ORDER Hari Swarup, J. - This writ petition has been filed by M/s. Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Unit Antibiotics Virbhadra, Rishikesh, U.P. against the interim finding given by the Industrial Tribunal in a reference made to it of the dispute under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 2. The reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal is in respect of the number of days allowable as earned leave to workmen employed after 27-5-1969. The workmen employed earlier than this date were setting 33 days earned leave while leave allowable to workmen coming later was reduced to 17 days. The dispute is in respect of the justification. propriety and legality of this difference between the earned leave admissible to the workmen. 3. It appears that in 1969 a dispute did arise between the management and the workmen. One set of demands was made by the Union known as Antibiotics Project (Rishikesh Karamchari Sangh). Another set of demands was raised by the Union known as Rashtriya Shramik Sangh. There was another Union known as `I. D. P. L.' employees Union, representing the workmen of the petitioner. This Union did not put forward any set of demand of its own but supported the demands raised by the other two unions. Ultimately a settlement was reached between the Management and the Antibiotics' I. D. P. L. employees Union and the Bhartiya Majdoor Sangh. Rashtriya Shramik Sangh did not enter into the agreement. Two separate agreements were signed between the Management and the two Unions which had entered into a settlement. They were almost in similar terms. The dispute which is at present the subject-matter of reference has been raised by Rashtriya Shramik Sangh. The settlement with the two unions were registered. Later on the management put up a notice to the effect that those workmen who were either members of Rashtriya Shramik Sangh or were not the members of the signing Unions could also receive the payment envisaged by the agreement dated 30th September, 1970 on condition that they would be deemed to have agreed to the agreement and thereby bound by the same. The members of the Rashtriya Shramik Sangh individually accepted the payment. 4. A dispute in respect of stoping of educational facilities by the management to the children of the workmen was raised and was referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Labour Court. The members of the Rashtriya Shramik Sangh individually accepted the payment. 4. A dispute in respect of stoping of educational facilities by the management to the children of the workmen was raised and was referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Labour Court. This dispute was also one of the disputes raised by the Rashtriva Shramik Sansh in its demand notice along with the dispute which is the subject-matter of present reference. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that by the acceptance of payment allowable to the workmen under the agreement dated 30th September, 1970 by the members of the Rashtriya Shramik Sansh had the effect of binding the Rashtriya Shramik Sangh and all the demands raised by that Union would be deemed to have been settled finally by the agreement of 30th September. 1970 even though the union was not a party to the same. 5. When the matter proceeded before the Industrial Tribunal, the management raised an objection to the effect that the present dispute had also been settled by the agreement between the parties dated 30th September, 1970 and was no longer a live issue. It was also pleaded that the findings of the Labour Court in the earlier matter acted as res judicata and the Industrial Tribunal was bound to answer the reference without going into the merits of the matter and that the dispute had been settled between the management and the workmen by the conduct of the workmen in their accepting the payment in terms of the agreement dated 30-9-1970. The Industrial Tribunal has negatived both the contentions of the management. The management has now filed the present writ petition challenging the findings of the Industrial Tribunal. It has also sought the abashing of the reference made to the Industrial Tribunal on the ground that no dispute subsisted because the dispute referred had already been settled. On the same reasoning a writ of prohibition has been sought. 6. Ordinarily the principle of res judicata applies to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and the decision by one Tribunal would be binding on another Tribunal if the matter in dispute is the same. On the same reasoning a writ of prohibition has been sought. 6. Ordinarily the principle of res judicata applies to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and the decision by one Tribunal would be binding on another Tribunal if the matter in dispute is the same. Section 11, Civil P.C. which specifically lays down the principle of res judicata, says that "no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court". The Labour Court had before it a dispute regarding the educational facilities to the children of the workmen. It held that that dispute had already been settled. The same may not possibly be raised again. The dispute in the present case is not the same. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, is that the real dispute that had arisen before the Labour Court in the earlier proceedings was whether the demands raised by the Rashtriya Shramik Sangh had stood settled or not and that his point has been decided by the Labour Court. No doubt, Labour Court has decided impliedly that all the demands raised by the Rashtriya Shramik Sangh had been settled, but as the present dispute was not specifically put before the Labour Court, it cannot be held that its decision is to the effect that the present dispute had already been decided. 7. Further, the principle of res judicata applies where the dispute is static and not where it has in it an element of dynamism. The dispute referred in the present case concerns the employees who joined after May 27, 1969. The reference will thus govern all persons who joined after 27th May, 1969. The reference of dispute concerns the stream of workmen which might flow into the industry even subsequent to the agreement. Hence the present dispute cannot be deemed to be a dispute which was limited to a date on which the settlement was alleged to have been reached. The reference will thus govern all persons who joined after 27th May, 1969. The reference of dispute concerns the stream of workmen which might flow into the industry even subsequent to the agreement. Hence the present dispute cannot be deemed to be a dispute which was limited to a date on which the settlement was alleged to have been reached. The dynamism of the dispute makes the principle of res judicata inapplicable. The Industrial Tribunal cannot for the reasons given above be deemed to have committed any error of jurisdiction or manifest error of law in holding that the decision of the Labour Court was not sufficient to bar its jurisdiction to proceed with the matter on merits. 8. According to Section 6-B of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding is binding on the parties to the agreement only. There is no assertion that the agreement had been reached during the conciliation proceedings. It was, therefore, binding only on the parties to the agreement. There is also no positive proof that all the workmen had entered into the agreement with the management. In any case, it cannot bind the workmen who came later. 9. It is also not possible to hold that the agreement became binding on those workmen who had merely accepted the benefit and were no party to any registered agreement. A similar matter came for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Jhagarkhan Collieries (P.) Ltd. v. G.C. Agarwal, AIR 1975 SC 171 : (1975 Lab IC 137). It was held "that an implied agreement by acquiescence or conduct such as acceptance of a benefit under an agreement to which the worker acquiescing or accenting the benefit was not a party, being outside the purview of the Act, is not binding or such a worker either under sub-sec. (1) or under sub-section (3) of Section 18". It was held "that an implied agreement by acquiescence or conduct such as acceptance of a benefit under an agreement to which the worker acquiescing or accenting the benefit was not a party, being outside the purview of the Act, is not binding or such a worker either under sub-sec. (1) or under sub-section (3) of Section 18". It was further observed that whatever its effect under the general law be, it could not "put an end to the dispute before the Labour Court and make it functus officio under the Act." The acceptance of benefit under the agreement by the workmen cannot have the effect of a settlement within the meaning of Section 6-B and oust the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to decide the dispute referred to it under Section 4-K of the Act. 10. The agreements which were reached between the management and the two unions are also not quite clear to show that the present dispute had been finally settled. The agreement with the Antibiotics Project (Rishikesh) Karamchari Sangh, clearly mentions that the settlement was of all matters of dispute referred to in the demand notice dated 22-8-1970. The present dispute was not amongst those demands. Similarly, the agreement with the other union does not indicate that the present dispute had been settled. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that the view taken by the Industrial Tribunal is erroneous. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to interpret the documents and to come to a conclusion as regards their effect. Hence, it cannot be held that it has committed any error of jurisdiction in deciding the matter. 11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.