K. N. SINGH, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking relief for the quashing of two orders passed by the Collector, Agra, dated August 5, 1974, reverting the petitioner from the officiating post of Naib Tahsildar to the post of Supervisor Kanungo and the order dated August 6, 1974, retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service under Fundamental Rule 56. The petitioner was holding the post of Supervisor Kanungo in a substantive and permanent capacity. While he was posted at Agra, the Collector made local arrangement and promoted the petitioner to officiate on the post of Naib Tahsildar. On August 5, 1974, the Col lector, Agra, passed an order reverting the petitioner to his substan tive post of Supervisor Kanungo without assigning any reasons. The following day, i. e. , on August 6, 1974, the Collector passed another order in exercise of his powers under Fundamental Rule 56 retiring the petitioner composedly from service as he had attained the age of 55 years. The petitioner has challenged both these orders in the present petition Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioners reversion from the officiating post of Naib Tahsildar amounted to re duction in rank but he was not given any opportunity of defence. He further urged that junior persons were retained while he was revert ed back to his substantive post, thereby discrimination was practised against him. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respon dents it has been asserted that the petitioner was appointed to offici ate on the post of Naib Tahsildar as stop- gap arrangement in a local arrangement by the Collector. He held no right to hold that post. He was reverted back to his substantive post as Supervisor Kanungo as other suitable persons were available for appointment to the post of Naib Tahsiidar. The allegation about retention of junior persons has also been denied. On these facts it is clear that the petitioners appointment was in the nature of stop-gap local arrangement which did not confer any right on him to hold that post. On these facts I am of die opinion that the petitioner was not visited with any civil consequences and the order of reversion did not amount to reduction in rank within he meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. On these facts I am of die opinion that the petitioner was not visited with any civil consequences and the order of reversion did not amount to reduction in rank within he meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. Fur ther the plea of discrimination cannot be sustained in view of the averments contained in the counter-affidavit that no junior person was allowed to officiate. It was then contended that the petitioner nad attained the age of 55 years in October, 1973, but even thereafter he was allowed to continue in service. Therefore he could not be retired compulsorily before attaining the age of 58 years. The petitioners work and con-duct was not found unsatisfactory during the period of his extended service. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that no doubt the petitioner completed his age of 55 years in 1973 but as his service record including the character roll was not above average, he was not considered fit to be retained in service after completion of 55 years, accordingly the Collector in exercise of his powers under Fundamental Rule 56 passed the impugned order. It has been fur ther asserted that the petitioners case had not been considered for retaining him in service when he attained the age of 55 years and he was never permitted by the appointing authority to be retained in service beyond the age of 55 years. The consideration of his case took some time and it was for the first time that the Collector passed the impugned order on August 6, 1974, and prior to that the peti tioners case was neither considered nor any order permitting him to continue in service had been passed. Under Fundamental Rule 56, the appointing authority is em-powered to retire a Government servant compulsorily on attaining the age of 55 years. If no such order is passed the Government servant has a right to continue in service till he attains the age of super annuation, i. e. , 58 years, but the rule does not require that the order for compulsory retirement should be passed precisely on the date when the Government servant attains the age of 55 years. The Rule further does not contemplate that no order of compulsory retirement can be passed after the Government servant has crossed the age of 55 years. The Rule further does not contemplate that no order of compulsory retirement can be passed after the Government servant has crossed the age of 55 years. When the case of a Government servant is not considered and no order is passed it is always open to the authority to consider the authority to consider the case of the said Government servant and to pass suitable orders. Mere absence of an order at the stage of 55 years does not confer any right on the Government servant to conti nue in service upto 58 years. There may be a case where the ap pointing authority after considering the case of a Government servant have permitted him to continue in service. In such a case the con cerned Government servant cannot be compulsorily retired unless his work and conduct is found unsatisfactory after his retention in the service. In the instant case, however, the petitioners case had not been considered and no orders had been passed. Instead the Collec tor for the first time passed the orders on August 6, 1974. The peti tioners contention that he was allowed to continue in service till he attained the age of 58 years is devoid of any substance. . It was then urged that the impugned order of compulsory re tirement was passed arbitrarily, the petitioners service record was excellent and no adverse entry had been communicated to him and therefore there was no basis for retiring the petitioner prematurely. The petitioners allegations in this respect have been denied in the counter-affidavit and it has been asserted that there were adverse en tries against the petitioner dated June 8, 1963, June 3, 1964 and Au gust 28, 1965. It is thus clear that the petitioners contention that he had an excellent record and that there was no adverse entry against him cannot be accepted, and therefore the order cannot be said to have been passed arbitrarily. I find no illegality in the two impugned orders. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .