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Allahabad High Court · body

1975 DIGILAW 618 (ALL)

Banketswar Shukla v. State Of U. P.

1975-12-05

R.L.GULATI

body1975
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner was appointed as Medical Officer Incharge, Temkuhiraj Dispensary, district Deoria, by the Adyaksh, Zila Parishad, Deoria, by an order dated August 27, 1966. The petitioner was latter confirmed in that post by the Zila Parishad by an order dated November 12, 1969 with effect from October 24, 1969.' On October 11, 1974 the State Government issued an order where under the allopathic dispensary of Temkuhiraj, district Deoria, was provincialised and the hospital along with its equipments became the State Government hospital. In pursuance of that order the Zila Parishad, Deoria, transferred the hospital to the State Government through a registered transfer-deed dated November 4, 1974. Under the order dated October 11, 1974 all the employees of the hospital were given an option to become Government servants within three months. THE petitioner being Incharge of the hospital also had the option to join the Government service within a period of three months. But after about 25 days, the petitioner was served with a notice asking him to hand over the charge of the Medical Officer to Dr. Parmod Kumar Rai, opposite party No. 5. 2. The petitioner's grievance is that he was not allowed to exercise his option to enter the Government service and without any prior notice, he was dislodged from his post. THE petitioner has alleged mala fides against the third and the fourth respondents. But it is not necessary to deal with this contention because the petition is entitled to succeed on another ground. 3. In the transfer-deed dated November 4, 1974 there is clause 2 which reads: - "2. That the transferee hereby covenants with the transferor that he will maintain and run the hospital in an efficient condition and will take over the staff at present employed by the transferor on the terms and conditions prescribed by the State Government for such employees, and will also pay the charges, if any, for the preparation, execution and registration of this deed." 4. It is clear from this clause that the transferee, namely, the State Government was obliged to take over the entire staff working in the hospital on the terms and conditions to be prescribed by the State Government. In my opinion, the State Government had no option whatsoever. It was bound to take over all the employees. It is clear from this clause that the transferee, namely, the State Government was obliged to take over the entire staff working in the hospital on the terms and conditions to be prescribed by the State Government. In my opinion, the State Government had no option whatsoever. It was bound to take over all the employees. It was not open to the State Government to refuse to take over an employee on the ground that he did not possess the necessary qualifications. It was not a case of a fresh appointment with the Government. It was a case of absorption of an employee of the Zila Parishad into the Government service. The Zila Parishad might have prescribed its own qualifications while making the recruitment, but once the Zila Parishad had engaged an employee on the basis of the qualifications prescribed by it, it was not open to the Government to prescribe fresh qualifications for purpose of absorbing the employee in the Government service, otherwise the very purpose of clause 2 of the transfer-deed would be frustrated. 5. The contention that the petitioner was not a party to the transfer-deed and as such was not entitled to invoke any of its clauses is misconceived. The agreement, indeed, was between the Zila Parishad and the State Government. But the petitioner along with other employees of the Zila Parishad was a beneficiary, under the deed of transfer. Clause 2 was clearly meant to protect and safeguard the interest of the existing staff of the Zila Parishad employed in the hospital. 6. According to the respondents, the petitioner was not fit for taking over in the P.M.S. cadre of the Government service, because he did not possess the necessary qualification. The necessary qualification, according to them, for entry in the P.M.S. is a degree of M.B.B.S. (Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery). The petitioner is Ayurvedacharya, Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (A.B., M.S.). It is difficult to understand how the petitioner does not possess the necessary qualifications. He is a Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery and over and above he is also Ayurvedacharya. Merely because the petitioner possesses the degree of A.B., M.S. (Ayurvedacharya Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery), he cannot be said to be disqualified. Indeed Le seems to be a better qualified than mere M.B., B.S. 7. He is a Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery and over and above he is also Ayurvedacharya. Merely because the petitioner possesses the degree of A.B., M.S. (Ayurvedacharya Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery), he cannot be said to be disqualified. Indeed Le seems to be a better qualified than mere M.B., B.S. 7. That apart, in my opinion, before the petitioner could be dislodged from his post, he ought to have been given a notice to show cause so that he could prove to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned that he was equally, if not better, qualified than an ordinary M.B.B.S. This admittedly has not been done and, in my opinion, the petitioner is rightly aggrieved. If a person is to be deprived of his post on the ground that he does not possess the necessary qualification, he must be given a prior notice and a hearing. That is the minimum requirement of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, under the notification of October 11, 1974, every employee of the hospital including the petitioner had been given three months' time within which to exercise the option. This time could not be curtailed, nor could the petitioner be denied the opportunity of exercising his option. The question whether the petitioner possessed the necessary qualification or not could arise when he exercised his option. 8. For all these reasons, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Deputy Chief Medical Officer of Health dated November 4, 1974, Annexure 'III' to the writ petition is quashed. The petitioner shall be treated to have continued in service and he should be paid the emoluments to which he is entitled. I, however, make no order as to costs.