Ramaprasada Rao, J.-Plaintiffs 1 to 5 are the sons of the first defendant and plaintiffs 6 to 8 are the sons of the second defendant. The first and the second defendants are the sons of one Vadamalai Pillai who, in this case has to be considered as the common ancestor. He died in 1926 leaving behind him his widow, Palani Ammal and his two sons, defendants 1 and 2 who were then minors. It is common ground that until the first and the second defendants became majors in course of time, Palani Ammal was managing the family properties. On the evidence on record, it is seen that Palani Ammal herself had to borrow, either by mortgaging properties or otherwise, for the maintenance and preservation of the family properties. After the first and the second defendants became majors and took over the family properties and administered them, they had to, in turn, incur expenses not only in connection with the family but also for purposes connected thereto. In the course of such administration, both defendants 1 and 2 had to borrow on mortgages, promissory notes, usufructuary mortgages, etc. Every precaution, however, was taken in the course of such borrowings by each of the first and the second defendants to take in their respective minor children who are plaintiffs in the action as parties to such borrowings. Necessarily either the first defendant or the second defendant represented such minors and were acting for them as well. Until 1953, the first and the second defendants were joint in possession, food, etc. In a partition action O.S. No. 188 of 1953, thebrothers partitioned the family properties and after effecting such a partition, on 16th April, 1956 each of the branches, represented by the first and the second defendants, was administering and in charge of the properties so taken over by them in such a partition as above. After such a partition, the first defendant represented for himself and his minor sons and the second defendant for himself and his branch of minor sons, did create further encumbrances or sales of the properties taken over by them in the partition. After such a partition, the first defendant represented for himself and his minor sons and the second defendant for himself and his branch of minor sons, did create further encumbrances or sales of the properties taken over by them in the partition. After such alienations were made by the first and the second defendants, either at the time when they were joint or after they disrupted themselves (during the period commencing from January, 1947 to February, 1958) the plaintiffs have come to Court in 1964 seeking for a partition of the joint family properties and challenging the various alienations made by defendants 1 and 2 at the time when they were joint or after they severed their joint status. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were majors on the date of suit. Plaintiffs 3 to 8 were minors on the date of action. Later, plaintiffs 3, 4 and 6 were declared as majors in toe course of the trial. The main challenge against the manner and mode of administration of the family properties by defendants 1 and 2 as made by the plaintiffs as a whole, appears to be that defendants 1 and 2 were abdicted to evil habits such as drinking and gambling and womanising and that the alienations including the borrowals which they made from time to time and which resulted in a large slice of the joint family properties being alienated for the purpose of discharging such debts, are not binding upon the share of the minor coparceners in the family. According to them, the income from the joint family properties was sufficient not only for the general maintenance of the members of the family but also would yield a surplus therein which surplus by itself is sufficient indicia which would prevent the manager of the joint family from either borrowing or alienating any of the family properties. They would attack the various alienations made between 1947 and 1958 as sales or mortgages or borrowings made by them without legal necessity and certainly, not for the benefit of the minor members of the family. In particular, the plaintiffs would attack the alienations of A to G Schedule properties as not for consideration, not for family benefit and not even for legal necessity. In particular, the plaintiffs would attack the alienations of A to G Schedule properties as not for consideration, not for family benefit and not even for legal necessity. The plaintiffs, no doubt, set out in the plaint, the various details regarding the alienations challenged or complained of and would, therefore, seek for a partition of the family properties ignoring such alienations and for a division of the available properties amongst them as coparceners of the family as a whole. They have impleaded the alienees as defendants 3 to 13. After the death of the 7th defendant, defendants 14 to 18 have been added as his legal representatives. The plaintiffs, therefore, pray for a decree to set aside all the alienations in relation to the properties comprised in Schedules A to G and for a division of such properties in accordance with law and for an allotment of their legitimate share therein. Defendants 1 and 2 remained ex parte. Most of the alienees have filed independent written statements and their main contention is that the sale deeds in their favour are for discharge of antecedent debts and that the properties have been sold for adequate consideration and there was at all times, a necessity for such alienations. They have referred to the fact that even during the lifetime of Vadamalai Pillai, the inadequacy of the income was felt as seen from the fact that the common ancestor himself had to mortgage the properties on several occasions. Such mortgages effected by the common ancestor were discharged by his widow, Palani Ammal after his death when defendants 1 and 2 were minors. Here again, Palani Ammal had to borrow by mortgaging certain properties in favour of Land Mortgage Banks in order to discharge the already existing and binding debts of the family. Their case is that Palani Ammal included defendants 1 and 2 also at or about the time when she executed the mortgages over the family properties. There fare , they would say th at the family, at all times, though possessed of considerable landed property, did not have such sufficient surplus income and this was the primary reason for her borrowings and ultimately for the sale of a large slice of the family properties. There fare , they would say th at the family, at all times, though possessed of considerable landed property, did not have such sufficient surplus income and this was the primary reason for her borrowings and ultimately for the sale of a large slice of the family properties. They would say that the first and the second plaintiffs having come to Court three years beyond the date when they became majors, they cannot attack the alienations made by their respective parents and in so far as the action relates to the first and the second plaintiffs, the defendants’ case is that it is barred by limitation. They have taken the other usual pleas which we shall consider if it becomes necessary in the course of our judgment. On the above relevant pleas, the following issues were framed: (1) Whether the alienations made by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of each of the defendants 3, 7, 8, 11 and 12 are true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs and whether they are tainted with illegality and immorality? (2) Is the suit in time? (3) Is the suit bad for partial partition? (4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to declaration and partition? (5) To what reliefs are plaintiffs entitled? Additional issues framed on 30th October 1964:- (6) Whether the debts quoted in the sale" deed dated 12th December, 1954 executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of 9th defendant’s father were incurred by defendants 1 and 2 for immoral and illegal purposes? (7) If the answer to additional issue (6) is in the affirmative whether the 9th defendant’s father was aware that the earlier debts quoted in the sale-deed, dated 12th December, 1964 were incurred for such immoral and illegal purposes? (8) Whether the 9th defendant’s father has remodelled and rebuilt the house at a cost of Rs. 10,000; if so, whether plaintiffs are bound to recompense 9th defendant by payment of a sum of Rs. 14,000 in equity ? (9) Whether the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff have not completed 18 years of age, 3 years, prior to the date of suit and the suit is not barred by limitation ? 10,000; if so, whether plaintiffs are bound to recompense 9th defendant by payment of a sum of Rs. 14,000 in equity ? (9) Whether the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff have not completed 18 years of age, 3 years, prior to the date of suit and the suit is not barred by limitation ? (10) Whether the suit is not barred by limitation as against all the plaintiffs under sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act of 1908 as regards all the sales executed by defendants 1 and 2 and the sale dated 12th December, 1954 in favour of the 9th defendant ? (11) Whether the plaintiffs or any of them are entitled to mesne profits and if so, at what rate? The following additional issues were framed:- (12) Whether the sale deed executed by defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiffs 1 to 3 with respect to B schedule properties was for family necessity and for discharging antecedent debts ? (13) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to set aside the alienations made by their fathers and claim partition and if so, to what extent ? The following additional issue was framed on 22nd November, 1967. (14) Whether the suit is bad for non. joinder and mis-joinder of parties ? 2. The learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the alienations of properties described in schedules A to G made by the first and the second defendants arebinding on the minor plaintiffs excepting for one item of property comprised in the B schedule which the lower Court upheld as an alienation which does not bind the minor coparceners. It held that the Test of the challenges made by the plaintiffs are unsustainbale. In so far as the first and the second plaintiffs are concerned, the suit was dismissed as the cause of action is stated to have been barred as against them. In the result, the lower Court decreed the suit for a partition and separate possession of the third plaintiff’s two shares out of the 24 shares in the plaint B schedule properties as against defendants 5and 6 and dismissed the suit as against the other defendants and other plaint schedule properties. He relegated the ususal enquiry as to mesne profits regarding the accepted claims of the third plaintiff to independent proceedings. It is as against this, the present appeal has been filed. 3. He relegated the ususal enquiry as to mesne profits regarding the accepted claims of the third plaintiff to independent proceedings. It is as against this, the present appeal has been filed. 3. We may at once, state that in this appeal defendants 7 and 8 who purchased the C schedule properties, the 10th defendant who purchased the E schedule properties and the 12th defendant who purchased the G schedule properties are the only contesting respondents. Mr. Sivamani, repeating his contentions raised before the trial Court, would urge that the alienations made by the first and the second defendants either at the time when they were joint or at a time when they severed their joint status, would not bind the minor coparceners of each of the family for the reason that there was no occasion or necessity for them either to borrow or to alienate parcels of joint family lands on the ground of necessity or benefit to such minor coparceners. He would take us through the evidence oral and documentary relating to each of the alienations comprised in schedules A to G and would urge that the evidence on record would not justify the conclusions of the trial Court. According to him, P.Ws. who have been examined on the side of the plaintiffs satisfactorily spoke about the available surplus income of the family and the subject if viewed in this context would not justify either the borrowing or much less, the alienations of the joint family properties by one or the other of the brothers who were managing the family properties till the minors came to Court. Contending contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondents would say that ever since the ancestor’s time, there is proof that the family was borrowing, from time to time, either for sustenance or for preservation of the family properties and it was this which is reflected in the conduct of the first and the second defendants when they took over the family properties as managers thereof. They would harp upon the fact that excepting for the ipse dixit of P.W. 1 and the others who could casually refer to the alleged fast life led by defendants 1 and 2, there is no acceptable material to show that the brothers incurred such debts for immoral purposes such as gambling and ‘womanising. 4. They would harp upon the fact that excepting for the ipse dixit of P.W. 1 and the others who could casually refer to the alleged fast life led by defendants 1 and 2, there is no acceptable material to show that the brothers incurred such debts for immoral purposes such as gambling and ‘womanising. 4. Before we deal with each of the schedules and the facts as found on the record in relation thereto and the manner and the reason for the alienations of such properties by one or the other or both of the first and the second defendants, it is convenient to make certain general observations regarding such subject-matters which have been coming and are likely to come often in Courts of law. When a minor institutes an action challenging the alienations made by his father or his ancestors on the ground that the debts were avyavaharika in nature and that there was no legal necessity which would compel the manager, though he may be a father, to sell or alienate otherwise the properties it is for him to establish at least reasonably, that the circumstances and the position of the family were such that no occasion could have arisen for such a borrowing and that there was no necessity, at all, to alienate the properties at any particular or material point of time. The mere ipse dixit of the plaintiff, as soon as he becomes a major basing his information on hearsay and gathering some witnesses who would parrot-like repeat what he wants them to say would not improve the position. Antecedent debt has a special signification. If the debts are incurred for paying off debts already in existence, then it will be normally understood as an occasion in which an antecedent debt is being discharged. Antecedent debt has a special signification. If the debts are incurred for paying off debts already in existence, then it will be normally understood as an occasion in which an antecedent debt is being discharged. It is therefore, essential that in such connections wherein alienations are made so as to pay off antecedent debts in the sense of debts which are recited in a registered and old document as existing debts of the family, the minor should be in a position to bring home to the Court that there was no occasion or there could have been no occasion for the father-manager or any other manager of the joint family to in volve himself in such entrepreneurship or this purpose, he must be in a position to prove what would be the income from the joint family properties and after meeting the generality of expenses connected with the family, there could have been available surplus the existence of which cannot prompt a respectable person to borrow unnecessarily or to mortgage unnecessarily the family properties so as to ultimately burden them. The Supreme Court has laid down in uncanny termsthat proof of such available surplus or a reasonable inference or acceptable material that there is a possibility of such available surplus, should be established so as to compel Courts of law to set aside an ancient or an old alien ation on the ground that the recitals in the document which; created such alienations have to be ignored, lightly and contemporaneously brushed aside as not binding on the challenging, minor coparceners. Further in cases like this, it would be a practical impossibility for the alienee who is brought to the threshold of the Court on the facts, adverted by the minor challenging coparcener to prove that the consideration which passed under one or other alienations made by the father-manager or the manager was rightfully or properly utilised by their vendors. It would be unreason a ble to expect such meticulous proof of appropriation and treatment of such consideration nearly 15 or 20 years after the date of such alienation. 5. We may also in passing refer to the decided cases making another general’ observation in cases like the one under consideration. It is the common feature in such cases that the father who is responsible for the litigation, who, though is living with the minor, keeps himself safely outside the witness-box. 5. We may also in passing refer to the decided cases making another general’ observation in cases like the one under consideration. It is the common feature in such cases that the father who is responsible for the litigation, who, though is living with the minor, keeps himself safely outside the witness-box. He can easily bepresumed to be a person who is encouraging this litigation as a sutradari. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the hand of the father is always there in this litigation and he just brings into the witness box his brother’s sons, minor-children and others so as to gamble in litigation, by challenging his own alienations through them. It is this conduct of the parents which is condemned in the following lines in Masit-Ullah v. Damodar Prasad1 . The learned Law Lords state that: "The only sum that was left unaccounted for was Rs. 2,000 odd, as found by the Subordinate Judge. Janki Prasad, the plain tiff’s father, admittedly received the whole consideration, and was the man who used the largest part of the money for the discharge, of the ancestral debts. He could have told in his evidence how the sum of Rs. 2,000 was applied. There is no evidence that it was used for immoral or unauthorised purposes. His testimony was therefore most material in the case.......................Efforts were made to get him into the witness box, but he studiously avoided appearing in Court." 6. We shall now state the general principles which apply under such circumstances as was spoken to by the Privy Council and the other decision of the Supreme Court as well. In Jagannath v. Shrinath1 an old father alienated certain family properties and the sale deed was attested by the eldest members of the family. In a suit brought by the minors challenging such alienations, the Privy Council said that the attestors who were the eldest members of the family and who were intimately connected with it were in a better position than anyone else to say whether the money was applied for the necessary purposes of the family. They had allowed their children to figure as plaintiffs and got themselves impleaded as defendants. The suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the elders afforded ample corroboration of the other evidence that the same was effected for necessary family purposes." 7. They had allowed their children to figure as plaintiffs and got themselves impleaded as defendants. The suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the elders afforded ample corroboration of the other evidence that the same was effected for necessary family purposes." 7. A Division Bench of the Oudh High Court in Sant Baksh v. Lachhman Prasad2, observed that: "Where the father executes a sale-deed by which he alienates joint family property to satisfy his previous liabilities and his son, on attaining majority, files a suit to set aside the sale deed on the ground that it was executed without any legal necessity in pleading the father as defendant and the father does not come forward to give evidence whether all or any of the debts borrowed by him were not for legal necessity, it must be held that the suit is a collusive suit filed at the instance of the father and the failure of the father to come into the witness box and to state the real facts raises a presumption against the plaintiff that the money must have been needed for legal necessity." (The italics is ours.) 8. Finally, the Supreme Court in Dhhar Amrit Lal Nagji v. Doshi Jayantilal Jethalal3 stated that: "Where ancestral property has been alienated either under a conveyance executed by the father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in execution of a decree for the father’s debt, the sons who challenge the allegation have to prove not only that the antecedent debts were immoral but also that the purchasers had notice that they were so tainted. In this respect no valid distinction can be made between mortgage and a purchase and the above principle will apply to a mortgage created by the father". 9. Again the Supreme Court ir Radha-krishnadas v. Kaluram4, stated that: "Where an alienation, by way of sale’ of the family property made by a Hindu father is challenged by his sons on the ground of want of legal necessity then it is now well established that what the alienee is required to establish his legal necessity for the transaction and that it is not necessary tor him to show that every bit of the consideration which he advanced was actually applied for meeting family necessity. The reason is that the alienee can rarely have the means of controlling and directing the actual application of the money paid or advanced by him unless he enters into the management himself." 10. It is, therefore, fairly clear that the challenges made by a minor in the matter of alienation or borrowings made by their elders including their father, cannot lightly be accepted by Courts unless the facts in each of those cases do satisfy the norms laid down by the various decisions cited above. 11. In the light of the above, it is for consideration, in the instant case, whether the minors have proved that the debts challenged by them or the alienations questioned were in connection with antecedent debts which were immoral and whether the purchasers had notice of the inherent avyavaharika nature of such debts. 12. Mr. Sivamani was not able to place before us any evidence about the income from the joint family properties. P.W. 1 is the first plaintiff, He was 26 years on 4th November, 1966 when he was examined in Court and he must have been bom in or about 1940. But he is chauvinistic enough to speak about the death of his grandmother 10 years ago and about the debts of his grandfather 40 years ago and asserts that the annual income from the properties before the alienations, the first of which was in 1947 about Rs. 25,000 per annum. He would, candidly, admit that his grandmother told him about his father and uncle keeping concubines. He says that he heard that his father used to drink and was living with women in what is called “Pakku Thoppu”. He is, evidently very sore that his father did not conduct the marriages of any of them during the relevant period. He would estimate that the debts quoted in the various sale deeds challenged by the plaintiffs were not for family necessity but he would not whisper in the witness box that such sales are not supported by consideration. Excepting for a bare statement in chief examination that the income would be about Rs. 25,000 per annum, he did not substantiate the same by producing any document or any other relevant material so as to prompt the Court to accept the same. P.W. 2 is the Drill Master. Excepting for a bare statement in chief examination that the income would be about Rs. 25,000 per annum, he did not substantiate the same by producing any document or any other relevant material so as to prompt the Court to accept the same. P.W. 2 is the Drill Master. In chief examination itself, he would say that he was not sure as to the income which the properties yielded. But, according to him the annual income by way of rent 25 years back from the crops would be about Rs. 5,000 and from the trees in the various topes was about Rs. 8,000. He is not sure as to who were the lessees and he does not know, personally, as to the income from the suit properties which were under the cultivation of the first defendant or his lessees. He would say that a day before he was examined he went to his lands and that the suit lands are visible from his lands but he did not note the trees as they were two furlongs away. We are referring to this part of his evidence, at this stage, only for the purpose of showing that P.W.2 who is, admittedly, interested in the family has been brought down by the plaintiffs to assert that the income was about Rs. 13,000 per annum. P.W.3 was invited to speak for a special purpose which we shall advert to later. He has been brought in for the purpose of saying that no consideration passed under Exhibit B-79. He does not speak to the income of the family properties as such nor does he corroborate either P.W.1 or P.W.2 in that regard. Thus, in the instant case, we have no evidence, at all about the income. It follows, therefore, that there is no acceptable material regarding the existence of available surplus which alone, possibly, would raise the presumption that there could have been and there was, no occasion for the manager of such joint family having such available surplus income to borrow or to mortgage or to sell the family properties. Exhibits B-4 to B-7 though of course, were of the year 1924, give a slight indication as to what, possibly, could have been the income from the family properties. It was only Rs. 1,075 per year. Exhibits B-4 to B-7 though of course, were of the year 1924, give a slight indication as to what, possibly, could have been the income from the family properties. It was only Rs. 1,075 per year. Having regard to the meagre income, Vadamalai himself was mortgaging properties and after his death, Palani Ammal continued the process and she had to borrow, presumably, to preserve the properties or to maintain the family. Though these pieces of evidence are not conclusive on the nature or quantum of the income, yet, they provide ample food for thought that the plaintiffs’ exaggerated estimate of the income as Rs. 25,000 per annum, is not based on any proved data or hypothesis whatsoever. 13. We, therefore, start with the background that the family did not have any surplus income, at all. Next, we shall consider whether there is any evidence that either the first or the second defendants were, at all times, or in any event, at all material times, engaged in immoral or illegal activities. We have, already, seen that P.W.1 heard about the first or the second defendant keeping concubines only from his grandmother who died 10 years ago when he could have been 16 years of age. We cannot expect that, in a family which claims to be so opulent and rich, the grandmother would discuss about the concubinage and the ways of living of his father with a teen-ager who is none else than her own grandson. Apart from this, P.W.1 is unable to bring home the alleged evil habits of his father or his uncle. P.W. 2 does not improve the position any further. In a casual manner, he would say that the first defendant used to drink, gamble with cards and keep women. Excepting for this, he does not speak to the character or the alleged illegal activities of either the first or the second defendants any more when he was in the witness box. P.W. 3, who was specially brought for the occasion, in connection with A schedule properties, does not refer to the bad habits of the brothers, at all. Excepting for this, he does not speak to the character or the alleged illegal activities of either the first or the second defendants any more when he was in the witness box. P.W. 3, who was specially brought for the occasion, in connection with A schedule properties, does not refer to the bad habits of the brothers, at all. In such a conspectus which touches upon the conduct and character of the first and the second defendants, it would be hazardous for us to risk the conclusion that the defendants 1 and 2 whenever and wherever they incurred debts on their behalf and on behalf of minor plaintiffs, they did so because they wanted to satiate their own thirst for lust and all such debts were for immoral, illegal and avyavaharika purposes. 14. We shall now deal with each of the schedules which relate to sales effected by one or the other or both the first and the second defendants. The first sale was under Exhibit B-75 dated 24th January, 1947. That was a sale of about 2.92 acres of wet land which was very near to Kalingarayan Channel for a sum and consideration of Rs. 15,900. After it was purchased under Exhibit B-75 the property devolved upon defendants 3 and 4 who, in turn, sold the western portion thereof under Exhibit B-74, to one Chinnammal who in turn, sold the property to the 13th defendant under Exhibit B-73. The 13th defendant,who purchased a portion of the property comprised in schedule A has been examined as D.W. 12. He would say that he purchased a portion of the A schedule property viz., 1-46 cents of wet land for Rs. 9,000 and would also speak to the fact that the first defendant or the second defendant did not keep concubines and they were having good conduct. In cross-examination, it was brought out that he did not obtain encumbrance certificate and that the third defendant was in possession of the original title deeds. It is significant that this witness was not asked about the want of consideration or about the absence of his bona fides when he purchased the property after inspecting the original title deeds which were with the third defendant. 15. It is significant that this witness was not asked about the want of consideration or about the absence of his bona fides when he purchased the property after inspecting the original title deeds which were with the third defendant. 15. The consideration in Exhibit B-75, which is the original sale deed with which we are concerned, is made up as follows: A sum of Rs.2,445 was paid off under Exhibit B-76 towards the subsisting mortgage and a sum of Rs. 5,000 was paid off under the promissory note exhibited as Exhibit B-79 and there were recitals in the said sale deed to the effect that three other promissory notes, dated 11th October, 1946, 15th October, 1946 and 5th November, 1946 were discharged under them and that only a sum of Rs. 826 was taken as cash consideration by defendants 1 and 2. We have already referred to the fact that the first and the second defendants discretely avoided the box. When P.W. 3 was in the witness box, he tried to make out a case that the promissory note Exhibit B-79 was not supported by consideration. The brother of P.W. 3 one Arulsami lent the amount under Exhibit B-79. P.W. 3 would swear that he and his brother were doing business in Erode from 1942 to 1946 in javuli and that they bad account books and that all the transactions will be entered in the accounts. When he was asked about the account books he would say that they were with his brother and he would not be in a position to produce the same. Though he attested Exhibit B-79 he would have it that even the endorsement, Exhibit B-80, was written on the same date and time on which the promissory note Exhibit B-79 was written. We have already seen that Exhibit B-79 is dated 5th November, 1946. After having stated that Exhibits B-79 and B-80 were written at the same time and in the same place, he would say that ExhibitB-80 was written on 25th January, 1947 as mentioned therein. This witness has, therefore, no respect for truth. He would also claim that Exhibit B-79 was antedated. After having stated that Exhibits B-79 and B-80 were written at the same time and in the same place, he would say that ExhibitB-80 was written on 25th January, 1947 as mentioned therein. This witness has, therefore, no respect for truth. He would also claim that Exhibit B-79 was antedated. Apparently, he has fallen out with his brother who is stated to be in jail and he was very handy for the plaintiffs as he was prepared to help them to the extent he can by saying that no consideration passed under the promissory note, Exhibit B-79. We disbelieve P.W. 3. In the absence of any other evidence which will give us at least the prima facie impression that the recitals in a document which is nearly 22 years old were falsely drawn into the instrument at that time, we are unable to accept the plaintiff’s contention that the recitals therein ought not to be taken at their face value. If, therefore, Exhibit B-75 is fully supported by consideration and the debts recited therein were antecedent debts, -"Antecedent debt" means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent of and not part of the transaction impeached. To validate an alienation so as to bind the son, there must also be an antecedent debt. Generally there is no question of legal necessity in such a case. " (Vide Mulla Hindu Law, 14th Edition, page 375.) — there is no question of legal necessity in such a case. 16. The challenge against the alienations evidenced by Exhibit B-75 and in relation to the A schedule properties, therefore, fails. 17. We shall now take up schedule B properties. The plaintiffs have succeeded in the lower Court in so far as their challenge against this alienation is concerned. But the learned judge would not give any relief to the first and the second plaintiffs on the ground that they came to Court 3 years after they became majors and that, therefore, they cannot, under the law of limitation, personally attack the alienations made by the first and the second defendants. There cannot be any further probe into this finding which, in our view, has been correctly rendered by the Court below. Though Mr. Sivamani lightly touched upon it. he could not pursue it further. 18. There cannot be any further probe into this finding which, in our view, has been correctly rendered by the Court below. Though Mr. Sivamani lightly touched upon it. he could not pursue it further. 18. We shall now take up the alienations relating to C schedule properties. Both the defendants 1 and 2 for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, viz., plaintiffs 1 to 8, sold the properties comprised in the C schedule under Exhibit B-14 dated 24th June, 1953, in favour of the 7th and the 8th defendants. The recitals in the deed touching upon the consideration of the borrowing as well, may be summarised thus: A portion of the consideration went to discharge a prior mortgage under Exhibit B-9 dated 12th November, 1947. The said mortgage itself was for purposes of clearing the earlier debts incurred by the managers of the family under Exhibits B-10, B-11 and B-12. The second item of consideration was for discharging an usufructuary mortgage exhibited as Exhibit B-15 dated 27th May, 1944. The mortgage itself was for a sum of Rs. 7,500 and the occasion for the execution of the mortgage was to discharge, once again, earlier debts, under Exhibits B-1, B-19 and B-20. The third item relating to the consideration for the alienation in question was to discharge a registered mortgage executed by the first defendant for himself and his sons under Exhibit B-21 dated 29th June, 1947. Here again, the mortgage was effected for the purpose of discharging earlier debts. The fourth item to make up the consideration for the alienation was to pay off the promissory note debt evidenced by Exhibit B-24 dated 1st July, 1952. This promissory note was executed by both the first and the second defendants. The fifth and the sixth items of consideration related to the payment of the decree debts. The said decrees were obtained against the first or the second defendants in O.S. No. 730 /51, District Munsif Court, Erode O.S. No.41 of 1962, District Munsif Court, Erode and O.S. Nos. 21/52 and 698/52 in the same Court. After paying off the above debts which were anterior in point of time to the execution of the sale deed, Exhibit B-14, only a sum of Rs. 783/12/0 was received in cash and even here, the precaution was taken that it was received in order to meet certain family and agricultural expenses. 21/52 and 698/52 in the same Court. After paying off the above debts which were anterior in point of time to the execution of the sale deed, Exhibit B-14, only a sum of Rs. 783/12/0 was received in cash and even here, the precaution was taken that it was received in order to meet certain family and agricultural expenses. It is thus seen that the several recitals in the sale deed, Exhibit B-14, which make up the consideration of Rs. 32,000, are either for payment of debts incurred by the manager prior to the date of sale or for the payment of decree debts which were obviously binding on them as well as the family. We have already prefaced by saying that at no point of time was there any query by the plaintiffs that the alienations are not supported by consideration. But their main attack was that the debts were not incurred for avyavaharika purposes. They have miserably failed to establish that any of the debts in so far as the present alienation is concerned, was ever tainted in the manner suggested. We, therefore, uphold the alienation made under Exhibit B-14 and also confirm the finding of the Court below as regards Schedule G properties. 19. We now come to Schedule D properties which were alienated under Exhibit B-70 for a sum of Rs. 4,000 in favour of the 9th defendant’s father. In connection with this transaction D.W. 9, who is the scribe of the document, has been examined. He in chief examination, would say that the first and the second defendants who are the executants of the said deed, got the money for family expenses. He would , also speak to the fact that their mother, Palani Ammal, was alive on the date of the execution of the said document. This was to clear off an earlier usufructuary mortgage in favour of one Vedavalli. In cross-examination, nothing significant has been brought out. He asserted that he wrote the mortgage deed himself and that the monies were borrowed for the benefit of the family in that, at the time, the residential house was in a bad state of repair. This was to clear off an earlier usufructuary mortgage in favour of one Vedavalli. In cross-examination, nothing significant has been brought out. He asserted that he wrote the mortgage deed himself and that the monies were borrowed for the benefit of the family in that, at the time, the residential house was in a bad state of repair. It is unnecessary for us to repeat at every stage, that excepting for a bare suggestion in the pleadings as well as in the witness box, the plaintiffs’ witnesses could not establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts and the consequential alienations by the first and the second defendants ought to be set aside or ignored, on the ground that such debts were incurred for immoral purposes. In the absence of an attack on the ground that there was no consideration for the sale and as the recitals are contain-ed in rather old documents, we are unable to lightly brush aside its contents and truthfulness. One general argument urged by Sivamani is that though the document contained recitals regarding discharge of mortgages under which defendants 1 and 2 purport to have borrowed monies, from time to time, those promissory notes were not forthcoming. In some cases, at any rate, those promissory notes were filed and exhibited. But the non-production of such promissory notes in some cases by themselves would not create the impression that the debts themselves were fictitious or that they were borrowed for immoral or illegal purposes. We therefore, accept the finding of the Court below that the plaintiffs have not proved that the alienation of the D Schedule properties under Exhibit B-70 is not for the benefit of the family or for legal necessity. 20. The E schedule properties were sold under Exhibit B-71. This sale was to pay off the usufructuary mortgage under Exhibit B-72. The document recites the receipt of the balance of cash consideration. D.W. 11, the husband of the alienee, speaks to this. Nothing has been stated against this witness. The plaintiffs, therefore, have not established that the alienation of the E Schedule properties was in any manner, improper. 21. We now come to F schedule properties. These properties were sold under Exhibit B-38 dated 6th May, 1956 by both the first and the second defendants. Nothing has been stated against this witness. The plaintiffs, therefore, have not established that the alienation of the E Schedule properties was in any manner, improper. 21. We now come to F schedule properties. These properties were sold under Exhibit B-38 dated 6th May, 1956 by both the first and the second defendants. The sale was in favour of the 11th defendant who examined himself as D.W. 3 and he also examined one of the attestors to the said document as D.W. 4. There were 17 items recited in the body of the sale deed, Exhibit B-38, which items disclosed that there were debts anterior in point of time to the present sale and that the sale itself was effected in order to pay off and discharge those 17 live debts incurred by the then managers of the family. Exhibits B-39 to B-53 arc the Exhibits which intrinsically establish that the consideration for the sale under Exhibit B-38 went for discharge of several prior debts incurred by the managers. The debts are in the nature of mortgages or evidenced by promissory notes. Several of the promissory notes and the endorsements made thereon were exhibited. But some of the promissory notes though recited in the sale deed have not been brought into record. Here again, the general comment is repeated. But, as we said, Exhibit B-38, is a sale which is nearly 18 years before this date and about 6 years before the action itself. In such cases, as the Supreme Court has stated, it is not for the alienee to see to the meticulous disbursement of the consideration paid by him to the vendors who are acting as managers of joint family, but to be generally satisfied about the integrity of such vendors in the matter of clearance and discharge of such debts. In such cases, as the Supreme Court has stated, it is not for the alienee to see to the meticulous disbursement of the consideration paid by him to the vendors who are acting as managers of joint family, but to be generally satisfied about the integrity of such vendors in the matter of clearance and discharge of such debts. D.W. 3 who proved the payment of consideration says that the sale negotiations took place for six months and there were other offers for this land as a whole and that he paid a fair price for the same and that the first and the second defendants were living jointly with as many as 25 members in the family at the time of sale and he denied that the first and the second defendants were leading a fast life and that the recitals in Exhibit B-38 show what were all the debts incurred by them and which were discharged from the sale consideration. He proved the Exhibits B-39 to B-53 and when he was cross-examined, no question was put to him that there was a failure of consideration nor was there any suggestion that the recitals in Exhibit B-38 are incorrect and have been invented for purposes of enabling the first and the second defendants to indiscriminately borrow so as to cause wrongful loss to the family properties. Here again the monotonous challenge made by a minor son as against the father who refused to go into the box to contradict or accept his son’s story has to be rejected on the grounds already set out by us while dealing with the alienations of the properties covered by the other schedules. We accept, therefore, the finding of the Court below in so far as the F schedule properties are concerned. 22. The last alienation which is also challenged by the plaintiffs in the action is that covered by Exhibit B-57 relating to the G Schedule properties which was a sale of family lands on 13th February, 1958. The sale was in favour of the 12th defendant. The 12th defendant examined himself as D.W. 5. He also got his testimony corroborated by examining D.W. 8. D.W. 5 says that the sale was effected in order to pay off a decree debt, a mortgage debt and debts evidenced by promissory rotes. The sale was in favour of the 12th defendant. The 12th defendant examined himself as D.W. 5. He also got his testimony corroborated by examining D.W. 8. D.W. 5 says that the sale was effected in order to pay off a decree debt, a mortgage debt and debts evidenced by promissory rotes. That such debts were incurred by defendants 1 and 2 and that they were discharged from and out of consideration paid under Exhibit B-57 are abundantly clear when we examine Exhibits B-58, B-67, B-68 and B-59 to B-64.Nothing clinching has been brought out in cross-examination. The witness reiterates that in the sale deed the debts which were to be paid off, have been recited and that he discharged some of the debts even before registration. He is definite that he discharged all the debts quoted in the saledeed and the consideration paid was fair and reasonable. D.W. 8 is the person who negotiated, in the first instance, for the sale and purchase of the properties comprised in the G Schedule. Though the first defendant and the second defendant agreed to sell the lands to D.W. 8, later on they resiled which necessitated D.W, 8 to file a suit for recovery of the advance of Rs. 2,000. This was the decree debt which was paid off when the second defendant subsequently, sold the properties to the 12th defendant. That was a sale which was effected by the second defendant for himself and his minor children after he and his brother the first defendant, partitioned the joint family properties amongst themselves in 1953. The net amount received in cash under this deed is only Rs.3,317. Applying the various principles already referred to by us and in the absence of telling evidence which would outweigh the acceptability of the recitals in Exhibit B-57, we are unable to accept the contention that the sale of the G schedule properties is not for the benefit of the family or, at any rate, not for legal necessity. 23. The above discussion therefore, prompts us to accept the findings of the Court below, in all respects, in relation to the dealings of the first or the second defendant or both, as regards the properties described in schedules A to G. 24. 23. The above discussion therefore, prompts us to accept the findings of the Court below, in all respects, in relation to the dealings of the first or the second defendant or both, as regards the properties described in schedules A to G. 24. In passing, we have to reiterate that this is one of those usual litigations filed by the minor children in the joint family-attacking the alienations made by the father either during their minority or immediately thereafter but, certainly, with the encouragement and active support of the parents. Without the first and the second defendants having a hand in the litigation, the plaintiffs would not have dared or could not have been encouraged to file the same. The mother of some of the plaintiffs was representing some of the minors. What prevented her from going, into the box and speak against her husband remains unexplained. The appeal is dismissed. As the litigation, in our view, ought to have been sponsored by the parents and the minor plaintiffs ought not to be blamed for it, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal. The appellants, however, will pay the Court-fee payable to the Government.