LODHA, J —These writ petitions are directed against the order of the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated 27th June, 1972, and since they arise out of the same proceedings and common questions of fact and law are involved, I propose to dispose them of by a single judgment. 2. The respondent No. 2 is a union of the employees of the various Household Departments of the Maharaja of Jaipur, such as, City Palace, Motor Garage, Gardens and Nursery, Atish Stables, Dairy and Farming. In the City Palace are Museum, Farrashkhana and Baggikhana and Kapatdwara On 10-3-1969, respondent No. 2 presented a charter of eight demands before the Household Management, but they were rejected. No settlement before the Conciliation Officer could be arrived at, hence the Government of Rajasthan by notification dated 17th October, 1969 (a copy of which has been placed on the record and marked Annexure A) referred the following dispute (translated into English) to the Court — "Are the following demands of the employees of the various Household Departments of the Maharaja of Jaipur presented by the Jaipur Horse Breeding & Riding Association Karamchari Sangh before the Master of Household ju3t and proper? If not, to what relief are the employees entitled? (a) Should the employees be given Dearness Allowance in accordance with the recommendations of the Mathur Committee and should they be awarded arrears of the past years? (b) Should the scale of pay of the employees be fixed and should they be awarded an increment of Rs. 20/-per year for the last five years? (c) Should the employees be awarded bonus for the past years in accordance with the provisions of the Bonus Act ? and (d) Should the employees be awarded house rent and medical? " 3. The respondent No. 2 filed a statement of claim before the Industrial Tribunal on behalf of the employees. The Master of the Household of Maharaja of Jaipur filed the written statement wherein he took certain preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the claim and contended that what had been referred to by the State Government was not an "industrial dispute", as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (which will be referred to as the Act). It was urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim. It was urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim. It was also contended that the S. M. S. Investment Corporation Private Limited and the Jaipur House Breeding and Riding Association were a corporate body and a registered partnership firm, respectively and did not form part of the petitioners Household. Respondent No. 2 examined four witnesses and five witnesses were examined on behalf of the Maharaja of Jaipur. The Tribunal by its award dated 27th June, 1972 (published on 4 9 1972) held that the City Palace, Gardens and Nursery, Farms and Dairy, Atish Stables and Motor Garrage of the Maharaja of Jaipur come within the definition of the word "industry", as defined in the Act. It classified the employees in the aforesaid departments into three catego-ries viz,, un-skilled, semi-skilled and skilled, and fixed minimum wages for each category as Rs. 85/-, Rs. 100/- and Rs. 125/ respectively on the basis of minimum wages pres-cribed by the State Government in the year 1971 under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Tribunal further prescribed scales of wages for the aforesaid categories as follows— (1) Un-skilled ... ... 45-1-69 (2) Semiskilled ... .... 60-2-90 (3) Skilled ... ... 85-5 125-10 175 The Tribunal also held that the employees shall be fixed in the above pay scales with effect from 17-10 1969. 4. So far as Dearness Allowance is concerned, the Tribunal allowed the same as per recommendations of the Mathur Committee with neutralisation at the rate of 0.60 p. (sixty paisa) per point rise calcuted on the basis of the index of prices on 1st January, 1970, with benefit of the same to the employees with effect from 17th October, 1969, and it was further directed that the arrears be paid within two months from the publication of the Award. The claim for bonus and medical facilities was disallowed. 5. Aggrieved by the Award of the Tribunal, Shri Bhawani Singh, Maharaja of Jaipur, the Jaipur Horse Breeding and Riding Association, Jaipur and the Managing Director, S.M.S. Investment Corporation Pvt. Ltd., Jaipur have filed separate writ petitions but they have all been argued by Mr. C. M. Sharma on behalf of the petitioners. 6. 5. Aggrieved by the Award of the Tribunal, Shri Bhawani Singh, Maharaja of Jaipur, the Jaipur Horse Breeding and Riding Association, Jaipur and the Managing Director, S.M.S. Investment Corporation Pvt. Ltd., Jaipur have filed separate writ petitions but they have all been argued by Mr. C. M. Sharma on behalf of the petitioners. 6. In writ petition No. 1686 of 1972, the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the various Departments of the Household do not fall within the definition of term "industry" as defined in the Act, and therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim with regard to the employees working in the Household. 7. "Industry"" has been defined in sec. 2( j ) of the Act as follows - "2(j) "Industry, means any business, trade undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen; " Sec. 2(k) defines "Industrial dispute" as follows— "2(k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employees and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen end workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person; " 8. The question what is an "industry" has been the subject-matter of a number of decision of the Supreme Court, and it would, therefore, be proper to refer to some of them to find out as as to what are the essential characteristics of an "industry". 9. In D.N. Banerji vs. R,P. Mukherjee(l), it was observed that "undertaking" in the first part of the definition and "industrial occupation or avocation" in the second part obviously mean much more than what is ordinarily understood by trade or business. The definition was apparently intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business venture. Their Lordships held that "having regard to the definitions found in our Act, the aim or objective that the Legislature had in view, and nature, variety and range of disputes that occur between employees and employees, we are forced to the conclusion that the definitions in our Act include also disputes that might arise between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying out of a trade or business". 10. 10. In Harinagar Cane Farm vs. The State of Bihar(2), it was held that agri-cultural operation carried on by a limited company formed for that purpose is an "industry" within sec. 2(j) and 16 of the 1947 Act. It was found in that case that for carrying on agricultural operations, the appellants had invested large amounts of capital with a view to make profits. It was also a common ground that the workmen in their respective operations contributed to the production of agricultural productivity which brought in profit to the appellants. What their Lordships held to be important was that the appellants were limited companies, which had been formed, inter alia, for the express purpose of carrying on agricultural trade or business. In these circums-tances, it was held that when the limited company was formed for the purpose of carrying on an agricultural operation, it was carrying on trade or business and a plea raised by it that this organised trade or business does not fall within sec. 2( j ) simply and solely for the reason that it is an agricultural operation, cannot be sustained. Their Lordships, however, made it clear that in dealing with the appeals before them, they did not propose to decide the larger question as to whether all agriculture and operations connected with it are included within the definition of sec. 2(j ). 11. In the Secretary Madras Gyamkhana Club Employees Union vs. The Management of the Gymkhana Glub(3), the Industrial Tribunal held that the management of the Gymkhana Club, Madras was not an "industry". After referring to the earlier cases decided by the Supreme Court, Hidayatulla J , as he then was, observed as follows— The definition of "Industry is in two parts. In its first part it means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. This part of the definition determines an industry by reference to occupation of employers in respect of certain activities These activities are specified by five words and they determine what an Industry is not is and what the cognate expression "industrial" is intended to convey This is the denotation of the term or what the word denotes. We shall presently discuss what the words "business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling" comprehend. The second part views the matter from the angle of employees and is designed to include something more in what the term primarily denotes. We shall presently discuss what the words "business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling" comprehend. The second part views the matter from the angle of employees and is designed to include something more in what the term primarily denotes. By the second part of the definition any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen is included in the concept of industry. This part gives the extended connotation. If the activity can be described as an industry with reference to the occupation of the employers, the ambit of the industry, under the force of the second part, takes in the different kinds of activity of the employees mentioned in the second part But the second part standing alone cannot define "industry". An industry to be found in every case of employment or service. An individual who employees a cook gets service from his employee whose avocation is to serve as a cook but as the activity of the individual is neither business, nor trade, nor an undertaking, nor manufacture, nor calling of an employer, there is no industry By the inclusive part of the definition the labour force employed in an industry is made an integral part of the industry for the purposes of industrial disputes although industry is ordinarily something which employers create or undertake." It was further observed— "Next where the activity is to be considered as an industry, it must not be casual but must be distinctly systematic. The work for which labour of workmen is required, must be productive and the workmen must be following an employment, calling or industrial avocation. The salient fact in this context is that the workmen are not their own masters but render services at the behest of masters. This follows from the second part of the definition of industry. Then again when private individuals are the employees, the industry is run with capital, and with a view to profits These two circumstances may not exist when government or a local authority enter upon business, trade, manufacture or an undertaking analogous to trade." 12. In The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital New Delhi vs. The workmen, (4) there was a dispute between the management of the Tuber Culosis Hospital, New Delhi and its workmen represented by the Asptal Karmachari Panchayat regarding pay scales and other facilities demanded by the workmen. In The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital New Delhi vs. The workmen, (4) there was a dispute between the management of the Tuber Culosis Hospital, New Delhi and its workmen represented by the Asptal Karmachari Panchayat regarding pay scales and other facilities demanded by the workmen. The management took a prelimi-nary objection that the Industrial Disputes Act does not apply since the hospital is not an "industry" and is not run as such. It was held that an "industry" as defined in Section 2(j) of the 1947 Act, exists only when there is a relationship between employers and employees, the former engaged in business, trade, under taking, manufacture or calling, of employers and the latter engaged in any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation There must, therefore, be an enterprise in which the employers follow their avocations as detailed in the definition and employ workmen who follow one of the avocations detailed for workmen. The definition no doubt seeks to define industry with reference to employers occupation bit includes the employees, for without the two there can be no industry. Their Lordships further pointed out that every case of employment is not necessarily productive of an industry. Domestic employment, administrative services of public officials, service in aid of occupation of professional men, also disclose relationship of employers and employees but they cannot be regarded as in the course of industry. After discussing in detail, the law bearing the subject, their Lordships were pleased to hold that the hospital is wholly charitable and is a research institute. The dominant purpose of the hospital is research and training, but as research and training cannot be given without beds in a hospital, the hospital is run. Treatment is thus a part of research and training. In these circumstances, the Tuberculosis Hospital cannot be described as an "industry". 13. In The Management of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry vs. Their Workman R.K. Mittal (5), the award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the respondent R.K. Mittal, an employee of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was challenged and a preliminary issue was raised before the Tribunal that the Federation was not an industry and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the reference. Their Lordships were pleased to observe— "In our view the linchpin of the definition of industry is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging namely whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employers. If it is that and there is cooperation of the employer and the employee resulting in the production of material services, it is an industry notwithstanding that its objects are charitable or that it does not make profit or even where profits are made, they are not distributed among the members." With respect to the facts of the case it was held that the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry carries on systematic activity to assist members and other businessmen and industrialists and even non-members as for instance in giving them the right to subscribe to their bulletin; in taking up their cases and solving their difficulties and in obtaining concessions and facilities for them from the Government is an "industry" within the meaning of sec. 2(j) as these activities are business activities or material services which are rendered to businessmen, traders and industrialists who are members of the constituents of the Federation, 14. In Palance Administration Board, Tripunithura vs. State of Kerala (6), it was held that the absence of a profit motive is irrelevant in considering whether an enterprise is an undertaking or not, but it must be one which requires the co-opera-tive effort of the employer and the employees; it must be one which is capable of being owned and transfered, and it is the nature of the enterprise irrespective of who does it that determines whether it is an industry or not. It is immaterial whether it is carried on by the owner or by the Government or the Board of it is an industry or undertaking. It "was further held that if the owner of an item of immovable property invests surplus income in erecting a building which he gives on lease, he cannot be treated as carrying on an undertaking 15. In Rarngaswami vs. Registrar of Trade Unions(7), it was held that even assuming that the definition of "industry" in sec. It "was further held that if the owner of an item of immovable property invests surplus income in erecting a building which he gives on lease, he cannot be treated as carrying on an undertaking 15. In Rarngaswami vs. Registrar of Trade Unions(7), it was held that even assuming that the definition of "industry" in sec. 2(j ) of the 1947 Act applies to the Trade Unions Act, it cannot be said that the authorities of the Raj Bhawan are emplo-yers engaged with the workmen in any undertaking within the meaning of the term industry. Two distinctive features of an industry, according to the learned Judge, are (1) that the employer as well as the employees should be engaged in the industry, however, vide the meaning of the term might be ; and (2) there should be co-operation between both of them for achieving the particular result. 16. In Rajasthan Khadi &Village Industries Board, Jaipur vs. State of Rajas-than (8), one of the question was whether the Rajasthan Khadi Gramodhyog Board is an industry" within the meaning of sec. 2( j ) of the Act, and it was held that the activities carried on by the Board within the ambit of the functions enumerated in the 1955 Act are the activities in the nature of trade or business and the cooperation of the employees of the Board result in the production of material services and material goods, though the objects with which these activities were carried on were not profit making. It was further held that the activities of the Board partook the character of organised business or trade and consequently the Board was an "industry". 17. It appears that the tests for determining whether a dispute is an "industrial dispute" have been enunciated and the principles crystalised, as a result of the several decisions of the Supreme Court, and the only question that is to be decided in each case is to find out from the facts and circumstances of the case whether, having regard to the various activities carried on by the Management it can be said to be an "industry". As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the crux of the matter is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging viz. whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employment. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the crux of the matter is to ascertain the systematic activity which the organisation is discharging viz. whether it partakes the nature of a business or trade or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employment. If it is that and there is co-operation of the employer and the employee resulting in the production of the material services, it is an "industry" notwithstanding that it does not make profit. Applying the aforesaid test I shall now deal with different branches of activities carried on by the Management in the present case with respect to which employees have raised dispute. 18. The learned Tribunal has first dealt with "City Palace including Farrash-khana and Baggikhana. "It has been observed that the furniture maintained by the Farrashkhana such as, beddings, carpets, tents etc. are given on hire to members of the public on marriage occasions and other functions. It has been further found by the Tribunal that a Chobdar with a gold or silver stick (chhadi) is also supplied by the Farrashkhana Department on marriages on payment of fee of Rs. 4/- per Chobdar. It further appears that in the City Palace there is a department called Kapatdwara which maintains jewellery, gold and silver ornaments and costly dresses and these articles are also supplied on occasion like marriages and other ceremonial functions not only to relations of erst while rulers of Jaipur, his Household staff but also to members of the public on payment of hire charges for the same. These facts are borne out from the state-ment of Ramgopal (Ex. 7) produced on behalf of the Master of the Household It has been no doubt stated by him that no new articles have been purchased nor the stock has been supplemented after merger of the erstwhile State of Jaipur. He has also given figures of expenditure and receipts in his statement so as to show that the management has made no profits. 19. Under this heading, the learned Tribunal has also observed that a Museum is maintained in the City Palace for which a fee of Rs. 4 50 is charged from each visi-tor though previously no fee was charged. 19. Under this heading, the learned Tribunal has also observed that a Museum is maintained in the City Palace for which a fee of Rs. 4 50 is charged from each visi-tor though previously no fee was charged. It may, however, be pointed out that Ram-gopl has stated in para No. 7 of his affidavit that the Museum situated within the precincts of the City Palace is a separate legal entity and maintained by a Board of Trustees of which, among others, Vice Chancellor of the Rajas than University and a Minister of the Central Government are two members and the Museum has nothing to do with the Household department. In answer to the first question in cross examination, Ramgopal has statded that before a Trust was formed for Museum, all the articles in the City Palace were shown to the visitors free of charge. In these circumstances, it appears to roe that the management is not responsible for maintenance of the Museum and the employees in the Museum cannot claim any relief without impleading the Board of Trustees for the Museum as parties to the claim. 20. While dealing with this item the learned Tribunal has also taken into consideration the income derived from Firm Companies which have used the City Palace for the purpose of shooting films and taking scenes. Ramgopals version is that on the occasion of shooting films in the City Palace, the Management makes lighting arrange-ments, supplies water for fountains and extends other facilities to the Film Companies and charges from them in lieu of these services. Ramgopal has supplied the following figures of expenditure and receipts in this connection— Expenditure Receipts 1958-59 64,570/- 11,133/- 1959-60 65,328/- 4,183/4 1968-69 62,090/- 28,754/4 21. Ramgopal has further sworn that during a period of twenty years ending in 1969, such Film Companies came only thrice. Thus, in my opinion, cannot be con-sidered as a systematic activity carries on by the management. 22. The learned Tribunal was, in my opinion, not justified in taking into consideration the activity of the Museum and the activity pertaining to shooting by the Film Companies in the City Palace for coming to the conclusion that all the activities carried on by the City Palace including Farrashkhana and Baggikhana fill within the defini-tion of industry as contained in the 1947 Act. In my view, only the Farrashkhana and Baggikhana including Kapatdwara fall within the ambit of the term "industry", but not the whole City Palace. 23. The second item dealt with by the Tribunal is Motor Garrage. The learned Tribunal has held Motor Garage maintained by the petitioner as an industry" and has, in this connection, referred to the statement of Tulsidas Bbargava who is looking after the Motor Garage. Tulsidas has sworn that no public vehicles are repaired in the workshop maintained by the Motor Garage and whatever spare-parts are purchased by it are meant for repairs to the vehicles belonging to the Maharaja. In course of cross examination, he has stated that 48 vehicles were owned by the Maharaja and there are three cleaners, two mechanics, three drivers, one Chowkidar, one Electrician and one Blacksmith employed in the Motor Garage. He has further averred that no private cars are repaired in the garage and if once in a blue-moon, vehicle of any friend or relation is repaired, a bill is given for the same but that happens very rarely. It appears that a copy of bill No. 130 was produced before the Tribunal on behalf of the Karmachari Sangh to show that a sum of Rs. 95 72 was charged from the Private Secretary to R.K. Sahiba for repairs to her vehicle. This bill has not been proved nor tendered in evidence nor was it put to Tulsidas in his cross-examination. I fail to understand how this bill can be used in evidence. At any rate it perfectly fits in with the explanation given by Tulsidas that once a while if the car of a friend or relation is repaired in the Motor Garage, a bill is given for the same. Mr. Sharma has submitted that this bill was not for labour charges but may have been for spare parts put in the vehicle. Be that as it may, the learned Tribunal committed an apparent error in basing its finding on this bill. But apart from that, this solitary bill even if relied upon cannot constitute a systematic activity of the Management of running a workshop and does not partake the nature of a business or trade or an undertaking or calling of employment. My conclusion, therefore, is that "Motor Garage" is not an "industry". 24. The next item is "gardens and nursery". But apart from that, this solitary bill even if relied upon cannot constitute a systematic activity of the Management of running a workshop and does not partake the nature of a business or trade or an undertaking or calling of employment. My conclusion, therefore, is that "Motor Garage" is not an "industry". 24. The next item is "gardens and nursery". There is no evidence from the side of the Karmachari Sangh in respect of this item. Abdul Gaffar Khan, Superinten-dent, Palace Gardens has sworn that no profit is earned on the gardens and nursery maintained by the Household though contract is given for gawa and flowers and last year the contract was given for Rs. 3,000/-. From the statement of Abdul Gaffar Khan it cannot be said that there is a systematic activity carried on in the nature of business or trade or an undertaking by the petitioner in respect of gardens and nursery. It is common knowledge that in case of private gardens and particularly gardens in the palace of the erstwhile rulers, if the yield of any fruits or flowers in a particular year is more than what can be consumed by the owner the surplus yield is sold by giving contract. But from that fact alone, it cannot be said that there is a systematic activity which the organisation is discharging in this respect. I, therefore, hold that the employees working in the gardens and nursery are not workmen and this activity does not fall within the definition of the term "industry". 25. The next item deal with by the learned Tribunal is "Stables and Horse Breeding and Ridding Association". So far as the "Horse Breeding and Ridding Association" is concerned, it is not contested before me, nor was it done before the Tribunal that it is not an "industry". But as regards stable, the contention of the learned coun-sel for the petitioner is that there is not an iota of evidence to show that Atish stable is a part of the Jaipur Horse Breeding and Ridding Association and the finding of the Tribunal that the private stable and the Horse Breeding Association constitute one unit of the Household management is based on no evidence. It is argued that the Jaipur Horse Breeding & Ridding Association is a separate entity and in the reference made by the State Government, the stable has been separately impleaded as a party. It has been urged by Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the late His Highness of Jaipur Swai Mansingh was an outstanding Polo player of world repute and used to maintain his private stable for polo horses. The learned Tribunal, in my opinion, committed a patent error of law in drawing an inference to the effect that the stable and the Horse Breeding & Ridding Association constitute one unit in absence of there being any evidence to that effect. In these circumstances I am unable to agree with the Tribunal that the private stable of the petitioner is an "industry". 26. Item No. 6, as mentioned in the judgment of the Tribunal is S.M.S. Investment Corporation Private Limited, which is admitted to be an "industry". I, therefore, need not address myself to this item. 27. Item No. 7 is "Shikarkhana". The learned Tribunal has held it not to be an "industry" and the Karmchari Sangh appears to be satisfied with this finding of the Tribunal. Therefore, I need not deal with it. 28. This brings to me item No 8—"Dairy and Farming". The finding of the Tribunal is that since the petitioner owns six farms and the produce is sold in the market, dairy and farming under the Household management must be held to be an "industry". The evidence relied upon by the Tribunal in this connection is the statement of Indushekhar Sharma, who has sworn that he is Agricultural Advisor to the petitioner, and that after the needs of the Household are satisfied, the balance of the agricultural produce is sold at concessional rate to the employees of the household, and if some surplus is left even thereafter it is sold in the market. In cross-examination he has farther stated that there are 6 farms with the petitioner and since the produce is more than what is required by the Royal Family, the surplus is sold. But he cannot say how much is the income on account of such sale. He has further stated that whatever surplus milk is left after meeting the requirements of the Household is also sold. But he cannot say how much is the income on account of such sale. He has further stated that whatever surplus milk is left after meeting the requirements of the Household is also sold. On the basis of this statement the learned Tribunal has drawn an inference that the activity is in the nature of an "industry". 29. In D.N. Banerjees case (1) it was observed that in the ordinary or nontechnical sense, according to what is understood by the man in the street, industry or business means an undertaking where capital and labour co-operate with each other for the purpose of producing wealth in the shape of goods, machines, tools etc. and for making profits The concept of industry in this ordinary sense applies even to agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture and so on and so forth. It is also clear that every aspect of activity in which the relationship of employer and employee exists or arises does not thereby become an industry as commonly understood. However, that was a case of a Municipality. 30. In Harinagar Cane Farms case (2) Gajendragadkar J. as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as follows: — "In dealing with industrial matters, industrial adjudication should refrain from enunciating any general principles or adopting any doctrinaire considerations. It is desirable that Industrial adjudication should deal with problems as and when they arise and confine its decisions to the points which strictly arise on the pleadings between the parties If in reaching any conclusion while dealing with narrow aspect raised by the parties before it, industrial adjudication has to evolve some principle, it should and must, no doubt, attempt to do so, but in evolving the principle, care should be taken not to lay down an unduly general or broad proposition which may affect facts and circumstances which are not before industrial adjudication in the particular case with which it is concerned." 31. After making the above observations, His Lordship observed that in that particular case the appellants had invested a large amount of capital for carrying on their agricultural operations for the purpose of making profits. It was also common ground that the workmen employed by the employers in their respective operations contributed to the production of agricultural commodities which brought in profit to the appellant. It was also common ground that the workmen employed by the employers in their respective operations contributed to the production of agricultural commodities which brought in profit to the appellant. It was, therefore, held that even the narrow traditional requirements of the concept of trade or business are in that sense, satisfied by the agricultural operations of the appellants. What was more important in those appeals, as observed by their Lordships was that the appellants were limited companies which had been formed, inter alia, for the express purpose of carrying on agricultural trade or business. The agricultural operations carried on by the appellants were within their objects, and so, in their Lordships view, there was no difficulty whatever in holding that the said operations were organised by the appellants and carried on by them as trade or business would be carried on by any trader or businessman. Thus, the decision in that case turned upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 32. So far as the earlier case of D.N. Banerjee (l) is concerned, I may point out that the context in which the general observations reproduced above were made shows that the Court was dealing with the ordinary or non-technical sense of the word "industry" as understood by the man in the street and so the observations made in that connection cannot, in my humble opinion, be taken to amount to an unqualified proposition that agricultural of all kinds is included in sec. 2(j ) of the Act. 33. The word "trade" has been assigned the following meaning in Halsburys Laws of England 3rd Edition, Vol. 38 Page 8:— (1) Exchange of goods for goods or goods for money, (2) any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or merchantile as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned profession and from agriculture. (The italic is mine) 34. It would be clear from the above definition that agriculture is not included in the word "trade". There are no such circumstances in the present case as existed in Harinagar Cane Farms case (2). If what has been held by the Tribunal in this connection is correct, then it seems to me that every agriculturist who engages labour to help him in his agricultural operations is running an industry. There are no such circumstances in the present case as existed in Harinagar Cane Farms case (2). If what has been held by the Tribunal in this connection is correct, then it seems to me that every agriculturist who engages labour to help him in his agricultural operations is running an industry. No doubt, the words trade and business are words of wide import and in one sense they may include all occupations and professions but in collection of the terms and their definitions, these terms have a definite economic content of a particular type. Agriculture, pure and simple, must be held to fall outside the ambit of "industry" as defined in the Act. The mere fact that the surplus produce is sold by the petitioner in the market is, in my opinion, not a sufficient ground for holding that the dairy and farms owned by the petitioner fall within the ambit of the word "industry" and the finding of the learned Tribunal in this respect must, consequently, be set aside. 35. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the Farrashkhana and Baggi-khana including Kapatdwara, Horse Breeding & Ridding Association and S.M.S. Investment Corporation Private Limited are "industry" as defined in sec. 2( j ) of the Act, and the rest of the items are not "industry". Consequently, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with those items and the award of the Tribunal in respect of them being ultra vires is hereby set aside. 36. I shall now deal with she other points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of those items which have been held to be "industry". 37. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in this connection,is that the Tribunal has travelled beyond the reference made to it by the Government and has proceeded to adjudicate on matters not referred to it, which it had no jurisdiction to do. In support of this contention, learned counsel, has relied upon The Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd., Jaipur vs. The Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (9) wherein it was held that under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, juris-diction of the Tribunal is very limited and it can adjudicate only those disputes which have been referred to it by the Government under the provisions of the said section and has no right to travel beyond the reference made to it. 38. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, juris-diction of the Tribunal is very limited and it can adjudicate only those disputes which have been referred to it by the Government under the provisions of the said section and has no right to travel beyond the reference made to it. 38. For the purpose of appreciating the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be necessary to examine the terms of reference and the findings of the Tribunal. 39. The first question referred to the Tribunal: whether the workmen are entitled to get dearness allowance according to the recommendations of the Mathur Committee and whether they are entitled to arrears of past years ? The Tribunal has held that the workmen are entitled to get dearness allowance as contained in the recommendations of the Mathur Committee. However learned counsel submits that the Mathur Committee has not made any recommendation for dearness allowance. He has further contended that the award is against the principles of wage fixation as laid down on the Supreme Court in French Motor Car Co, Ltd. vs. The Workrnen(10). His contention is that the Karmachari Sangh has led no evidence whatsoever in support of their claim for increased dearness allowance in terms of the Mathur Committee Report. He has argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to apply the minimun wages fixed by the State Government in the year 1971 with effect from 17th October, 1969 retrospective as minimun wages are fixed on the basis of price index prevailing at the time of fixation. 40. In French Motor Gar Co. Lids case (10) the Supreme Court observed— "It is now well-settled that the principle of industry-cum-region has to be applied by an industrial Court, when it proceeds to consider questions like wage structure, dearness allowance and similar conditions of service. In applying that principle Industrial Courts have to compare wage scales prevailing in similar concerns in the region with which it is dealing, and generally speaking, similar concerns would be those in the same line of business as the concern with respect to which the dispute is under consideration. In applying that principle Industrial Courts have to compare wage scales prevailing in similar concerns in the region with which it is dealing, and generally speaking, similar concerns would be those in the same line of business as the concern with respect to which the dispute is under consideration. Further, even in the same line of business, it would not be proper to compare for example) a small struggl ing concern with a large flourishing concern In Williamsons (India) Private Ltd. vs. The Workmen 1961-1 Lab LJ 302 (SC) it was observed that the extent of the business carried on by the concerns, the capital invested by them, the profits made by them, their standing, the strength of their labour force, the presence or absence and the extent of reserves, the dividends declared by them and the prospects about the future of their business and other relevant factors have to be borne in mind for the purpose of comparison. These observations were made to show how cornparison should be made, even in the same line of business." 41. In Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. vs. The Union of India (ll) it was held that in the fixation of rates of wages which include within its compass the fixation of scales of wages also, the capacity of the industry to pay is one of the essential circumstances to be taken into consideration except in cases of bare subsistence of minimum wage where the employer is bound to pay the same irrespective of such capacity. 42. The learned Tribunal has observed that the management has placed balance-sheet and profit and loss account in respect of each concern for the relevant year and has examined witnesses who are incharge of each section in support of the same. It goes on to observe that the Karmachari Sangh has also examined some witnesses but they have not been able to assail the correctness of the Account and the Balauce-Sheet tendered in evidence on behalf of the Management. The Tribunal has further held that there is no other option left to it except to believe the statement of income and expenditure in respect of various branches, produced by the Management. The Tribunal has further held that there is no other option left to it except to believe the statement of income and expenditure in respect of various branches, produced by the Management. In the words of the Tribunal, "it is after careful study of the statements regarding income and expenditure of the various branches of industry working under the Household Management of which His Highness Jaipur is the employer, it is found that except S.M.S. Investment Corporation Private Ltd, loss has been shown in other branches of the "industry". After having arrived at this finding, the Tribunal has stated that inspite of this the financial capacity alone cannot be the sole criterion to dispose of the workers demand of raising the clearness allowance, curiously Cenough, a little latter, the Tribunal goes back on its previous finding and observes that "the accounts of various other branches of industry are not annually published and, therefore, the correctness and genuineness of the present statements submitted on demand can be doubted and suspected to some extent for the simple reason that the employer would not have continued his own household activities in the form of industry if the same were not fetching a good profit to him." 43. The Tribunal has, thus, given contradictory findings on the question of the accounts and the balance-sheets tendered by the Management. There is absolutely no evidence on the record that those branches of the activity of the petitioner which have been admitted or held to be an "industry" are running at profit and the petitioner has a good financial capacity. In my view, the finding of the Tribunal, in this connection, is self-contradictory, and cannot be sustained. It has not at all taken into consideration the principle of industtry-cum-region as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in French Motor Car Co. Ltds case (10) and Express Newspaper Private Ltds (11). 44. In my view, the finding of the Tribunal, in this connection, is self-contradictory, and cannot be sustained. It has not at all taken into consideration the principle of industtry-cum-region as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in French Motor Car Co. Ltds case (10) and Express Newspaper Private Ltds (11). 44. The next finding of the Tribunal is "that it is an establishment which comes under the Minimum Wages Act" and "it is immaterial whether the concern or establishment is running in loss for the purpose of Minimum Wages fixed by the State Government under the Minimum Wages Act for the industrial workers who are receiving wages less than the minimum of the statutory minimum wages." In the ultimate analysis the Tribunal has found "that except the Shikarkhana, the seven sister concerns under the Household Management of His Highness Jaipur, are covered under the Minimum Wages Act and, therefore, their consolidated wages must be fixed in accordance with the recommendations of the Mathur Committee." 45. A perusal of the order of reference Annexure A would show that the question whether the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 applies in the present case or not at all referred to the Court, nor is there a reference on the point whether the workmen are entitled to get minimum wages fixed. There are no pleadings in this respect, nor is there any evidence on the point. The various provisions contained in the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, such as secs 3,4 and 5 which deal with fixing of minimum rates of wages and the procedure prescribed for the same, have not been kept in view by the learned Tribunal at all. The observation of the Tribunal that the State of Rajasthan fixed the minimum wages for the like industry with effect from 1st May, 1965 is also erroneous, inasmuch as it has not referred to any industry like the one under consideration. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the schedule appended to the Minimum Wages Act (under sec. 2(27) and has urged that for Rajasthan, the Act has not been applied to any type of activity which is in dispute. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the schedule appended to the Minimum Wages Act (under sec. 2(27) and has urged that for Rajasthan, the Act has not been applied to any type of activity which is in dispute. But I do not consider it necessary to embark upon the consideration of these points, as, in my opinion, the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in fixing the minimum wages by classifying the workmen into three categories. 46. So far as the wage structure is concerned learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this matter was also not referred to the Tribunal. I am, however, unable to accede to this submission. The matter of fixing of pay scales falls under question No. 2 referred by the Government in Ann. A. Consequently the following pay scales prescribed by the Tribunal are in order and cannot be interfered with : (1) Un-skilled 45-1-60 (2) Semi-skilled 60 2-90 (3) Skilled 85-5 125 10-175 47. A word about the Mathur Committee Report. It is rather surprising that while holding that the Workmen are entitled to get minimum wage or dearness allowance as recommenced by the Mathur Committee, the learned Tribunal does not make reference to any part of Mathur Committee Report at all. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred me to the following passage at page 38 of the Mathur Committee Report:— "Keeping in view all factors, the Committee recommends that for industrial workers at all level of the minimum of the statutory minimum wages, the neutralisation in the rise of the Consumer Price Index Numbers should be hundred percent. This cent percent neutralisation for the rise in the Consumer Price Index Number should be available to: (a) All industrial workers at the level of the minimum of the statutory minimum wages fixed under the Wages Act, 1948; and (b) Workers employed in all factories registered under the Factories Act (Except the factories covered under sec. 83 of the Act) receiving wages at the level of the minimum of the statutory minimum wages." These observations, it would be clear on reading para 5.8 of the Report, apply to those industries or employment which are covered either under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 or to workers employed under the Factories Act. 83 of the Act) receiving wages at the level of the minimum of the statutory minimum wages." These observations, it would be clear on reading para 5.8 of the Report, apply to those industries or employment which are covered either under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 or to workers employed under the Factories Act. Learned counsel for the Karmachari Sangh was unable to explain to me how the recommendations of the Mathur Committee have been made applicable to the workmen in the present case. He was also unable to justify the fixation of consolidated wages at Rs. 85/- in case of unskilled, Rs. 100/- in case of semi-skilled and Rs. 125/-in case of skilled workmen. However, the Tribunal has returned no answer to the question whether the workmen are entitled to get increment at the rate of Rs 20/- per year for the last 5 years ? 48. As a result of the foregoing discussion, I partly allow these writ applications and modify the impugned Award as follows:— (1) Among the various branches of activity of the petitioner dealt with by the Tribunal only the following fall within the ambit of the word "industry" as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act; (a) Farrashkhana and Baggikhana including Kapatdwara in the City Palace; (b) Horse Breeding & Ridding Association; and (c) S.M.S. Investment Corporation (P) Ltd. (2) That the workmen in the aforesaid activities described in para 1(a)(b) and (c) are entitled to be fixed in the following pay scales : Unskilled 45-1-60 Semi-skilled 60-2-90 Skilled 85 5-125-10-175 with effect from 17th October, 1969. 49. The rest of the Award is set aside and the case is sent back to the Tribunal for giving its Award on the following points, viz: (1) Whether the workmen of those branches of the petitioners activity which have been held to fail within the definition of the term "industry" are entitled to get dearness allowance and if so, at what rate and since when ? (2) Whether the workmen of the aforesaid activities are entitled to get increment at the rate of Rs. 20/- per year for the last five years ? This has become necessary as the Tribunal failed to give its award on these points even though they were referred to it. 50 The writ applications are allowed to the extent mentioned above. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear own costs.