Judgment 1. This is an appeal under Section 75 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the creditor. He claims to have advanced a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 on a handnote on the 17th August, 1964 to the debtor (respondent No. 1). He served a notice of demand as early as on the 17th July, 1965, but did not bring any suit for recovery of the amount although a sum of Rs. 100.00 only is said to have been paid by the debtor on 16th August, 1966. Just a day before the expiry of the limitation, a further sum of Rs. 500.00 is said to have been paid by him on the 17th July, 1969. By these two payments, the debt, however, did not become barred. The most relevant fact in this case is that the debtor in pursuance of the notice of demand had clearly informed the appellant and certainly on the 25th May, 1968 by a letter which is on the record of this case as Ext. 3 that he was heavily involved in debts and unable to pay anything to any of his creditors and that he had suspended payments to all of them including the appellant. The petition of insolevency, however, was not filed within the prescribed period from the receipt of those declarations from the debtor, but as late as on the 8th June, 1970. The other intervening fact that should be stated is that respondent No. 2 another creditor of the debtor, had obtained a consent decree for above Rupees 10,000.00 on the 11th July, 1969, against the debtor and was proceeding against his house property in the execution proceeding. The petition for insolvency was filed in the year 1970 in this background. The debtor in his rejoinder as well as in his evidence in the proceeding before the District Court had admitted that he was unable to Pay the debts and also confirmed his earlier stand communicated to the appellant in pursuance of his notice of demand, already referred to. The plea of the other creditor, namely, respondent No. 2, was that the appellant and the debtor were hands-in-glove and the entire transaction was collusive in order to deprive him of the fruits of his decree. The plea of the other creditor, namely, respondent No. 2, was that the appellant and the debtor were hands-in-glove and the entire transaction was collusive in order to deprive him of the fruits of his decree. The District Court, on reference to various circumstances, has dismissed the application under Sec.25 of the Act by clearly holding that the insolvency petition was filed by the petitioning creditor in collusion with the debtor. I shall advert to this incident a little later. The District Court has further held that there was no evidence on record to show that the act of insolvency on which the insolvency petition was grounded had occurred within three months before the presentation of the same. 2. Mr. Mitra, appearing in support of this appeal, has challenged the judgment of the learned District Judge dismissing the petition on the above grounds. With respect to the first ground, learned Counsel contended that the learned District Judge has committed an apparent error in not referring to the evidence of the creditor that he had made demands of the debt from the debtor within a period of three months from the date of the presentation of the petition and has recorded the finding against the appellant with reference to certain written demands only. It is no doubt true that the appellant after adverting to the preliminary demands and previous notice had also subsequently stated that he went personally to the debtor again on the 6th June, 1970 and demanded the dues when he openly expressed his inability to pay the same. However, there is a serious difficulty in the way of the appellant on which this appeal has got to fail. Section 9 of the Act prescribes that a creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor unless, inter alia, the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition (vide Cl. C). Acts of insolvency have been enumerated under Sec. 6 of the Act. The relevant clause thereof for the present case will be clause (g) which reads as follows : "6. C). Acts of insolvency have been enumerated under Sec. 6 of the Act. The relevant clause thereof for the present case will be clause (g) which reads as follows : "6. A debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following cases, namely :- (g) if he gives notice to any of his creditors that he has suspended, or that he is about to suspend, payment of his debts; or xxxxxx" In the petition of insolvency itself, which was filed in the district Court, the appellant himself has very clearly stated that "In his reply the debtor-opposite party stated that he is heavily involved in debts and that he is unable to pay anything to any of his creditors and that he has suspended payments to all the creditors and also gave the names of some other creditors in his letter dated 25-5-1968". It cannot, therefore, be disputed, and the learned counsel for the appellant had ultimately to concede, that the aforesaid unequivocal declaration of the debtor that he was heavily indebted and was unable to pay anything to any of his creditors and had suspended payments to all was an apparent act of insolvency within the meaning of clause (g) of Sec. 6 of the Act. A question arises as to when once an act of insolvency was committed by the debtor to the knowledge of the creditor, could he wait beyond a period of three months and still persist in making demands from time to time getting the same reply and then to present the insolvency petition within a period of three months from one of such demands and the refusal of the debtor. In my considered opinion, this view is not acceptable, because in that event, the whole purpose of fixing a limit of three months in clause (c) of Section 9 for a creditor to make the petition will be nullified altogether and would be contrary to the scheme of the Act itself. By prescribing a time-limit to the creditor, the Legislature in its wisdom has foreseen various consequences which might follow in a given case and give rise to serious complication and repercussion in commercial world with respect to the transactions that the debtor may happen to make with other persons. A limit, therefore has been very rightly fixed on time for taking any action for declaring a debtor insolvent. A limit, therefore has been very rightly fixed on time for taking any action for declaring a debtor insolvent. The creditor, therefore on his own accord, is not entitled to go on postponing the making of the insolvency petition by notionally extending the period when once a firm ground and an act of insolvency has already occurred. In a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Chenchuramana Reddi V/s. Arunachalam, AIR 1935 Mad 857 which was a case of a fraudulent transfer by a debtor in preference to the other creditors, it was held that as soon as three months period fixed under clause (c) of Section 9 had expired, the transaction ceased to be impeachable under the Insolvency Act, and the act of transfer itself immediately on the completion of the period of three months ceased to be an act of insolvency as such. In a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Muradan Sardar V/s. Secy, of State, AIR 1939 Cal 313, it was held that after the expiry of the period of three months the act of insolvency in question did not continue to be an act of insolvency in order to enable a petitioning creditor to take advantage of Cl. (c) of Section 9 of the Act. This, period of three months is not actually a period of limitation, it is only a condition precedent for making the application on sound reason and matter of public policy. The petition of insolvency in question that was filed by the appellant was, therefore, certainly not maintainable and incompetent as such. 3 Mr. Mitra, however, laid emphasis that the debtor made payments towards the debt in question - once on the 16th August, 1966 and again on the 17th July, 1969 on pressing demands by the appellant. On the basis of these materials, he contended that his earlier declaration that he had suspended payments to all the creditors and was unable to pay anything towards the debt which constituted an act of insolvency within the meaning of Sec. 6, clause (g) of the Act, would automatically stand rescinded. It is difficult to accept the contention of learned Counsel, for two reasons; firstly, that it is well settled that a debt may be barred for the purpose of recovery through the assistance of Court but it is not wiped out as such. It is difficult to accept the contention of learned Counsel, for two reasons; firstly, that it is well settled that a debt may be barred for the purpose of recovery through the assistance of Court but it is not wiped out as such. Therefore, there is no bar at any time for a debtor to make any payment to his creditor. Secondly, the contention must be overruled on a technical ground also that the act of insolvency was made complete in May 1968, whesreas the payment was made on tile 17th July, 1969, much after toe expiry of the period of three months within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 9 of the Act, and it thus ceased to be an act of insolvency by itself. The payment of the sum of Rs. 500/-, therefore, would not in any way be of any consequence in this case. 4. How, I shall also consider briefly the other question on which the petition has been dismissed by the trial Court, namely, on the ground of collusion. Sec.25 of the Act empowers the Court to dismiss the petition on certain specified grounds, it specifically mentions three circumstances in which the petition made by the creditor must be dismissed. In addition thereto, the Court has been given a discretion to dismiss a petition if it is satisfied that there is ether sufficient cause for not making an order against the debtor. It is true that such a general discretion must be read ejusdem generis with the specially mentioned conditions; but even so it enables the Court to take into consideration different circumstances not covered by express conditions, Reliance can be placed in support of the view on a decision of the Supreme Court Yenumula Malludora V/s. Peruri Seetharathnam, AIR 1966 SC 918 . The learned District Judge, therefore, had committed no error of law in proceeding to consider the circumstances and the evidence adduced on behalf of respondent No. 2 to show that the whole action of the appellant was collusive. 5. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal has pot no substance and it must fail. It is, accordingly, dismissed. I shall make no order as to costs.