SATISH CHANDRA, J. In the basic year the petitioner was recorded as the Bhuniidhar of the four plots in dispute. During consolidation operations Dhruva Narain (respondent) filed an objection claiming a one-third share in plot No. 151 and one-sixteenth share over the remaining-three plots, namely, plots Nos. 96, 164 and 181. He claimed that the three plots Nos. 96, 164 and 181, originally belonged to his grandfather, Chandra Shekhar, after whose death they were inherited by his father, Sukhdeo Prasad, along with his brothers. Plot No. 151 was acquired by his father, Sukhdeo Prasad, alone. Sukhdeo Prasad died, leaving a widow and two sons, namely, the objector Dhruva Narain and Beer Bhadra. The objectors father, Sukhdeo Prasad, executed a gift deed on March 30, 1938, by which he gave his landed property to his wife, Smt. Bittan Kuar, and his then existing son, Beer Bhadra on the condition that in case a son was born to him subsequently, he will have an equal share in the gifted property. Subsequently in 1955 and 1956 Bittan Kuar as well as Beer Bhadra transferred their interest in the plots in dispute in favour of Smt. Chandra Kumari, the present petitioner by registered deeds of sale. The other co-sharers (who were the descendants of the objectors grandfather, Chandra Shekhar) also transferred their interest in these plots to Smt. Chandra Kumari. As a result of these transfers Smt. Chandra Kumari alone came to be recorded as the Bhumidhar over the plots in dispute. The respondent was a minor when these sale deeds were executed, and so these transfers were not binding on him. The objection was contested by the present petitioner. She claimed that she had no knowledge of the gift deed. She had purchased all the existing interests in the plots in dispute. She was the exclusive Bhumidhar. In the alternative, it was pleaded that she was in possession on her own behalf for more than six years, and so she had, in any event, become Sirdar. The Consolidation Officer by a vaguely reasoned order, upheld the objection in respect of plot No. 151. He directed that the objectors name be recorded over a one-third share of this plot. He dismissed the claim of the objector with regard to the other three plots. He, however, gave a finding that there was no evidence to prove adverse possession. Both sides appealed. He directed that the objectors name be recorded over a one-third share of this plot. He dismissed the claim of the objector with regard to the other three plots. He, however, gave a finding that there was no evidence to prove adverse possession. Both sides appealed. The Settlement Officer dismissed the objection of Dhruva Narain in toto. He held that the land in dispute was Sir or Khudkasht and could validly be gifted. The objector had no interest at the tune of the execution of the gift deed, because he was not in existence then, he could not hence claim any right in the plots in dispute. The objector then went up in revision. The Deputy Director held that since the objector was not a party to the gift deed, there was no need for him to file a suit for the cancellation of the gift deed. He could raise the objection in consolidation proceedings. He was of the view that alienation of ancestral property without legal necessity was invalid, and a coparcener could object to such alienation, even though he was born subsequently. The objector became a coparcener as an after-born son, and he could challenge the gift deed. Since the gift was without any legal necessity, it was invalid qua the objectors one-third share. On these findings, he set aside the orders of the courts below and directed that the name of Dhruva Narain be recorded as cotenure-holder over the land in dispute with a one-third share, the remaining two-thirds share going to Smt. Chandra Kumari. Aggrieved, Smt. Chandra Kumari has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Deputy Director committed an obvious error in granting a one-third share to the objector in all the plots in dispute. He had claimed a one-third share in plot No. 151, while in the other three plots he had claimed only a one-sixteenth share. In the other three plots his father, Sukhdeo Prasad, only had a share along with his brother. According to the pedigree, the objectors share, even though his case is accepted, would come to one-sixteenth. The Deputy Director could at the most grant him a one-sixteenth share in the other three plots. In the other three plots his father, Sukhdeo Prasad, only had a share along with his brother. According to the pedigree, the objectors share, even though his case is accepted, would come to one-sixteenth. The Deputy Director could at the most grant him a one-sixteenth share in the other three plots. The principal question, however, is whether the condition imposed in the gift-deed, that if a son is born to the donor after the execution of the document, he will have an equal share, is valid. The case is completely covered by the decision of the Mysore High Court in Konahally Vasanthappa v. Konahally Channahasappa A. I. R. 1962 Mysore 98. In that case it was held that Section 20 of the Transfer of Property Act operates independently of Section 13 of that Act. Section 20 provides that "where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not then living, he acquires upon his birth, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer, a vested interest, although he may not be entitled to the enjoyment thereof immediately on his birth". The gift deed did not betray any intention that the interest conferred upon the after-born son will be anything other than a vested interest, or that he was not entitled to the enjoyment of his interest immediately on his birth. Under the circumstances, the objector acquired a one-third share in the interest of Sukhdeo Prasad in the property, which was the subject-matter of the deed of gift. For reasons mentioned in the aforesaid decision of the Mysore High Court, I agree that Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act is inapplicable. Learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to Katragadda Chinna Ajjaaneyulu v. Kattragadda Chinna Ramayya A. I. E. 1965 Andhra Pradesh 177 and Sri Venugonalaswamy Varu Temple v. V. Visweswara Prasad A. I. R. 1969 Andhra Pradesh 24, in support of the proposition that in case a coparcener releases his share in joint family property, an after born son will not get any interest in it. These cases are distinguishable. The present is not a case of relinquishment or release. The petitioner never took up this plea. The document purports to be one of gift. It was executed on the footing that the donor was the full owner of the property covered by it. These cases are distinguishable. The present is not a case of relinquishment or release. The petitioner never took up this plea. The document purports to be one of gift. It was executed on the footing that the donor was the full owner of the property covered by it. The cases cited are hence distinguishable. The case of adverse possession was not argued, evidently because the finding of fact of the Consolidation Officer that there was no evidence for it, still remains. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The order of the Deputy Director is modified and it is directed that the objector Dhruva Narain shall be recorded as Bhumidhar of a one-third share in plot No. 151 and as a co-Bhumidhar of a one-sixteenth share in the remaining three plots in dispute. Smt. Chandra Kumari shall be the Bhumidhar of the remaining shares in the plots in dispute. In view of the divided success the parties shall bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly. .