Judgment :- 1. The Plaintiff is the appellant before me. He filed O.S. No. 752 of 1969 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Poonamallee for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the irrigation rights over the suit well beyond their own holding in S. No. 209 of Srinivasapuram village. 2. According to the plaintiff, he was the absolute owner of S. No. 209/1 covering an extent of 32 cents and another 21 cents on the eastern side, while the defendants were the owners of 12 cents comprised in S. No. 2092. In the property of the defendants there is an irrigation well, which is the common source of irrigation for the entire extent of 65 cents in S. No. 2091. To the extent of the plaintiffs holding, he will be entitled to take water. The defendants have attempted to take water to the other fields also, and hence, the suit. 3. In defence, it was contended that according to the custom and usage of the village on a co-operative basis betel vine cultivation was carried on, and along with the suit well, there are three other wells and water from all these wells is taken, for irrigating the various survey numbers. It is not correct to contend that the suit well irrigates only these two survey numbers. There is no exclusive right as far as the plaintiff is concerned. The third defendant and 19th Pangudharars were raising betel vine in 10 acres and for all these lands, water was supplied only from the well in S. No. 209/2. The dispute arose because the defendants wanted to install an electric motor instead of an oil pump for drawing water. 4. The learned District Munsif, on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed and accordingly he decreed the suit. On appeal, in A.S. No. 106 of 1972, the learned Subordinate Judge of Chingleput, reversed the judgment of the trial Court, and hence, the present second appeal. 5. It is the contention of Mr. On appeal, in A.S. No. 106 of 1972, the learned Subordinate Judge of Chingleput, reversed the judgment of the trial Court, and hence, the present second appeal. 5. It is the contention of Mr. K. Parasaran, learned Counsel for the appellant that the defendants have no consistent case, in one breath they will go to the extent of contending that the well belonged to the Mudaliar Community and on that basis of common ownership they have put forth the plea of injunction, and in other breath they would set up a customary easement. In the instant case, there cannot be any easementary right at all, nor can there be a valid custom. In addition to the above, there were also certain prior proceedings from which it will be clear that the defendants case is not true. 6. Mr. K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that whatever may be the case of the defendants, as plaintiff, it is the duty of the appellant, to establish that water from the suit well cannot be taken to the other lands. So long as the water supply to the plaintiff is not, in any way, diminished by reason of the defendants taking water to the other survey fields, he will not be entitled to the relief of injunction. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relies on the ruling in Subbiah v. Ramaswamy A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 42: 85 L.W. 659. 7. On a consideration of the above arguments, I have little hesitation to accept the contention put forth on behalf of the appellant that there cannot be any custom in this case. At one stage, 600 Pangudarars are said to have acquired this customary right, while at another stage it is stated that only 19 Pangudarars have raised betal vine along with the third defendant. Such a fluctuating body cannot acquire customary easement. The defendants have also failed to prove that the suit well belonged to the Mudaliar Community people. But the question here is slightly different. The plaintiff also has not proved that the suit well was exclusively meant to feed only an extent of 65 cents comprised in S. No. 209. This is the categoric finding of the lower appellate Court and I see no reason to differ from the same. Therefore, it will follow that the suit well is a common well. The plaintiff also has not proved that the suit well was exclusively meant to feed only an extent of 65 cents comprised in S. No. 209. This is the categoric finding of the lower appellate Court and I see no reason to differ from the same. Therefore, it will follow that the suit well is a common well. Under those circumstances as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is for the plaintiff to prove that by reason of the defendants taking water to other survey numbers, he is not getting adequate supply. Therefore, so far as the plaintiff has not suffered any damages by the action of the defendants, he will not be entitled to the injunctions prayed for. 8. In this connection, I may usefully refer to the decision of Palaniswamy, J, in Subbiah v. Ramaswamy A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 42: 85 L.W. 659 where it has been held thus: “The question for consideration is whether the defendants, the common owners of the channel are entitled to use it, during their turn of enjoyment for taking water from their exclusive well. The plaintiff has not alleged in the plaint nor has he let in evidence to show that by the use of the common channel by the defendants for taking water from their well, his right is in any way affected. Nor is it his case that by such user, the channel is in any way or is likely to be damaged or injured. All that he contends is that the common channel is intended to be used only for taking water from the common well and that the defendants cannot use the channel to take water from their exclusive well. Mr. M.S. Venkatarma Iyer, appearing for the appellant-plaintiff, contended that in principle this case is in no way different from a case of the enjoyment of a common well by a co-owner to irrigate a land which was not previously irrigated by the well prior to the partition between co-owners, and argued that if a co-owner of a well cannot use the well to irrigate a land which was not previously irrigated by that well in the same way, the co-owner of a common channel cannot use it for the purpose of taking water from a well which does not belong in common to the owners of the common channel. In support of this argument, he relied upon the decision in Sivarama Pillai v. Maricham Pillai 2. In that case, Ramaraurti, J. on a review of the case law, held that when a well or some source of irrigation irrigates lands belonging to several persons, the source of irrigation cannot be divorced or dissociated from the lands and that irrespective of the question of damage, the plaintiff, one co-owner would be entitled to an injunction to restrain another co-owner from using the well to irrigate some other land, no the simple ground that the defendant has no right to use the water for irrigating other lands. The learned Judge has pointed out the uniform trend of decisions of this Court not to permit the co-owner to irrigate any and newly-acquired by him. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge followed a Bench decision of this Court in Venkatarama Sastri v. Venkatanarasayya A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 25. That was a case of a tank in an agraharam. The defendants in that case attempted to take water from the lank to convert their dry lands in the village into wet lands by using the tank water. The plaintiffs, the common owners of the tank, prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from using the water for that purpose. Though, in that case, the plaintiffs had proved that they had suffered damage on account of such use of water by defendants, the Bench held that the plaintiffs would be entitled to an injunction even if no damage had been proved. In that view, it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction. The principle is that the right to the water in the well is co-extensive with the right to irrigate a particular land. The right in the well is inseparably connected with the land. All the cases in which the same view was taken are referred to by Ramamurti, J. in 1970-1 M.L.J. 376 and it is unnecessary to repeat them here.” It was further held in paragraph 4 of the same judgment as follows: “When co-owners, at the time of partition, set apart a portion of the common property to be used as common for the beneficial enjoyment of their respective shares, that involves a dedication by each of them of a portion of the property, which, but for such dedication, would become his exclusive property. Each of such co-owners of the common property is entitled to use the property in the way most advantaging and beneficial to him without at the same time, causing any injury or detriment to the other co-owners. It is for such a co-owner to decide in what way he could so use the common property to his maximum advantage. It is not for the other co-owners to dictate in what manner the other co-owner should enjoy the common property by one co-owner does not materially interfere with the use of the property b y the other co: owners or affect their rights or in any way weaken, damages or injure the common property. Such Co-owners are not entitled to prevent the other co-owner from using the common property in the way most beneficial to him.” 9. Therefore, though not for the same reason as laid down by the lower appellate Court, but on a different reasoning, as found above, I see no merit in the second appeal and consequently, it will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. No leave.