Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was admitted in the B.Com., Degree course in the respondent College, in June, 1974. The said course, is of three years, duration commencing from June, 1974. At the end of the first year course the petitioner has to appear for the University examination. As the petitioner did have the requisite attendance and as the University did not condone the lack of attendance, he was not allowed to write the examination held in April, 1975 for the first year course. Later, the principal of the College by letter dated 6th May: 1975 informed the petitioner as follows: “As you have not earned your attendance progress and conduct certificate during 1974-1975, and as the University had not granted the necessary condonation to appear for the examination, you have not been promoted to the second year. I am therefore leading you enclosed, your Transfer Certificate, and conduct certificate which will enable you to apply afresh for admission to a satiable first degree Class at the commencement of the next academic year at any College, if you so desire.” 2. The petitioner, who was under the impression that he would be allowed to continue again in the first year B.Com., degree course, was surprised at the said letter and approached the principal to permit him to continue in the first year course. Since his attempt failed, he approached this Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the said communication dated 6th May, 1975 on the ground that the said communication amounts to an order expelling him from the College, and that the said communication is arbitrary, unjust and opposed to the principles of natural justice. In the writ petition the petitioner has also raised various other allegations. He has said that he was not short of attendance, that he has attended the college for the requisite number of days, and that the action of the respondent is discriminatory in that several students who were similarly absent have been permitted to write the examination. But as all these facts are denied by the respondent in his counter, those allegations cannot be gone into in this writ petition. But as all these facts are denied by the respondent in his counter, those allegations cannot be gone into in this writ petition. The only question new arises for consideration is whether the respondent can send the petitioner out of the College by issuing the transfer and conduct certificates without continuing him in the first year B.Com degree course one having been detained in the first year. 3. The petitioners case is that his not appearing for the University examination will result only in his detention in the first year degree course but, that will not enable the respondent to expel him from the College as it were, by issuing the transfer and conduct certificates and asking him to apply afresh for a suitable first degree class at any college. The respondents case, however, is that once a candidate is not promoted to the second year he must go out of the college unless he applied afresh and gets admission to the first year degree course in the same College. 4. Both the parties place reliance on Regulation 10 of Chap. 39 of the University Regulations in support of their respective contentions. The said Regulation is as follows:” “In the Pre University or the B.A. degree course, a student who has failed to earn the progress certificate at the end of the first years courts shall he required to rejoin in the first year class for another full year. A student who has not been selected for the March-April University Examination but who at the close of the academic year it certified by the Principal to have made such satisfactory progress that be may be admitted to the Examination, may appear for a subsequent examination without further attendance at a college, provided that be has earned the necessary attendance certificate. A student who has failed to earn the progress certificate for the second academic year must attend college, to receive such additional instruction at the Principal may, in his discretion, prescribe so as to enable him to earn the required progress certificate.” The said regulation provides that if a student fails to earn the progress certificate at the end of the first years course, he shall be required to rejoin the first year class for another fall year, and that if a student fails to earn the progress certificate in the second year, he must attend the college to receive such additional instruction as the Principal may, in his discretion, prescribe so as to enable him to earn the required progress certificate. The petitioner in this case was a student in the first year degree course and he has failed to earn the required attendance as also the progress certificate contemplated by the said regulation and, therefore, he is required “to rejoin the first year class for another full year.” 5. While the petitioner relies on the said regulation to say that though he was not allowed to sit for the examination for want of the required attendance and progress certificate he should be allowed to continue to study in the first year class for another full year, the respondent relies on the same regulation in support of its contention that a student like the petitioner who has failed to earn the required attendance and the progress report in the first year class should join the first year class by applying afresh for admission in the same college or in any other college”. 6. On a due consideration of the matter, I am not inclined to agree with the conreation of the respondent in this regard. The above regulation deals with various types of cases. Firstly it deals with a case where a student fails to earn the progress report in the first academic year and says that such a student has to rejoin the first year class for another full year. Secondly it deals with a student who has failed to earn the progress report for the second academic year and says that be must attend the college to receive such additional instruction as the Principal may, in his discretion, prescribe so as to enable him to earn the requited progress certificate, and not for the full year. Secondly it deals with a student who has failed to earn the progress report for the second academic year and says that be must attend the college to receive such additional instruction as the Principal may, in his discretion, prescribe so as to enable him to earn the requited progress certificate, and not for the full year. Thirdly, it deals with a case of a student who has earned the necessary attendance and progress certificate for the third academic year but who has not been selected for the University examination and says that he can be admitted in the subsequent examinations without further attendance at the college. Impliedly it means that a student who had not obtained the required attendance and progress certificate in the third academic year should attend the college for such period as the Principal may, in his discretion prescribe as in the case of a similar student in the second academic year. Thus a distinction is made between a student who has failed to earn the attendance and the progress certificate at the end of the first years course and the student who has failed to obtain such certificates at the end of the second or third academic year. While in the first case a student is required to undergo the first year course once again for the full year, in the second case the student is asked to attend the college only for such period as the Principal may prescribe the expression, required to rejoin the first year class for another full year, occurring in the regulation cannot, in my view, be read as “required to rejoin the course” as is contended by the respondent. 7. The petitioner got admission to the B.Com course, and the course is for a period of three years. Once a student joins a course, he is normally allowed to complete the course unless in the meanwhile he is expelled for any tenable reason. In this case the petitioner has not appeared for the first years examination for want of attendance and the progress certificate. As per the said regulation 10, he has to rejoin the first year class and undergo the first year course for another full year and he cannot join the second year course. In this case the petitioner has not appeared for the first years examination for want of attendance and the progress certificate. As per the said regulation 10, he has to rejoin the first year class and undergo the first year course for another full year and he cannot join the second year course. The expression “rejoin the first year class for another full rear” clearly contemplates that student is to continue in the first year class for one more year, The said expression does not, in my opinion, suggest that the student has to discontinue the course and apply afresh for the same course or different course in the same college or in any other college. If the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted it will mean that students who have joined a particular course of study but failed to acquire the required attendance or progress certificate due to circumstances beyond their control such as illness, etc., will have to be treated as having discontinued the course in which case they have to apply afresh for the same course or for any other course in the same or other colleges. This will be quite an anamolous situation in that while the first year students in a degree course is taken to have discontinued or the course of study, second and third year students are not so penalised for want of attendance or progress certificate. Therefore a consistent and reasonable interpretation of the regulation can only be that the first year students who are detained are enabled to continue the eourae of study to which they have been admitted by joining the first year class for another full year. The said regulation does not state that for shortage of attendance or for want of progress certificate a student should be sent out of the course of study to which he has been duly admitted. It is not, therefore, possible to agree with the respondents contention that because of want of attendance or progress certificate, the petitioner can be sent out of the college by the issue of transfer and conduct certificates. 8. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, the respondents learned counsel refers to the following clause relating to the admission of students in the college found in page 10 of the College Calendar for the year 1975-1976. 8. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, the respondents learned counsel refers to the following clause relating to the admission of students in the college found in page 10 of the College Calendar for the year 1975-1976. “Clause 8:—Students of the College seeking re-admission into the college should also apply for admission in the prescribed form. The re-admission is not a matter of right, but will be entirely at the discretion of the principal. This also applies to students who may be detained for lack of attendance.” It is true the said clause says that students who may be detained for lack of attendance should again seek readmission by applying for admission in the prescribed form and that the readmission is not a matter of right but is entirely at the discretion of the principal. In my view this clause is inconsistent with the said regulation which seems to say that the penalty, if any, for not earning the required attendance or the progress certificate by a first year student in a degree course is to require him to join the first year class again for another full year. It does not contemplate a student again applying for and getting admission to the course of study to which he has already been admitted. The respondent college is affiliated to the University of Madras and, therefore, the rules for admission cannot be inconsistent with the regulations prescribed by the University. 9. In this case, except saying that the petitioner had not acquired the requisite attendance and progress certificate, no other allegation has been made against him. The issue of a transfer certificate along with a conduct certificate asking the petitioner to apply afresh for admission to a suitable first degree class at the commencement of the next academic year at any college is virtually an order of expulsion from the college. As already stated, the course of study to which the petitioner has been admitted has not come to an end nor the petitioner has asked for a transfer and conduct certificates to enable him to apply for the same course or for a different course in any other college. I am not therefore inclined to agree with the respondent that the issue of transfer and conduct certificates in this case will not amount to expulsion. I am not therefore inclined to agree with the respondent that the issue of transfer and conduct certificates in this case will not amount to expulsion. Though the word expulsion is not used in the order, the order has resulted practically in the expulsion of the petitioner from the college, in that the petitioner has been sent out of the first year class against his will. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the respondent-college not being a public authority is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, the petitioner cannot get any relief in this writ proceeding. The learned counsel refers to the decision in Swapan Roy v. Khagendra Nath A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 520 wherein the Caloutta High Court held that a rule against a principal of a private college cannot be issued, that the fact that the college is affiliated to and receives grant from the University or is obliged to conform to the conditions contained in the statutes, Ordinances or Regulations issued by the University will not make the principal of a college a public officer or the college a statutory body and that, therefore, no writ will be issued against the principal of such a college. 11. In Sekkilar v. Krishnamoorthy (1951) (2) M.L.J. 568 Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) while dealing with a similar objection has, however, stated that the principal of an educational institution maintained from the funds of a public trust, affiliated to the University and as such governed by the rules to the University, and administered under a scheme framed by High Court, is a person holding a quasi public office, and, amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. In that case a student of the Pachiappas college run by the Pachiappas charities, a public charitable endowment was expelled. The student filed an application for a writ of mandamus directing the principal to re-admit him in the College, on the ground that he has a legal right to continue his studies in the college, and that the action of the principal in sending him out of the college was arbitrary and against the fundamental principles of natural justice. A preliminary objection was however taken by the principal of the college that an application for mandamus cannot be maintained against a private institution. A preliminary objection was however taken by the principal of the college that an application for mandamus cannot be maintained against a private institution. Dealing with this objection, the learned Judge referred to Chapter VIII of the Madras Educational Rules providing for disciplinary Regulations in regard to Colleges, particularly Rules 93 and 97 enabling Headmasters of Schools and Principals of colleges to exercise the power to inflict various punishments in the interest of the students or of the institutions concerned such at fine, less of attendance, loss of term certificates, suspension and expulsion and also the disciplinary Regulations of the University and expressed the view that the College being a public institution and governed by the Madras Educational Rules and by the disciplinary Regulations issued by the University, the Principal should be taken to be holding a quash-public office and is bound to discharge his duties in accordance with the rules governing the institution and regulating his conduct. The learned Judge referred to the following observations, of Bayley, J. in King v. Benchers of Lineolns Inn 107 B.B.K.B. 1277. “They make their own rules as to the admission of members and even if they act capriciously upon the subject, this Court can give no remedy in such a case, because in fact there has been no violation of any right. This case it analogous to that of a college,” and expressed that there is an essential distinction between admission to a college and illegal removal or expulsion from the college, that in the latter case, if the principal had acted arbitrarily or contrary to the rules, the student has got a right to compel the principal to follow the rules and regulators and to allow him to continue to study in the college. After referring to the relevant case law on the subject, the learned Judge laid down the following four propositions: “1. Though Article 226 of the Constitution is apparently wide, a writ of mandamus will not issue except to a public or quasi-public body or officer which is under an obligation, statutory or otherwise, to do or refrain from doing anything and which is likely to interfere with the rights of persons. 2. Though Article 226 of the Constitution is apparently wide, a writ of mandamus will not issue except to a public or quasi-public body or officer which is under an obligation, statutory or otherwise, to do or refrain from doing anything and which is likely to interfere with the rights of persons. 2. A student studying in a college has a personal right to continue to study therein till the course is completed or be has otherwise been removed or expelled from the college in strict compliance with the rules governing the institution. 3. The Principal of an institution maintained from the funds of a public trust and affiliated to the University and governed by the rules of the University is certainly a person holding a quasi-public office. 4. As the maintenance of discipline and the standards of behaviour in a body of students in such a college being primarily entrusted to the Principal the High Court will not interfere with his discretion unless it is satisfied on consideration of the entire materials placed before it that the impugned action of the principal is arbitrary and is due to mala fide exercise of discretion actuated by extraneous circumstances.” With respect, I am in entire agreement with the principles laid down in the said decision. The decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to above runs counter to the views expressed in the above Madras Case and it does not also contain, if I may say so with respect, any detailed discussion on the point. In Universityof Madrasv. Nagalingam (1968) 2 M.L.J. 251 a Bench of this Court held that an acedemie authority is imposing a punishment is not merely discharging an administrative act but is functioning as a quasi-judicial Tribunal. In Joseph Thambaraj v. Goverment Arts College (1968) I M.L.J. 120 Kailasam, J. had held that the Government Arts College which is run by the Government with public funds and governed by the Madras Educational Rules and the disciplinary Regulations issued by the Univesity is a public institution and the principal who is holding a quasi-public office is bound to discharge his duties in accordance with the rules. It is true in that case the institutions was run by the Government, but the reasoning of the learned Judge equally applies to the institutions run by a public trust while exercising their disciplinary authority. It is true in that case the institutions was run by the Government, but the reasoning of the learned Judge equally applies to the institutions run by a public trust while exercising their disciplinary authority. In Films Division, Bombay v. R.M. Seshadri 1973 II L.L.J. 444. A Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a contention that the Court has no power to issue a rule under Article 226 against the private arbitrator expressed the view that the terminology of Article 226 is wide that the Court has power to issue a writ or direction to any person or authority, that though once Courts were exercised over the limitations of the English writs those limitations need not necessarily apply to the wider concept of the power under Article 226 and that, therefore, a private arbitrator who acts as a quasi-judicial body entrusted with the task of deciding a dispute between two contesting parties involving rights and liabilities, the Court is empowerered to issue rule against such a private arbitrator. The Supreme Court in BoardHigh Schoolv. Ghanshyam A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 had held that an examination committee exercising its powers in cancelling the results of the students and debarring them from appearing for further examination was acting quasi-judicially and, therefore, the principles of natural justice have to be followed before a student is so debarred. 12. In this case, admittedly the respondent-college is run by a public trust and its disciplinary jurisdiction is both under the Madras Educational Rules as well as under the Disciplinary Regulations framed by the University. The petitioner who has been admitted to a course of study has been abruptly asked to discontinue the course and seek admission afresh for that course or any ether course in this or any other college, lock as abrupt termination of the petitioners course of study is said to be only on the ground that the petitioner has not acquired the requisite progress report in the first year. As already stated that will enable the respondent to detain the student in the first year, bat not to remove him from the course itself. Even the impugned order shows that the petitioner has been detained in the first year. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the respondent is directed to permit the petitioner to undergo the first year B.Com. Even the impugned order shows that the petitioner has been detained in the first year. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the respondent is directed to permit the petitioner to undergo the first year B.Com. course for a fresh period of one year as par Regulation 10 of Chapter 39. There will be no order as to costs.