JUDGMENT : J.M. Sheth, J. This revision petition is filed by the original defendant- tenant against the plaintiff-opponent-landlady against the judgment and decree passed by the learned 4th Extra Assistant Judge, Baroda, in Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1971, confirming the decree passed by the trial Court (Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Savli) for eviction in Regular Civil Suit No. 158 of 1970. 2. In this revision petition we are concerned only with the points : about the legality and validity of the suit notice, Ex. 26, dated 25.12.1967, and whether the Court below was justified in reaching the conclusion that the petitioner-tenant has lost the statutory protection under section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (which will be hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as admittedly the tenant did not pay the rent for the period between 10.11.1963 and the rent that had become due thereafter and had become time-barred on the date of the suit. 3. The appellate Court has reached the conclusion that no notice as required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary in the instant case as the petitioner-tenant had become a statutory tenant. According to the learned Extra Assistant Judge, taking any view of the matter, where the lease was for a period of one year as stated by the landlady or it was for a period of 20 years as claimed by the tenant, there having been no registered document which could be necessary, after the period of one year, i.e. after the efflux of period, there would be statutory tenancy. He has further reached the conclusion that even taking that house-site land in question was leased to the petitioner for the purpose of running a Ghani (this Ghani is run with the help of bullocks for extracting oil from Til or groundnuts and also for the purpose of business. It was, therefore, evident that it was not for exclusive purpose of running a Ghani which can be said to be a manufacturing purpose. He was for two purposes. The case would, therefore, fall, according to the learned Extra Assistant Judge, in the category of cases contemplated under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act where a lease of immovable property is for any other purpose. He was for two purposes. The case would, therefore, fall, according to the learned Extra Assistant Judge, in the category of cases contemplated under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act where a lease of immovable property is for any other purpose. This conclusion was reached by him on the basis that the lease was not for manufacturing purpose only. That being the position, the presumption that will arise under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will be, that such a lease for immovable property for any other purpose shall be terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Admittedly, such notice has been given and consequently the notice Exh. 26 is a legal and valid notice. 4. Mr. S.B. Majmudar, appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that in the instant case this lease was taken for the purpose of running a Ghani which would be a lease for manufacturing purpose. It was only incidentally that the product manufactured, viz. oil manufactured from oil seeds, was to be sold in the suit premises. Mr. Majmudar submitted that the main purpose of the lease was the manufacturing purpose, viz., running of a Chani. That was the dominant purpose. Consequently, such a lease should be held to be a lease for manufacturing purpose and it would require six months' notice for terminating the contractual tenancy. 5. In support of his submission, Mr. Majmudar has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Allenbury Engineer Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 425 At page 427, in para 7, it is observed : "The expression 'manufacturing purpose' in section 106 is used in its popular and dictionary meaning, the Transfer of Property Act not having supplied any dictionary of its own for that expression. The burden of proving that the lease was for manufacturing purpose, must, for the purpose of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, lie on the party who claims it to be so, in the present case the appellant-company. That burden is to establish that the exclusive or at least the dominant purpose of the lease was the manufacturing purpose. (See C. Mackertich v. Steuart and Co. Ltd., AIR 1970 Supreme Court 839)." In C. Mackertich v. Steuart and Co. That burden is to establish that the exclusive or at least the dominant purpose of the lease was the manufacturing purpose. (See C. Mackertich v. Steuart and Co. Ltd., AIR 1970 Supreme Court 839)." In C. Mackertich v. Steuart and Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court has, at page 842, made the following pertinent observations after referring to English decisions : "...It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that a similar principle must be applied in construing section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and if the purpose of the lease was mainly or in substance a manufacturing purpose, a presumption of yearly tenancy will arise and that it was incumbent upon the landlord to give a notice expiring with the end of the year of tenancy if the lease was to be validly determined. The opposite point of view is put forward on behalf of the appellant. It was argued that the test was exclusiveness of manufacturing purpose for applying the presumption under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ramesh Chandra v. Surya Properties, AIR 1957 Calcutta 198 and Sati Prasanna v. Md. Fazel, AIR 1952 Calcutta 320. But we do not propose in this case to express our concluded opinion regarding section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. We shall proceed on the assumption that the argument of the respondent is correct and that the test applicable under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not exclusiveness of purpose but what is the main or substantial purpose of the lease. As we have already shown there is no proper material on the record of the case from which it can be inferred that the dominant purpose of the lease was manufacture or that the respondent substantially used the premises for manufacturing purposes. It follows, therefore, that the trial Court was right in holding that the tenancy was monthly and notices Exs. 1 and 1-A were legally valid for termination of the tenancy." In Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra), the Supreme Court has further observed in para 8 : "The word' manufacture', according to its dictionary meaning, is the making of articles of material (now on a large scale) by physical labour or mechanical power. (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, 1203). (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, 1203). According to the Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, 'manufacture' implies change but every change is not manufacture and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be transformation ; a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character, or use. "The word 'manufacture' "said Abbot, C.J., in R. v. Wheeler (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 (349), cited in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Ed.) Vol. 3, p. 1734 : 'has been generally understood to denote, either a thing made which is useful for its own sake and vendible as such, as a medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others ; or to mean an engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed either in the making of some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose, as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for raising water from mines ; or, it may perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by known implements or elements acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better or more useful kind. No mere philosophical or abstract principle can answer to the word 'manufactures'. Something of a corporal and substantial nature-something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, or at least some new mode of employing practically his art and skill, is required to satisfy the word.' " After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 922 it is further observed at page 428 : "...Since the Excise duty was leviable under the Act on manufacture of goods, the Court explained the connotation of the word 'manufacture.' In so doing, the Court said that the word 'manufacture' implied a change, but that a mere change in the material was not manufacture. There must be such a transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. There must be such a transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. This was also the meaning given to the word 'manufacture' in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 791"............ The expression manufacturing purposes' in section 106, thus, means purposes for making or fabricating articles or materials by physical labour, or skill, or by mechanical power, vendible and useful as such. Such making or fabricating does not mean merely a change in the already existing articles or material, but transforming it into a different article or material having a distinctive name, character or use or fabricating a previously known article by a novel process." 6. Mr. K.K. Chokhawala, appearing for the opponent-landlady, has contended that even assuming for the sake of argument this such running of a Ghani could be said to be a manufacturing operation, there was no material whatsoever on the record of the case to reach the conclusion that the said purpose was the main or dominant purpose of the lease. On the contrary, even if the petitioner- defendant's own pleading is taken into account, it will clearly mean that the house-site land which the subject-matter of the lease was taken by the petitioner-tenant sometimes in year 1960 A.D. for the purpose of putting up a construction thereon for the purpose of running the Ghani and business. It is, therefore, evident that even according to the pleading of the petitioner himself, the lease was for both the purpose. It was not that the running of a Ghani was the main purpose and incidentally the product that came to be made on account of the said manufacturing process, viz., oil from oil seeds, was to be sold at that place. 7. This argument of Mr. Chokhawala appears to be quite well founded. In the plaint, the plaintiff landlady had in terms stated that the house-site in question was leased and this petitioner was a monthly tenant. Even in the suit notice, Ex. 26, dated 25-12-1967, which was admittedly received by the defendant, in terms it was stated that the defendant was a monthly tenant and it was on account of the Rent Act that he had continued to be a statutory tenant in respect of the suit premises. Even in the suit notice, Ex. 26, dated 25-12-1967, which was admittedly received by the defendant, in terms it was stated that the defendant was a monthly tenant and it was on account of the Rent Act that he had continued to be a statutory tenant in respect of the suit premises. It is significant to note that in spite of such clear averments made, the petitioner-defendant had not replied to it by stating that he was a yearly tenant and for terminating of tenancy, six months' notice was necessary, the lease having been given for manufacturing purposes. That is the conduct of the present petitioner. Apart from it, in the written statement, Ex. 12, itself, in para 19, which, according to the petitioner, recites true facts it is mentioned that the true facts are that the suit house-site land was remaining unoccupied and the people in the neighbourhood were using it. Thereupon, plaintiff's husband had called him in year 1960 and proposed to lease it for a period of 20 years. The material portion, which is very important for the purpose of deciding this revision petition, follows thereafter. It will, therefore, be advantageous to understand the real purport of it, to incorporate that portion in the very words in Gujarati as stated therein : "Amoe to vakhate Ghani karva Tatha vepar karva to gharthar upat bandhkmn kart paku niakan bandhi 'e rakhva kadelun. To vadan na dhanie teno kabjo thay. Ane loko khoto hak ubho na kare to karane anyone 20 varshni Bani Thi bhade aapvaa janavelun ane varshik rupiya 51 tenu blradun nakk karelvn ane to varsh puru thaye to aapvanu hatun atle vadanna dhani ni sainmati thi ane hajrima anroe to kharlli ghar thar upar bandhkanr kart rupiya 700 (saatso) jevo Kharch Karelo ane tern kari terna atno vepar karie chhie ane ghanchi ni ghani karie chhie." The English rendering of it will be : "...We told the plaintiff's husband that we take it on lease for construction of a Pucca building for erecting a Ghani and for doing business. The Plaintiff's husband, to see that other people do not occupy it and do not create any right, mentioned to lease it for a period of 20 years and Rs. 51/- were fixed as an annual rent which were to be paid at the end of the year. The Plaintiff's husband, to see that other people do not occupy it and do not create any right, mentioned to lease it for a period of 20 years and Rs. 51/- were fixed as an annual rent which were to be paid at the end of the year. So, with the consent of the plaintiff's husband and in his presence we had put up a construction thereon by spending a huge amount of Rs. 700/- and by so doing, we are doing the business and also running a Ghani of Ghanchi." It is thus evident that in this written statement in terms it is stated by the defendant that the purpose of lease was to make a construction for the use for the purpose of Ghani and for the purpose of running business and after taking the lease, constructed a house where they run the business as well as they run Ghani. It is nowhere suggested in this written statement that the main or dominant purpose was to run a Ghani and only incidentally the product of the alleged manufacturing process or operation was to be sold there. On the contrary, it is stated that the purpose was to do business as well as to run the Ghani. Evidence also does not exactly show the position that the dominant purpose was to run the Ghana. Mr. Majmudar has taken me through the entire oral evidence in that behalf. When there is such a clear admission made in the pleading itself, it was really not necessary to go through that evidence. The matter does not rest there only. 8. In Exh. 9, which was an application given by this very petitioner during the pendency of the suit for fixation of the interim rent, he has in terms stated that the suit-site land was given on lease by the plaintiff's husband to him for a period of 20 years for running a shop and for erecting a Ghani, and in that house-site land with the consent of the plaintiff's husband he had put up a construction spending Rs. 700/- and has from year 1960, the year of lease, constructed a shop and in that shop he is running a shop as well as running a Ghani. 700/- and has from year 1960, the year of lease, constructed a shop and in that shop he is running a shop as well as running a Ghani. It is thus evident that no case was even suggested at that stage that the dominant or the main purpose of the lease was to run a Ghani, which may, according to Mr. Majmudar be a manufacturing purpose. The onus lay on the defendant to prove this fact as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. There is no clear-cut and convincing evidence to show that the main or dominant purpose of the lease was to run the Gulzani. The Courts below have, therefore, rightly reached the conclusion that six months' notice was not required to determine such a lease and the notice given was quite legal and valid. This main contention raised by Mr. Majmudar, therefore, fails. 9. Coming next to the question regarding the availability of protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act, it is an admitted position that the demand was made in the suit notice, Ex. 26, which were given as contemplated under section 12(2) of the Act for the rent that was due from 10.11.65. The amount also was specified. Admittedly, the rent which had become time barred at the date of the suit was not deposited by the tenant. Mr. Majmudar has submitted that this time- barred debt was not claimed in the suit. Whatever rent was claimed in the suit wets deposited and consequently the tenant was entitled to protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. It is significant to note that in the notice, which is required to be given under section 12(2) of the Act, such a demand was made. That fact was also mentioned in the suit. So far as that money claim is concerned, the landlady could not claim it a, it was time-barred at the date of the suit. 10. In Ranrrao Palkar v. Amir Kasanz Bhagwan, 58 Bom. L.R. 284 this question has been considered. That fact was also mentioned in the suit. So far as that money claim is concerned, the landlady could not claim it a, it was time-barred at the date of the suit. 10. In Ranrrao Palkar v. Amir Kasanz Bhagwan, 58 Bom. L.R. 284 this question has been considered. It is observed therein : "The words 'rent then due' in Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rents Control Act, 1947, mean all rent in arrears of outstanding, including rent which cannot be recovered through the process of the Court owing to the bar imposed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908." It is observed at page 286 : "The only point, which has been urged by Mr. Pandya in this application, is that the learned Judge was not competent to direct the defendants to pay arrears of rent, the recovery of which was barred by limitation on the date of the suit, viz., November 3, 1952." After referring to the scheme of the Act and the meaning of the word "due" in Webster's Dictionary, at pages 287 and 288, the following observations have been made : This sub-section also makes it clear that the legislature intended to give relief to only those tenants, who are ready and willing to pay the rent due, and to observe and perform the other conditions of the tenancy. The section is not intended for benefit of those tenants, who evade their obligations or who are not willing to pay the rent due from them. We are accordingly of the opinion that the word 'rent' then due' in clause (h) of sub-section (3) of section 12 should be construed to mean all rent in arrears or outstanding, including rent which cannot be recovered through the process of the Court owing to the bar imposed by the Limitation Act. A similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Vesudeva Udpa v. Krishna Udpa, ILR 4 Madras 629. This decision is binding on this Court, it having been given prior to the bifurcation of the bigger bilingual Bombay State. Furthermore, in several decisions, this Court also has followed the aforesaid principle. The appellate Court was, therefore, fully justified in reaching the conclusion that on account of non-depositing the aforesaid amount which has become time-barred, the tenant was not entitled to protection under section 12(3)(b) of the Act. Furthermore, in several decisions, this Court also has followed the aforesaid principle. The appellate Court was, therefore, fully justified in reaching the conclusion that on account of non-depositing the aforesaid amount which has become time-barred, the tenant was not entitled to protection under section 12(3)(b) of the Act. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the question, whether the tenant has deposited the rent that became due thereafter regularly in the suit as well as the appeal. 11. The two contentions raised by Mr. Majmudar fail. Revision petition, therefore, fails. 12. Revision petition is dismissed. In view of the position that the question regarding the dominant purpose or the main purpose was not fully thrashed out in the two Courts below each party is ordered to bear its own costs in this revision petition. The Petitioner is given time by way of concession to vacate and handover possession of the suit premises on or before 10.11.1975. In the mean time, he has to pay Rs. 4.25 paise per month to the landlady by way of mesne profits for use and occupation the suit premises. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.