Order.- As the points involved in all the writ petitions are substantially the same, it is convenient to dispose of them together. 2. The petitioner is the same in all these writ petitions. He is a Member of the State Legislative Assembly and the Leader of the Opposition. In respect of a speech made by the petitioner at Gudiyatham on 26th November, 1972 which was published in “Navasakthi” dated 27th November, 1972, the petitioner and the publisher have been prosecuted for defamation under section 500 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code, in C.C No. 22 of 1973 on the file of the Second Additional judge, City Civil Court. Madras and that is the subject matter in Writ Petition No. 4492 of 1975. In respect of another speech made by the petitioner which was published in the issue of “Nathigam” dated 27th November, 1972 similar criminal proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner and the publisher of “Nathigam” in C.C. No. 21 of 1973 before the same Court and it is the subject-matter in W.P. No. 4493 of 1975. In respect of a statement issued to the Press by the petitioner on 23rd October, 1972 which was published in the issue of “Swadesamitran” the petitioner and the publisher of Swadesamitran have been prosecuted under section 193-B of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, read with section 500 of the Indian Penal Code in C.C. No. 3 of 1973 which is the subject-matter of W.P. No. 4494 of 1975. All the above criminal prosecutions have been launched on the basis of the sanctions obtained under section 198-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the sanctions obtained under the said section and seeks Writs of certiorari to quash the same. 3. The main contention advanced by the petitioner is that section 198-B is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, in that it makes a discrimination between prosecutions for defamation against public servants and against Ministers that the said discrimination had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by that section,‘that the sanctions granted in all the three cases by the Chief Secretary to Government under section 198-B (3) is void and, that therefore, the prosecution initiated on the basis of those sanction orders cannot be validly sustained. The other contentions raised by the petitioner relate to matters which can very well be raised before the criminal Court where the proceedings are pending, if the proceedings initiated on the basis of the sanction orders are held to be valid. Hence I do not consider it necessary to deal with the other contentions. 4. As regards the contention as to the validity of the sanctions granted under section 198-B (3) on the ground based under Article 14 of the Constitution, the learned Advocate-General contends that, in view of the Presidential Order prohibiting persons from moving the Courts for enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14 etc., by G.S.R. No. 361 (E) dated 27th June, 1975, it is not open to the petitioner to raise the said objection biased under Article 14 of the Constitution, and that in any event the object has no substance at all as the classification made in section 198-B is justifiable having regard to the position occupied by the categories of persons referred to in the various sub-sections. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondents that the categories of persons mentioned in section 198-B (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure form a separate class by themselves and as such the classification is a reasonable one, that the object of such a classification is to prevent Ministers, and Government servants from being barred or distracted from honest discharge of their duties by irresponsible or sourrilous speeches and that having regard to the fact that the interest of the State is in. extricably linked up with the discharge of their work, the special procedure relating to launching of prosecution for defamation of public servants, and State and Central Ministers has got a clear nexus to the object of classification. Thus the question that calls for a decision is as to whether the orders of sanction for prosecution in all these cases are bad for the reason that two different authorities have been constituted for granting sanction in respect of similar offences under section 198-B which is said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. Thus the question that calls for a decision is as to whether the orders of sanction for prosecution in all these cases are bad for the reason that two different authorities have been constituted for granting sanction in respect of similar offences under section 198-B which is said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. The learned Advocate-General, as already pointed out, has taken the objection that it is not open to the petitioner to invoke Article 14 of the Constitution in view of the said Residential Order during the subsistence of the proclamation of emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution. But as I am of the view that the petitioner’s contention based under Article 14 of the Constitution cannot, in law, be sustained, the petitioner need not be shut out from raising that point on the basis of the Presidential Order. 6. Mr. T.R. Ramachandran, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that section 198-B (3) in so far as it makes a distinction between the Central or State Ministers on the one hand and the public servants employed by the Central or State Government on the other is hit at by Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, the sanction given under section 198-B (3) (b) is invalid. 7. Section 198-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, sets out the procedure for initiating prosecutions for defamation against certain persons in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions. Sub-section (1) of that section says that when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code, is alleged to have been committed against the President or the Vice-President or the Governor of a State or a Minister or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or Of a State, in respect of his conduct is the discharge of the public functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of that offence, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor. Sub-section (2) deals with matters which are to be set out in the said complaint. Sub-section (2) deals with matters which are to be set out in the said complaint. Sub-section (3) with which we are immediately concerned, is as follows; “No complaint under sub-section (1) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction: (a) in the case of the President or the Vice-President or the Governor of a State, of any Secretary to the Government authorised by him in this behalf; (b) in the case of a Minister of the Central Government or of a State Government, of the Secretary to the Council of Ministers, if any, or of any Secretary to the Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned; (c) in the case of any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State of the Government concerned.” According to sub-section (3) the Public Prosecutor has to file a complaint with the previous sanction of the authorities referred to in clauses (a) to (c). Clause (a) provides that if the offence is alleged to have been committed against the President, Vice-President or the Governor of a State the sanction has to be obtained from a Secretary to Government authorised by him in this behalf. Clause (b) says that if the offence has been committed against any Central or State Minister, he sanction should be obtained from the Secretary of the Council of Ministers if any, or of any Secretary to Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned. Clause (c) states that in the case of any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, the sanction should be obtained from the Government concerned. In these cases the sanction has been given by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu who is “the secretary to the Council of Ministers” referred to in clause (5). 8. In these cases the sanction has been given by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu who is “the secretary to the Council of Ministers” referred to in clause (5). 8. The petitioner’s learned counsel submits that if the offence is laid to have been committed against any other public servant, sanction is to be given by the Government concerned which mean.s,the Governor, while in the case of Ministers, the sanction is to be obtained from a secretary to Government who is definitely a subordinate to the Government and that this creates an anomalous situation in that the alleged offence committed against a public servant is scrutinised and sanction given by the Governor while the alleged offence committed against a Minister is scrutinised and sanction given by a Secretary to Government. What the petitioner’s learned counsel seems to suggest is that a person who has defamed a Minister is discriminated adversely when compared to a person who has defamed any other public servant, in that the matter is scrutinised by the Governor in the case of public servants and by the secretary or the Chief Secretary to the Government who is a lower authority than the Governor in the case of Ministers. There does not appear to be any substance in this contention. The contention proceeds on an erroneous basis that the expression “Governor” and the “Government” are synonymous and that the sanction given by the Government is on a higher footing than the sanction given by the Chief Secretary or a Secretary to the Government. It is true, whenever a minister is defamed, the matter of sanction to be decided either by the Chief Secretary or by the Secretary to Government specifically authorised in that behalf by the Government and if a civil servant is defamed, it is left to the Government, that is the Governor acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers. Under clause (b) the Chief Secretary or a Secretary to Government specifically authorised has to give sanction in exercise of his independent judgment, while wider clause (c) the sanction is to be given by the Government, that is the Governor acting on the advice of his council of Ministers. Clause (c) uses the word “Government” and not the “Governor”. Under clause (b) the Chief Secretary or a Secretary to Government specifically authorised has to give sanction in exercise of his independent judgment, while wider clause (c) the sanction is to be given by the Government, that is the Governor acting on the advice of his council of Ministers. Clause (c) uses the word “Government” and not the “Governor”. Under Article 166 (1) of the Constitution, all executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Therefore, it cannot be taken that whenever a statute entrusts a function to the Government that function is to be done only by the Governor in his independent judgment as contended for by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Article 166 (3) enables the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of a State and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion. Therefore, in the matter of granting sanction under section 198-B (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Governor is not required to act in his independent judgment. The sanction to, be given by the Government under clause (c) can, therefore, be by a person who has been authorised by the Government Business Rules framed under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution. Though’ the order is to be made in the name of the Governor in view of Article 166 (1), it can be made and signed either by a Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretry, Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary as per rule 12 of the Business Rules. Thus the petitioner’s contention that the sanction given under clause (c) is on a higher footing that the sanction given under clause (b) has no basis at all. The distinction between clause (b) and clause (c) lies in the fact that under clause (b) the sanctioning authority is the Chief Secretary or any Secretary to Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned and that in cases coming in clause (c)the sanction has to be given by any Secretary to Government without any specific authorisation by the Government, treating the grant of sanction as a routine Government business. The complaint as to discrimination based under Article 14, therefore, fails. 9. The complaint as to discrimination based under Article 14, therefore, fails. 9. The other contentions, as I have already said, are to be advanced before the Court wherein the criminal cases are pending. Therefore I refrain from expressing any view in relation thereto in the sepetitions. The writ petitions therefore fail and they are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.