GULATI, J. The petitioner is an Advocate, who practised at Meerut until 1956. Thereafter he shifted to Allahabad and joined the Allahabad High Court Bar. He has stated that as there was a strong rumour that a Bench of the Allahabad High Court would be established at Meerut, he purchased House No. 29-A (New No. 31), Sakait, Meerut, for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- for his own personal use and occupation. He has further stated that when he learnt that there was no chance of the Bench being established at Meerut in the near future, he let out the house in November, 1971 to one Sri S. M. Has-nain, Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Recovery) Meerut, for his office-cum-residence on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/ -. It had been agreed between him and the tenant that the latter would vacate the house on three months notice, in case the petitioner required the accommodation for his personal use at any time. It is further stated that a part of the accommodation called do Chhatti was retained by him for his personal use. Sri Hasnain was transferred and in his place another gentleman was appointed as the Assistant Registrar. The New Assistant Registrar asked Mr. Hasnain to vacate the house and the latter in turn requested the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot him some other accommodation for his residence. A house was allotted to him, but since that was not vacant, he was not able to obtain possession. The petitioner goes on to say that new Assistant Registrar being unable to get possession of the house, shifted his office to some other place and Sri Hasnain handed over the possession of two rooms to the petitioner, which he was using as his office. In this way, according to the petitioner, he came in possession of Do Chhatti and two rooms. His father, Sri K. C. Mittal, gave up practice at Allahabad and decided to take up his residence at Meerut. The accommodation consisting of Do Chhatti and two rooms were, therefore, occupied by the petitioners father. The petitioner has alleged that on February 26, 1973, he received a notice through his friend, Sri A. S. Dublish, Advocate, Meerut, informing him that the petitioners house was sought to be requisitioned by the first respondent, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Meerut. The accommodation consisting of Do Chhatti and two rooms were, therefore, occupied by the petitioners father. The petitioner has alleged that on February 26, 1973, he received a notice through his friend, Sri A. S. Dublish, Advocate, Meerut, informing him that the petitioners house was sought to be requisitioned by the first respondent, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Meerut. A copy of the notice was sent to the petitioner, which required the petitioner to show cause against the requisition within fifteen days. The petitioner filed on objection, but the same was rejected and an order of requisition was passed on May 2, 1973. The petitioner has challenged this order. Section 3 of the U. P. Accommodation Requisition (Amendment) Act, 1972, after its amendment by U. P. Act No. 38 of 1972 provides: " 3 (1 ). Where the District Magistrate is of opinion that any accommodation is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose, not being a purpose of the Union and that the accommodation should be requisitioned, the District Magistrate- (a) Shall call upon the owner as well as the occupier of the accommodation by notice in writing (Specifying therein the purpose of the requisition) to show cause, with in fifteen days of the date of the service of such notice on him, why the accommodation should not be requisitioned, and. . . . . . " Now Section 3 provides that before a District Magistrate can requisition a house three requirements must be complied with: (i) That the District Magistrate must form the opinion that the house is required for a public purpose, (ii) The public purpose should not be a purpose of the Union, and (iii) That he must give a show cause notice to the owner as well as the occupier of the accommodation specifying therein the purpose for which the accommodation is sought to be requisitioned. Now, in the instant case, the notice (Annexure T) given to the petitioner merely recites that the accommodation in question is urgently required to accommodate government servants. It means that the accommodation was required for the residence of some government servant or servants, whose name or names were not specified. Now, in the instant case, the notice (Annexure T) given to the petitioner merely recites that the accommodation in question is urgently required to accommodate government servants. It means that the accommodation was required for the residence of some government servant or servants, whose name or names were not specified. But when one turns to the order dated March 8, 1973, rejecting the petitioners objection, one finds that the Additional District Magistrate has observed: " However, on the other hand, there are so many State and Central Government offices to be opened which due to lack of accommodations could not start functioning and the government is keen to provide accommodations to such offices so that they may start functioning only in the interest of general public. " From this observation, it appears that the Additional District Magistrate had in mind the need of some Central and State Government Offices. Now, this need is at variance with the need indicated in the notice. Moreover, Section 3 (1) prohibits requisitioning of an accommodation for purposes of Union. Reading the notice dated February 12, 1973 and the order dated March 8, 1973, one gets the impression that the respondents had no clear idea of the purpose for which they sought to requisition the house in question. In my opinion no order of requisition could be passed on such a vague conception of public purpose. Section 3 (1) requires the exact and specific purpose to be disclosed. To say merely that the accommodation is required for a public purpose does not meet with the requirement of the law. The requirement that the exact purpose should be disclosed is not without a reason. The idea is that if the exact purpose is disclosed, the owner or the occupier may be able to come forward and to say that the accommodation sought to be requisitioned is not suitable for the purpose for which it is being requisitioned or that some other accommodation which is better and cheaper is available. There is another aspect of the matter. The service of the notice on a landlord or an occupier is not a mere formality. The authority concerned is required to give a hearing to the owner or the occupier so that the owner or the occupier may be able to show why the order of requisition should not be made. There is another aspect of the matter. The service of the notice on a landlord or an occupier is not a mere formality. The authority concerned is required to give a hearing to the owner or the occupier so that the owner or the occupier may be able to show why the order of requisition should not be made. This view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Agarwal v. Distrct Maggstrale, Allahabad A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 2656, where in it has been held that although Section 3 of the Temporary Requisition Act, 1947 contains no express provision for notice and hearing before making of the requisitioning order, but considering the object of the provision, however, such a provision has to be read there by necessary implication. The following observation in that decision may be quoted: " The right to hold and enjoy the property is a cherished right and since requisitioning of the same deprives the owner of the right to hold and enjoy it as he likes, it is difficult to assume that the legislature would have intended to deprive the owner of pos- session of this cherished right without notice and hearing. " Eventually the Supreme Court observed that considering the fact that before passing an order the District Magistrate has to take into consideration certain objective facts coupled with the fact that he is constituted a plenary authority in that there is neither an appeal nor a revision provided against his order, it seems reasonable to assume that the legislature intended an order under Section 3 to be made after notice and hearing, so that no unfairness is done to any one. In the instant case, no hearing was given to the petitioner at all. In fact no serious attempt was made to serve the show cause notice on him. The petitioner got the notice through a friend at Meerut. In my opinion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it was necessary that the petitioner should have been given a full opportunity of hearing particularly when admittedly he was in occupation of a part of the accommodation. The law as amended does not permit the requisitioning of a house which is in occupation of the owner. This is clearly provided by clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3. The law as amended does not permit the requisitioning of a house which is in occupation of the owner. This is clearly provided by clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3. The petitioner being admittedly in possession of a part of the accommodation, no order of requisition could at least be passed in respect of that portion. Another serious flaw in the impugned order is that no notice was given to the tenant, Sri Hasnain, who was still retaining the residential portion and had by a notice dated March 1, 1973 (Annexure if to the writ petition) informed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Meerut, that he had decided not to vacate the residential portion of the accommodation. The law requires that a notice should be given to the tenant also, where the requisitioned accommodation or part thereof is being used as a residence by a tenant for not less than two months immediately preceding the date of the service of notice under sub-section (1) and the tenant has to be provided with an alternative accommodation. In the instant case, a portion of the accommodation was in possession of Sri Hasnain. He was given no notice and no alternative accommodation was provided or offered to him. For all these reasons, it is not possible to sustain the impugned of requisitioned and the same is hereby dismissed. The petition is allowed with costs. .