GUPTA, J —The petitioner was initially appointed as an Overseer in the former State of Jaipur on July 26, 1947. He was appointed substantively as an Assistant Engineer in the Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads) of the State of Raj-asthan (hereinafter referred to as the P. W.D.) by an order dated August 17/20, 1953 after he was selected for the aforesaid post by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. In May, 1955, seven officers of the P. W. D. were suspended for negligence for defective plastering of a school building at Gangapur City and after a departmental enquiry although the other officers were re-instated without any punishment, but punishment was inflicted upon the the petitioner and three grade increments were stopped without cumulative effect by the order dated November 13, 1956. 3. The petitioner was subsequently promoted as Executive Engineer in the P. W. D. of the State on May 10, 1958 and he was confirmed in that capacity by an order dated July 4, 1961 with effect from July 1, 1959. The petitioner was thereafter promoted as officiating Superintending Engineer on June 28, 1965 and was posted at Bikaner. By an order of the State Government dated July 24, 1970, a recorded warning was administered to the petitioner on the ground that he changed the road alignment without prior sanction of the Chief Engineer during the year 1961 and the petitioners explanation that he did so to effect economy in the expenditure was rejected. In the year 1961-1962, the then Chief Engineer of the P. W.D. made adverse entries in the confidential rolls of the petitioner, against which he made a representation and the State Government expunged a part of those adverse remarks made by the Chief Engineer by its order dated August 2, 1969, yet another part of such remarks was confirmed by the State Government by its aforesaid order. Then again adverse entries were made in the confidential rolls of the petitioner for the year 1963-1964. The petitioner made representations against the aforesaid adverse entries also, but the State Government by its order dated July 13, 1970, refused to expunge the same. The petitioners case is that the then Chief Engineer Mr. B.D. Mathur was annoyed with the petitioner and in support of his contention, the petitioner relied upon the remarks dated August 30, 1964 made by Shri Gordhan Singh, the then Secretary of the P.W.D. 3. The petitioners case is that the then Chief Engineer Mr. B.D. Mathur was annoyed with the petitioner and in support of his contention, the petitioner relied upon the remarks dated August 30, 1964 made by Shri Gordhan Singh, the then Secretary of the P.W.D. 3. The petitioner was transferred to Ganganagar as Superintending Engineer in the year 1971. The petitioners case is that during the period of his tenure as Superintending Engineer at Ganganagar, he incurred the displeasure of Kuldipsingh and Jaspalsingh, who were influential contractors of that place and who had been given contracts for the execution of several works in Ganganagar area, both on behalf of the Rajasthan Government as well as the Government of India (Ministry of Transport). According to the petitioner, he suggested changes in the bridge work regarding the construction of diversion channel of Suratgarh branch of the Rajasthan Canal which reduced the cost of construction by about Rs. 30.000/- and that he also objected to excess payment of about Rs. 7,00,000/- to the above mentioned contractors in respect of the construction of Hanumangarh-Suratgarh road and directed the Executive Engineer to stop further payment until the work was checked by the latter and he felt satisfied about the same. The petitioner has submitted that inspite of his aforesaid instructions, the then Executive Engineer, Shri Daljit Singh made an over payment to the tune of Rs. 1.5 lacs to the concerned contractors without submitting any explanation. The petitioner has further submitted that the contractors, Kuldip Singh and his brother Jaspalsingh wielded considerable influence over Shri J.S. Metha, the then P. W. D. Secretary and the late Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Shri Barkatullah Khan and that the aforesaid contractors told the petitioner that they had helped Shri Khan in his election. According to the petitioner, as he refused to succumb to the allurements and threats of the aforesaid contractors, he was transferred from Ganganagar to Kota on May 1, 1972. According to the petitioner, as he refused to succumb to the allurements and threats of the aforesaid contractors, he was transferred from Ganganagar to Kota on May 1, 1972. It is also alleged that this transfer of the petitioner from Sri Ganganagar had wide repercussions and some members of the opposition parties in the State Legislative Assembly raised the question of the alleged over-payments made to the aforesaid contractors and the transfer of the petitioner on the floor of the House and it was alleged in the Legislative Assembly that several lacs of rupees were paid by the contractor Kuldipsingh for election work to the then Minister-in-Charge of the P.W.D. but this allegation was denied by the Minister concerned on the floor of the House. 4. A complaint was made by some members of the Legislative Assembly against the petitioner on which a preliminary enquiry was ordered by the State Government against him in respect of the alleged irregularities. Shri V. N. Kalla, the then Additional Chief Engineer P„W D. was entrusted on June 6, 1972 with the task of making the aforesaid preliminary enquiry. Shri Kalla submitted a report in respect of some of the items referred to him for enquiry on July 22, 1972 and further enquiry in respect of the aforesaid complaint was thereafter entrusted to Shri Adiyappa, another Additional Chief Engineer of the Department. 5. On September 2, 1972, an order was issued by the State Government under Rule 244 (2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules ( hereinafter called the Rules), where in it was stated that the petitioner had completed 25 years qualifying service and that the State Government was satisfied that it was in public interest to dispense with further service of the petitioner and directed that the petitioner would be ccmpulsorily retired with effect from the date of the expiry of three calendar months from the service of the notice on him. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition against the aforesaid order of his compulsory retirement dated September 2, 1972. 6. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition against the aforesaid order of his compulsory retirement dated September 2, 1972. 6. In the first instance larned counsel for the petitioner assailed the validity of the provisions of Rule 244 (2) of the Rules However, the question of validity of the aforesaid provisions was exhaustively considered by the present Chief Justice, Honble Shinghal J. in Deep Chand Jain vs. State of Rajasthan (1) and it was held in that case that compulsory retirement under Rule 244 (2) could not be ordered by way of punishment and that there are ample safeguards in the aforesaid sub rule (2) of Rule 244, read with Note 1 appended to it against the exercise of the power of compulsory retirement in an arbitrary manner and further that necessary guidelines have been provided therein by the rule making authority. It has been further pointed out by his Lordship in that case that by compulsory retirement, the employee concerned does not lose any of the benefits which he had already earned, and which he would have lost by way of dismissal or removal and that no charge or imputation was made against the employee concerned while exercising the power of compulsory retirement. The matter relating to the vires of Rule 244(2) does not require any turther consideration inasmuch as it has been thoroughly considered by this Court in Deepchands case (1) and I am in respectful agreement with the decision in the aforesaid case. It may also be pointed out that a special appeal was preferred in Deepchands case (1) (being D. B. Special Appeal No. 12 of 1973), which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on July 5, 1974 and the Division Bench agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge in their entirety. 7. The provisions of Rule 244(2) of the Rules were also examined recently by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tarasingh vs. State of Rajasthan (Writ Petition No. 1253 of 1973, decided on March 19, 1975). In the above mentioned case, Ray C J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows — "The right to be in public employment is a right to hold it according to rules. The rule speaks of compulsory retirement. There is guidance in the rules as to when such compulsory retirement is made. In the above mentioned case, Ray C J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows — "The right to be in public employment is a right to hold it according to rules. The rule speaks of compulsory retirement. There is guidance in the rules as to when such compulsory retirement is made. When persons complete 25 years of service and the efficiency of such persons is impaired and yet it is desirable not to bring any charge of inefficiency or incompetency, the Government passes orders of such compulsory retirement. The Government servant in such a case does not lose the benefits which a Govern ment servant has already earned. These orders of compulsory retirement are made in public interest. This is the safety valve of making such orders so that no arbitrariness or bad faith creeps in." 8. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that leave for a period of more than 120 days was due to the petitioner and that the petitioner was deprived of his right to obtain leave for the period for which it was due. However, learned Deputy Government Advocate stated at the Bar that in case the petitioner was entitled to more leave, the State Government is prepared to grant leave salary to the petitioner for such period as may be found due to him in accordance with the Rules. In Deepchands case, a similar statement made on behalf of the State Government was considered sufficient and it was held that in view of such a statement, the argument of the larned counsel for the petitioner did not require further consideration. The observations made in Deepchands case are fully applicable to the present case in this respect and this submission, therefore, does not require any further consideration. 9. Then learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the procedure prescribed in the notification of the State Government dated June 19. 1972, which was in force at the relevant time, was not followed and relying upon the order of delegation dated December 13, 1963 it was argued that the delegation was made subject to the condition that the prescribed procedure was to be strictly followed. 1972, which was in force at the relevant time, was not followed and relying upon the order of delegation dated December 13, 1963 it was argued that the delegation was made subject to the condition that the prescribed procedure was to be strictly followed. The submi-sion of the learned counsel in this respect is without any substance because the power of compulsory retirement of a Government servant has been vested in the State Government, under the provisions of Rule 244(2) and by the order of delegation dated December 13, 1963, the said power has been delegated to the State Government itself. This power, vested in the State Government in pursuance of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 still continued to vest in the State Government itself even after the order of delegation dated December 13, 1963, was issued, so far as the cases of persons holding posts in State service, like the petitioner were concerned In the present case the power of compulsory retirement has been exercised by the State Government itself and, therefore, there is no illegality on that ground in the present case. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner then argued that the order compulsory retiring the petitioner in the present case dated September 2, 1972 was issued by the Commissioner and P.W.D. Secretary of the Government and that the said order was not passed by the Governor of the State. Learned counsel relied upon Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab (2) and Ramchander Singh vs. State of Punjab (3) in support of his submission, and argued that there was nothing on the record of the case to show that the order of the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was actually passed by the State Government, namely by the Governor on the advice of the Council of Ministers or the Minister concerned. Learned Deputy Government Advocate placed the original record regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner before this court. I have perused the same and it appears that a list of officers of the P.W.D. who had completed 25 years qualifying service or were to complete the said period of service on December 31, 1972 was drawn up by the Administrative Department and the same was placed before a Scrutinising Committee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the notification dated June 19, 1972. Meetings of the aforesaid Scrutinising Committee, constituted to review the cases of the officers of the P.W.D , were held on July 22 and 29, 1972 under the Chairmanship of Shri R.S. Kapoor, then a Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, who was nominated for the purpose by the then Chairman of the said Commission. The Committee scrutinised the confidential rolls and the service records of the officers concerned and recommended for the compulsory retirement of some of them including the petitioner, in terms of rule 244(2) of the Rules. The recommendation of the Scrutinising Committee alongwith the relevant records was forwarded by the Commissioner and P.W.D. Secretary, who was also the Secretary of the Committee, to the Chief Secretary who endorsed the recommendation of the Committee and the same was then forwarded to the Minister-in-charge who also concured with the same. Then matter was sent to the then Chief Minister, who agreed with the recommendation of the Scrutinising Committee in the case of the petitioner and all other officers except two. The Chief Minster directed the Committee to reconsider the cases of those two officers, but we are not concerned with them in the present case. The matter was thereafter sent to the Governor, who accepted the recommendation of the Committee, as modified by the Chief Minister on August 29, 1972. Thereafter, the order (Ex. 1) regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was issued by the Secretary of the Administrative Department on September 2, 1972- In view of the fact that there is an order on the file recorded by the Governor of the State, on the recommendation of the then Chief Minister, directing the compulsory retirement of the petitioner, it is futile to urge that the said order was not passed by the State Government in terms of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 of the Rules. 11. Now, under Rule 244(2) of the Rules, the State Government is empowered to pass an order of compulsory retirement of an employee, after giving him at least three months previous notice in writing and in the present case, it is not disputed that such a notice was given to the petitioner. 12. The law relating to compulsory premature retirement of Govt. 12. The law relating to compulsory premature retirement of Govt. servants was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shyamlal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (4) wherein it was laid down that the order of compulsory retirement differs from an order of dismissal or removal, inasmuch as there is no element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement, while in the case of dismissal or removal, the order is based or founded on some misconduct or inefficiency in the Government servant concerned and further in the case of compulsory retirement, the employee concerned does not lose the benefits which he had already earned, while in the case of dismissal or removal penal consequences are involved. The matter was again considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay vs. Subhag Chand Doshi (5), where Venkatarama Aiyar J., speaking for the Court, observed as under— "......The fact to be noted in that while misconduct and inefficiency are factors that enter into the account where the order is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement there is this difference that while in the case of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if held—and there is no duty to hold an enquiry is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of dismissal or removal, they form the very basis on which the order is made and the enquiry thereon must be formal, and must satisfy the rules of natural justice and the requirements of Art. 311 (2)." 13. The aforesaid principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Shyamlal (4) and Subhagchand (5) were reiterated by their Lordships in Dalipsingh vs. State of Punjab (6) and Motiram Deka etc. vs. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway etc. (7). It was held in the aforesaid cases that although consideration of alleged misconduct or inefficiency may have weighed with the Government in compulsory retiring a Government servant it did not affect the character of the order, so long as such misconduct or inefficiency was not the basis of the termina-tion of the services of the Government servant and did not involve the loss of benefits earned by him. 14. 14. The Law on the subject has been lucidly summed up by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Col. J. N. Sinha and anr. (8) as under:— "......The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before court. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has been not formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision....................Various considerations may weigh with the appropriate authority while exercising the power conferred under the rule. In some cases, the Government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. There is no denying the fact that in all organisations and more so in Government organisations, there is good deal of dead Wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56 (j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interest of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest." 15. While considering the rules permitting premature compulsory retirement in the Mysore Civil Services Rules, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. While considering the rules permitting premature compulsory retirement in the Mysore Civil Services Rules, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. N.V. Putta Bhatta vs. State of Mysore and another (9) that although the expression "absolute right" which occurred in Fundamental Rule 56 (j)did not find any place in the Mysore Rule but that made no difference at both the Rules gave the Government the name or similar rights and so long as the right was not qualified, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it must be held to be absolute. It may be stated here that the rule permitting premature compulsory retirement in the Mysore Civil Service Rules was similar to the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 of the Rules. All the above decisions of the Supreme Court on the point had been considered by our present Chief Justice Honble Shinghal J in Deepchand Jains case (1) and it was observed : — "If the tests are applied to the present case, it becomes quite clear that compulsory retirement has not been ordered by way of punishment, for no charge or imputation has been made the condition for the exercise of the power of retirement, and the petitioners are not losing any benefit which they had already earned and which they would have lost by way of dismissal or removal." Thus from a consideration of the aforesaid decisions it is fully established that an order of compulsory retirement is not passed by way of punishment as it does not cast an aspersion or attach any stigma to the employee, whom it purports to retire compulsorily nor the concerned employee suffers loss of any benefit which he has already earned and although misconduct or inefficiency may be taken into consideration, yet they merely furnish the background for such an action and do not from the very basis for termination of the services of the concerned employee. Therefore, where an order of compulsory retirement is passed by the State Government, as in the present case, in terms of Rule 244(2) of the Rules, the scope for further examination by the Court is very limited, inasmuch as this Court cannot embark upon an examination of the correctness of the opinion bona fide formed by the competent Authority. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Col. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Col. J.N. Sinhas case (8), the order of compulsory retirement can only be challenged on the grounds that either the requisite opinion was not formed by the concerned authority or that the decision was based on collateral grounds or that it was arbitrary or mala fide. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to challenge in the present case the order of the compulsory retiremerit of the petitioner on all the above mentioned grounds. However, the first ground that no opinion was formed by the concerned authority is absolutely untenable. The petitioner has himself reproduced in his application dated April 22, 1974, the minutes of the meeting of the Scrutinising Committee held on July 22, and 29, 1972 so far as they related to the petitioner. As I have already referred to above, the original record including the minutes of the Scrutinizing Committee were placed before this Court on behalf of the State Government and from a perusal thereof it appeared that the recommendations of the Scrutinizing Committee were considered by the Chief Secretary, the Public Works Minister, the Chief Minister and the Governor of the Slate. It cannot, therefore, he held in the face of the relevant record that no opinion was formed by the State Government in respect of the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that although the recommendation of the Scrutinizing Committee was accepted by the State Government but no one applied his mind at all. However, from a perusal of the record this allegation is clearly negatived. I have already referred to the fact that the recommanda-tion of the Scrutinizing Committee were considered by the State Government at various levels including the Chief Minister and the Governor of the State. I have also mentioned above that the then Chief Minister, after considering the recommendations of the Scrutinizing Committee, accepted the same in respect of other officers, including the petitioner, but he did not agree with the same in respect of two of the officers whose compulsory retirement was recommended by the Scrutinizing Committee and the matter relating to those two officers was referred for reconsideration to the Committee by the Chief Minister with certain directions. The views expressed by the Chief Minister in the matter were thereafter accepted by the Governor of the State. The views expressed by the Chief Minister in the matter were thereafter accepted by the Governor of the State. Thus, from the record, I am satisfied that the State Government, formed the requisite opinion in the present case, in respect of the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. 16. The second ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was arbitrary as there was no material before the State Government to justify the same. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions in the cases of Col. J.N. Sinha vs. Union of India and anr, (10), Shri J.R. Jain vs. Union of India and ors. (11), Jaggan-nath Dwarkanath Raje vs. State of Maharashtra (12), Dattaram Sadashiv Rane vs. State of Maharashtra (13), P. Shankar Rao vs. Government of India (14) Shri S.S. Garga vs. The Coal Collector (15), and A.C. Bora vs. Union of India (15A) wherein it has been held that if the order compulsorily retiring a Government servant is challenged in a Court on the ground that it is arbitrary, then the Government should place the relevant record before the Court to justify that the order of compulsory retirement was passed by the appropriate authority on the basis of some ground or material. It is not necessary for me to consider the aforesaid decisions in detail in the present case inasmuch as the State Government has placed the entire record in respect of the compulsory retirement of the petitioner before this Court and the petitioner has himself reproduced in bis application dated April 22, 1972 an extract of the report of the Scrutinizing Committee, so far as it related to the petitioner, recommending his compulsory retirement and in which reference was made to the relevant material. It cannot, therefore, be argued in the present case that there was no ground or material at all before the State Govt., on which the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner could have been based. In Col, J.N. Sinhas case (10), their Lordships of the Delhi High Court held that "the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority is one of the conditions for the exercise of the power of compulsory retirement conferred by the Rule and that the decision to retire a Govt. In Col, J.N. Sinhas case (10), their Lordships of the Delhi High Court held that "the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority is one of the conditions for the exercise of the power of compulsory retirement conferred by the Rule and that the decision to retire a Govt. servant under the Rule should not be arbitrary, which means that it should be based on some such ground or material which is germane to the question whether it is in the public interest to retire the Government servant. If the decision is based on onsuch ground or material or is based on a ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be arbitrary decision. Since Fundamental Rule 56(j) provides for the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by a Court, the sufficiency of the ground or material is not justiciable. But some ground or material germane to the issue must exist and it is open to a Court to examine whether such ground or material exists or not." In that case, the Government in its reply did not even allege that the concerned employee was "in any way inefficient or corrupt and/or unfit for retention in the service, and no reason of any sort had been given why and how his retirement was in public interest " Thus in that case the concerned authority failed to indicate the reason or ground on which the retirement of the Government servant concerned was considered to be in the public interest, even when the employee had challenged before the Court that the decision was an arbitrary one In the case of Shri J.R. Jain (11), a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court followed the aforesaid decision of that Court in Col. J.N. Sinhas case (10). 17. In Jaggannath Dwarkanaths case (12), it was held by the Bombay High Court that when an order compulsorily retiring a Government servant in challenged in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Government to place before the Court, if not all, at least some relevant material to show that the public interest required the compulsory retirement of the official concerned. In that case, the State Government failed to produce any material before the High Court "on the basis of which it could reasonably or possibly he held that the work or health of the petitioner was no unsatisfactory that it was in public interest to retire him compulsorily." On the other hand, the government claimed privilege under Section 123 of the Evidence Act on the ground that the documents were of confidential nature. The Bombay High Court in that case, rejected the claim of privilege and having regard to the fact that the Government was not in a position to place any material or to point out any material on the basis of which the order of compulsory retirement was made, held that there was no material whatsoever to enable the Government to come to the conclusion that public interest justified the compulsory retirement of the petitioner in that case. A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Dattaram Sada-shiv Ranes case (13) where also the Government claimed privilege in respect of production of relevant material, which was disallowed and the High Court held that there was no material which could be the basis of the decision of the Government, as no such material was produced or even indicated before them. In Shankar Raos case (14) Madras High Court held that the order of compulsory retirement of an officer in the public interest is to be based on the subjective opinion of the government concerned and the court could set aside such a decision of the appropriate authority only on limited grounds namely if it is shown that there were no reasons before the government for taking such action or if the reasons turn out to be non-existent or invalid in the eye of law. In S.S. Gargas case(15), the Calcutta High Court also took the same view and held that the opinion which has to be formed by the prescribed authority in respect of the compulsory retirement of a public servant is not an arbitrary power in the hands of such authority but it has a limitation, which has been prescribed by the Rule itself, that such power could be exercised where it was necessary in the public interest to do so. It was further observed that there was an objective test of public interest imposed for the formation of the opinion by the appropriate authority and although the correctness of the decision itself would not be open to judicial review, but it was open to the Court, if a challenge is brought before it, to see that such an order is based on an appropriate opinion and that the opinion was based on consideration of relevant and not collateral or extraneous material. 18. In the first instance, as I have already observed above, it could not be said that the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was arbitrary in the sense that there was no materia! at all before the competent authority on which such an order could be based. However, the further argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the material which was placed before the Scrutinising Committee and the State Government and which was considered by them, was not relevant. I will consider this objection of the petitioner while considering the next ground urged by him that the order of petitioners compulsory retirement was based on collateral or extra neons grounds because if such an order is based on material which is not relevant, then it would naturally be based on collateral or extraneous grounds. However, it could not be held in the circumstances of the present case, that there was no material at all on which the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was or could possibly be based. 19. The next question which has to be considered is as to whether the material considered by the appropriate authority was relevant and germane to the question of public interest or the same was extraneous or collateral. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that adverse entries in the confidential records made before the crossing of the efficiency bar or confirmation of the petitioner on the post of Executive Engineer and his subsequent promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer were wiped out and could not have been relied upon for the purpose of compulsorily retiring him. Learned counsel relied upon Shri J. R. Jain vs. Union of India (11), State of Punjab vs. Dewan Chuni Lal (16), Shri Shadilal vs. the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgao and ors. Learned counsel relied upon Shri J. R. Jain vs. Union of India (11), State of Punjab vs. Dewan Chuni Lal (16), Shri Shadilal vs. the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgao and ors. (17) and Satish Chandra Mital vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors(18) in support of his contention. 20. As I have already mentioned above, the petitioner was promoted on the post of Executive Engineer on May 10, 1956 and he was confirmed on the aforesaid post by the order dated July 4, 1961 with effect from July 1, 1959 and he was thereafter promoted as an officiating Superintending Engineer on June 28, 1966 and continued to work in the same capacity till he was compulsorily retired from Government service by the order dated September 2, 1972. The order of the State Government administering a recorded warning to the petitioner in respect of the change of alignment of road without prior sanction of the Chief Engineer was passed on July 24, 1970. The representation of the petitioner in respect of the adverse remarks entered in his confidential rolls for the year 1961-62 was finally disposed of by the State Government on August 2, 1969 and the adverse remarks made by the Chief Engineer were partly maintained. Similarly, the representation of the petitioner in respect of the adverse remarks entered into the confidential rolls of the petitioner for the year 1963-64 were finally disposed of by the State Government on July 13, 1970 and the same were maintained Thus, the confirmation of the petitioner on the post of Executive Engineer which took place in July 1961 and even his promotion on an ad hoc and officiating basis on the post of Superintending Engineer in the year 1966 were prior in point of time to the passing of the aforesaid orders administering a recorded warning to him and finally deciding the matter relating to the adverse entries recorded in his confidential rolls. Of course, the order stopping three grade increments of the petitioner in connection with the defective plastering of the school building was prior to the aforesaid promotions. Of course, the order stopping three grade increments of the petitioner in connection with the defective plastering of the school building was prior to the aforesaid promotions. However, it may be mentioned here that the petitioner was promoted as officiating: Superintending Engineer on ad hoc basis by the order of the State Government dated June 28, 1966 only on the basis of his seniority in the cadre of Executive Engineers and he was not promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer as a result of selection by a Departmental Promotion Committee in accordance with the provisions of the Service Rules applicable to him. Moreover, the case of Dewan Chunilal (16) is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the employee concerned in the year 1949 on charges of inefficiency and dishonesty, based on adverse confidential reports relating to the period earlier than the year 1944, in which year he was allowed to cross the officiency bar. In respect of such departmental proceedings, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that it was unthinkable that if the authorities took any serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1942 they would have overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the efficiency bar in the year 1944. It should be noted that this was a case of disciplinary proceedings in respect of those very adverse entries, which were not considered of such value at the time of allowing the employes concerned to cross the efficiency bar. In Deep Chands case (1), the aforesaid decision in the case of Dewan Chuni Lal (16) was distinguished on the very same reasoning that "the departmental enquiry was the outcome of the entries from the confidential character rolls of the employes for an earlier period of service and that the considerations in the case of compulsory retirement were entirely different." It was observed in that case that the entire record of service of the government employee had to be scrutinised for the purpose of examining his performance over a period of 25 years, before taking a decision to retire him compulsorily. The Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the Special Appeal preferred by Deepchand, also took the same view and observed that for compulsory retirement "the cumulative effect of the performance of (he officer" have to be considered. In J.R. Jains case (11), no doubt a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court Las held that adverse entries made in the confidential reports and punishments awarded to an employee before crossing the efficiency bar could not be taken into consideration while forming the requisite opinion for the purposes of compulsorily retiring such an employee and that by allowing the employes to cross the efficiency bar, his previous adverse reports stood wiped out. However, it must be noticed that in the abovementioned case the learned Judge applied the dictum laid down in the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dewan Chunni Lals case (16) although he himself pointed out that in the latter case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were concerned "with the case where an employes was charge sheeted on the basis of the adverse remarks given to him before he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar." The learned Single Judge also referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in P. Shankar Raos case (14) where it was held that the antecedents of an officer before he was promoted to the Indian Administrative Service could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of compulsorily retiring him from that service. That case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as there was a promotion of the employee concerned from the State Government Service to the Indian Administrative Service after due screening and the promotion committee was bound to consider the antecedents of the officer concerned before holding him suitable for such promotion to the higher service. In Shri Shadi Lals case (17), a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that crossing of efficiency bar condoned all previous adverse entries and that they could not be taken into consideration at the time of selection for promotion, of the concerned employee. The learned Judge, with great respect, has followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dewan Chunni Lals case (16) without considering the difference pointed out above. The learned Judge, with great respect, has followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dewan Chunni Lals case (16) without considering the difference pointed out above. With great respect for the learned Judges who decided Shadi Lals case (17) and J. R.Jains case (11), I am unable to agree with the view taken in the aforesaid two cases in this respect and would like to point out that in the aforesaid two cases the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dewan Chuni Lals case (16) was applied to the case of compulsory retirement and promotion without considering the difference which has been pointed by this Court in Deepchands case (1) and specifically referred to by me above. The matter of compulsory retirement cannot be considered on the same basis as that of awarding punishment or making selection for promotion to higher posts on the basis of merit seniority-cum-merit. It would be wholly unrealistic to hold that once an employee is allowed to cross the efficiency bar or is promoted to higher post on an ad hoc or officiating basis or is even confirmed on a particular post, all punishments awarded to him or adverse remarks made in his character rolls prior thereto are completely wiped out for "all purposes". It must be remembered here that compulsory retirement is not a punishment and does not take any of the benefits which have already been earned by the employee. The service tenure of an employee is an integrated whole and the cumulative effect thereof ought to be considered while deciding the question about the efficiency on usefulness of the employee for further retention in service. In Satish Chander Mitals case (18) it was held that the adverse entries in the character roll of an employee prior to his selection as Superintending Engineer lost their value after he was selected to that post as the selection was made strictly on merit, which was determined on the basis of service record. This case did not relate to compulsory retirement but it was in respect of the reversion of the petitioner in that case from the post of Superintending Engineer. This case did not relate to compulsory retirement but it was in respect of the reversion of the petitioner in that case from the post of Superintending Engineer. Mitals case is clearly distinguishable from the present case because the petitioner in that case was selected for the post of Superintending Engineer strictly on merit determined on the basis of service record and in those circumstances, it was held that the previous adverse entries lost their value after such selection, in relation to the matter of the said promotion. 21. In R. J. Butail vs. Union of India and others (19) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the consideration of adverse entries in confidential reports at the time of promotion without considering the representation of the employee concerned could not be invalid if his representation was subsequently considered and actually rejected with the result that the adverse entries in the confidential reports remained unchanged. It was observed by their Lordships that in case the representation was accepted and in consequence thereof the confidential report was altered or the remarks expunged, the Promotion Commitee would have to review its recommendation in the light of such a result but in case the representation was rejected, no question of any injustice having been done to the employee concerned arose, despite the fact that the Promotion Committee considered merely the adverse entries in the confidential report without the representation of the employee. In Prakash Chand Sharma vs. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission and ors. (20), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:— "...If the adverse remarks were there in the confidential reports it was the duty of the departmental Promotion Committee to take notice of them and come to a decision on a consideration of them. The Committee could not be expected to make investigation about the confidential reports. It appears to us that in this case there was no discrimination, purposeful or otherwise, and at the best, the Committees taking into consideration confidential reports with respect to which the petitioner had been given no chance to make a representation was merely fortuitous." In Sahadeo Patnaik vs. State of Orissa and others (21), it was observed "After taking the aforesaid facts into consideration the committee recommended for his retirement and the Governor being satisfied passed the impugned order. Thus, there were abundant materials in support of annexure 1. Thus, there were abundant materials in support of annexure 1. It cannot be styled as arbitrary or based on collateral grounds. It was contended by Mr. Nath that on 17-8-71 the Director of Fisheries recommended the peti-tioner for ad hoc promotion as Deputy Director and the Government also recommended his name to P.S.C. in 1972 and 1973 for appointment to the same post and that the P.S.C recommended the petitioners name to the Government for being appointed an Deputy Director. According to him, all these facts were not taken into consideration before annexure 1 was passed and as such it is valid It is to be noted that the court is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Government which is to take an over all picture of the officer. The entire character roll was before the Review Committee and the Governor. The salient features were highlighted by the Review Committee. They are enough to justify an order of compulsory retirement. The Committee is not to write out a judgment as in a judicial proceeding " 22. In S.S.S. Venkatraos case (22) the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court observed: — "...The considerations weighing with the authority empowered to allow crossing of E.B. are of a very limited nature. Even if an officers calibre is quite ordinary but no serious defects are noticed in him he may be allowed to cross the E.B. and that is what is exactly done in practice. The consideration when a question of inter se promotion comes is altogether different. There may not be any thing adverse against an officer in particular but on a comparison of merits the officer below him may be much more superior to him in performances. It would be extremely unreasonable to say that merely because an officer has been allowed to cross the E.B. all adverse entries prior to that stage are not to be taken into consideration for other purposes. The personality of an officer cannot be disintegrated. Character rolls reflects the developments in his official career. Ordinarily superior authorities at the time of considering promotion place greater weight on the performance of the officer near about the time of promotion. This does not-however mean that the earlier character rolls can be ignored. Reliance was placed on some observations of the Supreme Court in 1970 SLR 375 (The State of Punjab vs. Dewan ChuniLal). Ordinarily superior authorities at the time of considering promotion place greater weight on the performance of the officer near about the time of promotion. This does not-however mean that the earlier character rolls can be ignored. Reliance was placed on some observations of the Supreme Court in 1970 SLR 375 (The State of Punjab vs. Dewan ChuniLal). Their Lordships held in that case that reports earlier to 1942 should not have been considered at all inasmuch as the respondent was allowed to cross the E.B. in that year. They said that it is unthinkable that if the authorities took any serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1942 they could have overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the E.B. in 1944. This decision is distinguishable and does not lay down any general proposition that character roll prior to crossing of E.B. is to be ignored." I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. In Shikar Chand Jain vs. The State of UP. (23), the Allahabad High Court also took the same view. 23. There is no doubt that if the petitioner challenges in a court the impugned order of compulsory retirement on the ground that the same is either arbitrary or is based on collateral or extraneous grounds, then it is incumbent upon the appropriate authority to point out before the Court that the requisite opinion was formed by it on some ground or material which is relevant or germane to the question as to whether it is in public interest to dispense with the further services of the Government servant or not. As the existence of relevant material on which such decision is based would have to be proved, at least prima facie before the Court and it would not be sufficient merely to assert that some material existed without giving any clue to the nature of such material. However, the court is not empowered to sit as an appellate authority over the decision of the appropriate authority in the matter of compulsory retirement of an employee and to adjudge the correctness of such decision if the same is based on an over all view of the usefulness of the employee for further retention in service and is bona fide arrived at by the appropriate authority. 24. 24. Then learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Shri B. D. Mathur, the then Chief Engineer of the P. W. D. was annoyed with the petitioner, because he exposed the mal-practices and misdeeds of Shri Mathur and his stooges in the Department and as such the petitioner incurred his wreth and in this connection he drew my attention to the remarks of Shri Goverdhan Singh, the then P. W. D. Secretary dated August 30, 1964 in the confidential rolls of the petitioner for the year 1961-62. Learned counsel urged on the aforesaid basis that Shri B. D. Mathur intentionally spoiled the confidential rolls of the petitioner whenever he had an opportunity to do so. I have perused the confidential rolls of the petitioner and other relevant record produced by the State Government and find that the representations submitted by the petitioner regarding the adverse entries made in respect of the years 1961-62 and 1963-64 were considered at the highest level namely, by the Minister-in-charge and the Chief Minister and ultimately although the adverse entries made in respect of the year 1961-62 were partly maintained, yet the adverse entries made for the year 1963 64 were confirmed by the State Government. Thus even if Shri B. D. Mathur might be annoyed with the petitioner and he certainly does not appear to have been quite fair in his comments in respect of the work of the petitioner, yet as the State Government examined the whole matter in detail at the highest level and then came to the conclusion that the adverse entries in respect of the work of the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were justified, the petitioner cannot escape the consequences of such adverse entries, merely on the ground that Shri B.D. Mathur bore ill-will against him. Such adverse entries, after they were confirmed by the State Government, could legitimately be considered by the State Government for forming an opinion regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. It may also be noticed that even during later years the petitioner has been merely an average officer and there is nothing extraordinary or meritorious about him in his confidential rolls. 25. It was argued with great vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the report in respect of the preliminary enquiry conducted by Mr. It may also be noticed that even during later years the petitioner has been merely an average officer and there is nothing extraordinary or meritorious about him in his confidential rolls. 25. It was argued with great vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the report in respect of the preliminary enquiry conducted by Mr. V.N. Calla, the than Additional Chief Engineer, could not have been taken into consideration by the Scrutinizing Committee and the State Government for the purpose of arriving at a decision regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. In the first place, it was submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner had succeeded Mr. V.N. Calla as Superintending Engineer, Bikaner and in an enquiry conducted by him, he complained of certain overpayments made to the contractor Kuldipsingh and pointed out certain other irregularities during Mr. Callas tenure at Bikaner and that Mr Calla bore ill-will against the petitioner on that ground. It was next argued by the learned counsel that the Vigilance Commission by its letter dated June 29, 1972 had asked the State Government not to entrust any enquiries to Shri V.N. Calla. It was further argued that the report submitted by Mr. Calla was incomplete and ex parte and as it was not communicated to the petitioner, the same could not have been taken into consideration. Mr. Calla, who is a party to the writ petition has submitted an affidavit denying the allegation of ill-will against the petitioner and he has further clarified that as the enquiry made by him was only of a preliminary nature, the question of affording the petitioner an opportunity to submit an explanation in such an enquiry did not arise. There does not appear any substance in the allegation of ill-will advanced by the petitioner in respect of Mr. V.N. Calla. Such vague allegations could always be advanced against any one conducting an enquiry and making an advene report. The preliminary enquiry against the petitioner in the present case was entrusted to Mr. Calla, who was then working as Additional Chief Engineer on June 6, 1972 and the letter of the Vigilance Commission pointing out certain irregularities in the earlier enquiries conducted by Mr. Calla was dated June 29, 1972 and as such, it would not be proper to presume that the State Government entrusted the preliminary enquiry against the petitioner to Mr. Calla, who was then working as Additional Chief Engineer on June 6, 1972 and the letter of the Vigilance Commission pointing out certain irregularities in the earlier enquiries conducted by Mr. Calla was dated June 29, 1972 and as such, it would not be proper to presume that the State Government entrusted the preliminary enquiry against the petitioner to Mr. Calla on account of some motive. Mr. Calla in his report dated July 22, 1972 prime facie found the petitioners involvement in a matter relating to irregularities in the purchase of batteries worth in 1.5 lacs. There is no doubt, however, that the report of Mr. Calla was incomplete in the sense that he made a report only in respect of some of the items referred to him, because the works to which the other charges related had really started during the tenure of Mr. Calla and naturally he did not think it proper to make any report in respect of those matters. Thereafter further enquiry in respect thereof was entrusted to Mr. Adiyappa, who was also Additional Chief Engineer in the P. W. D. and against whom the petitioner has made no complaint whatsoever. However, Mr. Adiyappa also subsequent by held the petitioner prime facie liable in respect of some of the items. Applying the obsecrations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in R.L. Butalls case (19), as the petitioner was found prime facie liable by Mr. Adiyappa even subsequently in respect of some of the charges levelled against him, then no question of any injustice having been done to the petitioner arose in the present case, as the situation remained unchanged even after Mr. Adiy-appas report. Great emphasis was laid by the learned counsel that the report of Mr. Calla was an ex parte document and that it could not form relevant material for the purpose of arriving at a decision regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner under sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 of the Rules an the same was not communicated to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that nothing adverse to a person should be considered without notice to him and relied upon some cases relating to punishments awarded to students relating to their conduct during examinations and other quasi judicial proceedings, but those decisions are not in point. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that nothing adverse to a person should be considered without notice to him and relied upon some cases relating to punishments awarded to students relating to their conduct during examinations and other quasi judicial proceedings, but those decisions are not in point. It must be borne in mind that in all these cases, the right of a person was affected and as such, the principles of natural justice require the disclosure of the material to the person concerned and there arose the further requirement of calling of an explanation from him in respect thereof. However, in the case of compulsory retirement, when the entire relevant material is placed before the appropriate authority, including the confidential rolls of the Government servant concerned, there is no requirement of calling for an explanation from the concerned employee under the Rules. Reliance was also placed upon the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Binapanidei (24) and A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India (25), but the aforesaid two cases did not relate to the matter of formation of opinion for compulsory retirement and they were distinguished by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. Putta Bhettas case (9) following the observations in Col. J.N. Sinhas case (8) on the ground that those cases related to existing rights of the employees. While service for a minimum number of years was guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government was given the power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by retiring these persons, who in its opinion should not be retained in public interest and that the Government has an absolute right under the Rules to compulsorily retire an employee, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. In substance the Government has the power to chop off the dead wood and to terminate the service of those Government servants who had completed service for a minimum number of years and who in its opinion, have ceased to be efficient or were unfit for further retention in service or were outlived their utility in the opinion of the Government. Their Lordships held that the principles of natural justice ought to be applied in the back- ground of the law applicable to the matter. Their Lordships held that the principles of natural justice ought to be applied in the back- ground of the law applicable to the matter. It must be recognised that compulsory retirement does not deprive the Government servant of any existing right as he does not lose any of the benefits earned by him till the date of his retirement and does not visit him with any penalty. However, before passing an order under sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 of the Rules, the appropriate authority must bona fide form an opinion that the Government servant concerned was no longer required to be retained in public service in the public interest on the ground of inefficiency or impaired efficiency and such an opinion must be formed on the basis of some relevant material. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any decision in support of his contention that the material on which the opinion regarding the compulsory retirement of a Government servant could be based must be communicated to him before taking any such material into consideration. In Sobhag Chand Doshis case(5) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the appropriate authority may hold an enquiry before passing an order of retirement, only for the satisfaction of the authority who has take action and emphasised that there was no duty cast upon the concerned authority to hold any enquiry in the case of retirement. Thus such an enquiry, if held at all, need not comply with the principles of natural justice or the requirements of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. It has been consistently held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that there is no right in a Government servant to continues in service beyond a minimum number of years specified in the Rules and that after completing such period, an employed can be compulsorily retired in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. No notice to show cause is required to be served upon the employee concerned before passing an order of compulsory retirement in accordance with the Rules, inasmuch as no right of such an employee is taken away either by superannuation or even by premature compulsory retirement. Thus, the report of preliminary enquiry submitted by Mr. V. N. Calla even though exparte, did form relevant material for the purpose of arriving at a decision under sub rule (2) of Rule 244. Thus, the report of preliminary enquiry submitted by Mr. V. N. Calla even though exparte, did form relevant material for the purpose of arriving at a decision under sub rule (2) of Rule 244. It cannot be said that the aforesaid report was extraneous to the matter of further retention of the petitioner in public service in public interest. It may also be emphasised here that if some ground or material exists, then it is not for the Court to consider the question of its sufficiency. What the Court is entitled to look into is that there was some material, germane to the issue, on the basis of which the appropriate authority could reasonably or possibly come to the conclusion regarding the compulsory retirement of the employee but the Court cannot enter into an assessment of the value of such material to consider as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the appropriate authority in that respect is correct or not. I may also refer to the decision of the Orissa High Court it Daitary Patnail vs. State of Orissa (26) in this context. The Court could only interfere with the order of compulsory retirement of of a public servant if the appropriate authority has not applied its mind or the order was arbitrary or it was based on extraneous material or on material which was nonexistent or was invalid in the eye of law. In the present case, I am unable to hold that there was no relevant material at all before the Scrutinising Committee and the State Government on the basis of which the decision regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner in public interest could be arrived at. 23. It was also argued that even if one of the grounds considered by the Scrutinising Committee was vague or non-existent or irrelevant, the entire finding stood vitiated and it was urged that because partly expunged adverse remarks were also taken into consideration by the aforesaid Committee, as such the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was invalid and void. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon some decisions relating to cases of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act where the order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon some decisions relating to cases of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act where the order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sri Krishan Kapania and others vs. The State of Punjab (27) in support of this submission. In the last mentioned case, the only observation made by the learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is that the submission made on behalf of the petitioners in that case that if one ground given in support of an administrative order was wrong, the entire order should be struck down, could not be accepted in that case because such a principle could be applied if an order affecting an individual person was passed but the aforesaid principle could have no application if a policy decision was taken, whether the reason given was good or bad, The aforesaid observation is in the nature of mere obiter dicta, as on the facts of that case, his Lordship took the view that even if one of the grounds given in support of the order was wrong, the impugned order in that case was not vitiated as it was a policy decision. It may be observed that the rule applicable to detention cases cannot be applied to an order relating to the compulsory retirement of a Government servant, because while passing an order of compulsory retirement, there is no question of any subjective satisfaction of the competent authority. The rule itself lays down a limitation that the power of compulsory retirement could be exercised only in public interest in respect of a Government servant who was not efficient or whose efficiency was impaired. Therefore, the formation of the necessary opinion is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power conferred by the rules and such opinion has to be formed with reference to the objective test of public interest on the basis of relevant material. In such cases, where an objective decision has to be arrived at by the competent authority, it is not for this Court to interfere merely because one of the several grounds considered by the competent authority for the formation of the requisite opinion was extraneous or non-existent. In such cases, where an objective decision has to be arrived at by the competent authority, it is not for this Court to interfere merely because one of the several grounds considered by the competent authority for the formation of the requisite opinion was extraneous or non-existent. If in the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the competent authority had the necessary material before it, on the basis of which the opinion that the further retention of the Government servant concerned in public service was not in public interest could possibly be arrived at by the appropriate authority then the Court cannot interfere with such an order. In Shikhar Chand Jains case (20) it was observed :— "Thus, it is manifest that there was material on record on which the decision of the Government relating to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner could be founded. It cannot be gainsaid, that the service record of the Government servant, his character roll entries etc. are relevant factors for deciding whether it is in public interest to retire a Government servant compulsorily. See N.V. Putta vs. State of Mysore ( AIR 1972 S.C 2185 ). The right of the Government to compulsorily retire a Government servant is absolute and it is not open to the courts to judge the sufficiency of material on which the decision was based. The order could be impugned only on the ground that it was either mala fide, or based on collateral grounds or irrelevant and extraneous considerations or that it was arbitrary in the sense that there was no material on the basis of which any reasonable person could have come the conclusion that it was in public interest to exercise that power. As I have already observed, there was material in the case on which the opinion could be reasonably founded that it was in public interest to retire the petitioner compulsorily." 27. As I have already observed, there was material in the case on which the opinion could be reasonably founded that it was in public interest to retire the petitioner compulsorily." 27. As regards the question of malafides, the petitioner has alleged in paras 17 and 18 of the writ petition that Kuldip Singh had great influence over the than Chief Minister Shri Baikatullah Khan and the then P.W.D. Secretary, Shri J.S. Mehta and that Shri Daljit Singh, Executive Engineer and Shri V.N. Calla, the then Additional Chief Engineer were favourites of Kuldip Singh and it was on account of his intervention that the transfer of Daljit Singh from Ganganagar was kept in abeyance by the order of the then Chief Minister. According to the petitioner, Kuldip Singh claimed that the late Chief Minister, Shri Barkatullah Khan was a close friend of his and he had given lacs of rupees during the latters election from Tijara Assembly Constituency. It is further alleged by the petitioner that over-payments to the tune of Rs. 6,00,000/- were made to Kuldipsingh by the Executive Enginer Shri Daljitsingh and were pushed up by Shri V.N. Calla, the then Additional Chief Engineer. The petitioner has alleged that it was on account of the fact that he came in conflict with Kuldipsingh contractor and directed the Executive Engineer to stop making overpayments to Kuldipsingh that the petitioner was transferred from Ganganagar to Kota. It may be recalled here that the petitioner has referred in his writ petition to the matter of his transfer being raised on the floor of the Legislative Assembly and there it was alleged that as the petitioner did not allow payment of bills of about Rs. 6,00,000/-to Kuldipsingh, the latter told the petitioner that he would get him transferred and further that Kuldipsingh claimed that he had made payment of Rs. 5,00,000/-(to the then P.W.D. Minister for election work. This allegation of payment of Rs. 5,00,000/-) was stoutly denied on the floor of the House by the concerned minister. Thus, it appears that although it was alleged before the Legislative Assembly that Kuldipsingh had made payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the then P.W.D. Minister, the petitioner has made an allegation in the writ petition that Kuldipsingh made payment of "lacs of rupees" to the then Chief Minister Shri Barkatullah Khan and claimed to be a close friend of the latter. 5,00,000/- to the then P.W.D. Minister, the petitioner has made an allegation in the writ petition that Kuldipsingh made payment of "lacs of rupees" to the then Chief Minister Shri Barkatullah Khan and claimed to be a close friend of the latter. A perusal of the averments of para 18 of the writ petition shows that the entire allegation regarding the malafides of the then Chief Minister Shri Khan and the P. W. D. Secretary Shri J. S. Mehta is based only on what Kuidip-Singh claimed and the petitioner neither verified from other sources as to whether the claim of Kuldipsingh in this matter was justified nor any material has been placed on the record, which could have substantiated the aforesaid allegation. Learned counsel for the petitioner was pointedly asked as to whether there was any material to show that Kuldipsingh ever had close association or friendship with the late Chief Minister or as to whether any specific instances were disclosed as to the payment of any amount by Kuldipsingh to the late Chief Minister or the time or the probable period when such payments were alleged to have been made and whether any such payment was made either personally or through some other source. Learned counsel for the petitioner had concede that there were no such specific allegations made or instances or details disclosed either in respect of the then Chief Minister or the then P. W. D. Secretary. Merely that Kuldipsingh "claimed" to be a close friend of the late Chief Minister and alleged to have given lacs of rupees during his election, are very vague and indefinite allegations which hardly deserved any attention, unless charges with specific instances were levelled by the petitioner. The respondent State has denied that Kuldipsingh had any influence over the late Chief Minister or the P.W.D. Secretary or that Kuldipsingh was a close friend of either the late Chief Minister or the P. W. D. Secretary or that he paid lacs of rupees to the late Chief Minister in his election from Tijara Assembly Constituency. The respondent State has denied that Kuldipsingh had any influence over the late Chief Minister or the P.W.D. Secretary or that Kuldipsingh was a close friend of either the late Chief Minister or the P. W. D. Secretary or that he paid lacs of rupees to the late Chief Minister in his election from Tijara Assembly Constituency. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the aforesaid allegations of malafides were not denied by the late Chief Minister Shri Barkatullah Khan and the then P. W. D. Secretary Shri J.S. Mehta by affidavits they should be considered to have been admitted on the basis of the decision, of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in S. Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab (28) and C.S. Reddy etc. vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (29). In the present case, as I have already observed above that the allegations made by the petitioner are so vague and of general nature that it was hardly necessary to refute them Moreover, the same allegation of giving some lacs of rupees was made in the legislative Assembly against the then P. W. D. Minister and the petitioner appears to have borrowed the very same allegation in the writ petition but has implicating the then Chief Minister. Further, the petitioners case as spelled out in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the writ petition is that Kuldipsingh was instrumental in getting the petitioner transferred from Ganganagar to Kota. What one fails to understand is that as to why the petitioner was so much interested regarding his continuance at Ganganagar and how was he affected by his transfer from there to Kota in the same capacity, as Superintending Engineer. Besides this, there does not appear to be any rational connection between the allegations of malafides, which are side to have led to his transfer from Ganganagar to Kota and the subsequent compulsory retirement of the petitioner under Rule 244 (a) of the Rules. 28. Besides this, there does not appear to be any rational connection between the allegations of malafides, which are side to have led to his transfer from Ganganagar to Kota and the subsequent compulsory retirement of the petitioner under Rule 244 (a) of the Rules. 28. In S. P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (30), certain allegations of malafides were made against the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu by the petitioner who was then the Chief Secretary of that Sate and certain particulars were supplied, which were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it was held that the allegation imputing malafides against the Chief Minister were baseless and that the insinuation of vindicativeness and vengeance on the part of the Chief Minister were repelled by the facts and circumstances of the case. In Royappas case (30) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: — "We must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility..... In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may land themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore; be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner." 29. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner." 29. However, in the present case, there are no facts and figures supplied by the petitioner in the writ petition or his affidevit and very vague and general allegations have been advanced against the late Chief Minister. Apart from his bald assertion, not a single instance has been cited by the petitioner which could have led this Court to draw the inference that Kuldipsingh was a close friend of the late Chief Minister or wielded great influence over him. The allegation of giving lacs of rupees to the late Chief Minister by Kuldipsingh is equally vague and devoid of particulars of specifica-tion.s Even a single instance of payment of any amount by Kuldipsingh to the late Chief Minister, or as a matter of fact, to any person, on behalf of or for the benefit of the late Chief Minister has not been brought to light. It is quite easy to make such vague and general allegations against persons holding responsible positions in the administration and unless specific instances or charges are levelled, the onus of establishing mala fides could not be held to be discharged by the petitioner. In the case of Shri Pratap Singh Kairon (28) and Shri Sanjiva Reddy (29), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, specific allegations of grave and serious nature were made against the aforesaid persons and they required specific refutation on their part. In those circumstances, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in these cases that in the absence of refutation, the allegations of mala fides would be considered to have been established. But the aforesaid decisions are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case, as the petitioner has totally failed to furnish any particular instance or specification of the alleged charges regarding mala fides. But the aforesaid decisions are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case, as the petitioner has totally failed to furnish any particular instance or specification of the alleged charges regarding mala fides. I am constrained to observe that although the learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised that specific allegations should be proved against the petitioner if the State Government desired to bring about premature termination of his employment by compulsorily retiring him under Rule 244 (a) of the Rules, yet according to the learned counsel, the same principle is not applicable when charges of mala fides were recklessly advanced by the petitioner against persons holding high public offices of great responsibility, without citing any instance, which could support such charges. Thus, the petitioner has been unable to substantiate the allegations of mala fides in the present case. 30. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the scrutinising Committee failed to consider the good points regarding the service record of the petitioner and did not take into consideration the confidential rolls of the petitioner for the last six years prior to the passing of the order of compulsory retirement. The argument of the learned counsel was that the considerations made by the Scrutinising Committee did not lead to the conclusion that the efficiency of the petitioner was impaired, and that in case any chargesheet would have been served upon the petitioner then he would have been afforded ample opportunity to defend himself, but the service of innocent officer like the petitioner has been terminated on the basis of a preliminary enquiry conducted by an unreliable officer like Mr. Calla. In this respect I have already pointed out above that the petitioner was merely an average officer and even the confidential rolls for the last six years did not project him as a bright officer or one of outstanding merits and the committee high lighted only salient features of his record. It may also be pointed out that an order of compulsory retirement is not a matter of punishment and in the recent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tarasinghs case, it was observed by Ray C.J , relying on the decision in Col .J.N. Sinhas case (2), "In Sinhas case (supra) this Court said that compulsory retirement is not taking any penal action. An order of compulsory retirement is really passed after taking into consideration the rights of the Government servant on the one hand and the interest of Government on the other. It is also established that an order of compulsory retirement does not deprive the Government servant of benefits earned till the age of his retirement. An order of retirement is really passed on the basis of interest of administrative efficiency." It is well established that the right to pass an order of compulsory retirement is exercised by the State Government in those cases where it is not considered desirable to make formal charges of inefficiency. It may also be observed that it is not for this Court to make an assessment of the working capacity of the petitioner at the relevant time and as to whether his efficiency was impaired or that he ceased to be fully efficient. It was for the appropriate authority to examine the entire matter and to consider as to whether the petitioner was unfit for further retention in Government service or had outlived his utility after he had continued to work for a reasonably long period and completed minimum qualifying service, as specified in Rule 244 (2). It would be neither reasonable nor lawful for this Court to substitute its own opinion in place of the State Government, unless the order is vitiated on account of being arbitrary or based on extraneous or collateral grounds of malafides. I have examined each of these aspects of the matter at considerable length and have found that the petitioner has not been able to establish that the order of his compulsory retirement was vitiated either on account of malafides or was arbitrary or based on extraneous or collateral grounds. As the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner did not suffer from any of the aforesaid infirmities, it is not open to this Court to examine the merits of the considerations which weighed with the Scrutinising Committee and the State Government and to assess their value, as the totality of the circumstances had to be considered by the State Government. It is manifest that there was relevant material on record on which the decision of the State Government relating to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner could be reasonably based. As was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in J.N. Sinhas case (8) and Dr. It is manifest that there was relevant material on record on which the decision of the State Government relating to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner could be reasonably based. As was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in J.N. Sinhas case (8) and Dr. Putta Bhattas case (9), the rule gave an absolute right to the State Government to retire Government servants on the ground of public interest, after they have completed the prescribed minimum period of qualifying service and it is not open to the Courts to judge the sufficiency of the material on which the decision was based. 31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition has no merit and the same is consequently dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.