JUDGMENT S. K. Jha, J. The appellants in both the appeals are the same, they being tenant-defendants, who have been ordered to be evicted from the building, which was the subject-matter of the two suits. The contesting respondents were the landlord plaintiffs. 2. Two suits were filed before the trial court, namely, Title suit No. 72 of 1965 and Title Suit No. 73 of 1965. The necessity for filing two separate title suits arose on account of the fact that with regard to one portion of the holding in question the tenants were the appellants of the two appeals here whereas in the other portion, which was the subject-matter of Title suit No. 73 of 1965, the tenants were those appellants along with others. Title Suit No. 72 of 1965 gave rise to Title Appeal No. 181 of 1971 in the court of appeal below culminating in Second Appeal No. 419 of 1972. Title Suit No. 73 of 1965 gave rise to Title Appeal No. 180 of 1971 in the lower appellate court out of which arose Second Appeal No. 420 of 1972. The points in both the appeals are common; hence this common judgment. 3. The only facts relevant for the disposal of these appeals are these. The contesting respondents, namely, the plaintiff-landlords, instituted these suits under section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), on various grounds. During the pendency of the suits an application under section 11 A of the Act, was filed in each of the two suits for a direction to the defendants to deposit arrears of rent and current rent month by month during the pendency of the suits. Admittedly, the rent which was last paid by the appellants to the contesting respondents was at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. The petition under section 11 A of the Act, was allowed by an order of the trial court dated the 1st of July, 1969. Admittedly, the rent which was last paid by the appellants to the contesting respondents was at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. The petition under section 11 A of the Act, was allowed by an order of the trial court dated the 1st of July, 1969. Within the time allowed to deposit the arrears of rent, the appellants defaulted resulting in their defence being struck out in both the suits in consequence of the mandatory provisions of section 11 A. That sanction, it may be stated at the outset, provides that in the event of failure on the part of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent or current rent month by month ordered to be deposited by the Court, the necessary consequence will be that the defence will stand struck out. The appellants came up to this Court in civil revisions against the orders regarding their defence to be struck out. These revisions proved abortive and were dismissed. Ultimately the suits were tried and decrees for eviction were passed in both the suits, Whereas the arrears of rent were decreed at rate of Rs. 50/- per month, the trial court further decreed from the date the tenancy was determined by service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, (i.e. from 1.2.1965) for damages for use and occupation to be paid by the appellants at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month till the date of their vacating the houses. Being aggrieved by the decrees in both the suits, the appellants went up to the lower appellate court where both the appeals met the fate of dismissal. They have now come up to this Court. 4. Mr. J C. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants, urged two points in support of these appeals Learned counsel urged, firstly, that the orders striking out the appellant's defence in the two suits were without jurisdiction as the quantum of the amount which had been ordered to be deposited under section 11 A was not proper and was not consistent with the principle laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramnandan sharma v. Maya Devi 1974 B.B.C.J. 818. It was, therefore, urged that the entire proceedings since after the defence was struck out were illegal and the cases should be remitted to the trial court from that stage. It was, therefore, urged that the entire proceedings since after the defence was struck out were illegal and the cases should be remitted to the trial court from that stage. In my view, this contention of learned counsel has absolutely no substance as it is not open to the appellants to raise such a contention. The order striking out defence under section 11A of the Act, cannot in my view be deemed to be an interlocutory order attracting the provisions of section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not by virtue of the order of the Court that defence is struck out in the event of failure to abide by the directions and orders of the Court for deposit of arrears of rent and current rent month by month. It follows as a necessary consequence on account of the express statutory provisions and the Court has no option but merely to record such an order. An order striking out defence can be deemed to be an interlocutory order only in suck circumstances where the Court has an option either to pass such an order or not so to pass. But where the statute casts an obligation which leaves no option to the Court, it can by no stretch of imagination be held to be an Act, of the Court or an order of the Court which strikes out the defence. Therefore, apart from the fact that the very same orders had come up before this Court in civil revisions which were dismissed, even on principle there is no scope on the facts of these cases and in so far as the effect laid down by section 11 A of the Act, is concerned to attract the provisions of section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is thus no merit in the first point urged by learned counsel. 5. Mr. Sinha next urged that in any event the decrees in the two suits in so far as damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month had been awarded since after the determination of the tenancy by service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, were clearly illegal and that part of the decrees must be set aside. 100/- per month had been awarded since after the determination of the tenancy by service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, were clearly illegal and that part of the decrees must be set aside. Learned counsel submitted that the admitted case of the parties was that the rent which was last paid according to the contract was at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. Under section 2 (f) (i) of the Act, a tenant continues to be a tenant in spite of notice determining the tenancy and asking the tenant to quit so long as the decree of eviction was not passed against him under section 11 of the Act. I think there is much substance in this submission of learned counsel. Section 2 (f) (i) reads thus: “Tenant” means any person by whom, or on whose account, rent is payable for a building and includes a person continuing in possession after the determination of the tenancy in his favour”. It will be seen from the aforesaid provision that even after the termination of the tenancy by the landlord a person continuing in possession so continues not as a trespasser but as a tenant. While Mr. Sinha urged that he continued to remain in possession as a statutory tenant, Mr. Asghar Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, took serious exception to the expression "statutory tenant" for, according to learned counsel for the respondent, such a person continued after the termination of the tenancy not as a statutory tenant but as a tenant at sufferance, Be that as it may, the outcome will not in any way be different merely by entering into this controversy on quibbling of words. Whether the appellants continued as tenants at sufferance or as statutory tenants or as contractual tenant makes not the slightest difference in so far as the point involved is concerned. The appellants continued as tenants and that is the end of the matter. That being so, no decree for damages at an enhanced rate could be passed by the courts below for it is well-settled that damages can be awarded only against trespassers and not against tenants. The appellants continued as tenants and that is the end of the matter. That being so, no decree for damages at an enhanced rate could be passed by the courts below for it is well-settled that damages can be awarded only against trespassers and not against tenants. Indeed, there is an authoritative pronouncement of this Court in a Bench decision in the case of Balkan Sah and others v. Ganga Devi Nathani and others A.I.R. 1964 Pat 214 which supports the view that I have taken. That was also a case under section 11 of the Act. A claim for damages at an enhanced rate had been put forward by the plaintiff landlord in that case. At the relevant time the statutory provision which I have noticed above, namely, section 2 (f), was incorporated in the statute book as section 2 (h). The change in the number was effected by section 2 of Bihar Act. 16 of 1955 but the language was mutatis mutandis the same. While repelling the contention put forward on behalf of the plaintiff landlord in Bulkan Sah's case, the Bench held that the tenant could not be evicted before a decree was passed under section 11 of the Act, and till then he continued to be a tenant and was, therefore, liable to pay only at the contracted rent to the landlord. In the present cases, therefore, that part of the decrees in the two suits by which has been awarded damages at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month to the plaintiff respondents from 1.2.1965, the date of the determination of the tenancy cannot be upheld and must be set aside. All that the plaintiff-respondents would be entitled to would be a decree at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month only for that period also. 6. In the result, therefore, these appeals succeed in part only to the extent that for such of the period during which decrees at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month have been awarded they must be modified and reduced to the rate of Rs. 50/- per month only. These appeals are thus partly allowed and the success being divided, I shall make no order as to costs. S. N. P. Singh, C. J. I agree. Appeal partly allowed.