D. P. DESAI, N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these appeals which arise out of the two different suits filed by the appellant in both the appeals who is common against the respondents raise the question relating to bar of limitation Both the suits were disposed of by the learned Civil Judge who tried them on the preliminary issue relating to this bar of limitation. The learned Judge having held that both the suits were barred by limitation dismissed them. He did not decide other issues. ( 2 ) FIRST Appeal No. 84 of 1969 arises from Special Civil Suit No. 6 of 1966 for recovery of Rs. 22 65 Ps. The cause of action for recovery of this amount as not disputed by both the sides before the trial Court arose in September 1957 The suit came to be filed on March 30 1966 First Appeal No. 8f of 1969 arises from Special Civil Suit No. 7 of 1966 filed for recovery of Rs 20 422 Ps. Here again it was not disputed before the trial Court that the cause of action arose on August 6 1956 and the suit was filed on April 4 1966 The claim in both the suits arose out of an alleged over-payment or excess payment said to have been made by the plaintiff in each of the two suits to the concerned defendant. The suits were therefore for the recovery of this excess amount in each of the two suits. It was the Central Government prior to the enactment of the Major Port Trusts Act 1963 (hereafter referred to as the Act) which was entitled to recover this amount as its dues from the concerned defendant The Act came into force on February 29 1964 and by virtue of sec. 29 thereof the Board of Trustees under the Act became entitled to recover these dues of the Central Government. Therefore in each of the two suits instead of the Central Government the Board figuring as the plaintiff filed the suit. It is this contingency which has raised the question of limitation before the trial Court and before us. 29 thereof the Board of Trustees under the Act became entitled to recover these dues of the Central Government. Therefore in each of the two suits instead of the Central Government the Board figuring as the plaintiff filed the suit. It is this contingency which has raised the question of limitation before the trial Court and before us. It is not in dispute that if these two suits were filed by the Central Government prior to the enactment of the Act the period of limitation for recovery of these dues would have been 30 years as per Article 112 of the Limitation Act of 1963. Therefore the right of the Central Government to recover these dues on account of the alleged over-payments subsisted right upto the date of coming into force of the Act. In each of the two suits however the Board being a corporate body cannot claim benefit of Article 112 which provides for the period of limitation for suits by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is not disputed before us that to a suit of like nature by a private person against another private person the correct article applicable would be article 113 which provides for the period of limitation for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule. It prescribes three years and the period commences when the right to sue accrues. The plea of limitation in the peculiar circumstances of this case came to be raised in this form. In each case the cause of action having accrued more than three years prior to the institution of the suit the suit was barred as contemplated by article 113 of the Limitation Act because the right to sue accrued in 1956 in one case and in 1957 in the other. The learned trial Judge agreeing with this contention decided the preliminary issue relating to limitation in favour of the diffident and against the plaintiff in each of the two suits. Hence these appeals. ( 3 ) IT is quite clear that the question of limitation has to be decided on the reply to another question viz. when the right to sue accrued to the Board in the present case ? Hence these appeals. ( 3 ) IT is quite clear that the question of limitation has to be decided on the reply to another question viz. when the right to sue accrued to the Board in the present case ? Normally in case of transfer whether by an act inter vivos or operation of law relating to property including the right to sue the transfer or operation of law will not make the period of limitation start afresh on the basis that so far as the transferee is concerned the right to sue accrued to him only by virtue of the transfer and could not have accrued to him prior to that. In those cases the right to sue having accrued in favour of the predecessor-in-title of the trans- feree the period of limitation having commenced to run does not stop. In deciding these appeals we cannot go against this settled position of law. But then the contention raised before us on behalf of the appellant is quite different. ( 4 ) THE contention is that sec. 29 of the Act confers a new or a statutory right on the plaintiff to sue for moneys due to the Central Government or as the case may be the other authority in relation to the port immediately before the appointed day i-e. the date on which the Act came into force. It is submitted that this being a new right conferred by sec. 29 of the Act limitation for enforcing this right commences from the date the Act came into force; and therefore each of the two suits having been filed within three years from February 29 1964 is within time. In support of this contention reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on clauses (a) (d) and (e) of sec. 29. In reply the learned advocate for the respondent relied upon clause (b) of that section as well We will therefore reproduce all these four clauses:29 Transfer of assets and liabilities of Central Government etc. In support of this contention reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on clauses (a) (d) and (e) of sec. 29. In reply the learned advocate for the respondent relied upon clause (b) of that section as well We will therefore reproduce all these four clauses:29 Transfer of assets and liabilities of Central Government etc. to Board; (1) As from the appointed day in relation to any port (a) all property assets and funds vested in the Central Government or as the case may be any other authority for the purposes of the port immediately before such day shall vest in the Board; (b) all debts obligations and liabilities incurred all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by with or for the Central Government or as the case may be the other authority immediately before such day for or in connection with the purposes of the port shall be deemed to have been incurred entered into and engaged to be done by with or for the Board; (d) all rates fees rents and other sums of money due to the Central Government or as the case may be the other authority in relation to the port immediately before such day shall be deemed to be due to the Board; (e) all suits and other legal proceedings instituted by or against the Central Government or as the case may be other authority immediately before such day for any matter in relation to the port may be continued by or against the Board;after having considered the various clauses of sec 29 of the Act we have found that the present suits would fall under clause (d) of sec. 29; and we will have an occasion to examine the question whether that clause confers any new right on the plaintiff to sue for the sums mentioned therein. But before we do that we must deal with the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent that the present two suits would fall within clause (b ). Clause (b) deals with two types of matters viz. But before we do that we must deal with the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent that the present two suits would fall within clause (b ). Clause (b) deals with two types of matters viz. (i) all debts obligations and liabilities incurred by the Central Government or as the case may be the other authority immediately before the appointed day and (ii) all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by with or for the Central Government or as the case may be the other authority immediately before the appointed day. The learned advocate for the respondent relied upon the second out of the aforesaid two categories of clause (b) submitting that the claim in each of the two suits arose out of a contract with the respective defendant entered into by the Central Government. Therefore runs the argument the suits which related to over-payments made in the course of performance of these contracts by both the sides would fall under clause (b ). In our opinion clause (b) is not applicable to the present suits firstly because it does not provide for moneys due to the Central Government as specifically contemplated by clause (d ). Clause (b) only provides inter alia that the contracts entered into by with or for the Central Government shall be deemed to have been entered into by with or for the Board. The clause does not provide for vesting of any dues in relation to these contracts. Then the other contention raised on behalf of the respondent is that in that case the right to recover the dues as alleged by the plaintiff in each of the two suits will vest in the Board under clause (a) and clause (d) will not be applicable because the sums sought to be recovered in each of the suits become due out of over payments or excess payments alleged to have been made to the defendant and are not in the nature of rates fees or rents as contemplated by clause (d ). The conten- tion was that other sums of money occurring in clause (d) should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words rates fees rents. It was maintained by the learned advocate for the respondent that all these three categories of charges have common genus viz. The conten- tion was that other sums of money occurring in clause (d) should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words rates fees rents. It was maintained by the learned advocate for the respondent that all these three categories of charges have common genus viz. charges for service rendered; and therefore the words other sums of money must be referable to service rendered. It is not possible to accept this contention raised on behalf of the respondent as well. In the first place it is not shown to us that the sums of money other than rates fees and rents would become due to the Central Government by way of service rendered under any of the provisions of the Act apart from the provisions expressly relating to the rates fees and rents. The rule as to ejusdem generis interpretation is well settled since long; and as observed by the Supreme Court in AMAR CHANDRA V. EXCISE COLLECTOR TRIPURA A. I. R. 1972 SUPREME COURT PAGE 1863 this rule applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subject of the enumeration constitutes a class or category; (iii) that class or only is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. As stated above it is not shown to us that the class or category which is said to be se vice charges in the present case is not exhausted by the enumeration of the three words rates fees and rents and that there are some charges in the nature of service charges which are not included within these three words. In fact if we go by the definition of the word rate as contained in the Act itself we find that term to include any toll due rent rate fee or charge leviable under the Act. (vide clause (v) of sec 2 of the Act ). It is also not shown to us that under any prior enactment before the appointed day the charges in the nature of service charges not falling under the specific words rates fees and rents were payable to the central Govern- ment. In fact in our opinion the words states fees and rents cannot and do not form a class or genus by themselves. In fact in our opinion the words states fees and rents cannot and do not form a class or genus by themselves. Therefore it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that other sums of money due to the Central Government in relation to the part immediately before the appointed day would not include the moneys which became due to the Central Government under the general law arising from the excess payment to the concerned defendant. It was also urged that clause (d) does not apply because these monies alleged to be due to the Central Government have become vested in the Board under clause (a) and therefore the Board became entitled to the right to recover these moneys by the operation of law. Irrespective of the question whether the amounts for which the present suits have been filed would vest in the Board under clause (a) and assuming with the respondent that they do vest in the Board clause (d) would still hold the field in the present case because the sums of money for which the two suits have been filed are covered by the expression other sums of money due to the Central Government in relation to the port immediately before such day. These sums of moneys are due to the Central Government in relation to the port because the claim in each of the two suits arises out of an activity undertaken by the Central Government prior to the appointed day in relation to the port. It is out of this port activity of the Central Government that payments to the defendant involving over payments were made. Thus having held that the two suits would be covered by clause (d) of sec. 29 of the Act we may now examine the contention of the appellant in each of the two appeals that clause (d) confers a new right on the Board to recover dues of the Central Government by resorting to the statutory fiction. It is quite clear that the said clause does not restrict itself to dues of the Central Government recovery of which by the Board under the general law of limitation would not become barred. The Legislature in making this provision which we may say at this stage we have not been able to find in another Act viz. It is quite clear that the said clause does not restrict itself to dues of the Central Government recovery of which by the Board under the general law of limitation would not become barred. The Legislature in making this provision which we may say at this stage we have not been able to find in another Act viz. Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 intended that other sums of money recoverable by the Central Government would not become recoverable by the Board by virtue of the fiction enacted in clause (d ). The question which arises is what is the meaning of the words due to the Central Government. Do they mean merely payable to the Central Government or due in the sense of their recoverability by the Central Government ? It is obvious that these words do not carry the sense of payability alone. If we attribute that sense to these words then clause (d) would only constitute the Board an agent of the Central Government for the purpose of payment so that the payment of the dues to the Board will give effective discharge from the liability to the person making the payment. Now to constitute the Board an agent of the Central Government for the purpose of payability of the dues alone would be rather contrary to the object of the Legislature in vesting all properties assets and funds vested in the Central Government into the Board by virtue of the clause (a) of sec. 29. We are therefore of the opinion that the words due to the Central Government are used to mean recoverable by the Central Government. The relevant portion of clause (d) if expressed in this sense would read all rates fees rents and other sums of money recoverable by the Central Government shall be deemed to be recoverable by the Board. This ill our opinion would give a statutory right to the Board to recover the dues of the Central Government and would not be a mere case of transfer of the right vested in the Central Government under general law. This ill our opinion would give a statutory right to the Board to recover the dues of the Central Government and would not be a mere case of transfer of the right vested in the Central Government under general law. In fact when the Legislature vested all the properties assets and funds of the Central Government into the Board by clause (a) there was no need to make a separate provision as contained in clause (d) unless the object was to confer a statutory right on the Board to recover rates fees rents and other sums of money due to the Central Government. This is because vesting of all properties and assets under clause (a) would carry with it the right to enforce the recoverability as would be exercised by the Central Government under the general law. Clause (e) provides for continuance of all suits and legal proceedings by the Board or against the Board which suits and legal proceedings have been instituted by or against the Central Government or as the case may be other authority immediately before the appointed day. The Legislature thus provided for the continuance of actions already instituted by the Central Government which action in a ease like the present would not become barred by limitation. Thus if the Central Government had filed the suits for recovery of these amounts prior to the appointed day the Board would have been entitled to continue those suits by virtue of clause (e) and it is obvious that the claim in the suit as instituted by the Central Government would not become barred by virtue of the Board becoming entitled to continue the suit. Thus by clause (d) the Legislature provided for enforcement of recoverability of rates fees rents and other sums of money due to the Central Government by the Board; for which no suits were filed by the Central Government; and clause (e) saved all the legal proceedings instituted by the Central Government including the proceedings for recovery of moneys including rates fees rents and other sums of money due to the Central Government. The object of the Legislature in providing for vesting of properties and assets in the Board was to see that the Board is enabled to continue the suits already instituted and to file suits for recovery where they have not been instituted. The object of the Legislature in providing for vesting of properties and assets in the Board was to see that the Board is enabled to continue the suits already instituted and to file suits for recovery where they have not been instituted. This object of vesting all properties and assets of the Central Government in the Board would be frustrated if clause (d) is not interpreted in the sense that we have interpreted. It is obvious that the Central Government not having been bound by the ordinary period of limitation and having advantage of a period of limitation of 30 years under art. 112 may have allowed the ordinary period of three years to elapse with the result that the provisions of sec. 29 of the Act would in a sense deprive the Central Government of these very dues on account of the bar of limitation as applicable to the Board. It was with a view to see that the vesting made by clause (a) of sec. 29 is made effective that the Legislature conferred by clause (d) a right of recovery in terms on the Board with respect to rates fees rents and other sums of money due to the Central Government. Any other interpretation or construction would bring about an anomolous position inasmuch as the Board would not be in a position to recover rates fees rents and other sums of money due to the Central Government if the are more than three years old prior to the appointed day whereas it will be called upon to pay all debts obligations and liabilities of the Central Government under clause (b ). We therefore hold that clause (d) which governs the present suit confers a new right on the Board to enforce recoverability of the dues which Prior to the appointed day were recoverable by the Central Government. It is obvious that these dues of the Central Government became the dues of the Board; and therefore the right of their recovery accrues to the Board for the first time on the appointed day. In this view therefore the present suits are clearly within the period of limitation; and there is no dispute about that position. It is obvious that these dues of the Central Government became the dues of the Board; and therefore the right of their recovery accrues to the Board for the first time on the appointed day. In this view therefore the present suits are clearly within the period of limitation; and there is no dispute about that position. If the intention of the Legislature was not to confer a new right of recovery in enacting clause (d) there was no need to resort to the statutory fiction enacted therein because clause (a) would have brought about vesting of these dues in the Board and the Board would have been able to sue for them without resort to any statutory fiction subject to the infirmity in its right to sue on account of lapse of shorter period of limitation. It is with a view to remove this infirmity that specific provision has been made by enacting clause (d) with regard to monies due to the Central Government. ( 5 ) THE learned trial judge relied upon a decision in STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD V. GOVINDRAJULU A. I. R. 1960 MADRAS PAGE 571. The learned advocate for the respondent had also relied upon this decision. This was a decision which arose under the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 and the question which arose was whether the longer period of limitation available to the Government under art. 149 of the old Limitation Act was available to the Board in respect of a suit for compensation for breaking an electric pole. In case of a private party art. 36 would be applicable to such a suit; and the question was whether art. 36 applied or art. 149 ? The learned Single Judge of Madras High Court interpreted sec. 60 of the Electricity (Supply) Act and held that the object of sec. 60 (1) was merely to enable the Board to continue pending suits and legal proceedings and institute fresh ones. He further held that that sub-section did not speak about the period of limitation applicable to institution of suits or proceedings by or against the Board. He refused to hold that the provisions of sub-sec (1) of sec. 60 implied that suits instituted by the Board as a result of that provision would be governed by Art. 149. Now sec. He further held that that sub-section did not speak about the period of limitation applicable to institution of suits or proceedings by or against the Board. He refused to hold that the provisions of sub-sec (1) of sec. 60 implied that suits instituted by the Board as a result of that provision would be governed by Art. 149. Now sec. 60 of the Electricity (Supply) Act which has been reproduced in that decision at page 572 consists of two parts. The first part thereof may be said to correspond to clause (b) of sec. 29 of the Act; and it was the latter part thereof which fell for interpretation in the aforesaid Madras decision. That part reads: and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted or which might but for the issue of the notification under sub-sec. (4) of sec. I have been instituted by or against the State Government may be continued or initiated by or against the Board It was on the interpretation of this provision alone that the Madras High Court rejected the argument about applicability of the larger period of limitation under Art. 149 of the old Limitation Act. In our opinion the Legislature has in terms enacted clause (d) inter alia providing for recovery of moneys due to the Central Government. Such a provision was not there in the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 It is interesting to find that subsequently in the year 1966 the Legislature sought to insert a provision pertaining to saving of period of limitation by inserting sec. 60a in the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 In the present case it would not be necessary to do so in view of clause (d) as interpreted by us: The learned trial Judge has also relief upon some other decisions relating to lands or their grants by the Government to private individuals which lands have been adversely possessed by others. In our opinion the ratio of those decisions is not applicable to the facts of the present case in view of the specific provision contained in clause (d) of sec. 29 of the Act. It is thus clear that both the suits are not barred by limitation. ( 6 ) IN the result First Appeals Nos. 84 and 85 of 1969 are allowed. The decrees passed by the trial Court in each of the two suits from which these First Appeals arise are set aside. 29 of the Act. It is thus clear that both the suits are not barred by limitation. ( 6 ) IN the result First Appeals Nos. 84 and 85 of 1969 are allowed. The decrees passed by the trial Court in each of the two suits from which these First Appeals arise are set aside. It is held that each of the two suits is within time. Each of one suits will now go back to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law on other issues arising therein. Looking to the fact that these appeals succeed on the mere question of interpretation of sec. 29 of the Act and looking to the fact that the suits are not finally disposed of but these appeals it will be just and fair to leave each party to bear its own costs throughout. .