JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision has come up before me in the following circumstances. Hanskumar owned a house at Khandwa within the Municipal limits. The Municipal Council, vide resolution passed in the year 1958, assessed house tax for three years, i. e. , 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61. When the old Act was repealed and substituted by the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, the Municipal-Council, by a resolution dated September 30, 1962, continued the above-said assessment of 1958 for the years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64. Then again, by a resolution dated August 31, 1964, the same assessment was continued for the year 1964-65. No new assessment was done for the year 1965-66 also, and the same assessment was continued by a resolution dated December 31, 1966. Then, by a letter dated March 9, 1966, Hanskumar was asked to pay tax for the year 1965-66. It may also be mentioned that the house tax was enhanced for the year 1964 65 and this enhanced tax was demanded for the year 1965 66 also. ( 2. ) THIS demand was challenged by Hanskumar on the ground that the municipal Council had no power to continue to adopt the old assessment beyond three years. The demand was, therefore, illegal. Reliance was placed on sections 134 to 140 and 146 of the Act, as having not been complied with. The relief claimed was that the demand was illegal. This challenge was made by way of appeal under section 139 of the Act to the Civil Judge. Hanskumars prayer in the appeal before the Civil Judge was that the demand notice be quashed and the Municipal Council be directed to follow the procedure laid down in sections 134 to 140 and 146 of the 1961 Act. ( 3. ) IN the said appeal under section 139 before the Civil Judge, the Municipal Council raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not competent inasmuch as no objection had been filed under section 137. This preliminary objection prevailed with the learned Civil Judge, although he made observations against the Municipal Council. The learned Civil Judge considered Hanskumars argument which was advanced to meet the preliminary objection raised by the municipal Council. This preliminary objection prevailed with the learned Civil Judge, although he made observations against the Municipal Council. The learned Civil Judge considered Hanskumars argument which was advanced to meet the preliminary objection raised by the municipal Council. The stand taken by Hanskumar was that it was impossible for him to file any objection under section 137 of the Act or to file any extract from a non-existence register of tax inasmuch as there was no opportunity and no occasion to make an objection under section 137. The learned Civil Judge observed that the action of the Municipal Council in adopting and demanding tax according to the old assessment even in the year 1965 66, without following the provisions of sections 134 to 140, was in violation of the provisions of section 146 (2) of the Act. He further observed that the action in enhancing the tax in the case of Hanskumar, without giving him notice, was also illegal. However, the learned Judge found himself helpless in asmuch as the wording of section 139 was plain enough and did not admit of any other interpretation In the result, the appeal was dismissed. ( 4. ) HANSKUMAR then filed a revision before the District Judge. That revision was allowed. The learned District Judge held that since the mandatory provisions contained in sections 134 to 140 and 146 of the Act had not been complied with, the Municipal Council acted illegally in adopting the old assessment and imposing a new tax, and as no procedure under section 129 of the Act had been followed, the demand was illegal. The learned Judge finally observed that since no objections were invited because no new assessment was made and merely by a resolution the old assessments were continued, there was no occasion for the applicant to file an objection. Allowing the revision, he set aside the order of the Civil Judge. He also quashed the demand notice, giving direction that the procedure laid down in sections 134 to 140 and 146 of the Act be first followed. ( 5. ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the District Judge, this revision was filed by the Municipal Council. A learned single Judge referred the question of maintainability of this revision to Division Bench. The Division Bench, in its turn, referred the matter to a Full Bench. The Full Bench has held that the present revision is competent. ( 5. ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the District Judge, this revision was filed by the Municipal Council. A learned single Judge referred the question of maintainability of this revision to Division Bench. The Division Bench, in its turn, referred the matter to a Full Bench. The Full Bench has held that the present revision is competent. ( 6. ) IT is urged for the Municipal Council that the order passed by the learned District Judge is without jurisdiction inasmuch as no appeal lay to the civil Judge under section 139, as held by him. In my opinion, this contention must be accepted. ( 7. ) THE procedure for imposing tax is provided in section 129 onwards of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. Section 134 provides for preparation of assessment list. Section 136 provides for publication of notice of assessment list. Section 137 is about the date by which objections may be filed. Secz-tion 138 provides for investigation by Council of objections filed under section 137. Section 138 reads as follows :- "138. Investigation of"objections by Council.- (1) All such objections shall be entered in a register to be maintained for the purpose and, on receipt of any objection the Chief Municipal Officer shall give a notice in writing to the objector of the time and place at which his objection will be investigated. (2) At the time and place so fixed, the Council shall hear the objection, in the presence of the objector or his authorised agent if he appears, or may, for reasonable cause, adjourn the investigation. (3) When the objection has been determined, the order passed on such objection shall be recorded in the said register and, if necessary, an amendment made in the assessment list in accordance with the result of the objection. " The right of appeal is given in section 139, which may be reproduced here:- "139. Appeal to Civil Judge.- (1) If any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment or as to the basis or principle of assessment or as to the amount of tax assessed an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Council to the Civil. . . . . . . (Courts are specified ). Appeal to Civil Judge.- (1) If any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment or as to the basis or principle of assessment or as to the amount of tax assessed an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Council to the Civil. . . . . . . (Courts are specified ). (2) Such appeal shall be presented to the Civil Judge within thirty days from the date of the order passed under section 138 and shall be accompanied by an extract from the register of objections containing the order objected to. " The third sub-section is about limitation. Then sub-section (4) reads as follows : - "no appeal shall be admitted under this section unless an objection has been preferred under section 137. " Then under sub-section (5) a revision is provided from the decision of the Civil judge in appeal. Sub-section (60 is not material for our purposes. ( 8. ) THESE provisions, particularly, sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 139 leave do manner of doubt that an appeal under sub-section (1) lies against an order passed under section 138. If any such dispute arises as is described in the opening sentence of section 139, three things are mandatory. Firstly, the appeal can be presented within 30 days from the date of the order passed under section 128. If there is no order under section 138, then the question of presenting the appeal within 30 days from the date of the order under section 138, will not arise. Secondly, the appeal must be accompanied by an extract from the register of objections containing the order objected to. Thirdly, unless an objection has been preferred under section 137, an appeal cannot be admitted. The view that I take was also taken in Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur v. Radhakrishna pandey, 1969 MPLJ 325. where the provisions of section 149 of the M P. Municipal Corporation Act were considered These provisions are in pari materia with the provisions of section 139 of the Municipalities Act. ( 9. ) SHRI Choubes further argument is that no party can be deprived of his right of appeal by the Municipal Council not following the procedure prescribed under the law and by not affording an opportunity to the party to prefer an objection under section 137. This contention is not tenable. ( 9. ) SHRI Choubes further argument is that no party can be deprived of his right of appeal by the Municipal Council not following the procedure prescribed under the law and by not affording an opportunity to the party to prefer an objection under section 137. This contention is not tenable. All that is to be seen here is whether an appeal lay under section 139. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute. Such right can be exercised only when the statute specifically provides for it. The right of appeal resorted to was one under section 139. The right of appeal conferred under section 139 is restricted to an order passed under section 138. If an order is not passed under section 138, then an appeal under section 139 will not lie. If the order by which, the respondent is aggrieved was made under any other provision of the law, the remedy is not an appeal under section 139. It is for the respondent to address himself what remedy is appropriate and may, if so advised resort to it. ( 10. ) THIS revision is allowed. The order of the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the learned Civil Judge is restored. Parties shall bear their own costs. Revision allowed.