JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge, quashing certain notice issued by the appellant under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. 2. Opposite Party No. 1, Messrs U.P. Hotel and Restaurants Ltd., own the Clerk Shiraz Hotel at Agra. By the impugned notices, the appellant decided that the kitchen of the hotel was a factory or establishment to which the Act applied and demanded certain amounts of contributions towards the Employees' State Insurance Fund and threatened to recover certain amounts of fine. The notices were challenged by the respondent No. 1 by way of a writ petition before this Court. The main contention of the respondent No. 1 was that it was not covered by the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the notices were all illegal. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the ground that before determining the question whether the Act applied or not to the respondent No. 1, the authorities ought to have given them an opportunity of being heard and that since this opportunity was denied, the action was in violation of the principles of natural justice and had to be struck down. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Employees' State Insurance Corporation has preferred this appeal. 3. The only question argued before us by Sri B. N. Asthana, Learned counsel for the appellant, is that the authorities were not required to give any hearing to the respondent No. 1 before deciding the question whether the Act was or was not applicable to the hotel. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the authorities were not required to give any hearing to respondent No. 1. Section 44 of the Act which is material for this purpose, reads thus:- "Employers to furnish returns and maintain registers in certain cases- 1. Every principal and immediate employer shall submit to the Corporation to or such officer of the Corporation as it may direct such returns in such form and containing such particulars relating to persons employed by him or to any factory or establishment in respect of which he is the principal or immediate employer as may be specified in regulations made in this behalf. 2. 2. Where in respect of any factory or establishment the Corporation has reason to believe that a return should have been submitted under subsection (1) but has not been so submitted, the Corporation may require any person in charge of the factory or establishment do furnish such particulars as it may consider necessary for the purpose of enabling the Corporation to decide whether the factory or establishment is a factory or establishment to which this Act applies. 3. Every principal and immediate employer shall maintain such registers or records in respect of his factory or establishment as may be required by regulations made in this behalf." Sub-section (1) requires the employer to submit returns to the Corporation for the purpose of determining their contribution. Sub-section (2) refers to a case where no such return has been filed by an employer. In such a case, if the Corporation has reason to believe that a return should have been submitted by the employer, it may require the employer to furnish particulars necessary for the purpose of enabling the Corporation to decide whether the factory or establishment is a factory or establishment to which the Act applies. In the present case also no return had been filed by respondent No. 1. It is not clear whether the Corporation called upon respondent No. 1 to furnish any particulars or not. However, an inspector of the Corporation did go to the hotel and did collect certain particulars. Sub-section (2) contemplates a decision by the Corporation on the question whether the factory or establishment is a factory or establishment to which the Act applies. Such a decision was taken by the Corporation but without giving any hearing to the respondent No. 1. The question is whether in deciding this question the authorities were required to give a hearing or not to respondent No. 1. 4. There can be no doubt that the corporation is a statutory authority and in applying the provisions of the Act to a particular employer, it exercises statutory functions conferred by the Act upon it. Before deciding this question of the applicability of the Act the Corporation is required to collect materials relevant to the question. It is then required to decide the question whether the Act applied or not to the establishment or factory. The decision has to be objective and, not subjective. Before deciding this question of the applicability of the Act the Corporation is required to collect materials relevant to the question. It is then required to decide the question whether the Act applied or not to the establishment or factory. The decision has to be objective and, not subjective. It cannot also be disputed that the decision of the Corporation seriously affects the rights of the employers inasmuch as if the Act is held applicable to them they have to pay certain amounts towards contribution to the Employees' State Insurance Fund and in case of default they become liable to penal action. In these circumstances, it cannot but be held that the Corporation must act judicially when it decides the question whether the Act does or does of apply to a particular employer. 5. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that since the Act sets up an Employees' Insurance Court for decision of certain disputes where the employer can get a hearing, it is not necessary to give a hearing at the stage of the decision by the Corporation. We are unable to agree with this contention. Whether the function of the Corporation in deciding the question whether the Act applies or not to a particular employer is quasi-judicial or not, does not depend upon whether there is any further remedy open to the employer or not. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore. AIR 1970 SC 2042 = (1970) 2 SCR 600 . In our opinion, this case supports the view that we have taken rather than the view which the learned counsel has contended for. It was held in this case that the dividing line between administrative power and quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated, that the principles of natural justice apply to the exercise of the administrative power as well. It would follow from this decision that the principles of natural justice would apply even if it were held that the Corporation was only exercising an administrative power in deciding whether the Act applied or not to a particular employer. 6. It would follow from this decision that the principles of natural justice would apply even if it were held that the Corporation was only exercising an administrative power in deciding whether the Act applied or not to a particular employer. 6. For the reasons stated above, we are of opinion that the Corporation when it decided the question whether or not the Act applied to respondent No. 1 was required to act quasi-judicially and was required to give an opportunity of being heard to respondent No. 1. The view taken by learned Single Judge is quite correct. 7. The appeal is without merits and is hereby dismissed with costs.