Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 1599 of 1969 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, who succeeded before the trial Judge, but lost before the first appellate Judge is the appellant herein. The appellant was a consignee in respect of two bales of fancy floral paper of the value of Rs. 1536-11 under a railway receipt, despatched from Delhi to Madras through the respondent-railway. The appellant paid the freight of Rs. 113-90 after clearing the railway receipt through bank and presenting it through his clearing agents Kesavalu Naidu Sons at Salt Cottaurs, for delivery of the goods. One of the bales was missing and could not be traced. The other bale had been damaged considerably and could not be taken delivery of and the missing bale had cot been traced till the filing of the suit, and therefore, bad not been delivered to the appellant. The appellant instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 1653-11 made up of the invoice amount, freight charges, back commission and damages. The respondent-railway put forward several defences and ultimately the learned III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, by judgment and decree dated 28th January, 1971 overruled all the defences and decreed the suit as prayed for. 2. The respondent-railway preferred an appeal to the learned Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, and that learned Judge by judgment and decree dated 22nd October, 1971 reversed the conclusion of the learned trial Judge and dismissed the suit instituted by the appellant. Hence, the present second appeal by the plaintiff in the suit. 3. Since the suit was dismissed by the learned Principal Judge solely on the ground that the demand contemplated by S. 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, hereinafter referred to as the Act, had not been made as required by the statutory provisions, the only question that I have to consider in the present case is, whether this conclusion of the learned Principal Judge is correct or not. Sec. 78-B reads as follows: “A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods carried by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf: (a) to the railway administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to he carried by railway, or (b) to the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred, within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway: Provided that any information demanded or inquiry made in writing from, or any complaint made in writing, to any of the railway administrations mentioned above by or on behalf of the person within the said period of six months regarding the non-delivery or delay in delivery of the animals or goods with particulars sufficient to identify the consignment of such animals or goods shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a claim to the refund or compensation.” P.W. 2 on behalf of the clearing agents produced Ex. A-6 laid to be an acknowledgment relieved from a clerk in the office of the Divisional Commercial Superintendent for receipt of the claim preferred and that acknowledgement contains some scribbling said to be an initial of somebody under the date “29/7”. P.W. 2 himself had not stated as to who had initialled it and there is no evidence to show as to who was the person who received the claim and acknowledged it under Ex. A-6. Under these circumstances, the learned Principal Judge tightly came to the conclusion that Ex. A-6 could not constitute an acknowledgement of the demand contemplated by S. 78-B of the Act. 4. However, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that from Ex. A-4, it is clear that the demand or inquiry as contemplated by the proviso to S. 78-B of the Act has been made by the appellant herein. Ex. A-4 is a communication sent by the goods Agent, Salt Cottaurs by registered post acknowledgement due on 30th November 1967 to the appellant herein. That refers to a letter dated 6th July 1967 of the appellant. Ex. A-4 is a communication sent by the goods Agent, Salt Cottaurs by registered post acknowledgement due on 30th November 1967 to the appellant herein. That refers to a letter dated 6th July 1967 of the appellant. This communication reads:— “Please refer my registered letter number dt. 25/325/67 of 21-7-67 and arrange to effect delivery of one bale available at Salt Cottaurs early producing relevant records. For the remaining one bale efforts are being made to trace and deliver the same to you in completion of the consignment.” The learned counsel for the appellant contends that Ex. A-4 refers to a letter of the appellant dated 6th July 1967, that Ex. A-4 was by way of reply to the information demanded or inquiry made by the appellant herein and that therefore Ex. A-4 itself will establish that the appellant had preferred the demand as cons templated by S. 78-B of the Act. In this case, the learned appellate Judge himself pointed out that the period of six months would have expired only by 8th November 1967 and since Ex. A-4 refers to the letter of the appellant dated 6th July 1967, the said letter will be within the six months period, provided that letter can be brought within the scope of S. 78-B of the Act. The proviso to S. 78-B of the Act clearly states that there need not be any formal demand as contemplated by the main section and even any information demanded or inquiry made in writing or any complaint made in writing to any of the railway administrations by or on behalf of the person within the period of six months regarding the non-delivery or delay in delivery would be deemed to be a claim to the refund or compensation, as contemplated by the main part of the Section. On the face of it, having regard to the tenor of the reply in Ex. A.4, the letter of the appellant dated 6th July 1967 will certainly come within the scope of either ‘information demanded’ or ‘inquiry made’ or ‘complaint made’ with regard to the non-delivery of the goods in question. 5. However, Mr. On the face of it, having regard to the tenor of the reply in Ex. A.4, the letter of the appellant dated 6th July 1967 will certainly come within the scope of either ‘information demanded’ or ‘inquiry made’ or ‘complaint made’ with regard to the non-delivery of the goods in question. 5. However, Mr. Srisailam, leaned counsel for the respondent, contended that even for the purpose of proviso to S. 71-B of the Act, information should have been demanded and enquiry should have been made only to the railway administration as defined in S. 3(6) read with S. 140 of the Act. S. 140 merely states: “Any notice or other document required of authorised by this Act to be served on a railway administration may be served, in the case of a railway administered by the Government on the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent and, in the case of a railway administered by a railway company, on the Agent in India of the railway company— (a) by delivering the notice or other document to the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent or Agent; or (b) by leaving it at his office; or (c) by forwarding it by post in a prepaid let tee addressed to the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent or Agent at his office and registered under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898.” On the face of it, S. 140 of the Act has no application to the present case, because what was sent by the appellant herein was not a notice or other document required or authorised by this Act to be served on railway administration. On the other hand, it was merely an information demanded or an inquiry or complaint made in writing. 6. As far as S. 3(6) if concerned, it defines the expression, “railway administration” as: “railway administration’ or ‘administration’ in the case of a railway administered by the Government means the manager of the railway and includes the Government, and, in the case of a railway administered by a railway company, means the railway company.” S. 3 itself opens by saying: “In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context”. In my opinion, with regard to an inquiry or complaint made or information demanded as contemplated by the proviso to S. 78-B of the Act, the definition of the railway administration as contained in S. 3(6) will have no application. The information can be demanded or the inquiry can be made only from a person representing the railway, who is in a position to give information or give clarification. It is not in respect of every small consignment that is sent through a railway, the General Manager of the Railway will be the person who will be in a position to give information or particulars. Therefore, the context in which the expression, “railway administration” occurs in the proviso to S. 78-B of the Act will clearly show that it was not intended to refer to the General Manager or the Government coming within the scope of definition of that expression in S. 3(6) of the Act. It is not disputed in this care that the person who wrote Ex. A-4 on behalf of the railway is the Goods Agent and the said person was actually dealing with the consignment and was competent to give information and send the reply under Ex. A-4. The position may be entirely different if the information is demanded from or inquiry is made to a person who is totally unconnected with the transaction in question and who will not be in a position to answer the inquiry to give any particulars with regard to the demand. That not being the case in the present appeal, I am of the opinion that the letter addressed by the appellant on 6th July 1967 will certainly come within the scope of the proviso to S. 78-B of the Act As a matter of fact, it may also be pointed out that though the reply under Ex. A-4 was sent by the Goods Agent, Salt Coalurs, it docs not say to whom the letter of the appellant dated 6th July 1967 was itself addressed, while it merely refers to that letter. That letter itself has not been produced to show to whom it was addressed. Hence, it is quite possible that the letter itself was addressed to the Divisional Commercial Superintendent or any other authority, but it was dealt with and answered by the Goods Agent, who alone was in a position to deal with the same. 7. That letter itself has not been produced to show to whom it was addressed. Hence, it is quite possible that the letter itself was addressed to the Divisional Commercial Superintendent or any other authority, but it was dealt with and answered by the Goods Agent, who alone was in a position to deal with the same. 7. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that Ex. A-4 clearly establishes that a claim falling within the scope of the proviso to S. 78-B of the Act has been made within the time required by the statute, and therefore, the suit instituted by the appellant cannot be dismissed on the ground that there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of S. 78-B of the Act. Accordingly, the second appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree of the learned Principal Judge are set aside, and those of the learned III Assistant Judge are restored. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout. No leave.