Judgment :- 1. This is another of those writ petitions where the question debated is the legality of the levy of licence fee, this time by the Shertallai Municipality, for storing the textile materials under S.284 of the Kerala Municipalities Act read with Schedule III thereof. The petitioners have challenged the levy of the licence fee as illegal and on that basis have prayed for a refund of the collection of the fee made even from the year 1953 onwards; and for a direction to the respondent not to take steps against the petitioners for demanding the licence fee in question. S.284 of the Kerala Municipalities Act in so far it is relevant reads: "284 (1) The Council may publish a notification in the Gazette and by beat of drum that no place within municipal limits shall be used for any one or more of the purposes specified in Schedule III without the licence of the Commissioner and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein and where the licence is for keeping hostels, restaurants, eating houses, coffee houses, laundries or running barber saloons the licence issued by the Commissioner shall always contain and be deemed to contain a condition that admission or service therein shall be available to any member of the public: Provided that no such notification shall take effect until sixty days from the date of publication." Schedule III enumerates 130 items of purposes for premises which may not be used under S.284 without a licence. At the end of such specific enumeration of 130 items, there is an omnibus clause which reads as follows: "In general, any purpose or the doing in the course of any industrial process anything which in the opinion of the Commissioner is likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property of is likely to create or cause a nuisance." 2. Based on the principle of the decision of a learned judge of this court in Alleppy Municipal Council v. Veeriath Reddiar (1971 KLT. 830 the petitioners' counsel contended that the specific entries for 'storing' among the specifically enumerated items which number 130, do not cover a case of storing of textiles, and therefore no licence is necessary for the said trade or activity. The decision supports the petitioner' counsel. 830 the petitioners' counsel contended that the specific entries for 'storing' among the specifically enumerated items which number 130, do not cover a case of storing of textiles, and therefore no licence is necessary for the said trade or activity. The decision supports the petitioner' counsel. But, by a notification issued on 16th January 1969, as stated in page 2 of the counter-affidavit of the Municipality and published in the Kerala Gazette dated 4th February 1969, an entry on "cloths-dyeing, storing and selling" has been substituted for the original entry "cloths-dyeing". In view of the said substitution, the petitioners cannot have any case that the levy is beyond the provisions of S.284 read with Schedule III from and alter the date of the said notification. 3. But counsel for the Municipality sustained the levy on the ground that for the period, whether anterior or subsequent to the notification above referred to, there was full statutory authority or competence to justify the levy, by reason of the residuary or general entry which we have extracted earlier. He placed reliance on the principle of the Division Bench rulings of this court in Natesan Achari v. Municipal Council, Changanacherry and another 1960 KLJ. 994 and Thomas Joseph v. State of Kerala and another 1961 KLJ. 785. The latter of these decisions was rendered on appeal from a Single Judge's ruling reported in Thomas Joseph v. State of Kerala and another 1960 KLJ. 1481. We have gone through these decisions and we have little doubt that the principle of these decisions fully support the stand taken by counsel for the Municipality. The decisions were followed later by two learned judges of this court, each sitting alone, (vide) Devassia v. Municipal Commissioner Changanacherry and another 1963 KLJ. 23 and K. P. K. Menon v. Health Inspector of Changanacherry Municipality 1967 KLJ. 452. Counsel for the Municipality drew our attention to S.363 (3), S.347, clauses (15) and (32), S.340, 351, 344 and 346 to reinforce the power of the Municipality to take action under the residuary clause in Schedule III and to frame the necessary bye-laws. In view of these, we are of the opinion that the Municipality had the requisite power to license the particular activity of storing textiles with which we are concerned in the instant case. In view of these, we are of the opinion that the Municipality had the requisite power to license the particular activity of storing textiles with which we are concerned in the instant case. In Para.2 of the counter affidavit of the Municipality, it has been stated that bye-laws dated 21st January 1966 were framed by the Municipal Council duly complying with the provisions of S.284 and Schedule III and of the formalities contemplated by these provisions. The said paragraph has also stated that the successive Commissioners of the Council were of the opinion that the storage of cloths and textile goods invariably attract rats, the carriers of plague and other diseases likely to be dangerous to human life and health and even property. In view of these, we have little hesitation to hold that the requisite authority for levying the fee must be found in favour of the council. 4. But counsel for the petitioners contended that as a licence fee it is not supported by quid pro quo in the shape of conferment of a special benefit on the class of licensees to which the petitioner belongs or the performance of special services in favour of such class. We do not think it necessary to run the whole hog of decisions which have explained the scope and the ambit of the special benefit and the special services that are needed to sustain the levy of a licence fee. It would be enough to call attention to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Liberty Cinema's case AIR. 1965 SC. 1107 and to refer to the Full Bench decisions of this court in Kesavan Vaidyar's case 1970 KLT. 83 and in the Vaniamkulam Panchayat's case 1971 KLT. 264. The scope of these Full Bench decisions were fully explained recently by two Division Bench rulings of this court, to which both of us were parties in the Badagara Municipality's case 1973 K.L.T 845 and the Changanacherry Municipality's case I.L.R. 1974 (1) Kerala 161. As we pointed out in the Changanacherry Municipality's case it appears to us that the principles bearing on this branch of the law are well settled and the difficulty is only in applying the principle to the facts disclosed in each case. As we pointed out in the Changanacherry Municipality's case it appears to us that the principles bearing on this branch of the law are well settled and the difficulty is only in applying the principle to the facts disclosed in each case. On an examination of the authorities, it was ruled in the two Full Bench decisions in Kesavan Vaidyar's case 1970 K.L.T. 831 and the Vaniamkulam Panchayat's case 1971 K.L.T. 264 that the special benefit may take the form of service rendered to the payers of the fee in greater measure, volume and continuity than in the case of an ordinary tax-payer the payers of the fee requiring more than the ordinary municipal service. The Municipal authorities would be justified in charging a fee which would save them from being out of pocket by reason of the duties imposed for supervision and control of the activity sought to be licensed. But at the same time, the services rendered by the Municipality or the local body should not be those in discharge of its statutory duties to the general public, and such duties cannot be regarded as "special benefit" conferred on the payers of the licence fee. 5. Some arguments revolved before us on the question as to whether the special benefit or services should be established vis a vis the particular class of persons engaged in the particular trade or activity sought to be licensed, with respect to which the question is raised before us. It was argued in the light of certain observations in Kesavan Vaidyar's case 1970 K.L.T. 831 that it would be enough if the special benefit is established in regard to the totality of the class of persons licensed by the local body or Municipal authority. We are unable to countenance this argument. Kesavan Vaidyar's case 1970 K.L.T. 831 was concerned to clarify the observations made in an earlier judgment to the effect that special benefit must be established with respect to the individual person from whom the licence fee is sought to be exacted. The Full Bench explained the observations by stating that it would be enough if special benefit is shown to the class of persons who were the payers of the licence fee. The Full Bench explained the observations by stating that it would be enough if special benefit is shown to the class of persons who were the payers of the licence fee. In the Badagara Municipality's case 1973 K.L.T. 845 we have referred to the judgment of a Full Bench of this court in Vijayamohini Mills v. Commissioner of Corporation, Trivandrum A.I.R. 1971 Kerala 7 (F.B) Raman Nayar, C.J., Madhavan Nair and Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ., there struck down the levy on the ground that the service relied on had no relation to the activity that called for a licence. In other words, it proceeded on the basis that co-relation between the licence fee and the particular activity sought to be licensed had to be established. It was on this basis that we proceeded in the Badagara Municipality's case 1973 K.L T. 845 also. We notice that the same principle seems to have been accepted by our learned brother Poti J. in P. Kesavan v. Commissioner, Cochin Corporation and another 1974 KLJ.190 (confirmed in Writ Appeal No. 240 of 1974). In the light of these rulings, we are unable to agree with counsel for the Municipality that the special benefit or special services need not have relation to the particular activity sought to be licensed. 6. It then remains for us to examine whether the Municipality in this case has established the special service or special benefit to justify the levy. 6. It then remains for us to examine whether the Municipality in this case has established the special service or special benefit to justify the levy. These are sought to be explained in Para.9 of the counter-affidavit and in Annexures A, B and C. Analysing the allegations in the counter-affidavit, the purposes given in support of the levy are these; that the Council has to purchase stationery and to maintain special registers etc., in connection with the issue of licences; that fifty per cent of the office time of the Health Inspector employed by the Municipality is taken up in connection with the supervision of the place licensed and to be licensed and controlled under S.284 of the Kerala Municipalities Act; besides, one Health Assistant, two peons and three contingent workers including one scavenger, are exclusively employed for the purpose of inspecting and supervising such places and for giving the necessary instructions; one lower division clerk is exclusively employed in connection with issue of licences; and twenty per cent of the cashier's office time is taken up for preparing and issuing the receipts for collecting licence fees from traders and in connection with the supervision and control of such places. The Annexures A, B and C gave the break up value of the expenses and the figures in the light of these statements in the counter-affidavit. 7. Giving tie matter our best attention, we regret our inability to accept the case of the Municipality as stated in the counter-affidavit. These have not been supported by the production of any document or record on the side of the Municipality. We are not prepared to accept on a mere affidavit that a particular percentage of the time of an employee or employees of the Municipality had to be taken up on account of the special work of licensing or that the special work required detailing of a special quota of staff or officers of the Municipality, for the said purpose. We would require clear and more cogent proof before we can accept any such case. We may recall the observations that we had occasion to make in the Changanacherry Municipality's case ILR.1974 (1) Kerala 161 where we observed as follows: 11. We would require clear and more cogent proof before we can accept any such case. We may recall the observations that we had occasion to make in the Changanacherry Municipality's case ILR.1974 (1) Kerala 161 where we observed as follows: 11. The petitioner's counsel strenuously argued that the case falls within the line of the decisions indicated by the Vaniamkulam Panchayat's case and the Badagara Municipality's ease and outside the principle of Kesavan Vaidyar's case. The task of drawing the dividing line is not easy; and as these types of cases increasingly flood the courts, we trust that the attacking petitioners and the defending local bodies alike, would realise their due sense of responsibility in placing the best material to make good their respective contentions. In these writ petitions, we have done the best we can by sifting the materials and by applying the scissors to whatever we felt, it was necessary to excise. On the residue left, the Municipality has established a sufficient quid pro quo between the levy and the services." In the light of the above observations, we have analysed the statement in the counter-affidavit. They are only to the effect that the charges were incurred generally for service to be done to the class of licences covered by the licensing provisions of the Municipal Statute. We are unable to hold that the Municipality has made out a case for the levy of licence fee. We therefore hold that the licence fee is not supported by quid pro quo. There should be no difficulty to issue a direction prohibiting the Municipality from collecting licence fee as prayed for by the petitioner. We direct that such an order will issue. 8. We have, however, difficulty in directing a refund of the fee collected by the Municipality as prayed for by him. The collections dated from the year 1953-54. The principles in regard to the requirement of quid pro quo supporting levy of licence fee have, as we understand, been clearly laid down at least ever since the decision of Supreme Court in the Liberty Cinema's case AIR. 1965 SC. 1107. We can find little justification for the petitioner having approached this court with this application for refund only in 1972. On this ground, we disallow the prayer for refund of the licence fee. The writ petition will stand allowed to the extent indicated above, and dismissed otherwise. 1965 SC. 1107. We can find little justification for the petitioner having approached this court with this application for refund only in 1972. On this ground, we disallow the prayer for refund of the licence fee. The writ petition will stand allowed to the extent indicated above, and dismissed otherwise. There will be no order as to costs.