GUPTA, J.—This is plaintiffs first appeal for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,256/- from the respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter called the Corporation) and arises in the following circumstances:— On November 27, 1958 a proposal for insurance for a sum Rs. 10,000/- on the life of Jai Singh (now deceased) husband of the plaintif-appellant along with a personal statement and a confidential report of the medical examiner was submitted to the respondent Corporation. The appellant was nominated under sec. 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (hereinafter called the Act) as the person to whom the money secured by the aforesaid policy was to be paid in the event of the death of Jai Sing The aforesaid proposal for insurance was accepted by the respondent Corporation on December 11, 1958 and an insurance policy No. 6833799 was issued by the Corporation for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- in favour of Jai Singh, commencing from December 24, 1958 Jai Singh paid yearly insurance premia which fell due in respect of the aforesaid policy in the years 1959 and 1960. However, the next yearly premium which fell due on December 24, 1961 was not paid and, therefore, the above mentioned policy stood lapsed, with effect from that date. On October 20, 1962, the Branch Manager of the Corporations Jodhpur office addressed a letter to Jai Singh informing him that on payment of Rs 425.25 inclusive of Rs. 405/- as the yearly premium due on December 24, 1961 and Rs. 20.25 as interest due thereon and on furnishing a short medical report, the Corporation may consider the revival of the aforesaid lapsed policy. In compliance of this letter, on January 28, 1963, Jai Singh submitted a personal statement regarding health (Ex. A/7) and a short Medical Report (Ex. A/8) signed by Dr. S. C. Mathur, Medical Officer Incharge, Government Hospital, Bilara. The Corporation by its letter dated February 6/7, 1963 accepted the short medical report on the Life of Jai Singh and informed him that he should remit Rs 843/- consisting of two yearly premia which had fallen due on December 24, 1961 and December 24, 1962 respectively and Rs. 33/- as interest thereon so as to enable the Corporation to revive the policy in question. Jai Singh remitted the aforesaid amount with the result that the aforesaid insurance policy was revived with effect from April 1, 1963. 33/- as interest thereon so as to enable the Corporation to revive the policy in question. Jai Singh remitted the aforesaid amount with the result that the aforesaid insurance policy was revived with effect from April 1, 1963. Sometime later, on January 22, 1964- Jai Singh died and the information regarding his death was communicated to the Branch Manager of the Corporations Jodhpur office. Thereafter the appellant, being the nominee of Jai Singh deceased in respect of his aforesaid insurance policy, claimed the amount due under the aforesaid policy from the Corporation. After some correspondence, the Corporation by its letter dated February 26/28, 1966 repudiated the claim of the appellant as the Corporation was of the view that Jai Singh deceased had made deliberate mis-statement in his personal statement and withheld material information from the Corporation regarding his health at the time of getting his policy revived and as such, in their view, the revival of the insurance policy in question was void. The Corporation, however, expressed its intention to make payment of Rs. 1200/- towards the paid-up value of the policy and Rs. 256/- as the bonus, which had become payable in respect of the policy on the date of its lapse. The appellant requested the Corporation to reconsider her claim, but the Corporation intimated the appellant by its letter dated July 26/27, 1966 that its decision in that regard remained unaltered. Consequently, the appellant filed a suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge No. 1, Jodhpur for a decree in the sum of Rs. 10,256/- and interest thereon and costs. 2. The Corporation in its written statement admitted that the appellant was the nominee of Jai Singh deceased in respect of the insurance policy in question. It was also admitted that the proposal for insurance on the life of Jai Singh was received and a policy was issued by the Corporation. However, the Corporation averred that it was not liable for payment of any amount to the plaintiff-appellant because the policy issued in favour of Jai Singh deceased had lapsed on account on his failure to make payment of the premia due in respect thereof and the Corporation, believing the personal statement and short medical report sent by the deceased, revived the policy and the assured died within one year of the aforesaid revival. On making inquiries, the Corporation came to know that the deceased was suffering from diabetes mellitus and it was further revealed that Jai Singh deceased remained as an indoor patient at the M G. Hospital, Jodhpur from November 7, 1960 to November 19, 1960 for treatment of diabetes mellitus and coma. The case of the Corporation was that Jai Singh intentionally suppressed the fact of his aforesaid illness and gave wrong replies to questions 3(a) and (b) in his personal statement and that as the revival of the policy was obtained by Jai Singh deceased by making mis statement of fact and suppression of material information, the contract of insurance was null and void and, therefore, the plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to receive any amount from the Corporation. 3. The trial court framed an omnibus issue as to whether the deceased assured got the policy revived by practising fraud on the Corporation, the particulars of which were mentioned in paras Nos. 16 and 17 of the written statement and as such, the contract of revival was null and void. The trial court came to the conclusion that the case of the appellant fell under the second part of sec. 45 of the Act. It further held that it was proved by the evidence on record that Jai Singh deceased remained as an indoor patient at the Mahatma Gandhi Hospital, Jodhpur from November 7, 1960 to November 19, 1960 and that he suffered from diabetes mellitus The learned trial court further held that Jai Singh deceased knowingly made a false statement on a material matter and suppressed facts which it was material to disclose regarding his health, in the personal statement submitted by him in connection with the revival of the policy in question It was held that Jai Singh was fully aware of the fact that he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and that he knowingly and fraudulently suppressed material information and indulged in fraudulent concealment of material fact which vitiated the contract of insurance. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the learned Additional District Judge No 1, Jodhpur, by his judgment and decree dated October 30, 1969, dismissed the plaintiffs suit, but left the parties to bear their own costs. 4. Aggrieved from the aforesaid decree, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal and the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the learned Additional District Judge No 1, Jodhpur, by his judgment and decree dated October 30, 1969, dismissed the plaintiffs suit, but left the parties to bear their own costs. 4. Aggrieved from the aforesaid decree, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal and the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. K. Mal Lodha raised the following five contentions before me:— (1) That the identity of Jai Singh has not been established as the person who had remained as an indoor patient at the M. G. Hospital, Jodhpur from November 7, 1960 to November 19, 1960 and that Jai Singh did not suffer from diabetes mellitus. (2) That even if Jai Singh deceased suffered from diabetes before the aforesaid policy lapsed, then he was completely cured and the revival of the policy was not affected and that Jai Singh was not required to disclose the alleged illness relating to the period prior to the lapsing of the policy. (3) That Jai Singh deceased was not conversant with English and as he could not understand the questions, he was not responsible for the answers given to questions No. 3(a) and (b) of the personal statement Form Ex. A-7 and as such, it cannot be held that Jai Singh suppressed any material facts or committed any fraud. (4) That the facts which are alleged to have been suppressed were not material and it has not been proved that Jai Singh knew at the time of making the personal statement that the effect of his alleged illness in November, 1960 was material and should have been disclosed. Thus it could not have been concluded that there was any-fraudulent suppression of material facts by Jai Singh deceased within the meaning of sec. 45(2) of the Act. (5) That in any event the appellant was entitled to a decree for Rs. 1546/- plus Rs 810/- in respect of the paid up value of the policy and vested bonus and the revival amount and the learned trial Court erred in not granting a decree at least for the said amount. 5. 45(2) of the Act. (5) That in any event the appellant was entitled to a decree for Rs. 1546/- plus Rs 810/- in respect of the paid up value of the policy and vested bonus and the revival amount and the learned trial Court erred in not granting a decree at least for the said amount. 5. In respect of the first submission, learned counsel urged that there was no cogent evidence to establish that it was Jai Singh, husband of the appellant, who was an indoor patient at the M. G. Hospital, Jodhpur from November 7, 1960 to November 19, 1960 and that he suffered from diabetes mellitus. In this connection, inpatient bed-head ticket Ex. A-1 and the laboratory reports Ex. A 2, Ex A-3 and Ex. A-4 have been produced. It is evident from Ex. A-1 that a person by the name of "Jai Singh son of Bishan Singh, resident of village Nimbol, aged 30 years by caste Rajput" was admitted in the M. G. Hospital, Jodhpur as an inpatient on November 7, 1960 and was discharged from the said hospital on November 19, 1960. It also appears from the aforesaid bed-head ticket that Jai Singh was treated for diabetes mellitus and coma. The name of the Medical Officer Incharge of the Ward in which Jai Singh was an indoor patient has been mentioned in Ex. A-1 as Dr. K. Benerjee and the address of the patient has been mentioned as "c/o Kanwar Chan Singh, Sardar-pura Road No, 1-A, House No. 12" Dr. K. Benerjee and Dr. Manraj Mehta, who are said to have treated Jai Singh, have been examined as DW 2 and DW 5 respectively. Dr. K. Benerjee identified the bed-head ticket Ex. A-1, the original of which was brought by him in Court at the time of his examination and stated that he had examined the patient on the date of his admission in the hospital and that he was unconscious on that date. Dr. Benerjee stated that a portion in the bed-head tickect was in his handwriting and bore his initials. He further stated that the particulars of the patient were filled in by the registration compounder in accordance with the usual practice at the aforesaid hospital. He also stated that the aforesaid patient was attended during his stay in the hospital by him, Dr. Manraj Mehta, Dr. Ajeetmal Singhvi, Dr. He further stated that the particulars of the patient were filled in by the registration compounder in accordance with the usual practice at the aforesaid hospital. He also stated that the aforesaid patient was attended during his stay in the hospital by him, Dr. Manraj Mehta, Dr. Ajeetmal Singhvi, Dr. D. N. Chatterjee and one more doctor, who made their notes on the bed head ticket Ex. A-1 and initialled them and that the record Ex. A-1 was correct and complete Dr. Manraj Mehta DW 5 stated that the medical prescriptions on the bed-he ad ticket from 8-11 -1960 to 15-11-1960 and 17-11-1960 and 19-11-1960 were in his handwriting and that he attended upon the said patient in the Hospital. He also confirmed that at the time when the patient was admitted in the hospital his condition was the same as was mentioned in the bed-head ticket Ex. A-1 as he had examined the patient soon after his admission. The bed head ticket Ex. A-1 mentions that the patient was brought in a state of convulsion in the hospital. He was unconscious, drowsy, had many vomits and passed blood in stool and that on the next day i. e. on regaining consciousness, the patient gave out his history of passing sugar in urine since a long time and that he was loosing weight, feeling weakness and diminution of vision, swetting all over the body since many days, had insomnia and also cough and expectoration. Dr. Mehta further stated that the patient was discharged on November 19, 1960 on his own request although he was not completely cured then. Thus from the aforesaid bed-head ticket Ex, A-l and the statements of the two doctors, Dr. K. Benerjee and Mr. Manraj Mehta, it is absolutely clear that one Jai Singh whose particulars are mentioned in the bed-head ticket Ex A. 1 was admitted as an indoor patient at the Mahatma Gandhi Hospital, Jodhpur on November 7, 1960 and was discharged on his own request on November 19, 1960. It is also proved that the said Jai Singh suffered from diabetes mellitus and that he was suffering from the aforesaid disease for several days before he was admitted in the hospital as an indoor patient. It is also proved that the said Jai Singh suffered from diabetes mellitus and that he was suffering from the aforesaid disease for several days before he was admitted in the hospital as an indoor patient. As a matter of fact, he was brought into the hospital on November 7, 1960 in a state of coma after he had suffered from diabetes mellitus for considerable time. The laboratory reports Ex. A-2 to Ex. A-4 reveal that there was acetone in the urine and the sugar content therein was two to three percent. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no evidence on record to connect the husband of the appellant with the person who is alleged to have been admitted in the hospital as an indoor patient on November 7, 1960 and to whom the bed-head ticket Ex. A-l and the laboratory reports Ex. A-2 to A-4 related. It is true that none of the two doctors who attended the patient at the M.G. Hospital knew him from before and when they were examined in Court in January, 1968, they were unable to mention any special features in respect of the identification of Jaisingh. However, the parentage, village, age and caste which have been mentioned in the bed head tickect Ex A-l entirely agreed with the description of Jaisingh and, in my opinion, they are sufficient to identify that the person who entered the hospital as an indoor patient on November 7, 1960 was the husband of the appellant. It is impossible to believe that some other person would have entered the hospital at Jodhpur on November 7, 1960 as Jaisingh whose particulars regarding name, parentage, residence, caste and age as mentioned in Ex. A-l were fully and completely identical with the particulars of the appellants husband. The brothers of Jaisingh, Sawaisingh and Chandsingh who have been examined as PW 3 and PW 4 respectively have admitted that in the village Nimbol there was no other person by the name of Jaisingh son of Bishansingh Rajput. It is also not disputed that the age of Jaisingh deceased husband of the appellant, at the relevant time would have been nearabout 30 years, because in the proposal form which was admittedly filled in by Jaisingh on November 97, 1958, his age has been mentioned as 27 years. It is also not disputed that the age of Jaisingh deceased husband of the appellant, at the relevant time would have been nearabout 30 years, because in the proposal form which was admittedly filled in by Jaisingh on November 97, 1958, his age has been mentioned as 27 years. DW 4 Prern Krishan Pitti, Development Officer of the Corporation, stated that he made an enquiry in village Nimbol and there was no other person, who was resident of that viilage by the name of Jaisingh son of Bishansingh, Rajput except the husband of the appellant He also said that on basis of the electoral roll of village Nimbol for the year 1959 that the only person answering to the aforesaid was the husband of the appellant. In DCruz, F. A. V. DCruz, Mrs W. E.(l), it was held that the entries in a prescription register maintained by a Government compounder in a Government Dispensary was admissible under S. 35 of the Evidence Act, although the particular compounder who made the entries may not have been called as a witness to prove his handwriting and the evidence of the doctor of having treated a person by the name mentioned in the prescription register would be sufficient evidence to prove that the register was genuine. The same principle should be made applicable in the present case to the inpatient bed-head ticket, which was prepared and kept in the office of a Government Hospital and the same was no doubt admissible in evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act, as it was a public record made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the entries contained in Ex. A-l relating to the description of Jaisingh were not proved. Dr. K. Banerjee and Dr. Manraj Mehta have proved that certain entries made in the inpatient bed-head ticket Ex A 1 were in their handwriting and such entries bore their initials as well. Thus, the genuiness of the aforesaid document Ex. A-l could not be doubted. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Dirgaj Deo Bahadur vs. Beni Mahto (2) held that a register which is an official document, is admissible in evidence under s. 35 in the absence of anything to show that any particular part thereof was in excess of the official duty. Dr. A-l could not be doubted. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Dirgaj Deo Bahadur vs. Beni Mahto (2) held that a register which is an official document, is admissible in evidence under s. 35 in the absence of anything to show that any particular part thereof was in excess of the official duty. Dr. Banerjee clearly stated that the entries relating to the description of the patient were made by the registration compounder at the time of admission of the patient in the hospital. The whole of the inpatient bed-head ticket Ex. A 1 was an official record and it would be proper to presume that the entries made therein were so made by public servants in the discharge of their official duties. I am, therefore not prepared to discard the inpatient bed-head ticket Ex. A-l from consideration merely because the registration compoun-der, who filled in the particulars of the patient, or the doctor who admitted Jai Singh in the M.G. Hospital, Jodhpur, on 7-11-60 was not examined on behalf of the respondent. There is nothing to create any suspicion or doubt regarding the genuiness of the entries made in the bed head ticket Ex.A-l, both regarding the treatment prescribed by the doctors, who attended upon the said patient while he was an indoor patient at the M.G. Hospital, Jodhpur as also the particulars and the description of the patient recorded at the time of his admission. Much capital was sought to be made in this connection by fact that the name of the person, who gave the description was not mentioned in the bedhead ticket, as Jaisingh was unconscious at the time when he was brought and was admitted in the hospital and further that a declaration regarding the risk and responsibility was not got signed from a relative of the patient, who got him admitted into the hospital. Dr. Banerjee explained that generally a rubber seal is got signed by the patient, if he is conscious or by his relative if the patient is unconscious. But merely on account of the fact that the declaration in question was not got signed by a relative of Jaisingh at the time when he was admitted in the hospital could not lead to the conclusion that Jaisingh, husband of the appellant, was never admitted in the M.G. Hospital, Jodhpur. But merely on account of the fact that the declaration in question was not got signed by a relative of Jaisingh at the time when he was admitted in the hospital could not lead to the conclusion that Jaisingh, husband of the appellant, was never admitted in the M.G. Hospital, Jodhpur. As a matter of fact the seal relates to willingness to get an operation performed on the patient and it was not at all necessary to affix the seal in the case of Jaisingh, in respect of whom no surgery was required to be performed and the signing of the seal was, therefore, inconse-quential. In view of the evidence of Dr. K. Banerjee and Dr. Manraj Mehta along with the bed-head ticket Ex. A-l, I am convinced that Jai Singh, husband of the appellant, was got admitted in the M.G. Hospital,Jodhpur on 7-11-1960 as a patient of diabetes mellitus and coma and was discharged on 19-11 i960 from the hospital on his own request and the identify of Jaisingh husband of the appellant is fully established. 6. As regards the second objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it was argued by him that at the time of revival, the policy holder was required only to disclose any illness between the period of the lapsing of the policy and its revival and that any illness prior to the date when the policy lapsed was not required to be disclosed by the policy holder. In the present case, Jaisingh had already paid premia in respect of the policy in question upto December 23, 1961 and the policy was revived on April 1, 1963 and thus according to the learned counsel for the appellant, only the illness during the period between December 24, 1961 and April 1, 1963 was required to be disclosed by him and not the illness, if any, suffered by Jaisingh prior to December 24, 1961, Jaisingh entered the M. G. Hospital, Jodhpur as an indoor patient for treatment of diabetes mellitus on November 7, 1960 and remained there upto November 19, 1960, which was prior to the date the aforesaid policy lapsed and as such the illness was not required to be disclosed or considered for the purpose of revival of the policy. Learned counsel in this context relied upon Indian Equitable Insurance Go. Ltd Calcutta vs. Om karappa (3). Learned counsel in this context relied upon Indian Equitable Insurance Go. Ltd Calcutta vs. Om karappa (3). In that case, the Rules of the Insurance Company and the terms of the insurance policy merely required that the policy could be revived on the policy holder "furnishing satisfactory evidence of continued good health". It was held in that case that a statement of continued good health in the declaration for the purpose of revival did not imply that the person was required to state that he had no ailment between the date of the original policy and the date of declaration for the purpose of revival but that it would be sufficient if at the time he made the statement he was in good health. However, the form of personal statement regarding health Ex. A-7 which was required to be filled in for the purposes of revival in the present case did not only require a general statement of continued good health of the policy holder, but questions 3 a) and (b) are specific and the policy holder is required to disclose as to whether he suffered from any physical or mental illness, injury or disability since his last medical examination in-connection with the said policy and whether he was required to take medical treatment. The policy-holder was also required to give details of illness suffered by him such as the date and duration thereof, the effect of the treatment and the name and address of the doctor, who treated the person. Thus the decision in Onkarappas case (3) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Moreover, Dr. K. Banerjee as well as Dr- Manraj Mehta stated that Jaisingh was not completely cured at the time when he left the hospital on November 19, 1960, but his condition has been described as fair in the bedhead ticket Ex. A I and it has also been mentioned therein that he was discharged on his own request. Dr. Banerjee also stated that there was no cure from the disease diabetes mellitus but in case the patient took insulin injections regularly then his longevity may be normal. Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that Jaisingh was completely cured of diabetes and did not suffer from it at the time of revival of the policy is not supported by the medical testimony. Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that Jaisingh was completely cured of diabetes and did not suffer from it at the time of revival of the policy is not supported by the medical testimony. Learned counsel for the appellant in this respect very strongly relied upon the fact that in short medical report Ex. A 8, Dr. S. C. Mathur, who examined Jaisingh for the purpose of the revival of the policy stated that no sugar was found on an analysis of his urine. In that respect Dr. Banerjee stated that if a man sufferring from diabetes took insulin injection and the urine passed by him within a short period thereof was examined, it may not show any sugar. He further asserted that even if the urine report regarding sugar was nil in the cases of diabetes then too the patient could not be said to have been completely cured of diabetes. Thus the mere fact that at the time of the medical examination by Dr. Mathur, for the purpose of revival of the policy the urine analysis of Jaisingh did not show any sugar content; it could not be concluded that Jaisingh was completely cured of diabetes mellitus. The requirement of questions 3 (a) and (b) was the disclosure of all illness and treatment undergone by the policy holder not only since the date of the lapsing of the policy, but since the last examination of the policy holder in connection with the said policy, which obviously took place in the instant case when the proposal for insurance Ex. A 9 and along with it a confidential report of the medical examination were sent on November 27, 1958. Once the conclusion is reached that Jaisingh, who was admitted in the M.G. Hospital, Jodhpur on November 7, 1960 as an indoor patient was the husband of the appellant, then on the strength of the medical evidence recorded in the case it cannot be held that he was completely cured of diabetes mellitus and, therefore, the disclosure of the aforesaid illness sufferred prior to the lapsing of the policy was necessary in answer to the question 3 (a) and 3 (b). Thus the second ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant also fails. 7. Thus the second ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant also fails. 7. As regards the third contention, learned counsel pointed out that forms of personal statement regarding health were also available in Hindi with which Jaisingh was conversant, but the Development Officer of the Corporation did not use the Hindi form but utilised the form in English, although he knew fully well that Jaisingh could only put his signatures in English but actually he did not understand English. In this respect the statement of Johrilal DW 3, Development Officer of the Corporation, is relied upon. Learned counsel also laid stress upon the fact that the form Ex. A 7 was filled in by Joharilal, Development Officer of the Corporation and was not filled in by Jaisingh himself. Learned counsel also relied upon the statements of PW 3 Sawai Singh and PW 4 Chand Singh. PW 3 Sawai Singh and PW 4 Chand Singh are the real brothers of Jaisingh deceased and there is no doubt that they are deeply interested in the plaintiff, who is their brothers widow. Ah hough these persons have stated that Jaisingh had read upto 5th class, they also denied the fact that Jaisingh was ever admitted as an indoor patient in the M. G. Hospital, Jodhpur, although Chandsingh admitted that he passed his B. A. Examination from Jodhpur in the year 1962 and the inpatient bedhead ticket Ex. A 1 also mentioned the address of Jaisingh as "C/o Kanwar Chan Singh, Sardarpura Road No. 1 A; House No. 12/ In view of these circumstances the statements of these two witnesses could not be believed. Further Jaisingh signed the original proposal form for insurance Ex A 9 as also the personal statement of health annexed thereto in English and although the form Ex. A 9 was also not filled in by Jaisingh himself, yet none of the contents of that form which is in English including the questions and their replies has been disputed by the plaintiff. If the statements and declarations made by Jaisingh in that form Ex. A 9 was also not filled in by Jaisingh himself, yet none of the contents of that form which is in English including the questions and their replies has been disputed by the plaintiff. If the statements and declarations made by Jaisingh in that form Ex. A 9 and in the personal statement of Health annexed thereto can be accepted to have been given by him after understanding the same and if Jaisingh was bound by the statements made therein, it is difficult to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the statements made in the personal statement regarding health for the revival of the policy, Ex. A 7 were not understood by Jaisingh and the replies were, therefore, not binding upon him. Johrilal DW 3 who was the Development Officer of the area concerned at the relevant time when the form Ex. A 7 was filled in, clearly stated on oath that he read over the questions to Jaisingh and also explained to him the questions of the said form Ex A 7 and that the replies entered into the said form were those which were given by Jaisingh himself. He also stated that Jaisingh could understand English. He further explained that when a question in the form is read over to the insured in English and the latter gives a reply to the same either in English or in Hindi, it is sufficient to conclude that the insured understood English, though he may not be able to express himself well in that language. He stated that the que-stions in form Ex. A 7 were explained to Jaisingh by him both in English as well as in Hindi and the answers were written after he had fully understood the questions. The form Ex A 7 also contains a declaration that the statements and answers given therein were true in every particular and that the assured agreed and declared that the statements made there in would be the basis of revival of the lapsed policy between him and the Corporation and that the contract would be void if any untrue averments were contained therein. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of Johrilal DW 3 as there is apparently no basis for presuming that Johrilal might have written incorrect replies to the questions contained in the form Ex. A 7. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of Johrilal DW 3 as there is apparently no basis for presuming that Johrilal might have written incorrect replies to the questions contained in the form Ex. A 7. DW 4 Prem Kishan Pitti, who had filled in the original proposal form Ex. A 9 on behalf of Jaisingh stated that he knew Jaisingh for 10 years and that from the conversation he had with Jaisingh he came to the conclusion that he was an English knowing man and could understand English quite well. He also stated that he explained the questions in the proposal form Ex. A 9 to Jaisingh in Hindi as well as in English and filled in the form as per the replies given by Jaisingh. Thus this witness also testifies that Jaisingh understood English sufficiently well and was capable of understanding the questions contained in the form Ex. A 7 so as to make him responsible for the answers contained therein. Much stress was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on the fact that in the declaration in the form Ex. A 7 one of the two alternatives namely, "the contract of assurance/revival of the lapsed policy" had not been scored out. But, in my opinion, it has little relevance in the matter, because admittedly the form Ex. A 7 was filled in not for the purpose of a fresh policy by the insured but it was tilled in for the revival of the lapsed policy of Jaisingh and merely because at the time of signing the form Jaisingh failed to score out one out of the two alternatives, no significance could at all be attached thereto. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Smt. Benarasi Debi vs. New India Assurance Go. Ltd. (4) in support of his contention that in case of an assured who did not know English language, mere declaration under his signatures was not sufficient to establish that the assured signed the forms after understanding their full import. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Smt. Benarasi Debi vs. New India Assurance Go. Ltd. (4) in support of his contention that in case of an assured who did not know English language, mere declaration under his signatures was not sufficient to establish that the assured signed the forms after understanding their full import. In that case it was not denied that the assured did not know English and there was an endorsement in Hindi along with the signatures of the assured on the form to the effect that ^^lgh le> dj fd;k^^ It was held in that case that the aforesaid endorsement could at best only prove that the particular portions of the form were written in the pen of the assured and not that the entire form was filled in after the assured had fully understood its contents, which were admittedly written in English. In that case there was no evidence at all to prove that the contents of the forms were explained to the assured in Hindi and that the replies recorded were given by him after fully understanding and comprehending the contents thereof and its implica-cations. In these circumstances, it was held: "It is a well-established rule of law that in the case of a person who is illiterate or who is not in a position to read the contents of a document, the contract cannot be imposed upon him simply because he has endorsed his signature thereon unless further it is proved that he did that after understanding the contents of the same. In other words the rule of law is that the pen must go with the mind and unless both the elements are present it cannot be said that the document is his." 9 In Kulla Ammal (died) vs. The Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (5) it was held — "Mere signature of an insured person who does not understand English, on these forms with this binding declaration in English, is not enough to prove his knowledge of what he was signing and to bind him literally and irrevocably to such a contract. It is elementary law and justice that a person cannot be bound in law by his signature to a document which he does not understand. It is elementary law and justice that a person cannot be bound in law by his signature to a document which he does not understand. In no case to which we have been referred has a person, who did not know English, been held irrevocably bound by an insurance contract without the examination as a witness of the person who interpreted the questions to him and recorded the answers." It was a case of Tamil knowing gentleman, who admittedly did not know English but could only sign his name in that language. Their Lordships in that case expressed their astonishment on the failure of the Insurance Company to examine any witness to show as to who interpreted the questions contained in the forms to the assured and no evidence whatsoever was led of any person as to whether the assured understood the questions and the answers were recorded in the forms after he had understood them. In these circumstances, their Lordships rightly held that in the case of illiterate person or non-English knowing persons literate in a regional language, the person who interprets the form to them and records their answers must be examined before the assured could be bound by the consequences of their signatures. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the decision in The Life Insurance Corporation of India, South Zone, Madras vs. Bhogadi Chandravathamma (6). In that case also the assured was admittedly a Telgu-speaking person and neither the Agent nor the Medical Officer, who recorded the answers in the proposal form, was examined on behalf of the Corporation. Their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the Corporation was unable to discharge the onus which rested upon it that the answers were faithfully recorded after interpreting in Telgu the question in the proposal form and that he assured fully understood the meaning of the questions as it failed to examine those persons who were responsible for recording the answers in the language not known to the assured and as such it could not be held that the assured made any fraudulent concealment of material facts, merely by relying upon the fact that the declarations were signed by the assured. It was further observed: — "What is lacking in this case is the absence of evidence that the questionnaire was fully explained to and was understood by the insured so as to establish fraudulent concealment or suppression of a material fact which was within his knowledge." 11. However, the aforesaid cases are clearly distinguishable from the present case, inasmuch as in all these cases it was admitted that the assured was not conversant with English language and did not understand the contents of the form which was in English and further there was total absence of evidence to show that the contents of the form were explained to the assured in the language which he understood and that he had signed them after having fully understanding the meaning and import thereof. In the present case the evidence of DW-3 Johrilal and DW-4 Pitti shows that the assured Jaisingh understood English language sufficiently well and further Johrilal DW 3 has definitely stated that the contents of the questions in the form Ex. A 7 were fully explained by him to Jaisingh in English as well as in Hindi and the replies given by him were recorded after he had fully understood the import of the contents thereof. Thus the person who explained the questions to the deceased Jai Singh and recorded his answers, has been examined and there is no reason to disbelieve his testimony. The learned trial Court, in these circumstances, rightly held that even if it be considered that Jaisingh was not an English knowing man, yet it was proved that the questions in the revival form Ex. A 7 were understood by him and were explained to him in Hindi and the assured was, therefore, responsible for the answers recorded in the aforesaid form Ex. A-7 In this connection the following observations of their Lordships of the Mysore High Court in V. K. Grinivasa Setty vs. Messrs Premier Life and General Insurance Co., Ltd., Madras-1(7) may be usefully quoted: — "Now it is clear that a person who affixes his signature to a proposal which contains a statement which is not true, cannot ordinarily escape from the consequence arising therefrom by pleading that he chose to sign the proposal containing such statement without either reading or understanding it. That is because, in filling up the proposal form, the agent normally, cases to act as agent of the insurer but becomes the agent of the insured and no agent can be assumed to have authority from the insurer to write the answers in the proposal form. If an agent nevertheless does that, he becomes merely the amanuensis of the insured, and his knowledge of the untruth or inaccuracy of any statement contained in the form of proposal does not become the knowledge of the insurer. Further, apart from any question of imputed knowledge, the insured by signing that proposal adopts those answers and makes them his own and that would clearly be so, whether the insured signed the proposal without reading or understanding it, it being irrelevant to consider how the inaccuracy arose if he has contraded, as the plaintiff has done in this case that his written answers shall be accurate." 12. This brings me to the most crucial question arising in this case namely, as to whether there was a material suppression by Jaisingh at the time of filing the form Ex. A 7, on account of his non-disclosure of his illness and hospitalisation in November, 1960 for treatment of diabetes melltus and coma and further as to whether the said suppression of material facts was fraudulent within the meaning of sec. 45 of the Act. Sec. 45 of the Act, so far as is relevant for the present case, is as under:— "45. 45 of the Act. Sec. 45 of the Act, so far as is relevant for the present case, is as under:— "45. Policy rot to be called in question on ground of mis-statement after two years:—No Policy of life insurance effected before the commencement of this Act shall after the expiry of two years from the date of commencement of this Act and no Policy of life insurance effected after the coming into force of this Act shall, after the expiry of two years from the date on which it was effected, be called in question by an insurer on the ground that a statement made in the proposal for insurances or in any report of a medical officer, or referee, or friend of the insured, or in any other document leading to the issue of the policy, was inaccurate or false, unless the insurer shows that such statement was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and that it was fraudulently made by the policy-holder and that the policy holder knew at the time of making it that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose..............." 13. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mithoolal Nayak vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India(8) that whether the revival of a lapsed policy constitutes a new contract or not for other purposes, it is clear from the operative part of sec. 45 that the period of two years for the purpose of the section has to be calculated from the date on which the policy was originally effected. 45 that the period of two years for the purpose of the section has to be calculated from the date on which the policy was originally effected. In the present case the policy of insurance on the life of Jaisingh originally commenced with effect from 24.12.58 and Jaisingh admittedly died on 20-1-1964, which was definitely after the expiry of more than two years from the date of the commencement of the policy and, therefore, the policy of insurance could not be questioned merely on the ground that the statement made by the assured in the revival form was inaccurate or false, unless the Corporation further proved that the personal statement made by the assured in respect of the revival of the said policy was false on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and such inaccurate statement or suppression was fraudulently made by the policy holder and that the policy holder knew at the time of making such statement that it was false or that it suppressed material facts. The present case is, therefore, governed by the second part of sec. 45. In Mithoolals case (8) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that three conditions were necessary for the application of the second part of sec. 45 of the Act:— "(a) the statement must be on a material matter or must suppress facts which it was material to disclose; (b) the suppression must be fraudulently made by the policy holder; and (c) the policy-holder must have known at the time of miking the statement that it was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose." 14. Now the question is as to whether the aforesaid three conditions were fulfilled in the present case. From the foregoing discussion there is no doubt that the replies recorded in the personal statement of the assured (Ex. A 7) at the time of revival of the lapsed policy in respect of questions 3 (a) and (b) were inaccurate or false inasmuch as the assured failed to disclose his illness on account of diabetes mellitus, which led to his hospitalisation in November, 1960 and also the treatment that he had taken in respect of the said illness. 15. A 7) at the time of revival of the lapsed policy in respect of questions 3 (a) and (b) were inaccurate or false inasmuch as the assured failed to disclose his illness on account of diabetes mellitus, which led to his hospitalisation in November, 1960 and also the treatment that he had taken in respect of the said illness. 15. There is no doubt that a contract of insurance is in law based on a complete and truthful disclosure of all the facts by an assured to the questions put to him and the doctrine of uberrima fides is applicable to such contracts. However, it has been held in the above mentioned three cases that the aforesaid doctrine is certainly not intended to be merely one way traffic, but it calls for a reciprocal obligation resting on the Insurance Company of placing before the Court all the evidence in its possession without reservation. 16. In the leading English case on the subject, Brownlie vs. Campbell (9) Lord Blackburn speaking in the House of Lords observed: — "In policies of insurance, whether marine in-insurance or life insurance, there is an understanding that the contract is uberrima fides that if you know any circumstance at all that may influence the underwriters opinion as to the risk he is incurring, and consequently as to whether he will take it, or what premium he will charge if he does take it, you will state what you know. There is an obligation there to disclose what you know; and the concealment of a material circums-tance known to you, whether you thought it material or not, avoids the policy." 17. There is an obligation there to disclose what you know; and the concealment of a material circums-tance known to you, whether you thought it material or not, avoids the policy." 17. In Joel vs. Law Union and Crown Insurance Company (10), which is the leading insurance case on the subject, Vaughan Williams L.J. observed:— "The ubrrima fides is to be observed with respect to life insurances as well as marine insurances, The assured is always bound, not only to make a true answer to she questions put to him, but spontaneously to disclose any fact exclusively within his knowledge which it is material for the assurer to know; and any fraud by an agent employed to effect the insurance is the fraud of the principal." Fletcher Moulton L. J. made the following observations in the aforesaid case: — "The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you do not know The obligation to disclose, therefore, necessarily depends on the knowledge you possess ........There is. therefore, something more than an obligation to treat the insurer honestly and frankly, and freely to tell him what the applicant thinks it is material he should know..........the disclosure must be of all you ought to have realised to be material, not of that only which you did in fact raise to be so." 18. In Condogians vs. Guardian Assurance Company Ltd.(11) Lord Shaw speaking for the Privy Council approved the doctrine laid down by Moulten L.J. in Joel vs. Law Union and Crown Insurance Company(lO). 19. In All India General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. S. P. Maheshwari(12) Rama-swami J. emphasised upon the fundamental principle upon which all contracts of insurance are based, namely, on utmost good faith uberrima fides. Mutual trust and confidence are the basis upon which the parties proceed. His Lordship observed: — "The doctrine of Uberrima fides is certainly not intended to be a one way traffic, but calls for reciprocal obligation resting on the insurance company viz , that the company through its agent and medical officers has also obligations to carefully explain and assist, in the case of the insurance agent, the proposer and the life (where the latter himself is not the proposer) in correctly answering the printed questions " 20. In Kulla Ammal vs. Oriental Govt. Security Life Assurance Co. In Kulla Ammal vs. Oriental Govt. Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd.(5) it was held that:— "When such obligations were discharged by the company it would be fair to insist that in answering the questions put by the agent and the medical examiner the assured is bound to observe good faith towards the insurer and he must make full, direct and honest answers to all, without evasion or fraud and without suppression, misrepresentation or suggestio falsi or suppression very, within the knowledge of the insured." 21. There was thus duty cast upon the assured to disclose material facts. However, the question is as to what is the test of materiality. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council addressed themselves to this question in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York vs. Ontario Metal Products Co. Ltd.(13). It was suggested before their Lordships of the Privy Council in that case that the test of materiality should be determined by reference to the questions that the Insurance Co. had put, as it was important for them to know the matters incorporated in the questions stated in the form. On the other hand it was argued that in reply to the question as the whether the proposer had been within the hands of a medical man within five years of his application, it could not be said that if the insured had consulted a doctor for a headache or cold on a single occasion and had concealed or forgotten the fact, the same would amount to concealed of a fact material to the contract. Their Lord-ships observed in this context: — "In their view, it is a question of fact in each case whether, if the matters concealed or misrepresented had been truly disclosed, they would, on a fair consideration of the evidence, have in fluenced a reasonable insurer to decline the risk or to have stipulated for a higher premium." In the light of the aforesaid principles, the question arises as to whether the inaccurate or false statement made by Jaisingh deceased was in respect of material matter or suppressed facts, which it was material for him to disclose. The questions regarding the physical and mental illness of the assured during the period prior to the application for revival of the lapsed policy, as also whether he had taken any medical treatment during that period, no doubt, appear to be material from the point of view of the insurer as it is on the basis of those facts that the insurer could possibly come to the conclusion as to whether the lapsed policy should be revived or not. The amount of risk involved in respect of the life of the assured can only be ascertained by the insurer from a fair statement on the part of the assured about the illness, injury or disability, suffered by him during the period since his last medical examination in connection with the policy in question It may, of course, be observed in this respect that a policy holder while applying for revival may not be able to state the particulars of minor illness suffered by him, such as headache, fever or cold and as a matter of fact the assured may not be in a position to give the details of medical treatment in respect of such minor ailments. However, as I have already held above that questions 3(a) (b) of the form Ex. A-7 required the assured to disclose his illness and the treatment undergone since the date of his last medical examination and not only since the policy had lapsed, it must be held that the information about the hospitalisation of the assured Jaisingh in the month of November, 1960 for treatment of diabetes mellitus and coma, was a material information, which should have been disclosed by him while filling the personal statement of health in respect of the revival of his policy. The facts that Jaisingh deceased suffered from diabetes mellitus and was admitted as an indoor patient at the M. G. hospital, Jodhpur for treatment in respect of the same in a state of coma and remained an indoor patient there for more than 10 days no doubt appear to be material facts and the denial on the part of the assured in answer to questions 3(a) and (b) therefore clearly amounted to suppression of facts which it was material for the assured to disclose. 22. 22. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the suppression of facts made by Jaisingh in not disclosing that he suffered from diabetes mellitus and remained as an indoor patient at the M. G. Hospital in November, 1960 was fraudulent non-disclosure of such facts on his part and as to whether he knew at the time of making such statement that it was material for him to disclose the aforesaid illness and hospitalisation. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted in this respect that the Corporation has not put out any bar on the insurance of persons suffering from diabetes and further that no extra premium was levied by the Corporation in respect of such persons suffering therefrom and relied upon the manual of the Corporation for Agents, wherein special instructions have been specified in respect of the insurance of diabetes in Appendix D and it has been provided therein that diabetes under regular medical supervision may be insured after a waiting period of two years. It has further been argued that the burden of proof of fraud lay upon the Corporation and the same has not been discharged in the present case. Learned counsel for the Corporation has not been able to show that the insurance of persons suffering from diabetes is prohibited by the Corporation or that any extra premium is charged by it from diabetes. Mr. O.P. Gupta, Senior Divisional Manager of the Corporation has admitted in his deposition that persons living in a big city where facility for medical supervision exists and having favourable occupation could be considered for insurance subject to the diabetic patient having completely adjusted to the diabetic regimen of insulin and/or diet. The short medical report Ex. A 8 which was made by Dr. S.C. Mathur, Medical Officer Incharge, Government Hospital, Bilara, who examined the deceased Jaisingh on January 20, 1963 at the time of making the application for revival of the lapsed policy, states on urine analysis of Jaisingh no sugar or albumen was discovered. Dr. Mathur, who was examined as PW-5, has proved the aforesaid short medical report and has stated that the entries in column No. 10 of the said report relating to the condition of the urine of the assured Jaisingh were made by him after examination and analysis thereof and that he did not find any sign of diabetes. The medical report Ex. The medical report Ex. A-8 and the statement of Dr. Mathur show that diabetes mellitus, from which Jai Singh suffered, was duly controlled and hat he had reached the stage of stabilisation. Thus after the stage of stabilisation was achieved the fact that Jaisingh suffered from diabetes did not appear to be of much importance. It should be noticed in this connection that the revival application was submitted more than two years after Jaisingh was treated in the hospital for diabetes in November, 1960 and even if this fact would have been disclosed in answers to questions 3(a) & (b) in Ex. A 7, it would have been hardly of any effect on the revival of the lapsed policy. As I have already mentioned above, after a waiting period of two years even a new insurance policy is permissible in case of diabetic patients and in these circumstances, Jaisingh might not have realised that it was incumbent upon him to disclose that he was suffering from diabetes mellitus particularly as it was in a stabilised condition. The assured was admitted not a person of considerable education and the form Ex. A-7 was also filled by Johrilal, who was the Development Officer of the Corporation, although at the behest of the assured. In view of the clear medical report contained in Ex. A-8 by a medical consultant recognised by the Corporation appearing at the back of the personal statement Ex. A-7, it appears probable that the importance of Jaisinghs suffering from diabetes was not realised at the time when the form Ex. A-7 was filled in. One more important fact requires to be considered namely, that the Corporation has absolutely failed to lead any evidence whatsoever to show that the death of Jaisingh was in any manner connected with his suffering from diabetes mellitus The plaintiff has led evidence to the effect that Jaisingh died on account of fever for two or three days. It cannot, therefore, be held that the death of Jaisingh occurred on account of his suffering from diabetes. It cannot, therefore, be held that the death of Jaisingh occurred on account of his suffering from diabetes. It is also equally important to notice that although Jaisingh was admitted as an indoor patient in the M G. Hospital on account of his suffering from diabetes in November, 1960, yet after his discharge from that hospital he remained alive for more than three years and nothing has been brought on record on behalf of the Corporation to prove that during this period of three years Jaisingh had any complaint on account of diabetes. There is also no evidence on the record to show as to whether Jaisingh used to purchase insulin during this period of three years after he was discharged from the hospital at Jodhpur. All these facts go to show that Jaisingh might have been able to control diabetes by observing diet restrictions and as his condition might have stabilised, he might have thought that he no longer suffered from that disease, so long as he took the necessary precautions and maintained the diet control. It is significant that even the urine analysis carried out by Dr. Mathur in January, 1963 showed a negative result so far as the presence of sugar therein was concerned and the said doctor was unable to detect the existence of the disease inspite of proper examination and analysis. It would not, therefore, be reasonable in these circumstances to expect the assured, who was an ignorant layman, to disclose the existence of the aforesaid disease in his personal statement Ex. A 7 as he might not have thought it of sufficient importance. From the evidence on record it is difficult to come to the conclusion that there was any intentional misrepresentation on the part of Jaisingh from which the existence of fraud could be definitely concluded. Although there is no doubt that he had a duty to make a full and frank disclosure of all material facts and he should have been accurate in the representations which he made as to the material facts on account of fraud. In my opinion, the Corporation has failed to do so. Although there is no doubt that he had a duty to make a full and frank disclosure of all material facts and he should have been accurate in the representations which he made as to the material facts on account of fraud. In my opinion, the Corporation has failed to do so. As a mere suppression of facts, even if material, could not lead to the conclusion that it was caused as a result of fraud, a high degree of probability is required to be proved to show that the suppression of certain material facts was made by Jaisingh as a result of wilful and deliberate fraud on the part of the assured. 23. In Lakshmi Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Bibi Padma Wati (14), Tek Chand, J. considered the question of onus of proof in such cases and held that although the plaintiff had to prove facts necessary for establishing his cause of action, yet the burden of proving affirmative defences was on the insurer. It was further observed:— "In cases, where the policy has lapsed, the plaintiff has to prove the truth of statements in declarations made by him when applying for revival or reinstatement of his policy, but the insurer who alleges fraud and misrepresentation in procuring revival or reinstatement has to establish his defences. In other words, it is for the insurer to show, that insured know or should have known of the falsity of statements made in the application for revival. The insurance company has also to discharge the onus, that the representations alleged to be fraudulent were material and made with the insureds knowledge and wrongful intent regarding the condition of his health, family history, age, habits, occupation etc. The insurer must show that the statements made by the insured were such which he know or should have known that they were untrue and were made wilfully in bad faith and with intent to conceal or receive " In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sulochana Chowdharani (15) the insured in his personal statement, in answer to the question as to in what quantity and in what form he used to take alcoholic drinks, had replied that he did not use them except a peg of whisky a day or so. The insurance company set up a case that the insured deliberately and fraudulently made a false statement as he was used to heavy drinking. The insurance company set up a case that the insured deliberately and fraudulently made a false statement as he was used to heavy drinking. It was held in that case that the medical evidence established that the cause of death of the insured was cerebral malaria, which could not have resulted from excessive drinking. 24. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Tambireddi Subha Raghavareddi(16) it was alleged by the insurer that the insured suffered from hepatitis and that he fraudulently failed to disclose the disease in answer to the questions in the proposal form. It was held that the medical consultants of the insurer found the condition of the liver of the insured as normal and it was quite possible that the insured himself had no knowledge that he suffered from hepatitis and, therefore, the insurer failed to establish that the statement made by the insured suffered from fraudulent misrepresentation. 25. Moreover in the present case there is nothing on the record to show that Jaisingh could have realised that the fact that he suffered from diabetes mellitus which was in a controlled condition at the time of making the personal statement was a material fact, which ought to have been disclosed by him I have already pointed out above that there is no evidence on record to show that during the three years after the discharge of Jaisingh from the hospital upto the time of his death, he suffered on account of the existence of the aforesaid disease and from the short medical report Ex. A-8, it appears that the same was fully controlled. It, therefore, appears reasonable that it might not have occurred to Jaisingh at the time when he made the personal statement Ex. A-7 that he should have disclosed the fact that he suffered from diabetes or that he forgot to mention in respect of his hospitalisation which occurred more than two years prior to the making of the aforesaid personal statement. In view of these facts, it no doubt appears that the personal statement made by Jaisingh suffered from non-disclosure of material facts, yet it has not been proved by the Corporation that the alleged suppression was wilfully or fraudulently made by the insured and that at the time of making the statement he was aware of the fact that it was material to disclose such facts. In these circumstances, I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned trial Court that the ingredient No. 2 and 3 as specified by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mithulals case (8) were satisfactories proved by the defendant-corporation. No material has been placed on record on behalf of the Corporation from which an irresistible inference of fraud could be drawn. Learned trial Court mainly relied upon the fact that Jaisingh must have been aware of the fact that he was passing sugar in his urine but this finding is based merely on conjuncture as there is nothing on record to show that after Jaisingh was discharged from the hospital in November, 1960, he passed sugar in his urine. This might have resulted either on account of medical treatment or on account of controlled diet and if Jaisingh somehow achieved the State of stabilisation it cannot be inferred from his conduct that there was a fraudulent concealment or suppression of material facts on his part. The revival of the policy cannot therefore be held to be void. 26. As regards the last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is no doubt that the Corporation itself in its letter dated February 26/28, 1966 offered the appellant to make payment of the paid up value of the policy Rs. 1200/- along with a vested bonus of Rs. 256/- in all Rs. 1456/- in respect of the policy of insurance on the life of Jaisingh deceased. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection is that besides the aforesaid amount of Rs. 1456/-, the appellant was also entitled to the sum of Rs. 810/- which was paid by Jaising in respect of two overdue premium at the time of the revival of the policy in question. Learned counsel for the Corporation stated at the Bar that there was no dispute as regards the payment of Rs. 1456/- but as regards the sum of Rs. 810/-, he submitted that the said amount was not payable in case it was held that the revival of the policy was vitiated on account of the suppression of material. 27. Learned counsel for the Corporation stated at the Bar that there was no dispute as regards the payment of Rs. 1456/- but as regards the sum of Rs. 810/-, he submitted that the said amount was not payable in case it was held that the revival of the policy was vitiated on account of the suppression of material. 27. In Mithoolals case (8) their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations in this connection:— "One of the terms of the policy was that all moneys that had been paid in consequence of the policy would belong to the company if the policy was vitiated by reason of a fraudulent suppression of material facts by the insured. We agree with the High Court that where the contract is bad on the ground of fraud, the party who has been guilty of fraud or a person who claims under him cannot ask for a refund of the money paid. It is a well established principle that courts will not entertain an action for money had and received where, in order to succeed the plaintiff has to prove his own fraud. We are further in agreement with the High Court that in cases in which there is a stipulation that by reason of of breach of warranty by one of the parties to the contract, the other party shall be discharged from the performance of his part of the contract, neither S. 65 nor S. 64 of the Indian Contract Act has any application." In view of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court the amount of Rs, 810/ , which was paid in connection with the revival of the policy, could not have been claimed in case the contract of insurance would have been held to be void on the ground of fraud committed by the assured. 28. As a result of the findings arrived at by me, it cannot be held that the contract of revival of the insurance policy of Jaisingh deceased was null and void as the existence of fraud has not been proved. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the plaintiff-appellants suit is decreed for a sum of Rs. 28. As a result of the findings arrived at by me, it cannot be held that the contract of revival of the insurance policy of Jaisingh deceased was null and void as the existence of fraud has not been proved. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the plaintiff-appellants suit is decreed for a sum of Rs. 10,256/- with interest thereon at 6% per annum pendente lite and till realisation, against the defendant respondent In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.