JUDGMENT R.B. Misra, J. - The present revision is directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Kanpur, dated 18th July, 1975. The applicant, Sri Nath Jha, was the tenant of the premises in dispute on a monthly rent of Rs. 68/- ever since 1966. The landlord filed two suits against the applicant one for the recovery of arrears of rent and the other for the recovery of the arrears of rent and also for ejectment of the applicant from the said premises. 2. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the accommodation in dispute was constructed in 1964, and that the defendant had fallen in arrears of rent from December, 1969, which he did not pay despite notice of demand. He terminated the tenancy and filed the suit for the ejectment of the defendant. The suit was contested by the applicant on the ground that the plaintiff himself was avoiding to receive the monthly rent tendered by him. Consequently, the defendant had to remit the rent by money-order, but the same was refused by the plaintiff without any reason. It was further contended that the accommodation in dispute was constructed in the year 1960 and as such the building was coves by the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), (for convenience the new rent Act). The defendant had already deposited Rs. 1,240/- on 14th July, 1970, and he had also paid a sum of Rs. 324/- towards taxes under a receipt dated 23rd March, 1971, and that the said two amounts covered the rent for the period from 1st September, 1970, till 31st July, 1972. It was further alleged that the defendant was prepared to tender the residue of the amount. 3. The pleadings of the parties give rise to a number of issues. But, it appears that the defendant did not turn up on the date fixed, and, therefore, the Court proceeded ex-parse and eventually decreed both the suits on the basis of evidence on the record. 4. The defendant submitted to the decree in the earlier suit, which was only for recovery of arrears of rent, but he sought to challenge the ex-parte decree in the suit giving rise to the present revision. 4. The defendant submitted to the decree in the earlier suit, which was only for recovery of arrears of rent, but he sought to challenge the ex-parte decree in the suit giving rise to the present revision. He adopted two remedies : one by filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the other by filing a revision against the ex-parte decree. The revision against the ex-parte decree filed by the applicant was barred by time. Consequently, the revision application was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The District Judge after considering the affidavit and the other evidence produced by the applicant in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, declined to condone the delay and held that there was no sufficient cause preventing the applicant from attending the court on the date fixed. He accordingly dismissed the application under Section 5, and consequently the revision itself as time-barred, by his order dated 18th July, 1975. That order became final, as the applicant submitted to it. 5. The applicant, however, proceeded with the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This application was also supported by an affidavit and a medical certificate showing that the applicant was ill on the particular day and he was unable to attend the court. The other side also produced a medical certificate from the same doctor to show that the doctor was in the habit of giving wrong certificates for extraneous consideration. The court below after considering the evidence produced by the applicant and also by the opposite party, came to the conclusion that sufficient cause had not been made out for the applicant's absense on the date of hearing. Consequently, the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed. The applicant has now come up in revision under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Shri N. S. Chaudhary, appearing for the applicant, contended that the applicant has been able to make out sufficient cause and the court below acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its discretion in rejecting the application for restoration. I have gone through the order passed by the trial court as also by the revisional court. 6. Shri N. S. Chaudhary, appearing for the applicant, contended that the applicant has been able to make out sufficient cause and the court below acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its discretion in rejecting the application for restoration. I have gone through the order passed by the trial court as also by the revisional court. The courts below have taken into consideration the affidavit and the medical certificate produced by the applicant and have given cogent reasons for discarding the medical certificate. The same doctor who had given a certiffcate to the applicant about his illness on the relevant day had also given a certificate to the plaintiff-opposite party about his suffering from bronchitis, although he was quite hale and hearty. If, in these circumstances, the courts below have placed no reliance on the certificate issued by the doctor, no exception can be taken to the finding. They have also taken into consideration other circumstances in this case for their finding. The finding about sufficient cause being a pure finding of fact cannot be challenged in a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confers only a limited jurisdiction on this Court. 7. It was next contended that, in any case, the applicant had deposited the entire dues on 7th August, 1974 well within one month of the date of the enforcement of the new rent Act, and therefore, he was entitled to the protection under section 39 of the said Act. 8. In order to attract the provisions of section 39, the applicant had to satisfy that the accommodation in question was more than ten years standing on the date when the new rent Act came into force, i.e. 20th September, 1972. The applicant mainly relied upon the allegation made in paragraph 2 of the plaint In paragraph 2, the plaintiff alleged that the house in question was constructed in 1964. The plaintiff was not very specific as to in which month of the year 1964 the construction was made. If the construction was made in December, 1964, certainly, the house in dispute could not be more than ten years old on 20th September, 1972. It was not necessary, at that time, according to the law in force, to make any specific allegation and this question assumed importance only after the enforcement of the new rent Act. If the construction was made in December, 1964, certainly, the house in dispute could not be more than ten years old on 20th September, 1972. It was not necessary, at that time, according to the law in force, to make any specific allegation and this question assumed importance only after the enforcement of the new rent Act. The defendant-applicant alleged that the consideration was made in the year 1960. The plaintiff-opposite party adduced evidence, namely, assessment order and oral evidence. The courts below relying on the evidence of the plaintiff, came to the conclusion that the construction was made after 1964. In any view of the matter, the accommodation in question was certainly not of ten years standing on the date when the new rent Act came into force. The defendant-applicant, in these circumstances, could not be entitled to the protection of section 39. Sri Chaudhary, however, contended that, in any case, an enquiry should be made about this question as to in what particular month the construction in dispute was completed. If the courts below had not recorded a finding, then an inquiry was necessary. But, the courts below have recorded a clear finding that the construction was made after 1964 and, therefore, it is not at all necessary to make any further inquiry. Besides, section 2(2)(a) of the new rent Act provides :- "For the purposes of this sub-section, (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof conics into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time." In this case, the assessment order had been filed, and that is Ext. 5, dated 15th February, 1966. Calculating the age of the building from this date, the disputed construction was not ten years old on the date when the new rent Act came into force. 5, dated 15th February, 1966. Calculating the age of the building from this date, the disputed construction was not ten years old on the date when the new rent Act came into force. It was open to the defendant-applicant to have produced evidence, if he wanted to show that he was entitled to the protection of section 39, but he chose to remain absent. He is to thank himself for that. On the finding recorded by the courts below, the applicant has not been able to make out sufficient cause, and, therefore, the courts below rightly refused to set aside the ex-parte decree. 9. Last but not the least in importance, Counsel contended that, in any case, the ex-parte decree was without jurisdiction. He placed reliance on section 9 of the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972. In this case, it is clear from the order-sheet that initially the suit was filed before the city Munsif, Subsequently, it was transferred to 5th Additional Munsif by an order of the District Judge, presumably, under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Again, the case was transferred from the court of 5th Additional Munsif to the Court of 7th Additional Munsif, and eventually it was transferred to the Small Cause Court. The contention of the applicant is that the case could have been transferred to the Court of Small Causes by the District Judge only when it was pending in the Court of institution on the date when the said Civil Laws (Amendment) Act came into force, but in the instant case, the case was not pending in the Court of institution, but in a transferee court, and, therefore, section 9 will have no application. In support of his contention, Counsel placed reliance on a reported decision in K. K. Saksena v. S. N. Misra, 1975 A.L.R. 360 while considering section 9 of the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act. 1972, a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that if a suit was pending before the Munsif as a transferee court, then the case could not be transferred to the Court of Small Causes under section 9 of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act. There is considerable force in this contention of the applicant. 1972, a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that if a suit was pending before the Munsif as a transferee court, then the case could not be transferred to the Court of Small Causes under section 9 of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act. There is considerable force in this contention of the applicant. But the rigour of this section has been taken away by the fact that the applicant filed a revision against the ex-parte decree and did not choose to take up any such plea there. Consequently, the revision was dismissed as time barred and the ex-parte decree became final. If the ex-parte decree became final, it will not be open to the applicant now to urge that the ex-parte decree as without jurisdiction. Learned counsel, however, placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 340. He strongly relied on the following observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 of the judgment at page 342 :- "It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties." In the present case, it cannot be said that there was any inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court. The only difficulty pointed out was that the case was pending in a transferee court on the date when the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act came into force. If the case had been pending before the court of institution, then there was absolutely no difficulty ; and the suit as such was normally congnisable only by the court of Small Causes. The only difficulty pointed out was that the case was pending in a transferee court on the date when the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act came into force. If the case had been pending before the court of institution, then there was absolutely no difficulty ; and the suit as such was normally congnisable only by the court of Small Causes. As there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court and the applicant filed a revision and did not raise any such plea and allowed the ex-parte decree to become final, this court will not be justified in permitting him to raise this plea in proceedings arising out of an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. 10. It was next contended that the dismissal of the revision would not stand in the way of the applicant so far as the present revision is concerned. The District Judge has recorded a clear finding that the remedy for the applicant was by means of an application under Order 9 Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. It is true that the District Judge has set aside the finding of the trial court that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 was not maintainable. But, it is always open to a party to avail of both the remedies. The applicant chose to file a revision against the ex-parte decree on merits, and he also choose to file an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The revision application was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by time and the application for condoning the delay was rejected by the court as no sufficient cause was made out. The application for setting aside the ex-parte decree had also been dismissed on the ground that the applicant had not been able to make out sufficient cause for his absence on the date of hearing. The applicant cannot now say that even though the ex-parte decree has become final, yet he can raise all those points which could have been raised by him in the revision against the ex-parte decree. 11. For the reasons given above, it cannot be said that the learned Judge acted with material irregularity in deciding the case, or that the order is without-jurisdiction. In the result, the application in revision is dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs. 12. 11. For the reasons given above, it cannot be said that the learned Judge acted with material irregularity in deciding the case, or that the order is without-jurisdiction. In the result, the application in revision is dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs. 12. The applicant undertakes to vacate the premises in dispute within two months. The applicant had already deposited certain amounts to get the benefit of section 39 of the new Rent Act. If the amount so deposited by him is in excess of what is the amount due to the plaintiff-opposite party under the decree, the same be refunded to him.