Nesargi, J: In this appeal, by the State the Judgment of acquittal passed by the Judical Magistrate, First Class (Fourth Court), Bangalore, acquitting the three respondents, who were accused 1, 3 and 4 in C.C. No. 2287 of 1971 before the Magistrate of the offences under section 18 (c) punishable under section 27 (a) (ii), under section 18 (a) (i) punishable under section 27 (b) and under section 18-A punishable under section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) has been challenged. 2. Respondent No. 1 is a firm of which respondent No. 2 is a partner and respondent No. 3 is the manager. One more partner of the firm had also been arrayed as accused No. 2, but the trial did not proceed against him as he was absconding. 3. Respondent 1 admittedly holds a licence in the requisite form for re-packing of drugs. It has its premises as described in the cause-title. P.W. 1, H. Jayaram, Drugs Inspector, visited the premises of respondent 1 with panchas including P.W.3 Srinivas and P.W.4, K.S. Anantha Rao on 27th February, 1970 and inspected the premises. Respondent 3 was present in the premises. The premises were searched by P.W. 1 in the presence of the panchas. They found, in an upstairs room, various packets of drugs manufactured by different manufacturers. P.W.1 asked respondent 3 to disclose the source of acquisition of these drugs. Respondent 3 could not produce any material disclosing the source of acquisition of these drugs. Those drugs were sorted out and a list was prepared. It was found that the drugs consisted of 42 items and many of those items were not in the approved list appended to the licence issued to respondent 1. That disclosed to P.W. 1 that respondent 1 had in his possession in his premises drugs in regard to which he had no licence to deal with. All these drugs had been kept by him for distribution for purpose of sale. The panchanama Ex.P-3 with the list of the drugs was prepared and a receipt Ex.P-4 was issued. That disclosed to P.W. 1 that respondent 1 had in his possession in his premises drugs in regard to which he had no licence to deal with. All these drugs had been kept by him for distribution for purpose of sale. The panchanama Ex.P-3 with the list of the drugs was prepared and a receipt Ex.P-4 was issued. Respondent 3 signed on the panchanama and the list of the drugs and a copy of the list was furnished to respondent 3 it is the prosecution case that out of these 42 items listed and seized, 33 items are not in the approved list.........appended to the licence issued to respondent 1. Respondent 3 could not disclose the source of acquisition in regard to any of the items of the drugs seized. P.W.1 reported the seizure and obtained permission from the Magistrate to retain these seized 42 items of drugs with himself. Later, P.W.1 issued a notice under section 18-A of the Act to respondent 1. as per the original of Ex.P-5, calling upon it to disclose the source of acquisition of all the 42 items of drugs. No reply was received by P.W.1. Again on 23rd March, 1970 P.W.1 sent a reminder as per the original of Ex.P-6 calling upon respondent 1 to disclose the source of acquisition of the drugs seized. On 16th April, 1970, a reply, as per Ex.P-7 sent by respondent No.3 was received by P.W.1. By Ex.P 7, signed by respondent 3, respondent No. 1 denied the seizure and alleged that the drugs referred to in Ex.P-5 were not at all in his possession and hence the question of disclosing the source of acquisition of those items did not arise. Then on 25th September, 1970 as per Ex.P 8 P.W.1 made an application to the Court for permission to take sample from the seized drugs in order to get the samples analysed by the Government Analyst to find out whether they were of the standard prescribed by the Pharmacopeia of India. Permission was granted by the Court. On 8th October, 1970, he secured the very same panchas and in their presence and in the presence of respondent 3, opened the seals on the boxes of drugs and took samples in 4 items of the seized drugs. A mahazar Ex.P-9 was prepared and it was signed by respondent 3 as per Ex.P-9 (a). On 8th October, 1970, he secured the very same panchas and in their presence and in the presence of respondent 3, opened the seals on the boxes of drugs and took samples in 4 items of the seized drugs. A mahazar Ex.P-9 was prepared and it was signed by respondent 3 as per Ex.P-9 (a). Form No. 17 was issued to respondent 3 as per copies Exs.P-10 and P-l1. Respondent 3 endorsed on Exs.P-10 and P-l1 for having received copies. Samples taken were also given to respondent 3 at that time. The samples were sent to Government Analyst for analysis and report. The Government Analyst sent his reports which reached the office of P.W. 1 on 31st October, 1970. As per these reports it was found that sodium bromide LP. Batch No. 1 was of sub-standard. That disclosed that an offence under section 18 (a) (i) punishable under section 27 (6) of the Act had been committed by the respondents. P.W.1 was transferred from Bangalore and D. Hanumantha Rao, P.W.2 was transferred to Bangalore and posted as Drugs Inspector. He ultimately filed a complaint before the Court alleging that the respondents had committed the above narrated offences. 4. Respondents 1 and 2 have simply denied the prosecution case. Respondent 3 has in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr. P. Code (old) has contended that P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 had visited the premises as narrated by them on 27th February, 1970 and went to the upstairs room. He was sent for and he also went there. Some deal wood boxes had appeared there and they were taken away. Later on he was asked to affix his signatures on some prepared documents and he affixed his signatures. Further on he has contended that after some days, he was again sent for and asked to furnish his signatures on prepared documents and he obliged P. W.1 by affixing his signatures. In short, his defence is that the 42 items of drugs seized from the premises were not at all in the premises but had been somehow planted without his knowledge and that the seizure was not effected in his presence but he was simply made to affix his signatures on certain documents which had been kept prepared and this process adopted by P.W.1 on two occasions. In regard to the rest of the allegations made about the licence having been issued to respondent 1 and the approved list appended thereto and respondent 2 being a partner of respondent 1 and the other absconding accused also being a partner and respondent 3 being the Manager of respondent 1, there is no dispute. 5. The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents on considering the legal aspects as well as the aspect in regard to the seizure of the drugs. He has held that the prosecution had failed to establish that P.W.1 and P.W.2 were appointed as Drugs Inspectors in Bangalore and that P.W.1 had the necessary power to effect seizure of the drugs from the premises of respondent 1. He has also held that the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4, the two panchas, varied in material particulars in regard to their presence at one and the same time in the premises and the drugs having been seized in their presence and therefore the prosecution had failed to establish satisfactorily that the said drugs had been seized from the premises of respondent 1. It is on the basis of these conclusions that he was acquitted the respondents. 6. P.W.1, H. Jayaram has sworn that he was appointed as Drugs Inspector and his area of operation was Bangalore division. He was later transferred to Gulbarga, whereupon P.W.2, D. Hanumantha Rao, was posted as Drugs Inspector in his place. P.W.2 has sworn that he was working as Drugs Inspector in Bangalore Division from 2nd November, 1970 and he, in that capacity, filed the complaint before the Court. The learned Magistrate has, in this behalf, concluded that the prosecution has nit produced the orders of appointment and the necessary notification issued by the Government in regard to the empowerment of these two officers with powers of Drugs Inspectors, therefore the prosecution has not proved that P.W.1 was the Drugs Inspector and he had the necessary powers to seize the drugs from premises and P.W.2 had the necessary power to file the complaint. He has also observed in this connection that when P.W.1 had seized the drugs it was P.W.1 alone who ought to have filed the complaint and not P.W.2, therefore the complaint itself is incompetent. These aspects have been already considered by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1974, disposed of on 13th September, 1974. He has also observed in this connection that when P.W.1 had seized the drugs it was P.W.1 alone who ought to have filed the complaint and not P.W.2, therefore the complaint itself is incompetent. These aspects have been already considered by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1974, disposed of on 13th September, 1974. That case arose out of a Judgment passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class (First Court), Bangalore, City acquitting the accused therein of the offences under sections 18 (a) (i) and 18 (a) (vi) read with section 27 (b) of the Act. It is hence clear that the legal aspects involved in the case on hand have been dealt with and the said decision rendered by this very Bench covers these aspects. It has been held that in view of the notification being available in the Government Gazette, the very same Drugs Inspectors have been appointed as Drugs Inspectors and they had the necessary powers. The question whether P.W.2 who had succeeded P.W.1 was competent or not to file the complaint in regard to the offences unearthed by P.W.1, was also considered and it has been held that he had such a power and the complaint filed by him is competent in law. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary once again to go into those legal aspects in detail. The decision in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1974 acts as a precedent. 7. The main question that remains for consideration is whether the prosecution has satisfactorily proved that P.W.1 had in fact seized these 42 items of drugs from the premises of respondents No.1 on 27th February, 1970. The discrepancies found by the Magistrate, in the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4, are very minor in nature. The learned Magistrate has ignored the facts admitted by respondent 3, who was the only person present at that time in regard to the presence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 with P.W.1 at that time. He has specifically stated in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr. P. Code (old) that P.W.1 accompanied by P.Ws. The learned Magistrate has ignored the facts admitted by respondent 3, who was the only person present at that time in regard to the presence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 with P.W.1 at that time. He has specifically stated in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr. P. Code (old) that P.W.1 accompanied by P.Ws. 3 and 4 went to the premises of respondent No. 1 on 27th February, 1970 and directly went to the upstairs room and he was sent for, and then some deal wood boxes containing certain drugs somehow had appeared there and those drugs were seized by P.W.1 It is the prosecution case that they were already there and were seized by them under a panchanama Ex. P-3 and a list of drugs seized was prepared and a copy of the same was handed over to respondent 3. The receipt of the copy of the panchanama and the list is also admitted by respondent 3. But according to him he was simply asked to take them and to sign the prepared document. He has not denied his signatures on Ex. P-3 and the list now produced in Court. He has also not denied his signatures on Form No. 16 and the endorsement made on the obverse of it. He has also not denied his signature on Form No. 17 prepared and given to him on 8th October, 1970. Similarly, he has admitted his signature below the endorsement on the obverse of Form No. 17, reading to show that he has received the copy of the same and the samples mentioned therein from P.W.1. Therefore, the minor discrepancies found in the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4:‘n regard to the stages and times at which one or the other happened to reach the premises of respondent 1 are rendered insignificant. It is to be seen whether respondent 3 has probabilised his contention that the deal wood boxes containing the said drugs had been somehow made to appear in the upstairs room of his premises and in fact they were not there earlier to the visit of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4. No material is elicited in the cross-examination of either P.W.1, or P.W.2, or P.W.3 or P.W.4 to probabilise this contention. No evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defence to probabilise this contention. 1, 3 and 4. No material is elicited in the cross-examination of either P.W.1, or P.W.2, or P.W.3 or P.W.4 to probabilise this contention. No evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defence to probabilise this contention. As against this contention, there is the admitted material in the shape of documentary evidence showing the admitted signatures of respondent 3 in regard to the receipt of the panchanama and the copy of the list prepared and in regard to the receipt of Form No. 17. and the sample bottles from P.W.1. The earned Magistrate has made much of the fact the list attached to the panchanama Ex. P-3 does not bear the initials of the Magistrate. He has on this basis reasoned that that might not be the list that had been prepared on 27th February 1970 as alleged by the prosecution as there is a possibility of some other list having been made to replace the original list. The same is the contention argued vehemently by Sri A. K. Lakshmeshwar, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents. It cannot be ignored that the list found attached to Ex. P-3 is also signed by respondent 3. In that view of the matter, this could not be a spurious list introduced much later on 27th February, 1970. If in fact P.W.I had managed to do so, respondent 3 could easily have produced the copy of the list that was handed over to him as per the endorsement made by him on this very list itself and demonstrated to the Court the fraud committed by P.W.1. in replacing the list. Such an attempt has not been made by respondent 3 and for obvious reasons. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained on the facts and circumstances obtaining. 8. It is hence clear that the prosecution has satisfactorily established that P.W.1 seized these 42 items of drugs from the upstairs room of the premises of respondent 1 in the presence of respondent 3 on 27th February, 1979, after observing the procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Act. 9. Sri A.K. Lakshmeshwar argued that the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 discloses that the boxes containing the seized drugs, which had been allegedly sealed and over which labels bearing the signatures of the panchas had been pasted, could be opened without disturbing the labels and tampered with. 9. Sri A.K. Lakshmeshwar argued that the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 discloses that the boxes containing the seized drugs, which had been allegedly sealed and over which labels bearing the signatures of the panchas had been pasted, could be opened without disturbing the labels and tampered with. A reading of the evidence of three witnesses shows that a suggestion has been made to this effect and P.W.1 has answered that suggestion by saying that the boxes could have been opened only at the cost of the seals. Sri Lakshmeswar replied that P.W.1 had admitted that he had retained the seal with himself and that showed that even if the seals had been disturbed, he could have re-sealed the boxes without disturbing the labels and moreover P.Ws. 3 and 4 were always amenable to him. We are not impressed by this reasoning advanced by Sri Lakshmeswar. We find from Form. No. 17, which bears the signature of respondent 3 that the boxes were opened in the presence of respondent 3 and samples were taken in his presence and a set of samples were also furnished along with Form No. 17 to respondent 3 on 8th October, 1970. When that is so, it is difficult to accept this contention because if the labels had been disturbed, respondent 3 would have immediately protested and filed necessary application before the concerned Magistrate. He would have also as a fact included such an averment in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr. P.Code (old). It is, therefore, clear that it is only an after-thought on the part of the defence. 10. Sri A.K. Lakshmeswar argued that according to section 23 (1) of the Act, the price of the drugs had to be paid whenever samples were taken for analysis and it is not the case of the prosecution that P.W.1. at any time paid the price either on 27th February, 1970 or on 8th October, 1970, and hence the report of the Government Analyst is inadmissible in evidence. The object underlying section 23 (1) of the Act has been gone into in detail by this Court in the above cited decision in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1974. It has been held therein that non-payment of price by itself does not make the report of the Government Analyst inadmissible in evidence. Hence this contention has to fail. 11. The object underlying section 23 (1) of the Act has been gone into in detail by this Court in the above cited decision in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1974. It has been held therein that non-payment of price by itself does not make the report of the Government Analyst inadmissible in evidence. Hence this contention has to fail. 11. The list attached to Ex. P-3 in regard to the 42 items of drugs seized on 27th February, 1970 from the premises of respondent 1 in the presence of respondent 3 when compared with the approved list which forms part of the licence issued to respondent 1 shows that 33 items out of the 42 items seized do not find a place in he approved list. Therefore, it will have to be held in regard to these 33 items that respondent I had kept these 33 items of drugs in his premises for distribution or sale without having a valid licence. It is no doubt, respondent 1 only a re-packer and holds a licence for that purpose. Section 3 (f) of the Act lays down that: “(f) manufacture in relation to any drug or cosmetic includes any process or part of a process for making, altering, ornamenting, finishing, packing, labelling,.............” A plain reading of this section makes it crystal clear that a re-packer is also a manufacturer. Re-packing is also manufacturing for the purpose of the Act. Hence the offence under section 18 (c) punishable under section 27 (a) (ii) of the Act is complete. The respondents are therefore liable to be punished for the same. 12. Out of the samples sent to the Government Analyst for analysis and report, one sample pertaining to Sodium Bromide I.P. Batch No. 1 appears at item No. 13 in the list found attached to Ex. P-3, the panchanama for the seizure of the 42 items of drugs seized on 27th February, 1970. The charge against the respondents in regard to one of the drugs being of sub-standard, pertains only to this item No. 13 namely Sodium Bromide I.P. Batch No.1. The relevant report of the Government Analyst is at Ex.P-16. It discloses that the protocols of the test was as prescribed by Pharmacopeia of India, page 669, 1966 Edition. The charge against the respondents in regard to one of the drugs being of sub-standard, pertains only to this item No. 13 namely Sodium Bromide I.P. Batch No.1. The relevant report of the Government Analyst is at Ex.P-16. It discloses that the protocols of the test was as prescribed by Pharmacopeia of India, page 669, 1966 Edition. He has opined that the loss of drying found was at 11.63% w/w, while the Pharmacopeia of India prescribed that it should not be more than 5% w/w. In view of this finding he concluded that the said sample did not conform to I.P. standard with respect to loss in drying. This report conclusively establishes that this item was of sub-standard. Hence it will have to be held that the prosecution has satisfactorily established an offence under section 13 (a) (i) punishable under section 27 (b) of the Act against the respondents and the respondents are liable to be punished for the same. 13. P.W.1. has sworn that on 27th February. 1970, itself he called upon respondent 3 to disclose the source of acquisition of the seized items of drugs and respondent 3 failed to disclose the source of acquisition and further he was unable to produce any invoices or bills to show that he had acquired the said items from such and such manufacturers of drugs. Ex. P.W.7. which is admittedly the reply sent by respondent 1 and signed by respondent 3 to the reminder issued by P.W.7, shows that the contention of the respondents was that they were not liable to disclose the source of acquisition of those items on the ground that they were not at all seized from their possession. It is absolutely clear that the respondents have failed to disclose the source of acquisition of these drugs, namely the 42 items seized. It is absolutely clear that the respondents have failed to disclose the source of acquisition of these drugs, namely the 42 items seized. Section 18-A and section 24 of the Act read as follows: “18-A-: ”Disclosure of the name of the manufacturer: Every person, not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall, if so required, disclose to the Inspector the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom he acquired the drug or cosmetic.“ ”Section 24 -Persons bound to disclose place where drugs or cosmetics are manufactured or kept.-Every person for the time being in charge of any premises whereon any drug or cosmetic is being manufactured or is kept for sale or distribution shall, on being required by an Inspector so to do, be legally bound to disclose to the Inspector the place where the drug or cosmetic is being manufactured or is kept, as the case may be“. Section 18-A deals with disclosing of source of acquisition of drugs by a person not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic, if required by the Inspector of Drugs. In regard to the 33 items which are proved to be not in the approved list, respondent 1 cannot be the manufacturer within the definition of the term as found in the Act because he had no licence to re-pack these items of drugs. That means that the offence contemplated by section 18 A punishable under section 28 of the Act has been satisfactorily established against the respondents. In regard to the remaining items, namely 9 in number, respondent 1 is a manufacturer because the said items are found in the approved list, which is a part of the licence issued to respondent 1, for re-packing and hence section 24 of the Act applies and therefore it will have to be held that he has committed the very same offence under the Act. Both these counts of offences are punishable under section 28 of the Act. The respondents are liable to be convicted and punished for the same. 14. The offence contemplated in section 18 (c) of the Act is punishable under section 27 (a) (ii) of the Act which reads as follows: "Section 27.-Penalty for manufacture, sale etc. Both these counts of offences are punishable under section 28 of the Act. The respondents are liable to be convicted and punished for the same. 14. The offence contemplated in section 18 (c) of the Act is punishable under section 27 (a) (ii) of the Act which reads as follows: "Section 27.-Penalty for manufacture, sale etc. of drugs in contravention of this Chapter.-Whoever himself or by any other person on his behalf manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes- (a) any drug---------- (i) * * * * (ii) without a valid licence as required under clause (c) of section 18. shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may, for any special reasons to be recorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonmnent of less than one year.” A reading of this provision makes it manifest that a sentence of imprisonment as well as fine is mandatory. If the Court feels that there are any special reasons to impose a lesser sentence, it must record such special reasons in writing. Sri A.K. Lakshmeswar argued that the sentence of imprisonment, though made mandatory by a Statute, cannot be imposed on a company or a partnership firm and therefore by virtue of section 34 (1) of the Act no sentence of imprisonment can be imposed on any of the respondents for having committed those offences. He relied on the decision in The State of Maharashtra v. Joseph Anthony Pereira.1Clauses (1) and (2) of section 34 of the Act have been considered in the said decision. It is held therein that a sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on a company or a firm and therefore inspite of the provisions of section 27 of the Act, it would not be legal to impose a sentence of imprisonment on a company. It is also held therein that whenever any person is convicted by virtue of section 34 (1) of the Act for such an offence committed by the company, only a sentence of fine can be imposed on him as section 34 (1) contemplates and lays down that such a person can be convicted accordingly., meaning thereby, according to the punishment imposed on the company itself. In Ananth Bandhu Samanta v. Corporation of Calcutta2it is laid down that where the only punishment is imprisonment the limited company cannot be proceeded against, though under the Indian Penal Code, definition of the word ‘person’ includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. In this view of the position in law, it is to be held that sentence of imprisonment, though made mandatory under section 27 (a) of the Act, cannot be imposed on respondent 1. Section 34 (1) of the Act reads as follows: Section 34 (1).-Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence". It is undisputed that respondent 3 is the Manager of respondent 1 and respondent 2 is the partner of respondent 1. It is proved that respondent 3 was actively managing the affairs of respondent 1 and was found in the premises of respondent 1 when P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 visited the premises and seized the drugs in question on 27th February, 1970, and he received the copies of all documents, namely, panchanama, list of drugs seized, Form No. 16. Form No. 17 and also the samples, as required by the Rules. In view of the fact that respondent 3 is admittedly the manager of the company it follows that respondent 2 is responsible for the conduct of the company and respondent 3 was in charge of the business of the company. Neither respondent 2 nor respondent 3 has taken up the plea available to them as laid down in the proviso to section 34 (1) of the Act. Neither respondent 2 nor respondent 3 has taken up the plea available to them as laid down in the proviso to section 34 (1) of the Act. Therefore, by virtue of section 34(1) of the Act, it will have to be held that both respondents 2 and 3 are deemed to be guilty of these offences committed by respondent 1 and are liable to be punished accordingly. 15. Section 34 (2) of the Act reads as follows: ‘34 (2).-Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company ami it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any nr:glect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly”. A plain reading of this section which commences with non-obstante clause makes it abundantly clear that is the prosecution establishes satisfactorily that the offences committed by the company had been committed with the consent or connivance of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against punished accordingly. The words ‘shall also be deemed to be guilty’ provide a particular stress. These words, when read with the non-obstante clause at the commencement of the provision, leave no doubt in our mind that irrespective of such director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company being found guilty of the offence committed by the company by virtue of section 24 (1) of the Act, they shall also be deemed to be guilty by virtue of section 34 (2) of the Act. The only interpretation possible is that if it so happens that if the very person who is to be deemed to be guilty of the offence committed by the company by virtue of section 34 (1) of the Act, is also found to have consented or connived in the commission of the offence, he becomes guilty of the offences as if he also had himself committed the offence independently of the company. It, therefore, follows that he will have to be punished for the offence so deemed to have been committed by him, because of the fiction in law introduced by this provision. 16. It has been satisfactorily established by the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 and the stand taken by respondent 3 that respondent 3 was the manager of respondent 1, he was conducting the business of respondent 1 and he was present when 42 items of drugs were seized, he received copies of the panchanama and the list, he endorsed on the relevant documents and he received Form No. 17 and the samples from P.W.1. He is the sole manager, managing the affairs of respondent 1. He has replied to the notice issued by P.W.1 calling upon respondent 1 to disclose the source of acquisition of the item of drugs seized. All this material proves that respondent 3 has either consented or connived in the commission of these offences by the company. Hence section 34 (2) of the Act applies to respondent 3. In this view of the matter, respondent 3 has to be convicted and punished for having committed the offences himself by virtue of section 34 (2) of the Act. 17. For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the conclusions of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Glass, Fourth Court in C.C. No. 2287 of 1971. We convict the respondents for having committed offences under sections 18 (c), 18 (a) (2) and 18-A, punishable under sections 27 (a) (ii), 27 (b) and 23 of the Act. We sentence them to pay a fine of Rs. 2.000 each, on each one of the counts. In default of payment of fine, respondents 2 and 3 will undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months for each non-payment of fine. We further convict respondent 3 by virtue of section 34 (2) of the Act for having committed the above narrated three counts of offences. We sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months on each count and to pay a fine of Rs.500 on each count and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for eaeh non-payment of fine. We direct that the substantive sentences passed on respondent 3 are to run concurrently