Order.-The revision-petitioner, who was the complainant before the trial Court, is canvassing the correctness of the action of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Salem Division, in releasing the respondents accused 1 to 3, 5 and 6, under section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, after confirming the conviction of the respondent No. 1 of an offence under section 494, Indian Penal Code read with section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act and respondents 2, 3, 5 and 6 under section 494, read with section 109. These five respondents, along with one Vellachi (accused No. 4 — since discharged by the trial Court) were tried before the learned Additional I Class Magistrate, No. II, Salem, in C.C.No. 120 of 1973,and convicted of the above offences on the allegation that on 23rd March, 1973 at 7 a.m. at Anaikoundanur, the first respondent, who is the husband of the petitioner herein, entered into a second marriage with accused 2 with the active assistance of the other respondents, whilst his first marriage with the petitioner was subsisting. The trial Court found all the respondents guilty of the offences with which they stood charged and convicted them thereunder and sentenced them each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the respondents preferred an appeal in C.A. No. 110 of 1973 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Salem, who, while confirming the convictions released al-he respondents "under section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on their each entering into a bond to appear and receive sentence when called upon during a period of one year and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour." 2. The petitioner in this revision petition contends that the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act is most inappropriate so far as the offence of this nature is concerned and therefore, that part of the order of the learned Sessions Judge should be set aside and instead they must be sentenced to imprisonment. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents does not seriously dispute the concurrent convictions made by the Courts below, though the respondents 2 to 5 have filed a revision petition an S.R. No. 68708 of 1974 against their convictions with a petition in Cr.M.P. No. 1857 of 1975 for excusing the delay of 257 days in filing the said revision petition. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents does not seriously dispute the concurrent convictions made by the Courts below, though the respondents 2 to 5 have filed a revision petition an S.R. No. 68708 of 1974 against their convictions with a petition in Cr.M.P. No. 1857 of 1975 for excusing the delay of 257 days in filing the said revision petition. The said petition to excuse the delay has been dismissed by me today. 3. The only question of law, therefore, for consideration is whether the learned Sessions Judge was right in applying the provisions of section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, to this case and in not sentencing the respondents to imprisonment. 4. The reasoning given by the learned Judge for invoking the provisions of the probation of Offenders Act is as follows: "I think, having regard to the fact that the appellants (respondents herein) are first offenders and are villagers, the ends of justice would be served by modifying the sentence as hereunder." Section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows: "When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. In the Objects and Reasons of the enactment of this Act, it was stated as follows: ".......in the meantime there has been an increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender as a useful and self-reliant member of society without subjecting him to the deleterious effects of a jail life........ During the period of probation, offenders will remain under the supervision of probation officers in order that they may be reformed and become useful members of the society. During the period of probation, offenders will remain under the supervision of probation officers in order that they may be reformed and become useful members of the society. The Act seeks to achieve these objects......" Thus, it is seen that the laudable objective of probation service is two-fold: (1) the rehabilitation of probationers, and (2) the prevention of recurrence of crimes. The basic idea is that the offender redeems himself and is purged of the offence and the law helps him to help himself to erase the stigma of conviction by keeping the peace and being of good behaviour for the stipulated period. In criminal law, the word "probation" mean; the conditional suspension of imposition or execution of sentences by the Court in selected cases, especially of young offenders who are not sent to prison, but are released on probation either after simple admonition as contemplated under section 3 of the Act or on a bond, with or without sureties, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, has contemplated under section 4. On the other hand, it is a method of non-institutional treatment of offenders. In both these types of treatment (under sections 3 and 4 of the Act), it must appear to the Court that, having regard to the age, character, antecedents and physical or mental condition of the offender and to the nature of the offence, or any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, it is expedient to release him on probation, because in both the sections the words used are, “having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender....” In other words, the Court must apply its mind to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, before invoking the said provisions. The offender who is released on probation under section 4 of the Act, must agree to abide by certain conditions and in some cases be placed under supervision as provided for in that section and he must submit himself to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during the probationary period, and the said period under any circumstances cannot exceed three years. Section 4 applies to more serious offences also and enables the Court to release an offender on probation of good conduct having regard to the conditions enumerated under that section. Of course, the Court has very wide discretion; but, in my view, such discretion should be exercised wisely with a view to advance the objects of the Act. It is true, no opportunity to make an order under section 4 should be lost if there is any likelihood of reforming and benefiting the offender. At the same time, there should be no indiscriminate use of the method of probation, regardless of the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. The Supreme Court in Arvind Mohan. Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas and others1, has elaborately discussed the object, purpose and the social philosophy underlying the provisions of the Act and its applicability to offences. Their Lordships have observed that the object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to nip the attitude of social defiance and recklessness on the part of the offender, in the bud; and that the probation is a system which provides a means of re-education without the necessity of breaking up the offender’s normal life and removing him from the natural surroundings of his home. Their lordships have further observed that while exercising the discretion, the rules of reasons and justice should be followed. 5. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which is the personal law of Hindus says that any marriage between two Hindus, solemnized after the commencement of this Act, is void if on the date of such marriage, either party had a husband or wife living and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Panal Code, shall apply accordingly. Thus, the personal law not only makes the second marriage void, but also makes the parties to the void marriage liable to be punished under the said provisions of the Indian Penal Code. When such, an enactment has come into force, the respondents who are Hindus must be deemed to have been aware of the said provisions. Therefore, violation of the said provision of their personal law committed by them is clearly a deliberate disobedience of the law, and since they deliberately disobeyed the law, they have to be severely punished. When such, an enactment has come into force, the respondents who are Hindus must be deemed to have been aware of the said provisions. Therefore, violation of the said provision of their personal law committed by them is clearly a deliberate disobedience of the law, and since they deliberately disobeyed the law, they have to be severely punished. In the instant case, respondents 1 and 2 have not only committed the offence in violation of the code of conduct prescribed’ by their personal law, but have also stuck to such conduct by continuing their relationship. Therefore, the offenders viz., the respondents cannot be said to be persons of high principles and moral probity. 6. The offence is certainly a very serious offence, for which the punishment provided under section 494, Indian Penal Code, is seven years’ imprisonment and also fine. In my view, the nature of the offence is such that the invocation of the Probation of Offenders Act would be quite inappropriate, and the release of such an offender on the ground that he is a first offender and on the condition of his executing a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace and being of good behaviour etc., is meaningless. In cases of this nature, there cannot be any consideration whether he is a first offender or not, and the question whether he will reform or redeem himself of the offence during the probationary period does not arise. Similarly, it is inconceivable as to what is the supervision that the offender submits him. self to in cases of this nature, if the Court passes such a supervision order. Further I am unable to understand what the pro bation officer is expected to supervise regarding the conduct or behaviour of the offender in these cases. The main object of the suspension of sentence for a specified period is to give an opportunity to the probationer to rehabilitate himself and to prevent the recurrence of the crime. But, it is defeated in these cases since, as I have discussed above, when once the offender enters into such second marriage, it should be held that the offence is continuing. In that case, the execution of the bond by the offender that he will appear before the Court and receive sentence when called upon by the Court within the probationary period, serves no purpose. In that case, the execution of the bond by the offender that he will appear before the Court and receive sentence when called upon by the Court within the probationary period, serves no purpose. Above all, what is the peace and good behaviour that is expected from such offenders as per the bonds executed by such people? In my opinion, no value can be attached to such bonds executed by such offenders, undertaking to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. On the other hand, the good behaviour expected from a person, whose personal law prohibits bigamous marriages, is desisting from entering into a second marriage with another spouse while the first legal marriage is subsisting. Moreover, by section 494, Indian Penal Code, the Legislature has provided for a deterrent sentence, having regard to the fact that bigamy is considered to be a social evil and the defiance of such an enactment has to be viewed very seriously. For the above discussion, therefore, I am of the view that the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act is quite inappropriate and highly undersirable for offences of bigamy. In the result, the order of the learned Sessions Judge, releasing the respondents under section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, is set aside. 7. Respondents 2 to 5 (accused 2, 3, 5 and 6) are now present in Court, as already directed by this Court. The first respondent (accused), who is the main offender in this case, is reported to have died on 6th April, 1974, which fact has not teen denied by the petitioner herein. It is submitted by the counsel that these respondents are all poor agriculturists. Having regard to the fact that the first respondent (first accused) is now dead and the fact that these respondents are poor agriculturists, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met by imposing a lenient sentence. Accordingly, I sentence respondents 2 to 5 to suffer imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 10 each. (The fine amounts have been paid today.). 8. The petition againt the first respondent has abated. 9. With the above modification with regard to sentence, the revision petition is allowed.