Judgment :- 1. The main question in this appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for partition is whether item 1 in A schedule to the plaint belongs to the joint family of the parties who are governed by Hindu Law. Defendants 1 and 2 are the sons of Arumughan deceased and the plaintiff and defendant 3 are the sons of defendant 1 by his first wife. A schedule item 1 is a leasehold acquired by Arumughan and the first defendant under the original of Ext. Al dated May 23, 1946. The plaintiff claimed that it is a piece of joint family property and on that footing sought partition and separate possession of 1/6th share. The first defendant resisted this claim, contending that item 1 is his self-acquisition and not joint family property and that his father Arumughan joined in Ext. Al only at the instance of the landlords and took no beneficial interest. 2. The trial court accepted the plaintiff's case holding that A schedule item 1 is an acquisition of the joint family and that it is therefore available for partition. On appeal by the first defendant, the appellate court reversed this finding in the view that there was no proof of adequate joint family nucleus from which item 1 could have been acquired, that the junction of Arumughan in Ext. Al raised no presumption that it was an acquisition for the joint family and that the only possible conclusion was that Arumughan and the first defendant took the property as tenants-in-common. On this basis the appellate court held that one-half of item 1 belonged to the first defendant exclusively and that as a result of Arumughan's death, the other half was available for partition. 3. The plaintiff has appealed seeking restoration of the decree of the Munsiff's Court on A schedule item 1, but the first defendant has submitted to the decision of the appellate court. 4. The question when and under what circumstances an acquisition could be treated or presumed to be a joint family acquisition has been the subject of innumerable decisions but I think that it is enough for the present purpose to refer to the statement of law in some leading text books. 5. 4. The question when and under what circumstances an acquisition could be treated or presumed to be a joint family acquisition has been the subject of innumerable decisions but I think that it is enough for the present purpose to refer to the statement of law in some leading text books. 5. This is how the position is stated in Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edition, Para.281: "Where the members of a joint family acquire property by or with the assistance of joint funds or by their joint labour or in their joint business or by a gift or a grant made to them as a joint family, such property is the coparcenary property of the persons who have acquired it, whether it is an increment to ancestral property, or whether it has arisen without any nucleus of descended property. And it makes no difference that the form of the conveyance to them would make them tenants in common and not joint tenants." "It is now settled that when the members of a joint family, by their joint labour or in their joint business, acquire property, that property, in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention, would be owned by them as joint family property and their male issue would necessarily acquire a right by birth in such property." 6. Passing on to Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edition, in Para.233(2) after pointing out that "When in a suit for partition, a party claims that any particular item of the property is joint family property, or when in a suit on a mortgage, a party contends that the property mortgaged is joint family property, the burden of proving that it is so rests on the party asserting it" the learned author proceeded to state: "To render the property joint the plaintiff must prove that the family was possessed of some property with the income of which the property could have been acquired or from which the presumption could be drawn that all the property possessed by the family is joint family property or that it was purchased with joint family funds, such as the proceeds of sale of ancestral property or by joint labour. None of those alternatives is a matter of legal presumption. It can only be brought to the cognizance of a Court in the same way as any other fact, namely, by evidence." 7. None of those alternatives is a matter of legal presumption. It can only be brought to the cognizance of a Court in the same way as any other fact, namely, by evidence." 7. The following passage from Raghavachariar's Hindu Law, 6th Edition, under Para.248, "Joint Acquisition without the help of ancestral property" might also be read as relevant in this context: "Property acquired by the joint exertions of the coparceners, though Without the aid of ancestral assets, must be presumed to be joint family property. But this presumption does not arise where the acquirers are only some of the members of the coparcenary, or where they are living separately, and not under the same roof as coparceners are ordinarily expected to live, and can be rebutted even when the acquisition is made by all the members by proof of intention on their part to treat the acquisition merely as a partnership property governed by Partnership Act in which case the share of one of the acquirers will, on his death, devolve on h if own heirs and not by survivorship, or as joint property with the incident of survivorship as between the acquirers, but without the right by birth accruing to their sons". 8. Reference has also to be made to the statement of law in Mudigowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ramchandra Revgowda Sankh, AIR. 1969 S.C.1076: "Of course there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint, possesses any joint property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property, is, therefore, in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. This is however subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate". 9. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate". 9. Counsel for the first respondent contended that the rule in Gowdappa Sankh's case is exhaustive and self-contained and that apart from the mode indicated by their Lordships that the acquisition must be traceable to the nucleus of adequate joint family property there could be no acquisition for a joint family. The Supreme Court was considering only one situation when an acquisition would attract the presumption of joint family acquisition and neither the facts of the case nor the context of the observations warrants the inference that their Lordships excluded all the other modes in which acquisitions would become joint family property or attract the presumption. Property acquired out of joint business, gifts to the joint family or separate property thrown into the common stock, which stands on the same footing as property acquired out of joint family property and must partake of the same nature were not, for example, dealt with by their Lordships. As pointed out by Raghavachariar in Para.241 "because it is true that there can be no joint ancestral family property without previous nucleus of joint family property, it is not correct to say that there cannot be joint family property without a preexisting nucleus, for that would be identifying joint family property with ancestral joint family property." I reject the respondents' contention. 10. From the extracts made earlier it is obvious that, in the absence of a contrary intention the law recognises as joint family property an acquisition made by the joint labour of the members of the joint family. That, in my view is what has happened with respect to item 1. The family had only their homestead, 15 cents in extent as their ancestral property and its income was not much. Arumughan and the first defendant were agricultural labourers and despite his 75 years the former was in a position to work. The premium of Rs. 200/-paid under Ext. Al could only have been their joint earnings. The first defendant's case that he took the lease himself has not been accepted by either of the courts below. Arumughan and the first defendant were agricultural labourers and despite his 75 years the former was in a position to work. The premium of Rs. 200/-paid under Ext. Al could only have been their joint earnings. The first defendant's case that he took the lease himself has not been accepted by either of the courts below. The relationship between the acquirers and their joint residence with the second defendant is a circumstance that strengthens the presumption. What is more the acquirers were virtually the family, for the second defendant was then a minor. It is a clear case of an agriculturist joint family acquiring a lease for the benefit of the family. That is further emphasised by the provision in Ext. Al that for the arrears of rent and interest not only they but their properties would be liable, for the first defendant then had no property and the only property they had was the family homestead. In my view, the A schedule item 1 is a joint family acquisition and has been rightly found to be so by the trial court. 11. The appellant also contends that the C schedule movables which he claims to belong to the joint family are available for partition and that the decision of the appellate court to the contrary reversing the finding of the trial court is wrong. The C schedule consists of buffalos, agricultural implements etc. There is no satisfactory evidence, except the statement of the plaintiff as pw.1, about the existence, value or joint ownership of the movables. I therefore agree with the appellate court on this point. 12. Respondents 2 and 3 have filed a memorandum of cross-objection attacking the finding of the appellate court on A schedule item 1 and the C schedule movables. I have already covered these items while dealing with the appeal. 13. The judgment and decree of the appellate court are modified and the plaintiff is given a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of 1/6 share in A schedule item 1. Defendant 3 will get a similar share and defendant 21/2 share. The appeal and memorandum of cross-objections are allowed to the above extent and dismissed in other respects. Parties will bear their costs throughout.