J. B. MEHTA, T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE three appeals arise out of the three Refererences preferred by the appellants-claimants under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and disposed of by the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad in Compensation Cases which were respectively registered as 100/63 145163 and 40/63. ( 2 ) THE acquired lands are situated within the city limits of Ahmedabad in Sherkotda area on the eastern side of Ahmedabad Railway Station. In Appeal No. 239/67 2541 aq. yds. of land are acquired out of s. no. 135 which admeasures 9317 sq. yds. This acquisition is made for constructing Employees State Insurance Scheme Building. The notification issued under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in connection with this land is dated 15 March 1962 ( 3 ) IN Appeal no. 240/67 4846 sq. yds. of s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108 the total measurements of which are 1122 sq. yds. have been acquired for constructing a dispensary for Employees State Insurance Scheme. These acquisitions have been made under sec. 4 notifications which are dated 1. 12. 60 and 19. 4. 62. ( 4 ) 1031 sq. yds. of land of s. no. 246 the total measurement of which are 6587 sq. yds. have been acquired for the purpose of constructing a play ground by sec. 4 Notification on 28th April 1960. The location of all the above referred survey numbers is found in the map Appendix B attached to Ex. 61 which is the report of valuation expert one Shri Sukumar Manubhai whose deposition appears at ex. 59. ( 5 ) FOR the land which is acquired from s. no. 135 the Land Acquisition Officer has offered compensation at the rate of Rs. 35. 00 per sq. yd. However the learned Judge of the trial court has awarded an enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 40. 00per sq. yd. The claimants have claimed compensation in this appeal at the rate of Rs. 100. 00per sq. yd. The learned trial Judge has further awarded the amount of Rs. 10 0 for injurious affection of this survey number on account of severance because the land which is acquired is from the front portion of this survey number. The claimants have claimed more damage on account of this injurious affection of its severance. ( 6 ) SO far as s. nos. 10 0 for injurious affection of this survey number on account of severance because the land which is acquired is from the front portion of this survey number. The claimants have claimed more damage on account of this injurious affection of its severance. ( 6 ) SO far as s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108/a/2 are concerned the Land Acquisition Officer has awarded compensation for the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 18. 00per sq. yd. But the learned trial Judge has awarded an enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 23. 00per sq. yd. for 3770 sq. yds. and at the rate of Rs. 25. 00per sq. yd. for 1075 sq. yds. which are acquired from these survey numbers. The claimants has claimed compensation for the acquired lands of these survey numbers at the rate of Rs. 80. 00per sq. yd. The learned trial Judge has awarded damages of Rs. 4 0 this claimant on account of injurious affection resulting from severance. The claimant has claimed more damages in this appeal. ( 7 ) SO far as s. no. 246 is concerned the land Acquisition Officer has awarded compensation for the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 15. 00per sq. yd But the learned trial Judge has given enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/-per sq. yd. In this appeal the claimant has claimed compensation at the rate of Rs 100/-per sq. yd. As for damages for injurious affection resulting from the severance the learned trial Judge has awarded Rs 4 0 the claimant has claimed further amount in this appeal. ( 8 ) TWO questions principally arise for our consideration in these appeals. The first is whether the rate at which the market price of the acquired land is calculated by the lower court is proper and reasonable and the second is whether the amounts of damages awarded by the lower court on account of injurious affection of the land resulting from severance are proper or not. We first propose to take for our consideration the question as regards the market price of the acquired lands. ( 9 ) BEFORE dealing with the peculiar facts relating to this sale instance we would shortly refer to certain principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in selecting the methods for determining the compensation in land acquisition cases. We first propose to take for our consideration the question as regards the market price of the acquired lands. ( 9 ) BEFORE dealing with the peculiar facts relating to this sale instance we would shortly refer to certain principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in selecting the methods for determining the compensation in land acquisition cases. ( 10 ) IN R. C. COOPER V. UNION OF INDIA A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 564 at page 609 the Supreme Court has summarised as under some important methods of determining the compensation for the acquired land. Their lordships have observed:the important methods of determination of compensations are :- (i) market value determined from sales of comparable properties proximate in time to the date of acquisition similarly situate and possessing the same or similar advantages and subject to the same or similar disadvantages. Market value is the price the property may fetch in the open market if sold by a willing seller unaffected by the special needs of a particular purchase; (ii) capitalisation of the net annual profit out of the property at a rate equal in normal cases to the return from giltedged securities. Ordinarily value of the property may be determined by capitalizing the net annual value obtainable in the market at the date of the notice of acquisition; (iii) where the property is a house expenditure likely to be incurred for constructing a similar house and reduced by the depreciation for the num- ber of years since it was constructed; (iv) principle of reinstament where it is satisfactorily established that reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended there being no general market for the property for the purpose for which it is devoted (the purpose being a public purpose) and would have continued to be devoted but for compulsory acquisition. There compensation will be assessed on the basis of reasonable cost of reinstatement; (v) when the property has outgrown its utility and it is reasonably incapable of economic use it may be valued as land plus the break-up value of the structure. But the fact that the acquirer does not intend to use the property for which it is used at the time of acquisition and desires to demolish it or use it for other purposes is irrelevant; and (vi) the property to be acquired has ordinarily to be valued as a unit. But the fact that the acquirer does not intend to use the property for which it is used at the time of acquisition and desires to demolish it or use it for other purposes is irrelevant; and (vi) the property to be acquired has ordinarily to be valued as a unit. THE Supreme Court has observed as under in STATE OF KERALA V. P. P. HASSAN KOYA A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1201 with regard to the principles which should be followed in determining compensation of acquisition: in determining compensation payable in respect of land with buildings compensation cannot be determined by assessing the value of the land and the break-up value of the buildings separately. The land and the building constitute one unit and the value of the entire unit must be determined with all its advantages and its potentialities. THEN proceeding further the court has observed as under in the same judgment: when the property sold is land with building it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under sec. 4. Therefore the method which is generally resorted to in determining the value of the land with buildings especially those used for business purposes is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might reanonably be received from the land and the buildings. IN view of the above observations we can safely deduce the following principles which are relevant to the fats of those cases. These principles would be as under:1 Market value is that value which is not affected by special need of a particular purchase. 2 Where market value of a built up structure is to be assessed one method which could be adapted is to find out the expenditure likely to be incurred for constructing a similar house reduced by depreciation and hence if the value of the structure is nil to one of the parties of the purchase the said nil value would not be the market value. 3 The property in question should ordinarily be valued as a whole composite unit. 3 The property in question should ordinarily be valued as a whole composite unit. Aggregate of valuations of its different components such as land and structure would normally not give an idea of its market value;4 The fact that the purchaser or the acquirer of property does not intend to use the property for the same purpose for which it is used or desires to demolish it is irrelevant in determining its market value. ( 11 ) ON consideration of the evidence recorded in these cases we find that all the above four principles are negatived in the sale instance which is relied upon by the claimants. As will be presently seen the recorded evidence clearly reveals that the purchaser M/s. C. Patel and Co. had a special need of and fascination for the land of s. no. 137 which is covered by this sale instance It is further found that the parties to these documents have not adopted any systematic method for assessing the market value of the structure. It is an admitted position that the structure of four bungalows and other rooms which were standing on the land of s. no. 132 at the time of sale; was good enough. But this structure was treated by the parties as of merely scrap value because the purchaser wanted to construct a Cinema theatre on the land after demolishing this structure. Again it is evident from the two documents ex. 24 and 76 that the parties have not evaluated the property as a composite unit. They have resorted to break up method of assessing the structure as of scrap value and attributing the rest of the value to the land. This is obviously not approved by the Supreme Court in the above referred two decisions. Further in assessing the value of the structure the parties to those documents have taken totally an irrelevant fact into consideration namely the desire of the purchaser to demolish the structure to build a Cinema house. Taking of this irrelevant fact into consideration has resulted in reducing the valuation of a structure which was good enough to last for a number of years. We thus find that the above referred four principles which can be deduced from the said decisions of the Supreme Court are not observed by the parties in settling the valuation of the structure and land comprised by this sale instance. We thus find that the above referred four principles which can be deduced from the said decisions of the Supreme Court are not observed by the parties in settling the valuation of the structure and land comprised by this sale instance. ( 12 ) IN this connection it would be worthwhile to make a short reference to the evidence which is recorded in the case. On behalf of M/s. C. Patel and Co. one witness named Umedbhai Zaverbhai Patel is examined by the claimants. Deposition of this witness appears at ex. 17. The witness says that his firm is dealing in the business of purchasing old mills and factories together with the machineries and lands belonging to them. In para 3 of his deposition he claims that before the sale instance in question was entered into he had some negotiations with Mr. Udayan Chinubhai one of the claimants for the purchase of the property comprised by s. no. 132 According to him Mr. Udayan Chinubhai demanded the price at the rate of Rs. 150. 00 per sq. yd. and this price included the price of the structure. Ultimately as a result of the negotiations they decided that the four bungalows and the structure standing on the land should be sold at the price of Rs. 50 0 and the land of 5000 sq. yds should be sold at the rate of Rs. 130 per sq. yd. The witness admits that immediately on the execution of banakhat on 11th November 196 an earnest amount of Rs. 25 0 was paid and the possession of the whole of the property was taken over by him. Soon after taking the possession of this property the structure of the four bungalows was demolished. Subsequently after some time the purchasers paid up the amount of consideration. The agreement to sell stipulated the payment of interest for the amount of consideration remaining unpaid. However the accounts which are produced in the record of the case show that even though the remaining amount of the compensation was paid about 2 years after the agreement to sell was executed and possession of the property was handed over to the vendees no interest on the large amount of Rs. 6 75 0 which was remaining unpaid was charged by the vendors. 6 75 0 which was remaining unpaid was charged by the vendors. It is further revealed from the cross-examination of this witness that ever since the year 1958 his firm was contemplating to construct a Cinema house at Ahmedabad and that it was for this very purpose that this property was purchased at the price of Rs. 7 0 0 Following portion of the deposition of this witness is very instructive on this point and clearly shows that the purchase of this property was attended by very special circumstances and was dominated by the desire on the part of the purchasers to construct a Cinema house there by demolishing the standing structure. The witness says in para 5 of his deposition as under: I knew that the Government has acquired for the railway station land of Madhubhai colony. I have not made inquiries at what rate the compensation was paid for that land. I had not inquired for what year the land value was given for the acquired land for the railway. It was not necessary for me. We thought of constructing a cinema theatre on this land when it was agreed to be purchased. My employees had made inquiries about the prevailing rates of lands on both the sides that is eastern side and western side of the railway station. My employees had not sent me reports of their inquiries. We were thinking to construct a cinema theatre since 1958 in Ahmebadad. I had seen lands at other places but 1 found this land suitable for future development. Roads were also proposed on all the sides. When I purchased this land there were roads on two sides. As it was not necessary had not inquired at what rate the other lands of Madbubhai colony were sold. This was the only plot well situated opposite railway station with roads on three sides. I had seen Madhubhai colony before acquisition for the railway. These 5000 sq. yds. land was the best plot out of the remaining land after acquisi tion for the railway. THESE admissions made by the witness clearly reveal two most important features of the case. This was the only plot well situated opposite railway station with roads on three sides. I had seen Madhubhai colony before acquisition for the railway. These 5000 sq. yds. land was the best plot out of the remaining land after acquisi tion for the railway. THESE admissions made by the witness clearly reveal two most important features of the case. They are (1) that the witness had not made any inquiries about the prevailing market rates in the locality before purchasing this property and (2) witness was bent on purchasing this property even by giving a fancy price because he was thinking of constructing a cinema house in Ahmedabad since the year 1958 and the property in question was found to be eminently suitable for that purpose being the best piece of land out of the whole Madhubhai colony. These two features show very clearly that the price which M/s. C. Patel and Co. have paid for this property cannot be treated as the market price for the simple reason that the purchasers had a special need for the property. ( 13 ) THE above referred witness Umedbhai has categorically admitted that since he wanted to build a cinema house on this property the structure of four bungalows which was standing on this property had absolutely no value for him because it was only after the demolition of this structure that good cinema house could be built there. Therefore the question is whether this approach for the valuation of the structure which was standing on the property would give us any clear idea about its market price. It may be that for their own special reasons this structure had a nil value to the purchasers. But can it be said that so far as the vendors were concerned the structure was without any value or for that matter can it also be said that the structure had a nil value in the market. Shri Mehta on behalf of the claimants contented that since so far as the purchasers were concerned the structure had nothing but a nuisance value it must follow that the price Which they had paid is the price for the land and if that was the price for the land ther would be no reason not to treat the same as the market price prevailing on the date of the sale. We find ourselves wholly unable to accept this contention for the simple reason that it is not the whim or the desire of only the purchaser which settles the market price. Market price is that price which a normal and prudent buyer wants to pay after evaluating the prices prevailing in the round about area and which normal and a prudent seller is willing to accept. It is therefore the consensus between the buyer and the seller which would decide the price at which a particular property is bought or sold It is evident from Umedbhais deposition that during the course of his negotiations with Mr. Udayan one of the vendors he included the price of the structure when he quoted the rate for which he was willing to sell Under these circumstances the con- siderations which weighted with the purchasers M/s. C. Patel and Co. in purchasing this property would be of no avail in determining the market price of the property in question. ( 14 ) IT is further evident that contrary to what the Supreme Court has said in the above referred two decisions the parties to this sale instances have not treated the property of s. no. 132 as a composite whole. Under these circumstances we are not in a position to know what was the real market price of the structure which was standing on this property and so long as we are not able to know this data it would rot be possible for us to find out what was the prevailing market price of the land of 5000 sq. yds. of s. no. 132 when this sale took place. ( 15 ) WE thus find that none of the three sale instances which are relied upon by the claimants is capable of giving us any reliable data to fix the market price of the acquired land on the date of the acquisition. However we find that in the years 1957 and 1958 s. no. 122 to 132 of Madhubhai colony were acquired for the construction of new Meter Gauge Railway Station. As already noted above the compensation which was offered for the acquisition of these lands was at the rate of Rs. 25. 00 to Rs. 35. 00 per sq. yd. However we find that in the years 1957 and 1958 s. no. 122 to 132 of Madhubhai colony were acquired for the construction of new Meter Gauge Railway Station. As already noted above the compensation which was offered for the acquisition of these lands was at the rate of Rs. 25. 00 to Rs. 35. 00 per sq. yd. The learned trial Judge has taken the award of this compensation into consideration and has ultimately fixed the compensation of the acquired land of s. no. 135 at the rate of Rs. 40. 00 per sq. yd. Thus the learned trial Judge has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 5. 00 more per sq. yd. Therefore the question is whathe there is any reason to interfere with this finding of the learned trial Judge. ( 16 ) WHILE considering this question we find one very important admission made by the claimant Mr. Udayan about the value of the acquired land. The deposition of Mr. Udayan is recorded at ex. 36. In his cross-examination he has admitted that for the purpose of Wealth tax return for the year 1960 the acquired property was estimated by him at the rate of Rs. 35. 00 per sq. yd. In that return even the land of s. no. 132 which was eventually sold to M/s. C. Patel and Co was included. The witness says that income-tax department has not accept this valuation. In this case we are not concerned with what the income-tax department has done with regard to this valuation but the question is whether this admission of the claimant about the true market value of the land in the year 1960 can be utilised as one of the substantive pieces of evidence in fixing the market price of the acquired land or not The learned advocates of the claimants contended that whatever the witness might have stated for the purpose of filling his wealth tax return the same should not be considered as supplying any evidence about the market price for the purpose of assessing compensation under Land Acquisition Act because the valuation of building properties made under the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act would not be on the same principles on which market value is fixed under the provisions of sec 23 of the land Acquisition Act. We find ourselves ourselves to accept this contention. We find ourselves ourselves to accept this contention. It is not in dispute that while assessing compensation under sec 3 of the Land Acquisition Act what the court is called upon to determine is the prevailing market price of the property in question of the date in. acquisition. Now if a reference is made to the relevant provisions of the Wealth Tax Act it would be found that even the properties to be assessed for the purpose of the Wealth Tax Act are to be assessed at the market rate as Prevailing on the date of valuation. Sec. 4 of the Wealth tax Act 1957 says that in computing the net wealth of an individual there shall be estimated as belonging to that individual the value of his assets which ale held by him on the valuation date. Section 7 of the Act provides how the value of assets should be determined. It says that the value of assets other than cash for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act shall be estimated to be the price which in the opinion of the Wealth Tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. The words if sold in open market clearly connote the idea of market value. As to how this market value should be assessed with regard to different properties the concerned authority has framed Rules under the Wealth Tax Act. So far as the immoveable properties are concerned there is no special rule but its valuation is required to be made on the same principles of valuation of immoveable properties which are followed when the compensation is to be awarded for the acquired property under the Land Acquisition Act. In these circumstances it is crystal clear that even so far as the Wealth Tax Act is concerned the price of a particular asset be it moveable or immoveable is to be fixed with reference to its market price on the date of valuation. In this connection Shri Mehta appearing for the claimants in Appeal No. 239/67 drew our attention to certain decisions wherein the interest of an assessee in a property which was held by tenants was not assessed on the footing of the market value of the to tality of all the rights in the asset. In this connection Shri Mehta appearing for the claimants in Appeal No. 239/67 drew our attention to certain decisions wherein the interest of an assessee in a property which was held by tenants was not assessed on the footing of the market value of the to tality of all the rights in the asset. These decisions are in our opinion wholly irrelevant to the question under consideration because in cases where houses or other properties are occupied by tenants who are protected under a statute the owner of the property enjoys the ownership rights which are diminished by the existence of tenancy rights of the tenants. But whatever the rights an assessee possesses in a property these rights are to be assessed on the footing of their market value even for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act. Now even the property is acquired as a whole all the interests in the property vest in the State and therefore the assessment of the acquired property is to be made on the basis of the totality of the ownership rights over the same. So far as the present cases are concerned there is nothing ill evidence to show that either in the acquired land or in s. no. 132 which was purchased by M/s. C. Patel and Co. the owners did not possess the totality of the ownership rights or that there was any other tenant on the property Under these circumstances the decisions relied upon by Shri Mehta are of no relevance. We therefore come to the conclusion that the admission made by the claimants with regard to the rate of the market price of the acquired property as well as the property comprised by s. 110 132 in the year 1960 can he taken as a substantive piece of evidence. It is of course true that such admissions can be explained by the person who has made the same. But there we find that the claimants Mr. Udayan has not given any explanation to show that the rate of valuation of the acquired land which he has shown in his return for the year 1960 was wrong or was not dependable for some reason. But there we find that the claimants Mr. Udayan has not given any explanation to show that the rate of valuation of the acquired land which he has shown in his return for the year 1960 was wrong or was not dependable for some reason. In re-examination the witness has stated that in his Wealth Tax return he had assessed the value of the acquired land for the year 1960 at the average rate given in the award of Land Acquisition Officer for the lands acquired for the railway in the past In our opinion this is no explanation firstly because the award of the Land Acquisition Officer was given not in the year 1960 but in the month of February 1961 and secondly because if the award for the lands acquired for the railway was at a rate lesser that the market rate the witness was not obliged to accept the same and to file his Wealth Tax return accordingly. We therefore find that the admission as regards the assess- ment of this land made by the witness remains unexplained and since such admissions must be taken as substantive pieces of evidence there would be no reason to over look them. ( 17 ) WE however find that there is a cross check for the purpose of appreciating whether this admission is correct or not. We have already noted above that when the property of s. no. 132 was purchased by M/s. C. Patel and Co. the structure of four bungalows and other structure was evaluated by the parties at the scrap value of Rs. 50 0 Thus according to the parties the break-down value of this structure was Rs. 50 0 In ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. DWARKA V. THE WORKMEN EMPLOYED UNDER IT A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 967 the Supreme Court is found to have accepted the principle that the break-down value of plant and machinery is usually calculated at the rate of 5% of the cost price of the block in question. Thus if the break down value of 50 0 is taken as representing 5t/o of the costs price of the structure which was demolished we get the value of this structure at Rs. 10 0 0 But even taking the break-down value of the structure at 10% we find that the value of the structure would be Rs. Thus if the break down value of 50 0 is taken as representing 5t/o of the costs price of the structure which was demolished we get the value of this structure at Rs. 10 0 0 But even taking the break-down value of the structure at 10% we find that the value of the structure would be Rs. 5 0 0 Now since the claimant himself has valued the land in the year 1960 at the rate of Rs. 35. 00 per sq. yd. it would follow that according to him the value of the land which admeasured 5 0 sq. yds. was Rs 1 75 0 Thus even according to the claimants own calculations the value of the property comprised by s. no 132 was Rs. 6 75 0 in the year 1960. He has received the price of Rs. 7 0 0 from the purchasers It thus appears that the estimate of rate at which the acquired lands would be evaluated in the year 1960 given by the claimant in his Wealth-Tax return (at the rate of Rs. 35. 00 per sq. yd. gets sufficient corroboration from the fact that he seems to have assessed the break-down value of the structures standing on the land at the rate of 10% of the real value of the structure. This cross check therefore renders us further help in determining the market price of the acquired land as well as of the land comprised by s. no. 132 in the year 1960. ( 18 ) WE have already noted that according to witness Umedbhai of M/s. C. Patel and Co. lands of s. no. 132 which he purchased in the year 1960 was the best piece of land having three sides open. The eminent location which s. no. 132 possesses is not possessed by the acquired s. no. 135 This s. no. 135 is situated at a distant place in Madhubhai colony having only one side open on the south. Under the circumstances in in the year 1960 the acquired land could not have stood complete comparison with the land of s. no. 132. In other words. in the year 1960 the market price of the acquired land of s. no. 135 could not have been assessed at the rate of Rs 35/- per sq. yd. but could have been assessed at some lower rate. 132. In other words. in the year 1960 the market price of the acquired land of s. no. 135 could not have been assessed at the rate of Rs 35/- per sq. yd. but could have been assessed at some lower rate. However there are certain factors which would give a little enhanced rate for the acquired land of s. no. 135 on the date on which it was acquired. We shall presently discuss these factors. S. No. 132 was sold in the month of November. 1960 as per agreement to sell found at ex. 24. but s. no. 135 which is the subject matter of present acquisition has been acquired one year and several months thereafter on 15 In the meanwhile new Meter Guage Railway Station was already established and therefore that facts must have had its impact on the market price of the adjoining lands. Further it is an admitted position that the most important frontage of s. no. 135 is acquired by this acquisition. Considering these two important facts we find that even though the acquired land of s. no. 135 could not stand Comparison of its market price with the market price of s. no. 132 in the year 1960 we find that the learned trial Judge was justified in assessing the acquired land of s. no. 132 at a little higher rate i. e. at Rs. 40. 00 per sq. yd. Similarly the learned Judge was also justified in assessing the compensation of other acquired s. nos. (108/1 109 aad 108/a/2 and 246) at a higher rate of Rs. 5. 00 per sq. yd. We however see no force in the claimans contention that these rates should be substantially enhanced. ( 19 ) IN this connection we may mention that the claimants have also produced two instances of income which could be derived from certain pieces of open land situated in the area in which the acquired lands are situated. At. ex. 40 is the deposition of one such tenant Ratilal Babladas occupying a portion of the compound of Ramkumar Mills on lease. The witness has also produced rent receipt ex. 43 He has also proved that M/s. Hasu Textile Industries of which he is one of the partners also occupies some land in this area on lease. For this he has produced rent receipt found at ex. 42. The witness has also produced rent receipt ex. 43 He has also proved that M/s. Hasu Textile Industries of which he is one of the partners also occupies some land in this area on lease. For this he has produced rent receipt found at ex. 42. In our opinion this evidence is absolutely of no use in assessing the market value of acquired lands. Expert witness Chunibhai Patel has estimated the land value of these two lands at the rate of Rs. 120. 00 per sq. yd. There is however no evidence about the cost of structure and other amenities such as water electricity drainage road etc. which the tenants are enjoying. The learned trial Judge has rightly remarked that the expert has taken approximate value without giving the relevant materials and details. We find that the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected this evidence. ( 20 ) ANOTHER witness who is examined on this point is Keshubhai Purshottamdas Patel whose deposition appears at ex. 44. This witness is a tenant in A type block of Bapunagar Industrial estate which is situated about a mile away from the acquired lands Obviously even this evidence is of no use for determining the value of the acquired lands. . ( 21 ) IN conclusion therefore we find no reason to interfere with the rate at which the learned trial Judge has awarded compensation in all the three cases. ( 22 ) THIS takes us to the second question which is as regards the damages which could be awarded to the claimants on account of injurious affection of their property resulting from severance. Third clause of sec. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 says that in determining the account of compensation to be awarded under the Act the damage if any sustained by the person interested by reason of severing said land from his other land should also be awarded. Injurious affection of unacquired land of a claimant as a result of the acquisition of his other land is covered by this clause. The learned advocates of the parties have addressed to us on the principles which should guide the court at the time of awarding damages resulting from such injurious affection. Before however discussing these principles it would be necessary to state certain facts with regard to the acquired lands on this question. ( 23 ) SO far as s. no. The learned advocates of the parties have addressed to us on the principles which should guide the court at the time of awarding damages resulting from such injurious affection. Before however discussing these principles it would be necessary to state certain facts with regard to the acquired lands on this question. ( 23 ) SO far as s. no. 135 is concerned its total measurements are 9317 sq. yds. As already stated above this survey number is itself a part of the area which is known as Madhubhai colony. Out of 9317 sq. yds. of this survey number the Government have acquired 2541 sq. yds. The remaking area of this survey number is thus 6776 sq. yds. But the remaining area of the ownership of the claimant in the whole of Madhubhai colony is 65366 sq. yds. It is further found that this survey no. 135 had the frotage of 789 ft. on the public road on south Out of this frontage the frontage of 245 ft. is acquired. Now Chinubhai Chaturbhai Patel who is expert examined for the valuation of this survey number has not assessed any damage in his report on account of the loss of this frontage of this survey number. He has however given detailed evidence in paras 10 and 11 of his deposition reference to which shows that he was adopted two alternative methods of assessing the damage resulting from the loss of frontage. He has first taken the land of whole of the Madhubhai colony remaining with the claimant after the acquisition of a portion of s. no. 135 and has stated that the depreciation due to severance of the remaining 65366 sq. yds. of Madhubhai colony should be calculated at the rate of 2 According to the witness the assessment of market value of the acquired land at the time of acquisition was Rs. 150. 00 per sq. yd. Thus according to this witness at 2% the damage for serverance and injurious affection for the remaining land would be Rs. 3. 00 sq. yd and therefore the total damages should be estimated at Rs. 1 96 0 and odd. ( 24 ) IN the alternative the witness has taken s. no. 135 as a unit separate from other lands of the claimant in Madhubhai colony and has calculated the depreciation at 25% i. e. Rs. 37. 8 per sq. yd. 3. 00 sq. yd and therefore the total damages should be estimated at Rs. 1 96 0 and odd. ( 24 ) IN the alternative the witness has taken s. no. 135 as a unit separate from other lands of the claimant in Madhubhai colony and has calculated the depreciation at 25% i. e. Rs. 37. 8 per sq. yd. The land which remain after acquisition being of 6776 sq. yds. he has calculated the total damages at the figure of Rs. 2 50 0 ( 25 ) THE learned trial. Judge has rejected this method of calculation and has as already noted above awarded damages on account of injurious affection of the unacquired land at Rs. 10 0 ( 26 ) IT is an admitted position that as a result of the acquisition of frontage admeasuring 2541 sq. yds. of s. no. 135 only the frontage of about 60 ft. remains in this survey number and this strip of 60 ft. in width can be utilised for approaching the remaining unacquired land of this survey number. The learned trial Judge calls this strip of land a bottle neck for the purpose of approaching the unacquired portion of this survey number ( 27 ) SO far as s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108/a/2 are concerned their total area is 11223 sq-yds. They form a compact block of land. The area of the acquired land out of this total compact block comes to 4846 sq. yds. The area of the land which remains unacquired is 6377 sq. yds. At ex. 61 is the report of the expert Sukumar Manubhai Parikh and along with this report there is a map appendix-A which shows the different dim- ensions of these three survey numbers the land which is acquired out of these survey numbers and the land which is left over after the said ac- quisition. According to this expert a small frontage of 63 ft. on the pub- lic road on the east remains after the disputed acquisition. He says that originally the frontage on the road was 245 ft. This expert has assessed damages on account of injurious affection to the unacquired land of the claimant at Rs. 1 76 0 Here it should be noted that reference to the map which is annexed as Appendix A to report ex. 61 by this expert shows that s. nos. This expert has assessed damages on account of injurious affection to the unacquired land of the claimant at Rs. 1 76 0 Here it should be noted that reference to the map which is annexed as Appendix A to report ex. 61 by this expert shows that s. nos. 108/1 108 have been acquired as a whole. These two survey numbers were abutting on the above referred public road on the east but since they are acquired as a whole there is no rear land which can be said to have lost its frontage on account of acquisition of these two survey numbers. So far as s. no. 108/a/2 is concerned it did have some frontage which was useful for s. no. 108/a/1 a portion of which is situated on the rear side of this subsurvey number. However the acquisition of sub-survey no. 108/a/2 is so made that a portion of its frontage is set back with the result that practically the whole of the frontage which this sub-survey number enjoyed previously is now enjoyed by s. no. 108 Under the circumstances sub-survey no. 108/a/1 which is now left with the claimant as unacquired land has not substantially lost in its intrinsic frontage. This particular fact would be useful in assessing the damages resulting from the loss of frontage in the remaining unacquired land of these survey numbers. ( 28 ) SO far as s. no. 246 is concerned it is an admitted fact that it is contiguous with the adjoining s. nos. 247 248 and 175c all of which are of the ownership of this claimant. The total area of these contiguous survey numbers is 6587 sq. yds. out of which a front portion of s. no. 246 admeasuring 1031 sq. yds. has been acquired. Thus 5556 sq yds. have remained unacquired and contiguous Reference to the map showing this acquisition reveals that out of the total area of s. no. 246 a strip of land admeasuring 25 ft. in width and about 1051 in length remains unacquired and serves as a passage to the lands of s. nos. 247 248 and 175c wherein some chawls for labourers have been built. Evidence reveals that this strip of land was serving as a passage for the above referred remaining survey number even before the acquisition was made because on the acquired land of s. no. 247 248 and 175c wherein some chawls for labourers have been built. Evidence reveals that this strip of land was serving as a passage for the above referred remaining survey number even before the acquisition was made because on the acquired land of s. no. 246 there was a shed which was used by a Fire wood merchant as a tenant. Thus result of the acquisition is that the above referred 20 ft. wide strip which used to serve as a passage to the remaining survey numbers in the rear is even at present serving the same purpose. The claimant has however claimed that as a result of lose of of frontage covered by the acquired land the land of the remaining survey numbers which are situated in the rear has depreciated in value. The expert Chunilal has estimated the damages on this account at the rate of Rs. 10. 00per sq. yd. and has therefore calculated the total damages at Rs. 5 560 ( 29 ) THE above are the facts relating to the loss of frontage with regard to all the acquired 1ands and the question which how arises to be considered is to what extent the damages resulting from this loss of frontage should be assessed. ( 30 ) SHRI Vidyarthi learned Assistant Government Pleader contended that while assessing the market value of the acquired lands the court has taken into account the fact that these lands were frontage lands and therefore the court has assessed their market value at higher rate. According to him therefore the claimants are not entitled to any separate damages for the alleged injurious affection of the remaining unacquired land because by doing so we shall be calculating the amount of compensation twice over. He further contended that in s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108 as well as ins. no. 246 there are chawls of labourers in the land which remains unacquired and therefore it is not possible for the claimants to put this unacquired land to any other use in future. According to Shri Vidyarthi therefore it cannot be said that there is any dimunition in the potential value of the remaining land and therefore the claimants are not entitled to claim anything on account of damages resulting from so called injurious affection. Shri Vidyarthi further contended that so far as s. nos. According to Shri Vidyarthi therefore it cannot be said that there is any dimunition in the potential value of the remaining land and therefore the claimants are not entitled to claim anything on account of damages resulting from so called injurious affection. Shri Vidyarthi further contended that so far as s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108/a/2 and 246 are concerned the claimants were even in absence of this acquisition required to keep some passage open for the purpose of giving approach to the chawls situated in the interior. The said passage is even now available after the acquisition and therefore also there is no reason to believe that the remaining lands are injuriously affected. ( 31 ) SO far as the question of damages resulting from injurious affection as a result of acquisition of a particular parcel of land is concerned the same has been recognised by the statute itself by enacting the third clause of sec. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. In cases where the front portion of a piece of land is acquired the remaining unacquired portion of that piece of land is likely to lose its commercial or residential importance. Acquisition of frontage is also likely to deshape the remaining portion of land. In some cases such an acquisition may also injuriously affect the potential uses to which the remaining portion could have been put but for the acquisition. It is thus apparent that the acquisition of frontage of a composite block of land would result in injurious affection of the remaining land by the very fact of severance of the frontage from the rest of the land. If that be so it is obvious that the higher valuation of the frontage that is acquired would not in all cases compensate the owner fully for the damages resulting from the injurious affection of the remaining land. It is true that in a big parcel of land frontage can be conveniently severed from the rest of the land without doing any damage worth the name to the latter. In such cases assessment of the value of frontage at an enhanced rate would no doubt cover the possible damage to the rest of land. It is true that in a big parcel of land frontage can be conveniently severed from the rest of the land without doing any damage worth the name to the latter. In such cases assessment of the value of frontage at an enhanced rate would no doubt cover the possible damage to the rest of land. But there would be cases where the piece of land from which frontage is acquired is so compact and regular in shape that the acquisition of frontage would substantially destroy the value of the rear portion. In such cases it cannot be successfully contended that the higher value of the frontage which is acquired covers even the damage caused to the rear portion which is not acquired. Thus the solution of this problem depends much upon the facts of each case and it would not be possible to make any generalisations which would cover all cases. In this connection we may profitably refer to the decision given by the Bombay High Court in GOVERNMENT V THE CENTURY SPINNING and MFG. CO. LTD. (1942) 44 B. L. R. 57. There the facts of the case were that the land under acquisition admeasured 16585 7 sq. yds and formed part of a large piece of land admeasuring 34885 sq. yds. The entire piece had a frontage of 630 ft. on a road which was 60 ft. in width and another frontage of 518 ft. on a road which was 40 ft. wide. Out of these frontages the Land acquired which covered 16585. 7 sq. yds had a frontage of 473 ft. on the 60 ft. wide road and also a frontage of 578 ft. on the 40 ft. wide road. The result of the acquisition was that the unacquired portion of the land admeasuring 18300 sq. yds. had a frontage of only 130 ft. on 60 ft. wide road and no frontage at all on the 40 ft. wide road on these facts the Land Acquisition Officer pointed out that the amount at which compensation was largely based on the value of the frontage to the 60 ft. wide road and 40 ft. wide road. yds. had a frontage of only 130 ft. on 60 ft. wide road and no frontage at all on the 40 ft. wide road on these facts the Land Acquisition Officer pointed out that the amount at which compensation was largely based on the value of the frontage to the 60 ft. wide road and 40 ft. wide road. It was contended on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer that if you pay compensation by way of serverance because the frontage is reduced you are really paying twice over for the frontage Beaumont C. J. who was one of the Judges of the appellate Bench of the High Court found that there was no doubt some force in this contention raised on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer The learned Chief Justice however made the following observations which are pertinent to the facts of these cases. He said:but at the same time it does not follow that compensation allowed on the basis that the land acquired has a certain frontage will cover the whole of the damage occasioned to the reminder of the land by reduction of the frontage Suppose for example Government were acquiring the rest of the frontage that is to say the whole frontage to the sixty fect road so that the land not acquired had no frontage at all it is obvious that the loss in value to the land retained would be more than would be allowed for the frontage acquired. I think having regard to the large proportion of frontage being acquired in this case and the relatively small amount of frontage which is left with the claimants that they are entitled to some com- pensation in respect of severance. SIMILAR view is taken by the same High Court in an earlier case of GAJANAN VINAYAK V. COLLECTOR OF SELSETTE. A T R. 1924 BOMBAY 54. It is thus evident that it is not possible to contend in all cases that the damages which could be awarded on account of the injurious affection of the remaining land by loss of frontage would always be covered by the enhanced rate of frontage land which is given by way of compensation ( 32 ) AS already noted above one of the methods of assessing damages for loss of frontage which is adopted by the expert with regard to s. nos. 135 of the claimants in Appeal No. 239/67 is to take the aggregate of the whole of the remaining asset of Madhubhai colony. The question is whether this approach is proper or not. ( 33 ) SUCH and other questions have been considered by us and after considering the facts of the three cases which are before us we find ourselves in a position to formulate a few broad proposition for our guidance in deciding the question as well as the quantum of damages resul- ting from severance of frontage. We may state these principles as under: (1) Loss of frontage per se does not necessarily result in injurious affection of the remaining land because the question of such injurious affection depends much upon the nature and shape of the remaining land as well as the present and potential uses to which it can be put after the acquisition of the frontage as compared with the uses to which it could have been put but for the said acquisition. (2) In case of a parcel of land which is spread over a very large area having frontage in different directions acquisition of a partial or even total frontage on one side may not result in ally injurious affection of the remaining land and the enhanced rate of the acquired frontage would be sufficient to cover the damage if any resulting from severance. On the other hand if a parcel of land however big it may be is rendered totally land locked on all its sides as a result of the acquisition of its frontage the damages caused to the unacquired portion has to be separately assessed even though market value of the acquired frontage is assessed at a higher rate. Thus a general proposition that damages caused to the remaining land as a result of severance of the frontage are covered by the enhanced market rate of the frontage cannot be accepted as correct in all cases. Thus a general proposition that damages caused to the remaining land as a result of severance of the frontage are covered by the enhanced market rate of the frontage cannot be accepted as correct in all cases. (3) There would be cases wherein a claimant owns a large estate con- sisting of several survey numbers and the frontage of one of these survey numbers is acquired (such is in fact the case in F. A. No. 239 The question which would arise for courts consideration in such cases is whether the claimant can legitimately claim damages on the ground of severance with reference to the whole of the remaining part of his estate or with reference to only that survey number from which the acquisition of frontage is made. the answer to this question depends upon how the principle of unity of estate is worked out. If the whole area of the estate consisting of several survey numbers is so compact as to constitute a unity of estate and if the loss of frontage adversely affects the value of the remaining compact portion of that estate then damages should be calculated with reference to the whole area of the remaining portion of the estate. But if that is not so and if what is adversely affected is only a portion of the estate in question then damages should be assessed with reference only to the portion so affected. In such cases the fact that the whole estate is owned by one person is of no relevance. In other words what is significant in such cases is the unity of estate and not the unity of ownership (4) But then the question is what we mean by the expression Unity of Estate. When we consider the impact of the loss of frontage. In our opinion the expression connotes not only the compactness of the parcel of land in question but also the topographical and developmental interdependence of each of its component parts. The concept of Unity of Estate has been considered by House of Lords in THOMAS CHRISTOPHER COWPER ESSEX V. LOCAL BOARD (1889) 14 A. C. 153. There this question arose to be considered in view of the provisions contained in secs. 49 and 63 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 which contemplated damages on account of injury done or to be done to the lands held therewith. There this question arose to be considered in view of the provisions contained in secs. 49 and 63 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 which contemplated damages on account of injury done or to be done to the lands held therewith. by reason of the severing of the lands taken from the other lands or such owner or otherwise injuriously affecting such lands. There a contention was raised that the lands injuriously affected in that case were not other lands of the proprietor within the meaning of the statute. Dealing with this contention Lord Halsbury has made following observations which are very pertinent to the facts of Appeal on. 239/67 which is before us. The learned Lord observed:a person lays out a building estate in which unity of design correspondence of the lines of building adaptation of roads open spaces and the like all have or may have relation to each other. PROCEEDING further he observes as under: many other examples might be given; arrangements for sewers gas water and the like relate to the unity of the estate as one thing the usefulness and market value of which might be interfered with by the withdrawal of part; and it is in each case a question of fact dependent upon its own circumstances whether what I have called the unity of the estate is interfered with. BALSBURY in his laws of England fourth Edition Vol. 2 summarises this principle in para 318 at page 225 as under: where different pieces of land are owned by the same person and are so near to each other and so situated that the possession and control of the parts of it gives an enhanced value to the whole and one pieces is compulsorily purchased there will be a severance of the land purchased from the land held with it so as to give rise to a right to compensation for severance or other injurious affection with in the foregoing provisions. IN HOLDITCH V. CANADIAN NORTHERN ONTARIO RLY CO. (1916) 1 A. C. 536 P. C. it is held that the land taken must be so connected with or related to the part left that the owner of the latter is prejudiced in his ability to use or dispose of it to advantage by reason of the severance. IN HOLDITCH V. CANADIAN NORTHERN ONTARIO RLY CO. (1916) 1 A. C. 536 P. C. it is held that the land taken must be so connected with or related to the part left that the owner of the latter is prejudiced in his ability to use or dispose of it to advantage by reason of the severance. In our opinion therefore the tests suggested in the above referred English decisions would provide appropriate guidance for determining whether with regard to a particular piece of land there is unity of estate or not. (5)WE further find tat the simplest method of assessing damages resu- lting from injurious affection of the unacquired land which forms part of unity of estate is to take the whole area of such an acquired land into consideration and then to evaluate this area at the depreciated rate. The difference between the value of this area of land before depreciation and its value as a result of depreciation would represent the damage caused by severance. The experts who are examined in this case have adopted a different method. They have separately assessed the potentialities of the remaining frontage and the rear portion of each block of land and have arrived at the figures of damages which on the face of it are highly exaggerated. ( 34 ) THESE are the five principles on which we shall now proceed to determine the claim of the claimants with regard to the damages said to have been caused to the remaining lands of these acquisitions. ( 35 ) BEFORE proceeding with the individual cases we may dispose of one argument advanced by Shri Vidyarthi on behalf of the State. His contention was that in s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108/a/2 as well as s. no. 246 there are already chawls for labourers and therefore there is no future protentiality of any further development of these lands so long as the labourers are actually occupying these chawls. According to Shri Vidyarthi therefore the claimants are not entitled to any damages for loss of frontage. We are not impressed by this argument of Shri Vidyarthi because while assessing the damages resulting from the injurious affection of the remaining land we have to take into account not only the present use to which this remaining land is put but also to its potential development in future. We are not impressed by this argument of Shri Vidyarthi because while assessing the damages resulting from the injurious affection of the remaining land we have to take into account not only the present use to which this remaining land is put but also to its potential development in future. There would be such circumstances in further which would enable the claimants to demolish these chawls and to raise some new structure which would be more profitable to them. Under the circumstances we cannot reject the claim for damages simply because the remaining lands are at present put to a particular use. ( 36 ) SO far as s. nos. 135 is concerned it is no doubt true that the frontage which is now left is about 60 ft. in width. But the compensation of damages resulting from the acquisition of frontage of this survey number cannot be assessed with reference to the remaining lands of the whole estate of Madhubhai colony. Reference to the map shows that this colony is spread in a wide area which by itself is not a compact area and which also does not fulfil the requirements of the concept of unity of estate. The map shows that the area which is known as Madhubhai colony is surrounded by two public roads on two of its sides and by the new Meter Gauge Railway Station on the other. It is triangular in shape. The map further shows that s. no. 135 is situated on the southern side road and even if the whole survey number was acquired that acquisition would not have affected either the contiguity or the compactness or the developmental potentialities of the rest of the survey numbers of this area because these other survey numbers would have still enjoyed the facility of frontage on two of the roads which surround it. Under the circumstances mere fact that the whole area is of one ownership would not endow it with the character of unity of estate. In our opinion there fore damages resulting on account of loss of frontage of s. no. 135 can not be assessed with reference to the whole of Madhubhai but should be assessed only with reference to s. no. 135 of which the acquired frontage forms a part. In our opinion there fore damages resulting on account of loss of frontage of s. no. 135 can not be assessed with reference to the whole of Madhubhai but should be assessed only with reference to s. no. 135 of which the acquired frontage forms a part. ( 37 ) ANOTHER feature to be noted with regard to this survey number is that its total area is 9317 sq. yds. out of which the acquired frontage admeasures only 2541 sq. yds. Even after the acquisition of this frontage there is a strip of land of 60 ft. wide which gives entrance to the rear portion and we have already noted that the whole of the locality from which the lands are acquired is an industrial area. Lands of this area are therefore primarily suitable only for establishment of industries or for residential area for the labourers. It therefore follows that this is not the locality in which big show rooms which should always have the advantage of frontage could be constructed even in future. Industries can be developed with equal potency in the rear portion of this area and this development in the rear portion would not be seriously marred because 60 ft. wide frontage is left in this survey number to give easy approach to the rear portion. ( 38 ) HOWEVER the fact remains that a substantial portion of S. no. 135 has not lost its frontage with the result that the claimants are permanently disabled from putting the unacquired land to every type of use to which the land could have been put but for the acquisition. The claimants would therefore be entitled to some damages resulting from severance. Under ordinary circumstances and unless there are some exceptional reasons the damages caused by loss of frontage can be suitably assessed at 5% of the market value of the land. This principle seems to have been accepted by the Supreme Court in SMT. TRIVENI DEVI AND OTHERS V. THE COLLECTOR RANCHI. A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1417 at page 1421. Now the compensation which is awarded by the learned Judge in this case is of Rs. 10 0 which works out roughly at 4. 21% to 3. 7% if we put the market value of the whole of the s. no. 135 before its acquisition at somewhere between Rs. 35. 00 and Rs. 40. 00per sq. yd. Now the compensation which is awarded by the learned Judge in this case is of Rs. 10 0 which works out roughly at 4. 21% to 3. 7% if we put the market value of the whole of the s. no. 135 before its acquisition at somewhere between Rs. 35. 00 and Rs. 40. 00per sq. yd. since we have assessed the value of the acquired land after taking into account its value as a frontage we have to avoid overlapping of that valuation and hence we find that this assessment of damages on account of injurious affection of the remaining land as a result of the acquisition is proper. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the finding of the learned Judge. ( 39 ) NEXT survey number is the compact piece of land which is covered by s. nos. 108/1 108 and 108/a/2. The map found at Appendix A to ex. 61 shows that out of these survey numbers survey numbers 108/1 and 108 have been wholly acquired. The frontage of these survey numbers did not enure for the benefit of the remaining land and therefore no damages can be claimed for the loss of frontage resulting from the loss of these two survey numbers. However survey no. 108/a/2 has been partially acquired. This survey number did occupy the frontage of the remaining land to a certain extent but there also care seems to have been taken to leave some more frontage in the unacquired Sand by setting back a portion of the frontage of that survey number. The learned Judge has awarded the compensation of Rs. 4 0 for the damages resulting from the loss of this small frontage. The market price of the land is fixed at Rs. 24. 00 per sq. yd. It is found that in the rear portion of this land there are chawls for labourers and the frontage which is left over provides sufficient space for approaching this chawl. Even for future potential development if the owner of this land wants to construct some industry or godown in the rear portion after demolishing the chawls the frontage which is left over would be equally useful. Under the circumst- ances the assessment of damages at Rs. 4000. Even for future potential development if the owner of this land wants to construct some industry or godown in the rear portion after demolishing the chawls the frontage which is left over would be equally useful. Under the circumst- ances the assessment of damages at Rs. 4000. 00 for the loss of a small frontage is found to be proper and is rather more liberal and therefore even here the findings of the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference from this court. ( 40 ) SO far as s. no. 246 is concerned we have already noted above that this survey number along with other s. nos. 247 248 and 1750 form a compact block of land and there is also the unity of estate of all these survey numbers. In the rear portion of the land which remains in the hands of the owner there are chawls for labourers. 20 ft. wide frontage which is left over was upto the date of the acquisition utilised by the owner as passage to that chawl. Even if in future the owner prefers to raise some other construction in the rear portion of the land that construction would be principally for industrial purpose. Therefore the loss of frontage would not call for more damage to the owner. The learned trial Judge has awarded Rs. 4 0 as damages of the damage. This works out roughly at 4%. We find this also to he a proper quantum of damages and therefore here also we do not find any reason to interfere. . ( 41 ) THE claimants have made a grievance of the fact that the learned trial Judge has awarded interest at the rate of 4% from the date of possession. However the rate of interest should be at 4% upto 15th August 1965 and at 41 1/2% onwards. Decree of the trial court shall therefore stand amended accordingly. ( 42 ) THE claimants have further claimed refund of court fees in view of the decision of this court in LADY TANUMATI V. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER 14 G. L. R. 537. This decision of this court is still pending in appeal before the Supreme Court. The learned Assistant Government Pleader agrees to abide by the decision which the Supreme Court would give in that appeal and to act accordingly. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER 14 G. L. R. 537. This decision of this court is still pending in appeal before the Supreme Court. The learned Assistant Government Pleader agrees to abide by the decision which the Supreme Court would give in that appeal and to act accordingly. Under the circumstances no order as to refund of court fees are required to be passed on at this stage. ( 43 ) IN view of what is stated above all these three appeals fail subject to the modification as regards interest as stated above. The appellants shall bear the costs of the respondents in all these appeals. .