Judgment :- 1. These three revisions arise out of O. S.259 of 1970, O.S. 13 of 1973 and O. S. No. 14 of 1973; all pending before the Munsiff's Court, Chengannur. 2. The common question raised in these cases arose this -way. The three suits are for recovery of different buildings with adjoining land in the occupation of different persons. In all the cases the concerned defendants sought protection under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 (briefly the Act). Issues were joined on the basis of that contention and on motion by the concerned defendants in each of these cases the question of tenancy was referred for adjudication to the Munsiff Land Tribunal Quilon. In O.S. 259 of 1970 the question was referred to the Tribunal on the strength of S.125 (3) of the Act after hearing both sides. The Tribunal in its turn has entered necessary finding and forwarded the papers to the Munsiff 's Court. In the other two cases, reference to the Tribunal was made on the basis of consent of both sides; and I am made to understand that the Tribunal has not yet decided the referred matter. In O.S. No. 259 of 1970. the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 802 of 1974 for ignoring the finding entered by the Land Tribunal as void and for trial of the issue afresh by the learned Munsiff. In O. S. No. 13 of 1973 and 14 of 1973 the common plaintiff filed I. A. No. 1717 of 1974 and I. A. No. 1716 of 1974 respectively to recall the records from the Munsiff Land Tribunal, Quilon, for decision of the question referred, by the Munsiff himself. All the three interlocutory applications were allowed; and these revisions are directed against the respective orders. 3. Bereft of details the view taken by the learned Munsiff in ignoring the order of reference passed in each of these cases by his predecessor-in-office is that the claim made under S.106 of the Act is not covered by S.125 (3) of the Act, and consequently, the order passed by the court on previous occasions referring the tenancy question for decision by the competent Tribunal is void. According to the learned Munsiff the lease referred to in S.106 was never intended by the legislature to be a tenancy sought to be covered by S.125 (3). According to the learned Munsiff the lease referred to in S.106 was never intended by the legislature to be a tenancy sought to be covered by S.125 (3). At the very outset I would say that the real question to be decided in these cases is not whether a tenancy coming under S.106 of the Act is hit by S.125 (3), but whether the learned Munsiff acted within the limits of law in treating the prior orders passed by the court in each one of these cases referring the disputed issues to the Land Tribunal as void ab initio. If the orders referring these cases to the Tribunal were passed with jurisdiction then the question whether the orders are correct or incorrect is immaterial, and the orders, even if they are wrong, are to be corrected according to the procedure known ,to law. The short question that falls for decision is whether the earlier orders referring the dispute to the Tribunal are a nullity as held by the learned Munsiff. 4. While considering the true import of the expression 'jurisdiction' one is reminded of the rather cynical reference to 'socialism' as a hat that has lost its shape being worn by too many. Of late, the expression 'jurisdiction' also has lost its original shape in as much as it has assumed wider dimensions so as to take in the sanction behind administrative orders even. In its traditional sense the term broadly signified the authority conferred on a court or other competent body to decide a dispute brought before it, in accordance with the procedure recognised by law. The jurisdictional error that can vitiate an order can assume more than one form; but every such error does not render the consequential order null and void. It is only when a court arrogates to itself a power which it does not possess under law that a decision rendered by it can be regarded as null and void for want of jurisdiction. The question is whether the proposition can be extended so as to cover a case where a court refuses to exercise a jurisdiction properly vested in it. I am inclined to answer in the negative. If a court or other competent body disowns the jurisdiction vested in it under law to decide the lis, the order passed by it to that effect is at best only a wrong order. I am inclined to answer in the negative. If a court or other competent body disowns the jurisdiction vested in it under law to decide the lis, the order passed by it to that effect is at best only a wrong order. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is to get the order corrected according to law and not to ignore it as a nullity. What then is the nature of the order passed by the court in these cases while referring the issue relating to tenancy for adjudication by the competent Tribunal? S.125 (1) provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or determine any matter which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal. If the court thought that in a particular case, its jurisdiction is taken away by I S.125 (1), an order passed to that effect tantamounts to disowning the jurisdiction actually vested in it. It undoubtedly had the jurisdiction to take such a decision. In so far as the prior orders were thus orders passed with jurisdiction the learned Munsiff was clearly wrong in treating the orders as null and void. On the other hand, what should be characterised as nullity are the impugned orders. 5. In the result, the orders under challenge are set aside and I. As. 802 of 1974, 1717 of 1974 and 1716 of 1974 are dismissed. I wish to make it clear that this order will not debar the respondents herein from agitating before the' proper forum, at the proper stage, the question whether the concerned Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide the questions referred. 6. The revision petitions are allowed as shown above. No costs. Allowed.