JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. Petitioners Babu Singh and Jamuna Singh have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated August 19, 1969 contained in Annexure4to this petition. The brief facts of the case are that plot Nos. 496, 50012, 312 and 820 of Khata No. 510 situate in village Gaura, Tahsil Bilgra, District Hardoi were settled with the Zamindar by Chandrika Singh, Surat Singh and his nephew Surjan Singh who constituted a joint Hindu Family. The pedigree relevant for the petition is as under Deo Singh Jagat Singh Narapat Singh Chandrika Singh Surat Singh Surjan Singh X Gokaran Singh X Shanker Singh X Kunjan Singh X Sarju Singh (O.P.4) Nanhoo Singh (O.P.3) Manna Singh(O.P.6) Chobhar Singh (O.P.5) Babu Singh Jamuna Singh Surjan Singh whose name continued to be recorded in the revenue papers as a cotenant deposited ten times rent and obtained a Bhumidhari Sanad on February 3, 1966 and on the same date he executed registered saledeed in favour of the petitioners. When the village came under consolidation operation the village papers were recorded in the names of Surjan Singh. Kunjan Singh, Sarju Singh, Nanhoon Singh, Manna Singh and Chobhar Singh. On publication of record petitioners filed objections claiming for mutation of their names over the disputed plots mentioned above on the basis of sale deed. It may also be mentioned that some other plots had also been claimed to be mutated of Khata No. 143 of the same village. The claim was contested by Nanhoon Singh, Sarju Singh sons of Chandrika Singh and Chobhar Singh, Manna Singh sons of Surat Singh who in the present petition have been arrayed as opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 respectively. The dispute was referred to the Consolidation Officer who vide his order dated March 31, 1967 allowed the objections holding that Surjan Singh the transferor was a cotenant in the disputed Khata and was competent to execute the saledeed and that the saledeed was executed for the Bhumidhari land. He accordingly allowed l|3rd share to Surjan Singh, 19th share each to Kunjan Singh, Sarju Singh and Nanhoon Singh and he further allocated the share of Munna Singh and Chobhar Singh as l|6th. In place of Surjan Singh he allows the names of the petitioners to be mutated. This order is Annexure1 to the petition. He accordingly allowed l|3rd share to Surjan Singh, 19th share each to Kunjan Singh, Sarju Singh and Nanhoon Singh and he further allocated the share of Munna Singh and Chobhar Singh as l|6th. In place of Surjan Singh he allows the names of the petitioners to be mutated. This order is Annexure1 to the petition. The opposite parties, feeling aggrieved by the order, preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation but the same was dismissed on September 15, 1967. A certified copy of this order is Annexure2. The Settlement Officer Consolidation was of the view that Surat Singh had acquired cotenancy rights by estoppel and acquiescence. Kunjan Singh and Nanhoon Singh feeling aggrieved by the order preferred a revision before the District Deputy Director of Consolidation. It may be mentioned that Surjan Singh had died on March 23, 1967, viz., prior to the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. After filing of the revision Kunjan Singh died and on his death Sarju Singh was substituted. It may be pointed out that Sarju Singh originally had not filed any revision nor any revision had been preferred by Manna Singh and Chobhar Singh. The Deputy Director of Consolidation after hearing the parties allows the revision vide his order dated August 19, 1969. Certified copy of his order is Annexure4. The Deputy Director of Consolidation had allowed the claim of the petitioners so far as it related to Khata No. 143 but, however, with respect to the present Khata No. 510 he was of opinion that Surjan Singh was not a cotenureholder; as such the petitioners could not claim any title. He further ordered that Kunjan Singh, Surjan Singh and Nanhoon Singh were allowed l6th share each in the disputed plots of the Khata, while Munna Singh and Chobhar Singh were given l4th share each. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation have come up before this Court by means of the present petition. The petition has been contested on behalf of opposite parties and a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite parties 3 and 4 only. It is stated that the petitioners were the sons of Manna Singh and therefore opposite parties Nos. 5 and 6 were interested in favour of the petitioners. The petition has been contested on behalf of opposite parties and a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite parties 3 and 4 only. It is stated that the petitioners were the sons of Manna Singh and therefore opposite parties Nos. 5 and 6 were interested in favour of the petitioners. It is further asserted that Narpat Singh son of Deo Singh was the hereditary tenant of the disputed Khata, Narpat Singh died issueless some 20 to 22 years ago leaving behind Chandrika Singh and Surat Singh. It is further stated that Jagat Singh, brother of Narpat Singh, had predeceased him and as such at the time of the death of Narpat Singh only two brothers Chandrika Singh and Surat Singh were alive. It is asserted that the lant did not devolve upon Surjan Singh, Gokaran Singh and Shankar Singh sons of Jagat Singh. It is also stated that they did not form a joint Hindu family and at the time of death of Narpat Singh every one was living separately and not as members of the joint Hindu family. It is in these circumstances asserted, that Surjan Singh had no right, title or share in the disputed holding and since he was not a cotenureholder he could not obtain Bhumidhari Sanad which was fraudulently obtained and the saledeed executed on February 3, 1966 by Surjan Singh in favour of the petitioners could not entitle the petitioners for mutation. It is in this manner that an attempt has been made to support the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioners advanced threefold argument. In the first instance he argued that the entries in the names of Chandrika Singh, Surat Singh and Surjan Singh since continued to be in existence after the death of Narpat Singh right up to the time the village came under consolidation operation, and these entries had not been found to be incorrect, as such Surjan Singh by virtue of being a cotenant wag rightly granted a Bhumidhari Sanad and the saledeed executed by him in favour of the petitioners was a competent transaction. He next contended that Nanhoon Singh had admitted in his statement that he knew about the entries in favour of Surjan Singh and about the gift deed and saledeed by him and yet he did not take any action; as such the finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that recorded tenants did not do anything to treat Surjan Singh as cotenant was against the evidence on record and consequently the order was manifestly erroneous. He lastly argued that Surjan Singh had acquired cotenancy rights and the other recorded tenureholders were estopped from challenging his rights. He asserted that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation that Surjan Singh had acquired cotenancy rights by estoppel and acquiescence was correct and in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand argued that Surjan Singh could not be deemed to be a lawful heir of Narpat Singh deceased and Surjan Singh could not be treated as cotenant. In this connection he relied on Section 33 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. He maintained that by acquiescence and estoppel no cotenancy rights could accrue to Surjan Singh and as such he could not legally obtain a Bhumidhari Sanad and the transfer made in favour of the petitioners by Surjan Singh was incompetent. In my opinion the question raised by the parties could be determined on the basis if evidence brought on record. The Consolidation Officer, after carefully considering the oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that there was no document to show that the property in suit belonged to Narpat Singh and after his death it was inherited by Chandrika Singh and Surat Singh alone to the exclusion of the branch of Jagat Singh. He further observed that the name of Surjan Singh was recorded as cotenureholder for over 20 years, hence he acquired cotenancy rights by acquisition. As regards saledeed it is observed by him that Bhumidhari Sanad was obtained by Surjan Singh by being a cotenant, and it was thereafter that a registered saledeed was executed. Since there was no evidence on record to show that saledeed was executed fraudulently or without consideration it was a competent document executed in favour of the petitioners. As regards saledeed it is observed by him that Bhumidhari Sanad was obtained by Surjan Singh by being a cotenant, and it was thereafter that a registered saledeed was executed. Since there was no evidence on record to show that saledeed was executed fraudulently or without consideration it was a competent document executed in favour of the petitioners. It was on the basis of these findings that he held that Surjan Singh was entitled to l3rd share in the disputed Khata No. 510 and the petitioners accordingly were entitled to mutation of their names. In appeal, however, the Settlement Officer Consolidation recorded a definite finding that the disputed Khata No. 510 originally belonged to Narpat Singh and Jagat Singh, father of Surjan Singh had died during the life time of Narpat Singh. Consequently Surjan Singh ordinarily could not have been a cotenant in the disputed Khata but since entry in favour of all the three branches, viz., Chandrika Singh, Surat Singh and Surjan Singh continued for over 20 years and that no objection to it had been raised by any body at any time, he came to the conclusion that all of them acquiesced in the rights of Surjan Singh as being a cotenant. He further observed that cotenancy can be created by estopped and acquiescence and as such Surjan Singh had become a cotenant. He relied on a decision of this Court, Dudh Nath Kori v. Smt. Dhanraji and another 1966 R.D. 324. The Settlement Officer Consolidation next observed that on coming into force of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act all the land, whether cultivated or barren, vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 6A (i) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The State of U.P. had created absolutely new rights in favour of certain persons and these rights were in the nature of Bhumidhari, Sirdari and Asami tenants. These new rights had nothing to do with the previous rights. In this connection he relied on a Full Bench case of this Court, Manhoo Mai v. Nuloo and others 1963 AL.J. 731. He categorically recorded a finding that all the three branches recorded as Sirdars after the abolition of Zamindari were joint Sirdars of the Khata. These new rights had nothing to do with the previous rights. In this connection he relied on a Full Bench case of this Court, Manhoo Mai v. Nuloo and others 1963 AL.J. 731. He categorically recorded a finding that all the three branches recorded as Sirdars after the abolition of Zamindari were joint Sirdars of the Khata. Surjan Singh being a cotenureholder could lawfully be granted Bhumidhari Sanad and as such the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioners was a valid document. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation on the basis of entries with respect to Khata No. 143 came to the conclusion that Surjan Singh was entitled to cotenancy rights but, however, with respect to Khata No. 510 regarding which the present writ petition has been filed he agreed that this Khata originally belonged to Narpat Singh and not to all branches of the family. He, however, observed that there was nothing on record to show that the other recorded tenants did anything which could indicate that they treated Surjan Singh as their cotenant; as such he held that Surjan Singh could not be treated as cotenant by estoppel and acquiescence. It was on this basis that he upset the order passed by the subordinate consolidation authorities. I have given my anxious consideration to the Statement of Nanhoon Singh which is Annexure5 and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observation made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is contrary to evidence on record. Nanhoon Singh has clearly admitted in his statement that he knew about the entries in favour of Surjan Singh and about the giftdeed and saledeed executed by him and yet he did not take any action. That being so, there is substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that actually nothing was done by other persons against Surjan Singh to oust his claim of cotenancy in the disputed Khata. It is now well settled that if a person continues to be in possession he in law can acquire cotenureholder's rights by estoppel and acquiescence. In the instant case the property of the grandfather came in possession of Surjan Singh and he asserted himself as cotenureholder and not only this, he also remained in possession for over 20 years. In such circumstances in my opinion he did acquire cotenureholder's rights by prescription. In the instant case the property of the grandfather came in possession of Surjan Singh and he asserted himself as cotenureholder and not only this, he also remained in possession for over 20 years. In such circumstances in my opinion he did acquire cotenureholder's rights by prescription. It has already been held in Dudh Nath Kori v. Smt. Shamraji and another 1974 R.D. 95, that cotenancy rights can also be acquired apart from Section 33 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Mewa Ram and others v. Shanker and others (3) also took the same view. I have not been able to find anything to take a contrary view. I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the case of Surjan Singh could not be covered under Section 33 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and as such he could not become a cotenant of the disputed Khata. The learned counsel for the opposite parties then argued that estoppel is only a rule of evidence and cannot confirm any substantive right. It is true that some times it is thought that an estoppel is a rule of procedure precluding a party from asserting of denying the existence of certain state of facts, and it cannot form the basis of any substantive right, of course an estoppel cannot have the effect of conferring upon a person status expressly denied to him by statute, but where such is not the case rights can be claimed as having come into existence on the basis of estoppel and it is capable of being enforced and defended as against the person precluded from denying it. It is well settled that estoppel may be said to be a foundation of a right as against the person estopped and if it was not so it is difficult to see what protection the principle of estoppel can afford to the person by whom it may be invoked and conversely what disability it can create in the person against whom it operates in cases affecting rights. It appears to me that where rights are involved estoppel may with equal justification be described both as a rule of evidence and as a rule creating or defeating rights. It appears to me that where rights are involved estoppel may with equal justification be described both as a rule of evidence and as a rule creating or defeating rights. In the instant case there is nothing on record to show that the opposite parties for over more than 20 years had taken any steps against Surjan Singh for holding possession by virtue of cotenancy rights in the disputed Khata. What being so I am of opinion that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation suffers from manifest error and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The result is that the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated August 12, 1969 contained in Annexure4 is quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly to cancel the original of the same from the record. I, however, make no order as to costs.