any other railway servant as provided therein at the inquiry and further provides that in the case of a non-gazetted railway servant he may have the assistance of an official of a railway trade union recognised by the railway administration. Sub rule (10) provides that after all the necessary steps preliminary to the inquiry are completed a date ordinarily not exceeding one month shall be fixed for the Holding of the inquiry and communicated to the railway servant. Sub-rule (II) provides for the production of the oral and documentary evidence by the disciplinary authority on the date fixed for the enquiry and for the examination, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses. Rule 12 provides for the production of evidence on behalf of the disciplinary authority which was not included in the list given to the railway servant and for recall and reexamination of witnesses by the disciplinary authority. Rule 12 provides for the production of evidence on behalf of the disciplinary authority which was not included in the list given to the railway servant and for recall and reexamination of witnesses by the disciplinary authority. The said sub rule further provides that in the case of production of new evidence the railway servant shall be entitled to have a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and to an adjournment of the enquiry for three clear days and to inspection of documents, Sub-rule (13) prescribes that after the closure of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority the railway servant shall be required to state his defence orally or in writing, as he may prefer. Sub-rule (14) then provides for the production of evidence, oral and documentary, on behalf of the railway servant and provisions similar to those contained in sub-rule (11) are made in respect of such witnesses. Sub-rule (15) enables the inquiring authority, after the railway servant has closed his case, and, in cases where the railway servant has not examined himself, it imposes upon such authority the duty to generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence. Sub-rule (16) then provides for giving a hearing to the presenting officer and the railway servant and enables both of them to file written brief of their respective cases if they so desire. Sub-rule (17) provides for ex-parte inquiry in cases where the railway servant does not submit his written statement or otherwise fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of the Rules. Sub-rule (19) (imposes upon the inquiring authority the duty to prepare a report at the conclusion of the inquiry inter alia containing an assessment of the evidence and findings on each article of charge and reasons in support thereof. The said sub-rule provides that the inquiring authority, if it is not itself the disciplinary authority shall forward to the disciplinary authority the record of the inquiry. Rule 10 deals with the action on the inquiry report. Sub-rule (1) thereof inter alia provides that the disciplinary authority may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interest of justice, recall the witnesses. Rule 10 deals with the action on the inquiry report. Sub-rule (1) thereof inter alia provides that the disciplinary authority may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interest of justice, recall the witnesses. Sub-rule (2) provides for remitting the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry in certain cases. Sub-rule (3) provides that the disciplinary authority, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority, shall record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings if the evidence on record is sufficient. Sub-rule (4) enables the disciplinary authority to impose minor penalties if it is of the opinion that having regard to the findings such action is warranted. Sub-rule (5) requires the disciplinary authority, in cases of imposition of major penalties, to give to the railway servant concerned a notice to show cause why penalty proposed to be imposed upon him should not be inflicted and to furnish to him a copy of the report of the inquiry and findings on each article of charge and in case of disagreement with the findings of the inquiring authority, brief reasons for its disagreement. The notice served on the concerned servant must call upon him to submit his representation within a specified time ordinarily not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice but subject to a minimum of seven days. Under the said sub-rule the disciplinary authority is authorised after considering the representation of the concerned servant and taking info account the advice given by the commission to determine the penalty and to make such order as it may deem fit. Rule 11 relates to the procedure to be followed for imposing minor penalties. Broadly speaking it requires the disciplinary authority to give to the railway servant information about the proposed action and about the imputation of misconduct and to give him a reasonable opportunity of making representation. It also enables the disciplinary authority, in every case in which it is of the opinion that such an inquiry is necessary, to hold an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (19) of Rule 9. It also enables the disciplinary authority, in every case in which it is of the opinion that such an inquiry is necessary, to hold an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (19) of Rule 9. The disciplinary authority is further required to consider the representation and the record of the inquiry and to record a finding on each imputation of misconduct and to pass suitable orders. The holding of an enquiry in the manner laid down in sub rules (3) to (19) of Rule 9 is, however, mandatory in certain cases indicated in clause (2) of the said sub-rule. Rule 12 provides for the communication of orders to the concerned railway servant together with a copy of the report of the inquiry and a copy of findings on each article of charge and, in cases where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority, a copy of the report of the inquiry authority and statement of findings with reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority. Then comes Rule 14 which is material and which may be cited verbatim':- "14. Special procedure in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 9 to 13 ; (1) where any penalty is imposed on a railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it In writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) where the President is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit; Provided that the commission shall be consulted where such consultation Is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule." Rule 15 deals with disciplinary proceedings against railway servants whose services are lent to other authorities. Part V deals with appeals and Part VI with review and detailed provisions are made in these two parts with regard to the procedure to be followed in appeals and review. Part VII contains miscellaneous provisions including a repeal and saving clause. 18. Part V deals with appeals and Part VI with review and detailed provisions are made in these two parts with regard to the procedure to be followed in appeals and review. Part VII contains miscellaneous provisions including a repeal and saving clause. 18. It would appear from the aforesaid analysis of the various provisions of the Rules that: (i) the power to impose penalties is delegated to the disciplinary authority subject to two conditions, namely, that a penalty could be imposed for good and sufficient reasons and as provided in the Rules, (ii) an elaborate procedure, which could be almost assimilated to the procedure followed before a Tribunal or Court, is prescribed in the relevant Rules for imposition of penalties, (iii) certain rights are conferred on the delinquent railway servant and duties imposed upon the disciplinary authority and any breach of such rights and duties may in conceivable cases invalidate the inquiry and (iv) a provision is made in Rule 14 for special procedure to be followed in certain cases prescribed therein notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13 and the disciplinary authority is enabled in such cases to make such orders as it deems fit after considering the circumstances of the case. 19. Now, in order to determine the controversy between the parties, the first question which we must examine is whether the inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) and the inquiry required to be held under the Rules is in substance similar or identical, for, in such a case, dispensation of the Inquiry in the maimer prescribed in the Rules might automatically bring about dispensation of the inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) and exercise of powers under Rule 14 (ii) might ipso facto amount to an exercise of powers under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311 (2). In Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300, the Supreme Court has indicated the essential content of the reasonable opportunity which is required to be afforded to a Government servant under Article 311 (2) In paragraph 19 of the decision, it has been observed as under :- "To summarise : the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes : (a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the inquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant, tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant". It would thus appear that ordinarily an inquiry in the minner contemplated by Article 311 (2) can be said to have been properly held if the delinquent is : (i) informed of the charges against him and the allegations in support of such charges, (ii) given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses produced against him and examine witnesses in support of his defence and (iii) afforded an opportunity to show cause against the proposed penalty. It is true that this is the minimum content of the reasonable opportunity envisaged by Article 311(2). However, unless special circumstances are shown to exist in a given case, an inquiry held in compliance with such requirement would ordinarily be held to satisfy the provisions of Article 311(2). As against this, we find that the Rules with which we are concerned in the present case prescribe, as stated earlier, a much more elaborate inquiry containing many more procedural steps and conferring upon the delinquent certain safeguards which he would not be able to claim as of right irrespective of the circumstances of the case if the inquiry were to be held as contemplated by Article 311(2). As and by way of illustration we might refer to sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 which entitles a railway servant to present his case with the assistance of any other railway servant, and in the case of a non-gazetted railway servant, with the assistance of an official of a recognised railway trade union, at the inquiry. If the inquiry were to be held as contemplated by Article 311(2), the concerned railway servant may not as of right be able to claim such assistance and whether or not to allow him such assistance would be a question for the disciplinary to decide in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Similarly, we find in the Rules several provisions prescribing time limits for taking various steps during the course of the inquiry (see, for example, sub-rules (4), (5), (10) and (12) of Rule 9 and sub rule (5) of Rule 10). This time bound schedule is also not an essential ingredient of the rule of reasonable opportunity enunciated by Article 311(2). There are certain procedural steps contemplated by the Rules such as the requirement : (i) of drawing up of a charge sheet and statements and lists in the manner laid down in sub-rule (3), (ii) of stating the defence orally or in writing at the close of the case of the disciplinary authority, (iii) of questioning the railway servant on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, (iv) of giving to the parties an option to file written briefs, (v) of the preparation of a report in the manner laid down in sub rule (19) etc. which are not essential ingredients of reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 3(1(2) and failure to follow such procedure would not necessarily and inevitably vitiate an inquiry under Article 311(2). It would thus appear that the disciplinary authority acting under the Rules has to hold an elaborate inquiry following a much more detailed procedure than what would have been necessary under Article 311(2) and that this difference between the two inquiries is not merely apparent but also real. 20. We wish to make it clear that it is not our view that the Rules in question confer upon a railway servant a protection which is in excess of what is contemplated by the doctrine of reasonable opportunity embodied in Article 311(2). 20. We wish to make it clear that it is not our view that the Rules in question confer upon a railway servant a protection which is in excess of what is contemplated by the doctrine of reasonable opportunity embodied in Article 311(2). The Rules, even though they are more eleborate and contain special procedural steps and safeguards, are still enacted in aid of and with a view to affording to such servant a reasonable opportunity in disciplinary matters. However, in their scope and ambit, they are wider than the minimum content of reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in K.hem Chand's case (supra). It would not, therefore, be right to suggest, as was sought to be done on behalf of the respondents, that if the above view is taken, the Rules might be prone to attack on the ground that they impeach upon the exercise of pleasure by the President under Article 310. The Rules are still within the mandated area of Article 311(2) and they could not, therefore, be said to restrict the exercise of pleasure by the President or his delegate otherwise than by virtue of an express provision of the Constitution. If such elaborate Rules were not enacted, the pleasure could have been exercised by the delegate after holding an enquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Under the Rules, however, the delegates power is exercisable in compliance with certain special requirements-mostly procedural-which, though they are additional requirements, are still Within the ambit of reasonable opportunity. Consequently, the delegate would not be able to act except n accordance with the Rules and disciplinary action taken by him in breach of the Rules might be open to challenge also on the ground of non-compliance with statutory provisions. 21. The conclusion which we have arrived at as regards the difference between an inquiry under the Rules and an inquiry under Article 311(2) is fortified by the very enactment of the Rule 4 and more particularly Rule 14(ii). It is significant to bear in mind that clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) enacts that the provisions of the said sub-article shall not apply where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing. It is significant to bear in mind that clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) enacts that the provisions of the said sub-article shall not apply where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing. It is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. The words "such inquiry" mean an inquiry as contemplated by Article 311 (2). The effect of this provision is that once the satisfaction indicated therein is reached the fetter on the power of the disciplinary authority to impose penalties of the nature described in Article 311(2) only after holding an inquiry as contemplated by the said sub-article is removed. Therefore, once such satisfaction is arrived at, reasonable opportunity as contemplated by Article 311(2) and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Khem Chand's case (supra) need not be afforded. Rule 14(ii) provides, on the other hand, that where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in the Rules it may, notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13, consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. Once the satisfaction contemplated by Rule 14(ii) is reached, therefore, the fetter on the power of the delegate to impose penalty only after holding an inquiry "in the manner prescribed in these rules" is removed. In other words, the disciplinary authority need not then hold an elaborate inquiry contemplated by the Rules and it may consider the circumstances of the case and pass suitable orders. It would thus appear that the satisfaction which is to be reached under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) and that to be reached under Rule 14(ii) is substantially different. In he first case, the satisfaction which is to be reached is that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry which complies even with the minimum of the requirement of reasonable opportunity, whereas in the other case the satisfaction which has to be reached is that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the elaborate inquiry as provided in the Rules. The mind has to be applied under two different provisions to two different aspects and circumstances which have to be considered in reaching the satisfaction would not necessarily be the same. It was ultimately conceded even by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that it is conceivable that though it may not be reasonably practicable to hold an elaborate inquiry as prescribed in the Rules, It may still be possible to afford to a railway servant reasonable opportunity as contemplated by Article 311(2). It would thus appear that clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 14(ii) do not occupy the same field though at first sight there might appear to be some overlapping. Both are enacted to meet different situations and the considerations governing the exercise of powers under both and the Circumstances in which the powers under both can be exercised not necessarily be the same. An exercise of power under one of them cannot, therefore, necessarily amount to exercise of power under the other. 22. There is another way of looking at the matter. A rule enacted in exercise of powers conferred by Article 309 cannot of its own force take away or authorise the delegate to take away a constitutional protection afforded to a Government servant under Article 311 because Article 309 is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Such a protection can only be taken away by a provision like the proviso to Article 311(2) contained in the Constitution itself. Rule 14(ii) could, therefore, never he interpreted as taking away of its own face or authorising the delegate to take away the protection conferred on a railway servant under Article 311. The said Rule could only have been enacted for taking away the elaborate procedural safeguards conferred by the Rules upon such a servant. Besides, it would be legitimate to presume that every provision of the Statute has some purpose and that is presence was necessary to effectuate that purpose. The power to dispense with an inquiry under Article 311(2) in certain cases is to be found in the proviso to the said Sub-article. Therefore, it would be legitimate to hold that Rule 14(ii) must have been enacted to effectuate some other purpose, namely, to dispense with the detailed inquiry. 23. The power to dispense with an inquiry under Article 311(2) in certain cases is to be found in the proviso to the said Sub-article. Therefore, it would be legitimate to hold that Rule 14(ii) must have been enacted to effectuate some other purpose, namely, to dispense with the detailed inquiry. 23. From the foregoing discussion it would appear that before any railway servant could be visited with the major penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank without affording to him any reasonable opportunity whatsoever of showing cause, the disciplinary authority must be satisfied about two thing : first, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an elaborate inquiry in the manner prescribed in the Rules and, secondly, that it is also not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry complying with the minimum requirement of reasonable opportunity as contemplated by Article 311(2). Unless both these satisfactions are reached, no imposition of penalty without affording an opportunity of showing cause to the concerned servant would be valid. An exercise of power under Rule 14(ii) would not necessarily and of its own force amount to an exercise of power under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311. It would be a question of fact in each case whether or not both the satisfactions are reached and the true indication thereof must be found in the order made by the disciplinary authority containing reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. 24. That takes us to the question whether in the present case the disciplinary authority was satisfied both under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 14(ii) In order to answer this question we must turn to the contents of the original orders produced at the hearing which contain the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority for dispensing with the inquiry. Paragraph 2 of the said order recites that if the "ordinary procedure of dismissal" were followed, there were likely to be numerous complications detrimental to the interests of the railway. Paragraph 2 of the said order recites that if the "ordinary procedure of dismissal" were followed, there were likely to be numerous complications detrimental to the interests of the railway. It is further recited that at the relevant point of time, "the peaceful working of the important work of head ticket collector" could not be disturbed and that, therefore, "it is note reasonably practicable to give an opportunity of showing cause." Then follows paragraph 3 which records the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority to the effect that it considered that the powers vested under Rule 14(ii) should be exercised in dismissing the petitioners from service. 25. Now, on a bare perusal of the orders it appears clear that the disciplinary authority was satisfied that the "ordinary procedure of dismissal" could not be followed in the circumstances of the case and that, therefore, powers vested under Rule 14(ii) were required to be exercised. The expression "ordinary procedure of dismissal" must necessarily refer in the context to the elaborate procedure prescribed under the Rules and, therefore, it is difficult to read into these orders any satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) and to afford to the petitioners even the minimum of reasonable opportunity contemplated by the said sub-article. In terms the orders recite that the disciplinary authority considered the case of the petitioners to be a fit one for exercise of powers under Rule 14(ii) and he orders do not disclose even faintly that the disciplinary authority was conscious of its duty to reach a satisfaction contemplated by clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) as well. It is thus that the question as to satisfaction must, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the true intention of the disciplinary authority and that the matter would be judged on a consideration of the substance of the order and not of its form. However, there must be convincing reasons for holding that an order passed statedly under Rule 14(ii) should be held to have been passed also under clause (b) to the proviso of Article 311(2) and such reasons could have been furnished if there were any recitals in the order which could indicate that the disciplinary authority had applied its mind to both the aspects and intended to act under both the provisions. In this connection, it cannot be overlooked that in their appeal memos both the petitioners had in terms made a grievance about the fact that by invoking Rule 14(ii) the disciplinary authority could only have dispensed with the holding of an elaborate inquiry but could not have denied to them reasonable opportunity to show cause and that, therefore, the impugned orders were passed in violation of the guarantee by Article 311(2). The appellate orders record that during the course of personal hearing, both the petitioners reiterated what was stated in the memos of appeal. Therefore, it would be legitimate to assume that this ground must also have been urged before the appellate authority. Still, however, it was not the finding of the appellate authority that from the record it appeared that the disciplinary authority was not only satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an elaborate inquiry but that it was also not reasonably practicable to afford to the petitioners a reasonable opportunity even to show cause. Similar grievance is made in the petition by the petitioners and still no return has been filed on be halt of the respondents stating that disciplinary authority was duly satisfied as regards the impracticability of holding any inquiry whatsoever. It would thus appear that it has not been the contention of the respondents at any stage prior to the hearing of this petition that the orders in question were made both under clause (b) of the proviso to Article 311(2) as well as under Rule 14(ii) and that satisfaction contemplated by both these provisions was reached. Indeed, on reading the original orders as a whole, it becomes manifest that the disciplinary authority was not even mentally aware of the requirement of reaching two distinct and independent satisfactions. We have been unable in this context to appreciate the submission made on behalf of the respondents that even if the distinction between the more elaborate inquiry under the Rules and the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) was not present to the mind of the disciplinary authority, on a plain reading of the orders in question it clearly appeared that the disciplinary authority was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances of the case to hold any inquiry whatsoever and that, therefore, its satisfaction was a composite satisfaction. It is difficult to appreciate as to how an authority could be said to have been satisfied about a matter which was not present to its mind. It is true that the orders in question contains a recital that it was not reasonably practicable to give an opportunity of showing cause to the petitioners. However, the said recital has to be read in proper context and in the light of what precedes and follows it and so read, it becomes clear that what the disciplinary authority meant to convey thereby was that it was not reasonably practicable to give an opportunity of showing cause as contemplated by the Rules. It is not apparent on the face of the concerned orders or on the record of the case, therefore, that a composite satisfaction was arrived at by the disciplinary authority. 26. In our opinion, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the conclusion is inevitable in the instant case that the disciplinary authority had not applied its mind to and was not satisfied about the impracticability of holding an inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) and that the impugned orders of dismissal which were passed without affording any opportunity whatsoever to the petitioners to show cause are, therefore, invalid and ultra vires being in derogation of the provisions of Article 311(2). Consequently, the orders passed in appeal and review modifying such null and void orders must also be held to be nullity. 27. We wish to make it clear that the order passed by us in this petition will not prevent the railway authorities from initiating fresh disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners, if it is permissible under the Rules to do so. Application allowed.