Judgment :- 1. The interesting question of law raised in this writ petition is whether a company registered under the Companies Act is a'person' entitled to avail of the provisions contained in S.75(3) or the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, if other conditions are satisfied. 2. The petitioner is a company registered under the Travancore Companies Act, 9 of 1114, as a company limited by guarantee but without the addition of the word 'Limited' to the name, as per licence dated 4th July, 1946 issued by the former Government of Travancore in its favour. The objects of the petitioner are to promote the economic, spiritual, educational and religious interests of the members of the community, to espouse the cause of its members in various fields and to strive for the general welfare of the Vala Community, as detailed in the memorandum of association of the company. The petitioner has its registered office at Vaikom. The activities of the petitioner are controlled by the Board of Directors, from their office at Vaikom. Its main assets are situate in Vaikom. The real business is carried on and central management and control actually abide at the registered office at Vaikom. 3. The contention raised by the petitioner is that in view of its activities, it has to be held that it resides at Vaikom where it keeps house and does business. An extent of about 44 cents in Sy. No. 199/22 out of the only property of the petitioner in Vaikom had been acquired by the Government for the purpose of constructing Police Quarters. The remaining land in the possession of the petitioner was inadequate and as there was a kudikidappukaran in the said property, it was felt that the construction of the office building of the petitioner cannot be undertaken or completed in the remaining property available with the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, made an application to the respondent the State of Kerala on 18th August, 1970 under S.75 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for acquisition of land for shifting the kudikidappukaran. This petition was rejected by the Government as per Ext. P1 order No. 1902/T3/73/RD of the Revenue (T) Department dated 181973. For understanding the stand taken by the Government, Para.2 of Ext. This petition was rejected by the Government as per Ext. P1 order No. 1902/T3/73/RD of the Revenue (T) Department dated 181973. For understanding the stand taken by the Government, Para.2 of Ext. P1 order is reproduced below: "You have applied on behalf of the Akila Kerala Vala Samithy for acquisition of land under S.75 (3) of the KLR Act, 1963. Though the Samithy may come under the expression "person" as defined in the Act, the primary requirement of sub-section (3) of S.75 is that the person holding the land shall require "the land occupied by such kudikidappu for constructing a building for his own residence." This requirement can be satisfied only with respect to a natural person and not to a Samithy like yours which is an artificial juristic person. As such the provision is intended only for natural persons. Therefore, the definition of the expression "person" will not apply to the context in which that expression is used in S.75 (3). Consequently the benefit of the sub-section is not available to your Samithy. In the circumstances, your application cited is rejected." 4. The term "person" is defined in S.2 (43) of the Act as follows: "'person' shall include a company, family, joint family, association or other body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; and any institution capable of holding property;" The relevant portion of S.75 (3) reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), where the total extent of land held by a person, either as owner or as tenant, is less than one acre and there is a kudikidappu on any land held by him, he may, if he requires the land occupied by such kudikidappu for constructing a building far his own residence, apply to the Government for the acquisition of land to which the kudikidappu may be shifted: Mrs. Usha Sukumaran, counsel for the petitioner submits that in the light of the definition in S.2 (43) and the wording used in sub-section (3) of S.75 the interpretation sought to be given by the Government in Ext. P1 order cannot be sustained. Usha Sukumaran, counsel for the petitioner submits that in the light of the definition in S.2 (43) and the wording used in sub-section (3) of S.75 the interpretation sought to be given by the Government in Ext. P1 order cannot be sustained. It is particularly argued by the counsel that where a contrary intention not to include a company within the purview of S.75 (3) is not made in any of the provisions of the Act, the stand taken by the Government cannot be considered to have any legal basis.' In an attempt to establish that it is possible for companies to have residence, certain decisions have been cited. In De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited v. Howe (1906 (2) Law Reports, Appeal Cases 455) the observation is as follows: "I cannot adopt Mr. Cohou's contention. In applying the conception of residence to a company, we ought, I think, to proceed as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A company cannot eat or sleep, but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does business An individual may be of foreign nationality, and yet reside in the United Kingdom. So may a company. Otherwise it might have its chief seat of management and its centre of trading in England under the protection of English law, and yet escape the appropriate taxation by the simple expedient of being registered abroad and distributing its dividends abroad. The decision of Kelly C. B. and Huddleston B. in the Calcutta Juto Mills v. Nicholson (1) and the Cesena Sulphur Co. v.Nicholson (1), now thirty years age, involved the principle that a company resides for purposes of income tax where its real business is carried on. Those decisions have been acted upon ever since. I regard that as the true rule, and the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually abides." In Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Those decisions have been acted upon ever since. I regard that as the true rule, and the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually abides." In Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. v. Todd (1929 Law Reports, Appeal Cases 1) at page 17 there is the following observation: "It is I think plain that your Lordships' house affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the first of these two grounds only, for the Lord Chancellor says (2): 'An individual may clearly have more than one residence ...and on principle there appears to be no reason why a company should not be in the same position. The central management and control of a company may be divided, and it may 'keep house and do business' in more than one place; and if so, it may have more than one residence'" At page 19 of the said decision it is stated as follows: "How then do the learned Barons deal with the point thus clearly raised before them? On p. 445, Kelly C. B. answers the question, 'what is the meaning of the word 'residing' as applied to a joint stock company?' thus: 'whether there may or may not be more than one place at which the same joint stock company can reside, I express no opinion at present a joint stock company resides where its place of incorporation is, where the meetings of the whole company are held and where its governing body meets in bodily presence ' and exercises the powers conferred upon it" Reliance is also placed on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (64 Commonwealth Law Reports 241). The passage cited is at page 246 and reads as follows: "It is unnecessary for me to traverse again the 'weary road of the tax cases.' A company may be a 'resident' for the purpose of Income Tax Acts and it may have more than one residence for the purposes of these Acts. A company resides 'wherever it keeps house and does business"." 5. In Para.5 of the writ petition it is clearly stated that the petitioner is having its registered office and central management and other activities at Vaikom where the property in question is situate and where the petitioner wants to construct an office for its residence. A company resides 'wherever it keeps house and does business"." 5. In Para.5 of the writ petition it is clearly stated that the petitioner is having its registered office and central management and other activities at Vaikom where the property in question is situate and where the petitioner wants to construct an office for its residence. As there is no indication whatsoever that the legislature intended to take the companies out of the purview of S.75(3) of the Act, I am constrained to hold that the view expressed by the Government in Ext. P-1 order cannot be sustained. Ext. P-1 is therefore quashed and the respondent State of Kerala is directed to go into the question afresh giving opportunity to the petitioner to make its representations. The writ petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.