JUDGMENT R. L. AGRAWAL, J. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal by the decree-holder is as to whether the decree directing eviction of the respondent-tenant is a nullity and as such not executable. 2. The facts out of which the present appeal arises are these. The appellant instituted a title suit which was numbered as Title Suit No. 36 of 1963 in the First Court of Munsif at Monghyr for eviction of the respondent under the provisions of section 11 (1) (c) & (d) of the Bihar Buildings, (Lease Rent & Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), i.e. on the grounds that he reasonably and in good faith required the premises for his own occupation and that the respondent had committed a default by not having paid three months rent. The parties entered into a compromise in the trial court and on the 22nd of March, 1965 a joint petition was filed by them, in which the respondent agreed to vacate the premises. And as it appears from the statement of facts recorded in the Judgments of the courts below, it did not state any further fact, namely, the existence of either of the two conditions, on which the appellant had sought the eviction of the respondent. However, the trial court, on the basis of the said petition, passed a decree on the 29th of April, 1965 for eviction and the same was put into execution in the year 1969. When an order for issue of delivery of possession was passed on the 14th of May, 1969 by the executing court, the respondent filed a petition purported to be under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the decree itself was a nullity, in as much as it was passed without satisfying the mandatory requirement of section 11 of the Act. The objection prevailed and on appeal by the appellant before the first appellate court, the decision of the executing court has been affirmed. 3. Section 11 of the Act, lays down that a tenant in possession of any building shall not be liable to eviction there from except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the several grounds enumerated therein. As I have already said above two of those grounds on which the decree-holder had sought the eviction of the respondent. As I have already said above two of those grounds on which the decree-holder had sought the eviction of the respondent. The provision contained in the Bihar Act, therefore, creates a bar for passing a decree for eviction in favour of a landlord on any other ground, except those mentioned in section 11 of the Act, itself. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that if a decree for eviction is passed without satisfying the existence of any of the conditions on which such a decree could be rested, cannot be supported in law. 4. Order 23 Rule 3 provides that a court shall order only such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded which are proved to its satisfaction that it has been done by any lawful agreement or compromise. In other words, the duty is cast upon a court, while recording compromise between the parties and disposing of a suit to be satisfied that the compromise or agreement in question was lawful. If it is otherwise, the court is duty bound to refuse to record the agreement or the compromise etc. It has been stated in the Judgment of the court of appeal below that neither in the compromise petition nor in the decree, that was passed on its basis, there was any intention that any of the statutory grounds, on which a decree for eviction could be passed against a tenant in favour of a landlord under section 11 of the Act, existed. I have got no doubt, therefore, in my mind to hold that the learned Munsif, while passing the order recording the compromise and passing a decree in terms thereof, committed an apparent error of law and violated the requirements of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. In this view of the matter, the compromise decree which was put into execution, was entirely illegal and has rightly been held to be a nullity by the courts below. 5. The view that I have taken finds ample support from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shrirnati Kaushalya Devi & others Vrs. Shri K. L. Bansal 1969 (1) S.C.C. 59 and K. K. Chari V. R. M. Seshadhari A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1311. In the first case the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and in the second case, the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, were under consideration. Shri K. L. Bansal 1969 (1) S.C.C. 59 and K. K. Chari V. R. M. Seshadhari A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1311. In the first case the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and in the second case, the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, were under consideration. The relevant provisions in both the aforesaid acts are in pari materia with the Bihar Act, laying down conditions on which a tenant was liable to eviction. In both the aforesaid cases like as in the present case, a compromise had been entered into between the parties to vacate the premises, without, however, stating the relevant facts upon which a decree for eviction could be passed against the tenant under the Act, governing the parties. it has been very clearly observed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that for making an order of possession, the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlords claim, unless the tenant in fact admits that the landlord was entitled to possession on one or the other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act. In that case it was open to the court to Act, on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further inquiry. In both the cases before the Supreme Court, the compromise suffered from a similar defect and it was held that the decree was a nullity. 6. As it has already been seen above that the decree in the case in hand as well did not indicate that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in section 11 of the Bihar Act, existed, it has got to be held that the decree was a nullity. The execution, therefore, could not proceed. The Courts below, have taken a correct view of the law and this appeal must fail. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.