SHARMA, J.—This appeal filed by Ganesh Narain Joshi is directed against the judgment of the learned Special Judge for Rajasthan, Jaipur City, dated 18th November, 1970, by which the appellant was convicted under sec. 409, I.P.C. and sec. 5(i)(c) read with sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 50/-, in default of payment of fine to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month on each count. He was further convicted under sections 467 and 471, I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 25/-, in default of payment of fine to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for one week on each count. All the substantive sentences were, however, ordered to run Concurrently. 2. The prosecution case against the appellant may be briefly described as follows: Ganesh Narain Joshi was working as Sub Post Master, at Sub-Post Office, Desuri on 1-5 1967. He was incharge of the said post-office and in the capacity of such public servant was operating the S. B. accounts and maintaining the record thereof. It is alleged that on 1-5-1967, Ganesh Narain Joshi while working as sub-Post Master at Sub-Post-Office Desuri, fabricated as application for withdrawal cum warrant of payment in the name of Bhika Kumhar, a resident of Desuri, for the purpose of withdrawal of a sum of Rs 500/-, from Bhikhas S.B. Account No. 151829 and on the basis of the said false document, withdrew a sum of Rs. 500/-, from the cash of the said sub-post-office against the said S.B. account. The appellant is said to have made necessary false entries relating to the withdrawal of the sum of Rs. 500/-, in the S.B. Journal, S.B. ledger and the daily cash account in order to show that in reality the sum was withdrawn by Bhikha Kumhar. On 5-5-1967 he managed to get the possession of the S.B. pass-book from Bhikha Kumhar when the latter had come to the sub post office to operate his S.B. account and made a back-date entry for the withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 500/-, in the S.B. pass book. In this manner, the appellant dishonestly misappropriated a sum of Rs. On 5-5-1967 he managed to get the possession of the S.B. pass-book from Bhikha Kumhar when the latter had come to the sub post office to operate his S.B. account and made a back-date entry for the withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 500/-, in the S.B. pass book. In this manner, the appellant dishonestly misappropriated a sum of Rs. 500/-, by affixing his own thumb impression of the right hand on the application form for withdrawal cum warrant of payment dated 1-5-1967 while knowing it fully well that Shri Bhikha Kumhar never visited the said sub-post office, Desuri on 1-5-1967 and never applied for withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 500/-, from his S.B. account. It will not be out of place to mention that according to the prosecution story Bhikha Kumhar was an indoor eye-patient in General Hospital, Udaipur, on 1-5-1967 and had undergone an eye-operation. On his return to Desuri from Udaipur, Bhikha was in need of money. So on 5-5-1967, he visited the sub-post-office, Desuri, for withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 300/-, from his S.B. account. On that date the appellant was on leave but he was present in the sub-post-office. On seeing Bhikha the appellant took him upstairs, got the pass-book into his possession on the pretext of filling the withdrawal form for Rs. 300/-, and made back-date false entry for withdrawal of Rs. 500/-, which he had dishonestly misappropriated on 1 5-1967. The appellant is said to have affixed a postal stamp for 1-5-1967 against the said entry in the pass-book of Bhikha, Bhikha came to know about the misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 500/-, on 24-5-1967 when the pass-book, which was retained in the post-office for the addition of interest, was returned to him by Shri Ghanshyam Bhatia Sub-Post-Master. Bhikha showed his pass book to Mangi Lal in the presence of Ghanshyam Bhatia and asked how much money was in balance. He was informed that interest had not been added and a sum of Rs. 1000/-, was in balance. Bhikha then told that a sum of Rs. 1500/-, ought to have been in balance after withdrawing a sum of Rs. 300/-. He was then informed that a sum of Rs 500/-, was withdrawn from his S.B. account on 1-5-1967. Bhikha categorically denied to have withdrawn a sum of Rs. 1000/-, was in balance. Bhikha then told that a sum of Rs. 1500/-, ought to have been in balance after withdrawing a sum of Rs. 300/-. He was then informed that a sum of Rs 500/-, was withdrawn from his S.B. account on 1-5-1967. Bhikha categorically denied to have withdrawn a sum of Rs. 500/-, on 1-5-1967, as he was admitted as an indoor patient in the General Hospital, Udaipur, that day. Bhikha then sent a written complaint on 26-5-1967 to the Superintendent, Post-offices, Ajmer, about the said criminal breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs. 500/-. An inquiry was started into the allegations made in the complaint. Meanwhile the appellant approached Bhikha and asked him to take the money. Bhikha told the appellant that he would not accept the money and that the appellant may deposit the same in the post-office in his account. Thereupon, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs, 500/-, in the sub-post-office, Desuri, in the S.B. account of Bhikha on 31-5-1967. Later on, on 13-9-1967 a criminal case under sections 409, 467, I..P.C. and S. 5 (2) read with S. 5(l)(c) of the Act was registered against the appellant by the Superintendent of Police, S.P.E. . Jaipur on the basis of a credible information. Shri Vijai Singh, Inspector, S.P.E. Jaipur, conducted the usual investigation into the case and after collecting necessary evidence, put up a charge-sheet against the appellant in the court of the Special Judge for Rajasthan, Jaipur City, after obtaining the necessary sanction for prosecution from Shri J.L. Arora, Superintend dent, Post-Offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar. 3. The Special Judge tried the appellant for the aforesaid offences and found him guilty thereof. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the appellant has come up in appeal to this court as stated above. 4. I have carefully gone through the entire evidence available on the record and heard the arguments advanced by Mr. M.G. Bhandari for the appellant and Mr. R.S. Parihar appearing on behalf of the C.B.I. 5. During the course of arguments Mr.M.C. Bhandari appearing on behalf of the appellant filed applications on 13-1-1975 and 3-2-1975 for letting in additional evidence in the case. M.G. Bhandari for the appellant and Mr. R.S. Parihar appearing on behalf of the C.B.I. 5. During the course of arguments Mr.M.C. Bhandari appearing on behalf of the appellant filed applications on 13-1-1975 and 3-2-1975 for letting in additional evidence in the case. The additional documentary evidence sought to be produced were orders of appointment and confirmation of the appellant on the following posts : (1) clerk in the Posts and Telegraphs Department with effect from 1-7-1958 in a quasi-permanent capacity vide order dated 23-6-1958: (2) temporary reserve clerk on probation for one year with effect from 1st April, 1959, subject to the condition that the confirmation in the post will be subject to his passing the confirmation examination as prescribed under rule 253 of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual Vol. IV. (3) Order of passing the confirmation examination dated 1-9-1958. Notices of these applications were given to Shri R.S. Parihar, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the G.B.I. Shri R.S. Parihar raised no objection to the letting in of the documentary evidence by the appellant. As genuineness of these documents was beyond dispute and as this appellate court considered that in the interest of justice and for the proper decision of the case, it was necessary that additional documentary evidence should be brought on the record, the referred to above documents were taken in evidence for reasons recorded in the order of this Court dated 3 2-1975. 6. Shri R.S. Parihar was, however, given an opportunity to rebut the additional evidence led by the appellant by adducing evidence, if any. Shri R.S. Parihar declined to adduce any evidence in rebuttal of these documents. 7. Firstly, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the sanction for the prosecution accorded by the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, is no sanction in the eye of law, because the sanctioning authority was not competent to do so. It was further urged that the defect in the sanction is not a mere technical defect, but it goes to the very root of the matter and vitiates the trial. It was further urged that the defect in the sanction is not a mere technical defect, but it goes to the very root of the matter and vitiates the trial. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the sanction of the authority competent to remove the appellant from the service was necessary for his prosecution and as the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, who accorded the sanction was subordinate in rank to the Senior Superintendent, Post-offices, Ajmer Division, by whom the appellant was appointed, the sanction accorded by the former would be invalid. In support of his above contention, the learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the orders of appointment and confirmation of the appellant on the posts of Clerk, Temporary Reserve Clerk on probation and the order of passing the confirmation examination and contended on their strength that the appointing authority in the case of the appellant was the Senior Superintendent of Post-offices, Ajmer Division and that the appellant could not be dismissed or removed from service by an authority lower in rank than the one who actually ordered the appointment. The learned counsel lor the appellant placed reliance on Mahesh Prasad vs. State of U.P. (1), wherein their Lordships were pleased to make the following observations at page 73 : "Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the requirement both of the Constitution and of the rule of the Railway Code contemplates that the authority competent to remove must be either the very authority who appointed or any other authority directly Superior to the appointing authority in the same department We do not think that this contention is tenable. What the Constitution require is that a person should not be removed by an authority sub ordinate to the one by whom he was appointed and what the rule in the Railway Code prescribes is substantially the same, viz , "the authority competent to remove should not be lower than the one who made the appointment." 8. These provisions cannot be read as implying that the removal must be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior. It appears to us to be enough that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade. These provisions cannot be read as implying that the removal must be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior. It appears to us to be enough that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade. In the present case it does not appear into which particular branch of the department, the appellant was taken, in the first instance in 1944 under Ex. F. But it is in the evidence of P. W. 4, the Head-Clerk of the office of the Divisional Superintendent, that the office of the Running Shed Foreman in which the appellant was a clerk in 1951 was directly under the Superintendent Power. He was obviously the most appropriate officer to grant the sanction provided he was of a rank not less than the Divisional Personnel Officer. 9. Shri R.S. Parihar appearing on behalf of the C.B.I. on the other hand, urged that the sanctioning authority is not subordinate to the Senior Superintendent of Post-offices, Ajmer Division, who ordered the appointment of the appellant and that under the rules the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, is competent to make appointments or to dismiss or remove the appellant and that it is not necessary that the dismissal or removal must be by the same authority by whom the appointment was made or by his direct official superior. According to him, the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, is neither bound under the law to carry out the orders of the Senior Superintendent, Post-offices Ajmer Division, nor is he under his control. In support of his above contention, Shri R.S. Parihar relied upon posts and Telegraphs Manual Vols. III, V and VIII and cited Amar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (2), Dulal Ranjan vs. R.K. Bose (3), Shafiq vs. S. R. Supdt. Post offices(4), Keshava Nand vs. State (5) and Moti Ram vs. N.E. Frontier Railway (6). 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. It may be observed at the outset that under S.6 of the Act, sanction would be necessary for the prosecution under S. 52) of the Act and that the court is debarred from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under S. 161, or S. 164, or S. 165, I.P.C. or under sub sec. (2) or sub-sec. It may be observed at the outset that under S.6 of the Act, sanction would be necessary for the prosecution under S. 52) of the Act and that the court is debarred from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under S. 161, or S. 164, or S. 165, I.P.C. or under sub sec. (2) or sub-sec. (3A) of S. 5 of the Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, of the Central Government in the case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is removable from his office by or with the sanction of the Central Government, or of the State Government in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is removable from his office by the State Government, or in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. In the present case the appellant was not employed in connection with the affairs of the Union of India or with the affairs of a State and was not removable from his office by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government. He was appointed on the post of a Clerk on 1-7-1958 by the Senior Superintendent vide his order No. DR. 26 dated 23rd June, 1958, and then by the same authority on the post of Reserve Clerk vide memorandum No. B. 2-75/Gen. dated 28th October, 1959. Hence in his case the authority to remove him from his office was the Senior Superintendent, Post offices or his direct superior officer or an authority equal in grade or rank to the appointing authority. It is an admitted fact that the sanction for the prosecution of the appellant was not accorded in this case by the Senior Superintendent, Post-offices, Ajmer Division or by his direct superior. The pertinent question that arises for determination in this case, therefore, is whether the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Marwar, who accorded the sanction for the prosecution was subordinate to the authority which ordered the appointment of the appellant. The pertinent question that arises for determination in this case, therefore, is whether the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Marwar, who accorded the sanction for the prosecution was subordinate to the authority which ordered the appointment of the appellant. The competency to remove from service has to be determined with reference to Article 311 of the Constitution of India which clearly lays down that no civil servant of the Canter or of a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The word subordinate used in Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India has been construed to mean subordination in rank or grade in Mahesh Prasad vs. State of U.P. (supra) and in Mysore S.R.T. Corpn. vs. Khaja Mohiddin (7), Hari Prasad Raghuram vs. State of Gujarat (8), Laxminarayan vs. State of Orissa (9), Anukul Chandra vs. I.T. Commissioner (10) and State of Rajasthan vs. Kaloo Singh (11). Hence, rank or grade is an important test for ascertaining whether or not the removing authority is subordinate to the appointing authority. Judged from this criterion, the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, is decidedly subordinate in rank or grade to the Senior Superintendent, Post-offices, Ajmer Division, Ajmer, who ordered the appointment of the appellant. From a bare look into the Gradation Lift of Postal and R.M.S. Officials of Rajasthan Circle (including the Circle Office) corrected upto 1st July, 1967, Part I, issued under the authority of the Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, page 11, it appears that the Senior Superintendent of Post offices, Ajmer Division is a First Grade Officer Class I in the pay scale of 400-1250 while the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali, who accorded the sanction for the prosecution of the appellant in this case, i. a Class II officer in the pay scale of 350-900 who is subordinate in rank or grade to the Senior Superintendent. It is undoubtedly true that the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali, is not subordinate to the Senior Superintendent, Ajmer Division, in respect of powers and duties, but, as stated earlier, Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India contemplates subordination in rank or grade and not subordination in respect of function. It is undoubtedly true that the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali, is not subordinate to the Senior Superintendent, Ajmer Division, in respect of powers and duties, but, as stated earlier, Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India contemplates subordination in rank or grade and not subordination in respect of function. Hence, it cannot be reasonably held that the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, is an authority of equal rank or grade with the Senior Superintendent, Post-offices, Ajmer Division, by whom the appointment of the appellant has been made. Although Article 311 (1) of the Constitution does not require that the dismissal or removal must be by the same person by whom the appointment was made, yet it certainly lays down that if the actual appointment in a particular case has been made by an authority higher in rank, such an authority alone or some officer to whom he is subordinate can dismiss or remove the person so appointed from service and that a subordinate authority is not competent to dismiss or remove him from service although he was competent to make similar appointments under the rules. In this view of the matter, the sanction accorded by the Superintendent, Post-offices, Pali Division, Pali Marwar, for the prosecution of the appellant is not valid in the eye of law, because of his sub-ordination in rank or grade to the Senior Superintendent by which the appellant was appointed. Consequently, in the absence of a valid sanction to prosecute the appellant, the Special Judge could not legally take cognizance of the offence punishable under S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(c) of the Act alleged to have been committed by the appellant. The defect in the sanction is not of a technical nature, but it goes to the case and vitiates the trial in this case. 11. The next question that crops up for consideration is whether the appellant has been properly tried for the offences punishable under sections 409, 467 and 471, I.P.C. by the Special Judge for Rajasthan, Jaipur City, in the absence of a valid sanction under S. 6 of the Act for his prosecution under S. 5(2) read with S.5(l)(c) of the Act. It may be observed that under sub-sec. (1) of S. 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, jurisdiction has been conferred upon a Special Judge to try the offences specified in S.6(l) of the Act. Sub-sec. It may be observed that under sub-sec. (1) of S. 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, jurisdiction has been conferred upon a Special Judge to try the offences specified in S.6(l) of the Act. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 7 the Criminal Law (Amendment), 1952, no doubt empowers the Special Judge to try any offence other than an offence specified in S.6 of the Act with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial. This jurisdiction to try any offence other than an offence specified in S. 6 of the Act, has been conferred on him when he is trying the offences specified in the Act itself. He can try the accused for offences other than an offence specified in S. 6, also by virtue of sub-sec. (3) of S. 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, only if he has a jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence or offences under the Act. If for want of a valid sanction the very competence and the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try the offences specified in the Act itself is adversely affected, he cannot take cognizance for any offence or offences under the Penal Code. A similar view has been taken in Shriram vs. State (12) and Ramautar Mahton vs. State (13) also. Consequently, I have no hesitation in holding that the trial of the appellant under sections 409, 467 and 471, LP G. is also vitiated, because the Special Judge for Rajasthan, Jaipur City, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences punishable under sections 409,467, and 471, I.P.C in the absence of a valid sanction to prosecute the appellant for offences under S.5(2) read with S.5(1)(c) of the Act. 12. In this view of the matter, It is not necessary for me to give a decision on the other points, which have been argued before me relating to the merits of the case. 13. In the result, the appeal is accepted and the convictions of the appellant under sections 409, 467, 471, I.P.C and S. 5(l)(c) read with S. 5(2) of the Act are set aside on the ground that he was prosecuted in the court of the Special Judge for Rajasthan, Jaipur City, for the said offences without a valid sanction as required by S. 6 of the Act. The appellant is on bail. He need not surrender to his bail bonds, which are hereby cancelled.