M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) A merchant of Rajkot against whom a prosecution was launched by the Octroi Officer of the Rajkot Nagarpalika for evasion of Octroi duty under a complaint instituted on March 17 1973 has called into question the power of the Chief Officer to delegate to the Octroi Officer his function to direct prosecution of offenders for contravention of the provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or of any rule or by-law thereunder. Now the power to direct such prosecutions has been conferred on the Chief Officer under sec. 246 of the Act. And sec. 49 of the Act which deals with the powers and duties of the Chief Officer enables him under clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) with the sanction of the executive committee to delegate any of his powers or duties to any municipal officer or servant. In exercise of these powers the Chief Officer of the Rajkot municipality after obtaining the sanction of the standing Committee (which was accorded on October 8 1968 as per resolution No. 351) delegated his power in this behalf to the Octroi Officer by an office order dated October 14 1968 ( 2 ) THE petitioner made an application in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class Rajkot in Criminal Case No. 414 of 1973 on January 4 1974 raising the plea that there was no legal delegation in favour of the Octroi Officer who had instituted the complaint against the petitioner and that the complaint therefore deserved to be dismissed. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Rajkot did not accede to this argument and by his order dated July 22 1974 rejected the application made by the petitioner. The petitioner thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court at Rajkot by way of Criminal Revision Application No. 20 of 1974. The learned Sessions Judge Rajkot concurred with the view taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Rajkot that the delegation made in favour of the Octroi Officer was valid and lawful and rejected the revision application by his order dated September 12 1974 Having failed in the trial Court and Sessions Court the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and has re-iterated the same contention. ( 3 ) THE relevant provisions secs. ( 3 ) THE relevant provisions secs. 49 and 246 of the Act deserve to be quoted in so far as they are material in order to deal with the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner. 49 (1) The Chief Officer shall (2) Subject to the general control of the president watch over the financial and executive administration of the municipality and perform all the duties and exercise all the powers specifically imposed or conferred upon him by or delegated to him under this Act (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (h) xxx xxx xxx (2) The Chief Officer may (a) xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx (c) with the sanction of the executive committee delegate any of his powers or duties to any municipal officer or servant; (3) xxx xxx xxx sec. 246 (1) of the Act is in the following terms: 246 Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) the Chief Officer may and where the executive committee so requires shall direct ally prosecution for any public nuisance whatever and order proceedings to be taken for the recovery of any penalties and for the punishment of any persons offending against the provisions of this Act or of any rule or by-law thereunder and shall order the expenses of such prosecutions or other proceedings to be paid out of the municipal funds; provided that no prosecution for an offence under this act or by laws framed thereunder shall be instituted except within six months next after the date of the commission of the offence or if such date is not known or the offence is a continuing one within six months next after the commission or discovery of such offence. (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx now sub-sec. (1) of sec. 246 of the Act empowers the Chief Officer to direct a prosecution in such matters. The question is whether this power exercisable by the Chief Officer can be delegated under sub-sec. (2) (c) of sec. 49 of the Act. On a plain reading of sec. 49 (2) (c) of the Act which is of wide amplitude it would appear specious to argue that powers under sec. 246 of the Act exercisable by the Chief Officer cannot be delegated. Sec. 49 (2) (c) in terms uses the expression any of his powers or duties. 49 of the Act. On a plain reading of sec. 49 (2) (c) of the Act which is of wide amplitude it would appear specious to argue that powers under sec. 246 of the Act exercisable by the Chief Officer cannot be delegated. Sec. 49 (2) (c) in terms uses the expression any of his powers or duties. And the width and amplitude of the expression any cannot be restricted or circumscribed. If any of the powers can be exercised the power to direct prosecution conferred on the Chief Officer by sec. 246 of the Acts which is one of the many powers exercisable by him can certainly be delegated. It is however argued by Counsel for the petitioner that notwithstanding the fact that the legislature has employed the expression any of his powers in sec. 49 (2) (c) of the Act the Chief Officer cannot delegate his powers other than the powers specified in sec. 49 of the Act. The fallacy in the argument is patent. The manifest purpose of sec. 49 (it must be realised) is inter alia to enumerate the powers of the Chief Officer. And by sec. 49 (2) (c) one of the powers which the lagislature has conferred on the Chief Officer is the power to delegate. The power to delegate is also one of the powers enumerated in sec. 49. When sec. 49 (2) (c) speaks of any of his powers it would mean powers exercisable under any of the provisions of the Act. Besides sec. 49 (1) (a) in terms inter alia provides that the Chief Officer shall perform all the duties and exercise all the powers specifically imposed or conferred upon him under the Act. And the power under sec246 of the Act is a power conferred on the Chief Officer. It is therefore clear that the power exercisable under sec 246 of the Act is incorporated by reference and must be read into sec. 49 (1) (a) of the Act. On this reasoning also the power to delegate is referable to sec 49 itself and therefore there is no legal embargo on the chief officer delegating his powers under sec. 246 of the Act. On a combined reading of secs. 246 and 49 (2) (c) there is no escape from the conclusion that the Chief Officer has power to delegate his function to direct prosecutions in such matters. 246 of the Act. On a combined reading of secs. 246 and 49 (2) (c) there is no escape from the conclusion that the Chief Officer has power to delegate his function to direct prosecutions in such matters. ( 4 ) COUNSEL however placed reliance on K. M. KANAVI V. STATE OF MYSORE A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1339 and contended that certain observations made therein buttress the proposition canvassed by him viz. that powers under sec. 246 of the Act cannot be delegated. The Supreme Court was concerned with the question as regards the validity of a complaint filed by the President of the Municipal Borough of Gadag Betgeri. A reference was made to sec 200 (1) of the Bombay Municipal Borough Act (18 of 1925 and it was argued before the Supreme Court that only the standing Committee or the Chief Officer had the authority to issue directions for taking proceedings under the said Act. The Supreme Court upheld the contention in the context of the fact that the proceeding was directed to be taken by the President and not by the Chief Officer or the Standing Committee having regard to the scheme of the said Act and the purpose of the aforesaid provision. In that case the Chief Officer had not delegated his functions to any other municipal officer. The question whether or not such delegation could be lawfully made was not before the Supreme Court. Admittedly there was no delegation in favour of the president. The President was authorised in this behalf by the Deputy Commissioner at the instance of the Additional Commissioner (see statement of facts emdodied in paragraph 1 of the judgment ). It was in this fact-situation that the Supreme Court upheld the contention that on the facts of that case the prosecution was not validly instituted or authorised. The question of delegation not having been argued before the Supreme Court (for the very good reason that there was no delegation in favour of the Presidents it is difficult to comprehend how the petitioner can seek support from the aforesaid decision. The question of delegation not having been argued before the Supreme Court (for the very good reason that there was no delegation in favour of the Presidents it is difficult to comprehend how the petitioner can seek support from the aforesaid decision. In fact the Supreme Court has in terms re-affirmed the ratio laid down in two earlier decisions rendered in the case of BALLABHDAS AGARWALA V. J. C. CHAKRAVARTY A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 576 and in the case of MANGULAL CHUNILAL V. MUNILAL MANGANLAL AND OTHERS A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 822. Says the Supreme Court in paragraph 7: this Court referred to the decision BALLABHDAS AGARWALA (1960) 2 S. C. R. 739 = (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 576) (Supra) and said: similarly here it seems to us that only the authorities mentioned in sec. 481 read with sec. 69 can launch proceedings against persons charged with offences under the act or the rules regulations or bylaws made under it. Now sec. 481 and 69 referred to in the aforesaid passage are contained in Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 And whereas sec. 481 refers to legal proceedings which the Commissioner may take against a person charged with any offence under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act. 1949 sec. 69 refers to the powers of the Municipal Commissioner to delegate his duties and functions. In other words sec. 69 and 481 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act are similar in perspective to the provisions with which we are concerned in the present matter viz. sec. 246 and 49 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 Turning to the first decision referred to by the Supreme Court in KANAVIS CASE VIZ. BALLABHDAS AGARWALA V. J. C. CHAKRAVARTY A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 576 a reference to paragraph 28 of the judgment makes it clear that the view taken by the Bombay High Court to the effect that it is also true that whenever the Act gives any powers to a Commissioner the power must be exercised by him or by an officer to whom the Commissioners power is delegated under the provisions of sec. 69 has been approved by the Supreme Court as is evident from the fact that having quoted the passage from the judgment of the Bombay High Court the Supreme Court has remarked that this decision also helps the appellant in so far as it lays down that whenever the Act gives any power to a Commissioner the power must be exercised by him or by an officer to whom the Commissioners power is delegated. So also in the case of MANGULAL CHUNILAL A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 822 the Supreme Court has observed that where the Commissioner has delegated his powers and functions under sec. 481 (1) (a) to a Municipal Officer it is the officer alone who can launch proceedings against persons charged with offences under the Act or the rules regulations or bye-laws made under it. It is therefore clear that the power exercisable by the Commissioner under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act to take legal proceedings can be delegated under the Act. The only point of distinction is as regards the nomenclature employed by the two different statutes. While the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act employs the expression Commissioner the Gujarat Municipalities Act employs the expression Chief Officer. Nothing turns on the nomenclature. The provisions are in pari meteria and have the same perspective. The same reasoning must therefore prevail and culminate in the inescapable conclusion that the Chief Officer can delegate his power to direct a prosecution under sec. 246 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 by virtue of the statutory authority conferred on him as per sec. 49 (2) (c) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. In my opinion therefore the view taken by the lower Court is correct and no interference is called for. ( 5 ) A half hearted attempt was made at the fag end to find fault with the resolution of the Standing Committee according sanction to the Chief Officer to delegate his powers under sec. 246 and the office order of delegation passed by the Chief Officer in regard to the delegation in favour of the Octroi Officer though no such point appears to have been canvassed in the lower Courts. 246 and the office order of delegation passed by the Chief Officer in regard to the delegation in favour of the Octroi Officer though no such point appears to have been canvassed in the lower Courts. These contentions may be disposed of on merits without prejudice to the objection of the other side that it is not open to the petitioner to do so for the first time in the High Court in a proceeding invoking Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. So far as the resolution passed by the Standing Committee resolution No. 351 is concerned it was urged that there was nothing to show that the Chief Officer had made a proposal in this behalf. Now the very opening portion of resolution No. 351 adverts to the proposal made by the Chief Officer. Immediately thereafter there is a reference to sec 246 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act and to prosecutions in connection with offences relating to evasion of Octroi duty. There is therefore no substance in this contention. ( 6 ) IT was similarly argued that the office order passed by the Chief Officer in regard to the delegation of his powers or duties dated October 14 1968 was defective as it did not refer to a direction to prosecute. Again there is no substance in this contention. In terms there is a reference to prosecute in connection with offences relating to breach of provisions in regard to Octroi duty and power in this behalf has been conferred on the Octroi Officer. It also provides that the Octroi Officer will have the power to consider on merits the question as to whether it is worthwhile to launch prosecution in every case. Now in the present case the prosecution has been directed by the Octroi Officer and he himself has signed the complaint. There is thus no substance in this contention either. No other point was urged. ( 7 ) IN the result the petition fails and is rejected. Rule is discharged. The respondent Corporation will however maintain status quo for a period of four weeks in order to enable the petitioner to take appropriate steps in regard to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Respondent No. 1 will however be at liberty to proceed with the prosecution in other allied matters. Rule is discharged. The respondent Corporation will however maintain status quo for a period of four weeks in order to enable the petitioner to take appropriate steps in regard to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Respondent No. 1 will however be at liberty to proceed with the prosecution in other allied matters. The direction to maintain status quo in this matter will not require the trial Court to stay prosecutions launched in the allied matters. .