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1975 DIGILAW 54 (KAR)

SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTREAL EXCISE v. A. GOVINDARAJAN

1975-04-18

CHANDRASHEKARAIAH, NORONHA

body1975
( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from the order of Jagannatha Shetty, J. in WP. 3222 of 1972. The appellants were respondents and the respondent herein was the petitioner therein. In the writ petition he had prayed for. (i) To issue a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the seizure proceedings conducted by the respondents on 15-12-1972; (ii) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to return the sum of Rs. 3,15,000 seized by them from the petitioner on 15-12-1972. ( 2 ) CERTAIN material facts, which are not in dispute, may be stated. On 15-12-1972, the writ petitioner was proceeding in the car bearing Registration no. MDD 6575, near Venkataramanappa Choultry in Palace, Road, bangalore. The Central Excise Authorities stopped the car and searched. He wos found to be in possession of a large number of currency notes. He was taken to the Office of the Collector, Central Excise, Bangalore. There the currency notes of Rs. 3,15,000 were seized from him under a mahazar. His statement was also recorded. The next day he was produced before the judicial Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody. ( 3 ) IN the writ petition, the petitioner's case was briefly as follows: He was a partner of a firm in Madras. Un 15-12-72, he was carrying currency notes of Rs. 3,15,000 for the purpose of the firm's business. Mere possession off currency notes could not form the basis of a reasonable benef in the mind of appellant 2 (The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Preventive, head Quarters, Bangalore) that they were the, sale proceeds of smuggled goods. The search and the seizure of those currency notes from him, were illegal. In the office of the Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore, he was compelled to make a statement according to the dictation of the officials. He is entitled to return of those currency notes. The search and the seizure of those currency notes from him, were illegal. In the office of the Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore, he was compelled to make a statement according to the dictation of the officials. He is entitled to return of those currency notes. ( 4 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition (the appellants), it was stated, inter alia, that on 15-12-72 Applt 2 had received information that a person would be arriving in a car and would be waiting near Venkataramanappa Choultry near Maharani's College on Palace Road, Bangalore, between 14-30 hrs and 15 hrs and that, if that car is intercepted, either contraband gold or the sale, proceeds thereof in currency notes would be found. On the basis of such information, the appellants stopped the car driven by the writ petitioner, who was the sole occupant thereof, and searched it and seized the currency notes from him. They seized the currency notes on a reasonable belief that they represented the sale proceeds of contraband gold. In his statement made in the Office of the collector of Central Excise, the writ petitioner admitted that the currency notes seized from him represented the sale proceeds of contraband gold entrusted to him by his brother, A. Ramalingam, at Salem, for being given to a person near Venkataramanappa Choultry in Bangalore. The seizure of the currency notes was in accordance with law. On completion of the investigation, adjudication proceedings would be in tiated. The writ petitioner would be gfven a reasonable and sufficient opportunity to show that he had not committed any offence and that the currency notes seized were not liable to confiscation. As he has remedies under the Customs Act, 1962, and has not exhausted them, he is not entitled to invoke prematurely the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) SUBSEQUENT to the filing of the writ petition, the learned Single judge made an interim order on 14-6-1973 that the currency notes seized from the writ petitioner should be returned to him on his furnishing a Bank guarantee of a nationalised Bank. The Indian Bank furnished such gaurantee on his behalf and the Central Excise Authorities returned the currency notes to that Bank on his behalf. The Indian Bank furnished such gaurantee on his behalf and the Central Excise Authorities returned the currency notes to that Bank on his behalf. ( 6 ) THE learned single Judge allowed the writ petition, quashed the seizure proceedings and directed return of the currency notes to the writ petitioner. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the learned single Judge, the Central Excise Authorities have come up in appeal. ( 7 ) MR. U. L. Narayana Rao, learned Senior Standing Counsel of the central Govt, urged the following two grounds in support of the appeal. , (i) The learned single Judge should not have interfered with the seizure of the currency notes when the writ petitioner had effective alternative remedies under the Customs Act; and (ii) The learned single Judge erred in holding that before seizing the currency notes from the writ petitioner, the appellants did not have a reasonable belief that they were the sale proceeds of smuggled gold. ( 8 ) ELABORATING his first ground, Mr. Narayana Rao argued that the adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act had already been ihitiated against the writ petitioner, that he had an effective remedy in those proceedings, that the questions involved in this case are purely questions of of fact and that hence the learned single Judge should not have interfered with the seizure proceedings. In other words, the contention of Mr. Narayana Rao was that the respondent should have exhausted the remedies under the Customs Act before approaching this Court prematurely. ( 9 ) THE above contention was also urged before the learned single judge, who while repelling it, observed that) the writ petitioner had approached this Court immediately after the seizure of currency notes and long before the adjudication proceedings had commenced, that he had challenged the validity of the search and the seizure on the ground that they were illegal and were made without the authority of law and that hence it was an appropriate case for this Court to pronounce upon the validity of the search and seizure on the ground that they were illegal and were made without the authority of law. ( 10 ) AS the second ground urged by Mr. ( 10 ) AS the second ground urged by Mr. Narayana Rao, which we uphold is sufficient to allow this appeal we do not consider it necessary to pronounce on the first ground urged by him, that the writ petitioner could not approach this Court without exhausting the alterative remedies under the customs Act. ( 11 ) THE second ground urged by Mr. Narayana Rao is substantial enough to sustain this appeal. Before we deal with it, it is useful to set out the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. ( 12 ) THE word goods' has been defined in sub-sec (22) of S. 2 of the customs Act as including currency and negotiable instruments. ( 13 ) SUB-SEC (33) of S. 2 of the Customs Act defines 'prohibited goods' as any goods import and export of which is subject to any prohibition under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, but does not include any such goods in respect of which the conditions subject to which the goods are permitted to be imported or exported, have been complied with. ( 14 ) SUB-SEC (39) of S. 2 of the Customs Act, defines the word 'smuggling' in relation to any goods, it means any act or omission which will render such goods liable to confiscation under S. 111 or S. 113. ( 15 ) SUB-SEC (1) of S. 101 of the Customs Act provides that if any officer of Customs empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Collector of Customs, has reason to believe that any person has secreted about his person any goods of the description specified in sub-sec (2) which are liable to confiscation, or documents relating thereto, he may search that person. The goods specified in sub-sec (2) of that Section include gold. ( 16 ) SUB-SEC (1) of S. 110 of the Customs Act provides that if the authorised Officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under that Act, he may seize such goods. ( 17 ) THE material portion of 9. 111 of the Customs Act, reads : 111. The following goods brought from a placet outside, India shall be liable to confiscation. (a ). . . . . . . ( 17 ) THE material portion of 9. 111 of the Customs Act, reads : 111. The following goods brought from a placet outside, India shall be liable to confiscation. (a ). . . . . . . (b) (c) (d) any goods which are imported or attempted to be imported or are brought within the Indian Customs waters for the purpose of being imported, contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this act or any other law for the time being in force; section 121 of the Customs Act reads : where any smuggled goods are sold by a person haying knowledge or reason to believe that the goods are smuggled goods, the saleproceeds thereof shall be liable to; confiscation. ( 18 ) AS early as in the year 1948 the Govt of India issued under S. 8 (i) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, a notification to the effect that except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank, no person shall bring or send into India, gold, thus bringing into India gold from outside, except under the permission of the Reserve Bank is prohibited. ( 19 ) WE are in complete agreement with the learned single Judge that the existence of a reasonable belief on the part of the empowered officer, that goods are liable to confiscation under the Customs Act, is a prerequisite condition for his exercising the power of search under S. 101 (1) or the power of seizure under S. 110 of the Act. If the appellants had no reasonable belief that the writ petitioner had secreted about his person goods liable to confiscation, they could not search him. If they had no reason Ho believe that currency notes were liable to confiscation, they could not seize them. ( 20 ) THE learned single Judge has observed that except the statement in the counter-affidavit, nothing else had been placed before him to justify the seizure of the currency notes, nor was there anything to indicate that the currency notes seized were the sale proceeds of any smuggled goods. He has also observed that all that was disclosed by the appellants was that appellant 2 has received some information on 15-12-1972 that a certan person would be arriving in a car and would be waiting near YHV. He has also observed that all that was disclosed by the appellants was that appellant 2 has received some information on 15-12-1972 that a certan person would be arriving in a car and would be waiting near YHV. Choultry near Maharani's College on Palace Road, between 2-30 and 3-30 P. M. and, if he wag intercepted, either contraband gold or the sale proceeds thereof in currency notes would be found. The learned single Judge was of the view that such information was lacking in material particulars as to the car and the person driving it. He observed that the car was found in the course of a fishing expedition' without the foundation of any reasonable belief and that no contraband gold nor anything incriminating was seized from the writ petitioner. ( 21 ) BEFORE the laarned single Judge, the stand taken by the learned counsel appearing for Customs Authorities, was that the Customs Authorities were not bound to disclose to the Court the information on the basis of which they searched the writ petitioner and seized currency notes from him. However, in this appeal Mr. Narayana Rao has produced before us the confidential papers containing the information which the Central excise authorities had received before they searched the car of the writ petitioner and seized from him the currency notes. It is seen from these papers that on 15-12-1972 at about 1-30 P. M. appellant 2 had received from a Customs Officer at Madras the following information: a person will be coming in a car and will be waiting near the Choultry opposite to Maharani's College and if you intercept the car, you can seize gold or currency. ( 22 ) MR. MRM. ABDUL Karim, learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that the papers now produced before us by the appellants, had not been produced before the learned single Judge, that these papers must have been subsequently got up by the appellants and that hence we should not rely on them. ( 23 ) THE mere fact that these papers had not been produced before the learned single Judge, is not sufficient to doubt their genuineness. ( 23 ) THE mere fact that these papers had not been produced before the learned single Judge, is not sufficient to doubt their genuineness. In para 2 of the counter-affidavit produced before the learned single Judge it is stated as follows : on 13-12-1972, respondent 2 (appellant 2) had fecelved an information that a certain person would be arriving in a car and would be waiting near YHV Choultry near the Maharani's College on Palace Rd between 14-30 hrs and 15 hrs and that if the said car is intercepted either contraband gold or the sals proceeds of contraband gold in currency would be] found. ( 24 ) THE above statement in the counter-affidavit must have been based on the contents of the papers produced now before us. We have no reason to doubt that appellant 2 had received the aforesaid information on 15-12-1972 at about 1-30 P. M. ( 25 ) WE are unable to agree with the view of the learned single Judge that the aforesaid information was too vague on account of absence of description of the car and the name of the person who would come in it. It is too much to expect that the authorities would be able to gather before hand all particulars of the activities of smugglers. At the time when the customs Officer at Madras passed on to appellant 2 the information that a person would be coming in a car with contraband gold or sale proceeds there of that Officer might not have had information as to which person would be employed to smuggle gold and to bring the sale proceeds thereof and in what car he would come to Bangalore. Generally, smugglers, would do everything in their power to keep their activities secret and to escape detection. The car in which the writ petitioner was found on 15-12-1972, had the Registration No. MDD 6575. The. letters 'mdd' indicated that the car was registered in Madras State (now Tamil Nadu ). Not many cars bearing registration numbers of Madras State) would be moving in Bangalore. When the car bearing the Madras registration number was found moving near Venkataramanappa Choultry on 15-12-1972 at about 2-30 PM it was not unnatural for the appellants to anticipate that that might be the car in which smuggled gold or sale proceeds thereof had been brought from Madras. When the car bearing the Madras registration number was found moving near Venkataramanappa Choultry on 15-12-1972 at about 2-30 PM it was not unnatural for the appellants to anticipate that that might be the car in which smuggled gold or sale proceeds thereof had been brought from Madras. The learned single Judge has entirely overlooked the material circumstances that the number plate of this car bore the Madras registration number and hence could be distinguished from numerous cars moving on the Palace Road near V. Choultry on the afternoon of 15-12-1972. We are unable to agree with the view of the learned single Judge that this car must have been stopped and searched by the appellants in the course of a fishing expedition or a random search on the off-chance of finding contraband goods. The search proceeded on the definite information received by the appellants from the Customs Officer, Madras. Such information provided a reasonable belief that the writ petitioner had smuggled gold or sale proceeds thereof liable to confiscation. We are unable to agree with the learned singlq Judge that there was no such reasonable belief preceding the search and the seizure by the appellants. ( 26 ) HOWEVER, Mr. Abdul Karim contended that even if the currency notes in the possession of the writ petitioner were the sale proceeds of smuggled goods, and even if the appellants had reason to believe that he had concealed them about his person, they could not search him, as currency notes are not goods specified in 8. 101 (2) of the Customs Act. ( 27 ) AT the time when the appellants searched him, they had on the basis of the information furnished by the Customs Officer, Madras, reason to believe that the writ petitioner had secerted about his person gold or sale proceeds thereof. As the importation of gold has been prohibited except under the permission of the Reserve Bank, under the Foreign Exchange regulation Act, 1948. it comes within the definition of prohibited goods' in S. 2 (33) of the Customs Act and is liable to confiscation under s. 111 (d) of the Customs Act. Gold is also one of the goods specified in 3. 101 (2) of the Customs Act. Hence, it was Competent for the appellants u|s. 101 (1) of the Customs Act to search him. Gold is also one of the goods specified in 3. 101 (2) of the Customs Act. Hence, it was Competent for the appellants u|s. 101 (1) of the Customs Act to search him. The mere fact that what was found after the search were currency notes and not gold, does not mean that prior to that search the appellants had no reason to believe that he had secreted gold. ( 28 ) ASSUMING, for the sake of argument, that the information received by the appellants from the Customs Officer, Madras, that the person coming by car near V. Choultry would have with him smuggled gold or sale proceeds thereof, did not amount to a definite information that the writ petitioner had secreted about his person, gold and that consequently the search was not preceded by a reasonable belief that he had secreted gold, the seizure of currency notes from him cannot be held to be vitiated in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Radha Kishan v. State of U. P. AIR. 1963 SC. 822, There the house of the appellant was searched and certain incriminating articles were seized. It was contended for him that the search was illegal inasmuch as it was in contravention of the provisions of 3s. 103 and 165 Crpc. Dealing with that contention, this is what the Supreme, Court said at page 824: it may be that where the provisions of Ss. 103 and 165, Crlpc, are contravened, the search could be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding seizure. But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues. " ( 29 ) MR. Abdul Karim next contended that S. 121 of the Customs Act is not attracted to searches and seizure under Ss. 100 to 110 or confiscation under Ss. 111 and 113 of the Customs Act. Elaborating this contention he argued that Ss. 100 to 110 deal with cases in which no mens rea' is involved and that the mere fact of goods being smuggled, is sufficient for exercising the powers of search and seizure under Ss. 100 to 110 or confiscation under Ss. 111 and 113 of the Customs Act. Elaborating this contention he argued that Ss. 100 to 110 deal with cases in which no mens rea' is involved and that the mere fact of goods being smuggled, is sufficient for exercising the powers of search and seizure under Ss. 100 to 110, without any necessity to prove knowledge or guilty mind on the part of the person searched or from whom goods, are seized, whereas knowledge or reasoable belief of the goods having been smuggled, on the part of the person selling such goods, is necessary for confiscating the sale proceeds of such goods under S. 121 of the Customs Act. It was'also contended by Mr. Karim that 'goods' as defined in S. 2 (22) do not include sale proceeds of smuggled goods and that the appellants could not search the writ petitioner for currency notes even if they were the sale proceeds of smuggled goods, nor could the currency notes in his possession be seized under S. 110 of the Customs Act. ( 30 ) WHAT Sec. 110 (1) of the Customs Act provides for, is seizure of goods liable to confiscation under that Act and not merely goods liable to confiscation under S. 111 or 113. We are unable to accept the narrow interpretation sought to be placed by Mr. Karim on S. 110 (1) of the Act so as to exclude seizure of sale proceeds liable to confiscation under S. 121. We are also unable to accept the contention of Mr. Karim that when the sale proceeds of smuggled goods are currency notes, they cannot be regarded as currency coming within Cl (d) of S. 2 (12) of the Customs Act. ( 31 ) THE learned single Judge has observed that there was no incriminating circumstance connecting the currency notes seized from the writ petitioner, with the sale of any smuggled gold and that hence seizure; of currency notes from the writ petitioner should be held to be only on pretence of suspicion. ( 32 ) IT was contended by Mr. ( 31 ) THE learned single Judge has observed that there was no incriminating circumstance connecting the currency notes seized from the writ petitioner, with the sale of any smuggled gold and that hence seizure; of currency notes from the writ petitioner should be held to be only on pretence of suspicion. ( 32 ) IT was contended by Mr. Karim that even if the currency notes seized from the writ petitioner, were the sale proceeds of gold, there was no material to show that the persons who sold such gold knew or had reason to believe that such gold was smuggled gold and that hence those currency notes were not liable to confiscation under S. 121 and consequently could not be seized by the appellants under S. 110 (1) of the Customs Act. ( 33 ) IT is true that the currency notes seized from the writ petitioner, which according to the information received by the appellants were the sale proceeds of gold, would be liable to confiscation under S. 121 of the customs Act, only if the person selling them had knowledge or reason to believe that such gold was smuggled gold and not otherwise. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Pukhraj v. D. R. Kohli AIR. 1962 SC. 1559. , the very largeness of the quantity of gold in the possession of a person, may itself indicate, prime facie, that it is smuggled gold. In the present case, the currency notes, which according to the information received by the appellants, represented the sale prqceeds of smuggled gold, were of the light order of Rs. 3,15,000. A person dealing in such large quantity of gold, prima facie, knew or had reason to believe that it was smuggled gold. ( 34 ) MOREOVER, the stage of confiscation of currency notes has not yet been reached. When the writ petitioner appro-ached this Court, the currency notes had been merely seized. Whether the requirements of S. 121 have been satisfied to justify confiscation of the currency notes, will be gone into at the stage, of adjudication under S. 122 of the Customs Act. When the writ petitioner appro-ached this Court, the currency notes had been merely seized. Whether the requirements of S. 121 have been satisfied to justify confiscation of the currency notes, will be gone into at the stage, of adjudication under S. 122 of the Customs Act. At the stage of seizure of such currency notes, it was sufficient if the appellants had reason to believe that they (the currency notes) were the sale proceeds of smuggled gold which was sold by a person who knew or had reasons to believe that such gold was smuggled gold. The information received by the appellants, was, in our opinion, sufficient for such reasonable belief. ( 35 ) AS pointed out by the Supreme Court in Pukhraj v. D. R. Kohli (2), while dealing with the question whether the belief in the mind of the pror per officer who seized the goods, was reasonable or not, the Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of that Officer. All that the Court can consider is whether there was ground, prima facie, justifying such reasonable belief. In the present case, the information received by the appellants from the Customs Officer, Madras, prima facie, justified the reasonable belief that the person coming in a car near V. Choultry on that afternoon, would either carry smuggled gold or the sale proceeds thereof. The learned single judge has overlooked that at the stage of adjudication under S. 122 of the customs Act, th'e writ petitioner will have an opportunity to establish that the currency notes seized from him were not the sale proceeds of smuggled gold and that even if such currency notes were the sale proceeds of smuggled gold, the person who sold such gold did not know, nor had reason to believe that such gold was smuggled gold. ( 36 ) IN the result, we allow this appeal, reverse the decision of the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petition. As stated earlier by virtue of the interim order made by the learned Judge, the currency notes seized from the writ petitioner were returned to his representative, namely, the Indian Bank. The consequence of our allowing the appeal, would be that the writ petitioner has to return to the appellants the aforer said sum of Rs. 3,15,000 within one month from today. The consequence of our allowing the appeal, would be that the writ petitioner has to return to the appellants the aforer said sum of Rs. 3,15,000 within one month from today. We direct the respondent (the writ petitioner) to arrange to deposit with the appellants a sum of Rs. 3,15,000. ( 37 ) IN the circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear, their own costs both in this appeal and in the writ petition. --- *** --- .